Fr. Luis de Lossada, S.J.

Philosophical Course of Salamanca 1

According to the Mind of the Eximius Doctor

Translated by Osvaldo R.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE OF SALAMANCA

FR. LUIS DE LOSSADA, S.J.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE OF SALAMANCA

ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF THE EXIMIUS
DOCTOR FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

TOME I.

I. ON LOGIC OR RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.

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This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Luis de Lossada, S.J., is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Eximious Doctor, Francisco Suárez, from whose ocean of wisdom this most faithful disciple drew, and whose streams he caused to flow anew through the fields of his own age; he who, though ever reputed a true son of the Angelic Doctor, refuted the Thomists themselves by the authority of St. Thomas; that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To the Eximious Doctor Francisco Suárez
and to St. Thomas Aquinas.

August 15, 2026.

Osvaldo A. R. | Sol 5.6
Translator.

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TO THE VENERABLE FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND
THE FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

Permission of the Reverend Father Provincial

I, Francis Paul Mazzario, Provincial of the Society of Jesus in the Province of Castile, by the authority granted to me for this purpose by our Very Reverend Father Michael Angelo Tamburino, Superior General of the same Society, grant permission for the book entitled *Cursus Philosophicus Regalis Collegii Salmanticensis Societatis Jesu*, divided into three parts, composed by Father Luis Lossada, theologian of our Society and interpreter of Sacred Scripture, and approved by the judgment of grave and learned men of the same Society, to be committed to print. In testimony whereof, we have issued these letters, signed by our own hand and that of our Secretary, and secured with our seal. At this our Royal College of Salamanca, on 7° December, in the year 1720.

IHS
Francis Paul Mazzario.

Emmanuel de Prado,
Secretary.

Permission of the Ordinary

The Most Illustrious Lord Don Sylvester García Escalona, Bishop of Salamanca, granted to any printer of this City permission to commit to print this book, entitled *Cursus Philosophicus Regalis Collegii Salmanticensis Societatis Jesu*, divided into three parts, together with the Dialectical Institutions pertaining to the first part.

Salamanca, 5 September, in the year 1721.

Summary of the Privilege

Father Luis de Lossada of the Society of Jesus holds a privilege from His Majesty to print this book for a period of ten years, and so that no one may print it without his permission, as appears from the original thereof, certified by Don Balthasar de San Pedro, Secretary of His Majesty's Chamber.

Given at San Lorenzo on 3 August 1721.

Summary of the Price Assessment

The Lords of the Council assessed this book at eight maravedís per sheet, as appears from the certification of Don Balthasar de San Pedro, Secretary of the Chamber of the King our Lord.

Madrid on 19 February 1724.

Editor to the Reader.[1]

Since Fr. Luis de Losada wrote this philosophical work at a time when controversy was at its height among the most learned scholastic doctors, he sometimes appears to attack the opinions of the Thomists rather sharply. Yet take care not to suppose from this that this most distinguished philosopher was opposed to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, since he always shows himself to be his most obedient disciple. For by the name *Thomists* the authors of that age did not designate all followers of the Angelic Master, as the etymology of the word might seem to require, but only the members of that school which had undertaken to defend physical premotion and certain other opinions as being more conformable to the mind of St. Thomas. Since other doctors, most eminent both in number and in learning, relying also upon the authority of St. Thomas himself, refused to assent to the tenets of that school, the latter claimed the name Thomists as proper to themselves and began to be refuted by other authors under the designation of Thomists.

If these things are kept before one's eyes, it will readily be understood that Fr. Losada is most rightly to be numbered among the disciples of St. Thomas; for generally, not to say always, he is accustomed to attack and refute the Thomists by the authority of St. Thomas himself.

We wished therefore to warn you of this, most gracious reader, lest, while we devote our chief effort to restoring the study of sound philosophy

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[1] From the Barcelona edition.

to its former splendor, you should suppose us opposed to that restoration of solid studies which the Most Holy Father Leo XIII-whom may God preserve-is striving with all his strength to advance.

Farewell.

To the Readers, Greetings.[1]

Before admitting the reader into the philosophical school of the illustrious Father Luis de Lossada of the Society of Jesus, I have judged it fitting to place before him one work which may prepare him to know the master whose philosophy he is about to study, and thereafter to indicate the elementary dialectical preparation by which he may be conducted to the threshold of the *Cursus Philosophicus*.

The work here prefixed is the *Brief Account of the Life, Gifts, and Virtues of Father Luis de Lossada of the Society of Jesus*, written by Father Jacinto de Yebra, his own disciple, and published at Salamanca in 1748 by order of Father Diego de Tobar, Provincial of the Province of Castile.

No more fitting introduction could be desired. For before contemplating the works, one ought first to know something of the man from whose extraordinary mind they proceeded. And what a man! Yebra, who knew Lossada not merely through books but as disciple knew master, presents to us one of those exceedingly rare spirits in whom Nature seems to have gathered what she ordinarily distributes sparingly among many. Philosophy and Theology, Sacred Scripture and Law, history and languages, mathematics, eloquence, and poetry seemed all to find in his capacious intellect a common dwelling. His contemporaries regarded him as a universal man; his disciple called that prodigious memory and understanding an "animated library"; and those who mourned him did not

[1] Translators preface.

hesitate to name him the Glory of Spain, an Atlas of his Province, a consummate Master, and one of those extraordinary intellects whom Divine Providence sends only from time to time into the world.

Yet the splendor of his learning is scarcely the greatest thing that Yebra records. More admirable still is to behold so lofty a wisdom joined to so profound a humility; so vast an intellect subjected so perfectly to obedience; such severity toward himself united with such tenderness toward others; so ardent a zeal for truth accompanied by charity toward his adversaries; and a life consumed almost without interruption in prayer, study, teaching, sacrifice, and the service of God and neighbor. In Lossada the sciences did not extinguish devotion, nor did intellectual greatness nourish vanity. Rather, the greater the treasures of his mind became, the more deeply he seemed to bury them beneath humility.

It is therefore impossible to read Lossada rightly as though he were merely another name in the history of scholastic philosophy. He belongs to that greater race of masters for whom philosophy was not an ingenious exercise of the understanding but a grave search for truth beneath the eyes of God.

And among the lights by which his own course was directed, none shone more brightly for him than the Eximious Doctor Francisco Suárez. Lossada loved Suárez with the fidelity of a disciple, followed him as a master, defended him against his adversaries, and drew so abundantly from the ocean of his wisdom that he himself compares his philosophical labors to little gardens irrigated from that inexhaustible source. If, then, Lossada did not fear to crown his master with every title that love, gratitude, and admiration could furnish, neither ought we to approach Lossada with a coldness foreign to the very school whose spirit we seek to recover. As Lossada followed Suárez, so let us follow Lossada; and as he reverently received the light entrusted to him by the Eximious Doctor, let us receive from Lossada that same light, now reflected through the singular force and brilliance of his own genius.

After Lossada's prefatory writings there ought naturally to follow his *Institutiones Dialecticae, vulgo Summulae, ad primam partem Philosophici Cursus pertinentes*, the *Dialectical Institutes, Commonly Called Summulae, Pertaining to the First Part of the Philosophical Course*. Their proper place would be here, immediately before the course itself. The *Summulae* supply the dialectical principles, terminology, distinctions, and instruments which Lossada presupposes in the greater philosophical work. They are the vestibule of the edifice. Here the student receives the elementary discipline by which he is afterward prepared to penetrate the more difficult recesses of Logic, Physics,

and Metaphysics. To translate the *Cursus* while leaving these entirely behind would be to open the temple while withholding the key.

It is therefore a grave misfortune that Lossada's own *Summulae* could not be added to the present translation. So far as the copies presently accessible to us are concerned, the work survives only in scans of such poor and defective quality that a translation worthy of the author cannot responsibly be attempted from them. Few deficiencies in the present undertaking have caused us greater regret. The work is indispensable as a preparation for the course proper, and yet the very text by which Lossada intended that preparation to be given remains, for the moment, beyond our reach.

Thus, although it had originally been our desire to place both Yebra's life of Lossada and Lossada's own *Summulae* before the reader, only the former could in fact be included. Rather than conceal this deficiency or give the impression that a second work has been supplied where none has been, we state it plainly: the biography has been added; the *Summulae* have not. For the latter, until a usable copy of Lossada's text can be obtained, recourse must temporarily be had elsewhere.

We have therefore judged it better not to leave the reader without a guide, but to direct him to a master worthy to stand, for a little while, at the entrance of Lossada's school. For this purpose we have chosen Father Juan José Urráburu of the Society of Jesus, a philosopher of immense learning and uncommon force of mind, who himself greatly admired Lossada, cited him with honor, and followed him in many questions. No stranger, then, is being introduced into this place, nor has convenience compelled us to seek assistance from a school foreign to our own. Rather, where Lossada himself cannot yet speak, we have called upon one who knew his greatness, revered his doctrine, and in no small measure continued the same intellectual inheritance.

The reader is therefore directed to the minor Logic of Urráburu, commonly called the *Summulae*, which forms the necessary preparation for the higher parts of philosophy. This work may be found in Tome I of our English translation of Urráburu's own *Course of Philosophy*. It is not reproduced or added to the present volume as though it were a second prefatory work; rather, the reader is referred to it as a temporary substitute for Lossada's inaccessible *Summulae*. Since that course has likewise been translated by us, the reader need not search far for the elementary discipline which the loss of a usable text of Lossada has made necessary. He need only pass for a time into the school of Urráburu, receive there the first

instruments of dialectic, and then return, thus prepared, to the fuller philosophical course of Lossada.

Nor could we desire a more splendid guide for such an office. Urráburu belonged to that noble succession of scholastic philosophers in whom the ancient discipline still lived with vigor, precision, and grandeur. His intellect was too great to be content with servile repetition, yet too reverent to disdain the masters from whom he had received so much. In this he resembles Lossada himself. For as Lossada drew deeply from Suárez without ceasing to exercise his own judgment, so Urráburu received the inheritance of the older Society while preserving the freedom and strength proper to a true philosopher. Thus the passage from one to the other is not a violent interruption, but the continuation of a kindred spirit.

There is indeed a certain fitness in this succession. Suárez stands at the fountainhead, the Eximious Doctor whose learning seemed to later generations an ocean without shore. Lossada drank deeply from that ocean and caused its waters to flow again through the fields of his own age, enriched by the singular vigor of his judgment and the abundance of his learning. Urráburu, appearing in a later century, gathered up much of the same inheritance and bore witness that the old philosophical greatness of the Society had not entirely vanished. If necessity prevents us from placing Lossada's own elementary Logic before the reader, there is no dishonor in receiving that first discipline from such a man.

The reader should therefore begin with Urráburu's minor Logic in Tome I of our translation of his *Course of Philosophy*. There he will learn the first discipline of terms and propositions, opposition and consequence, syllogism and demonstration, and the habits of distinction and exact reasoning without which the scholastic method soon becomes difficult to follow. Once thus armed, he may enter Lossada's *Cursus Philosophicus* with far greater profit, carrying with him those instruments which the greater work continually presupposes.

This arrangement, however, is provisional. We have by no means abandoned the hope of one day restoring Lossada's own *Summulae* to the place which belongs to them. Should a complete and sufficiently legible copy ever become accessible to us, whether through a better scan, another surviving exemplar, or the generosity of some library or private possessor, we shall promptly undertake its translation and issue it as an appendix to this course. Then the reader will possess not only the great philosophical edifice of Lossada, but also the very vestibule which the master himself constructed for those who were to enter it.

Until that happier day, let no one suppose that the recourse to Urráburu diminishes the honor owed to Lossada. Rather, the greatness of the substitute bears witness to the greatness of the master whose place he temporarily occupies. We would not entrust the reader to an ordinary teacher where Lossada himself ought to stand. If the voice of the Glorious Doctor must remain silent for a few pages, it is fitting that one of the noblest heirs of the same tradition should speak in his stead.

The reader will therefore first know Lossada through the testimony of the disciple who loved and revered him; he will then hear Lossada speak in his own prefatory writings; thereafter, for the elementary discipline of dialectic which we had hoped, but were unable, to supply from Lossada himself, he will turn to the minor Logic contained in Tome I of our translation of Urráburu's *Course of Philosophy*; and only then, suitably prepared, will he enter the full expanse of Lossada's *Cursus Philosophicus*.

May he enter with reverence. For if Suárez was an Ocean from which Lossada drew heavenly streams of wisdom, Lossada himself proved no narrow channel. What he received from the great masters he purified by judgment, fortified by argument, adorned by immense learning, defended with uncommon courage, and transmitted to his disciples with such abundance that three centuries have not exhausted it. And if, by the misfortunes of preservation, we must for a little while receive our first lessons from Urráburu before Lossada himself takes us by the hand, we may count ourselves fortunate that so great a philosopher has been left to us for the journey.

Long silent in a language inaccessible to many, may the voice of this glorious Father now speak again in English; may what time has obscured be restored wherever Providence permits; and may those who enter his school discover for themselves why the men who knew him believed that, if earth had already bestowed upon Lossada all the honor it could give, nothing remained worthy of him but the stars.

Forever may you shine,
O Glorious Doctor,
our most precious treasure.

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The Life of Luis de Lossada, S.J.[1]

In[2] a letter of April 10 of the present year 1748, the Father Provincial commands me to make public, as quickly as I can, whatever information I possess concerning the religious life of Father Luis de Lossada; for there are many, he says, both within and outside the Society who desire to know something of this distinguished Jesuit, so deservedly praised for his gifts. The polished pen of Father Luis de Meneses, Rector of this Royal College, would undoubtedly have satisfied this common desire better; his refined style and judicious expression in letters and matters of this kind had often been heard with pleasure and approval throughout the Province. But when the Father Rector was preparing to begin the work, a fatal cold, descending from his head to his chest, did not permit him even to draw its first lines, but afflicted him for many weeks with the violence of an almost continual cough. Afterwards the grave illness that ended his life on the 29th day of the past month of March entirely cut short both his design and our new hopes; thus, within the space of one month, died the two most precious men named Luis who, in the present state of affairs, gave much luster and splendor to this Province. And without offense I may say that it lost two of the most

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[1] *Brief Account of the Life, Gifts, and Virtues of Father Luis de Lossada of the Society of Jesus*, written by his disciple Father Jacinto de Yebra of the same Society, and published by order of Father Diego de Tobar, Provincial of the Province of Castile (Salamanca: Antonio Joseph Villargordo and Alcaraz, 1748).

[2] no. 1.

conspicuous columns upon which today the greater part of its learning and government rested.

2. But the death of Father Meneses adds the very painful circumstance that together with his life there also perished the work he had planned to publish concerning Father Luis de Lossada. In the severity of his illness he told me of his intention to write it, giving it the just title it deserved, *Austere and Laborious Life*; but seeing the impossibility of promptly carrying this out because of his ailments, he entrusted to my care the making of some draft of it, to which His Reverence would give the final hand if God restored him to health. In truth I neglected this charge, much against my desire to serve the Father Rector, because his danger soon disabused me of any expectation that an occasion would arise for him to make use of my work. But from this arose the obligation now laid upon me to supply the absence of so worthy a writer —a difficulty truly beyond my powers. For Father Luis de Lossada left so exalted an idea of himself in the memory of all who dealt with him personally or knew him through his works that it is not easy to satisfy the common expectation with this brief epitome of his gifts and virtues. I shall endeavor only not to leave altogether exposed to oblivion the marks of a man who undoubtedly made himself memorable by the rare qualities of his spirit and who has more than deserved to enter the catalogue of the great men who gave their name to the Society in this Royal College of Salamanca.

3. This singular mind was born on February 20, 1681, in the delightful valley of Quiroga in the Kingdom of Galicia, of the illustrious family bearing his surname, highly distinguished throughout that valley as one of the eminent branches of the most ancient Lossadas, Lords of Pol and of Freyria, houses well known in Spain for the purity of their nobility and the glorious distinctions of their ancestors. His education corresponded to his noble birth and was such as it ought to have been in order to serve as a proportionate foundation for the elevation and greatness of soul to which he later rose. In the rudiments of reading, writing, Latin, orthography, and the other humane letters that were the recreation of his earliest years, he began to display a rare penetration and quickness, accompanied by a most fortunate memory, greatly assisted by the seriousness and exactness with which he studied even then—not as a child who applies himself through fear or respect, but as a man who by choice seeks his recreation in study. I shall relate in this connection what occurred a few months before his death, when in his presence an entertaining conversation arose concerning the physiognomy of faces. Father Luis spoke very much to the point of what we were discussing, and, to embellish his thought better, brought forward with his customary wit and aptness several passages from histories of the

Moriscos, mingling with them various verses, now from Mena's *Trescientas*, now from old ballads of the Cid, of Carpio, and of other ancient Spaniards of whom the learned of these times make little or no account. We all applauded the well-seasoned application of these remnants of his playful erudition; and amid the praise and merriment one of those present said: "I do not know, Father Luis, when Your Reverence finds time to amuse yourself by reading these curiosities." To this he answered candidly and simply: "I have no memory of having read them except when I was a child, in the books and ballads from which they taught me to spell at school." This answer, worthy of complete credence both because of Father Luis's great truthfulness and because no book or ballad on such subjects was ever found in his possession, is convincing proof of his tenacious memory, and still more of the by no means childish reflection with which even at that tender age he read and committed to memory what was later to season his discerning conversation in old age.

4. With such beginnings, which promised advantageous progress, his parents sent him to this celebrated University of Salamanca, so that in the proper theater of Wisdom his vast comprehension might find a sphere proportioned to it. But God, who was preparing him to be a pattern and exemplar of true wise men, soon made him understand that sciences which are not directed to the practice of the virtues are contemptible; that the study of Wisdom must begin with the fear of God; and that this fear is preserved with difficulty in the workshop of the wise men of the world, where greater attention is given to fashioning from apparent merit the hollow statue of honor than to fashioning from true merit the crown of sanctity. With this knowledge, which he always kept fixed in his mind, he resolved to abandon the great hopes that the wealth of his intellect offered him in the pursuit of letters, to flee the dangers of the world, and to withdraw into the sanctuary of religious life in our Society, to which he was especially guided by the example of one of his brothers, who had entered it a few years earlier. He asked to be received and obtained this without difficulty in this Royal College on April 26, 1698, as he was entering his eighteenth year.

5. From here he went to make his novitiate in the House of Probation at Villagarcía, where singular modesty, silence, gravity, and circumspection immediately became joined to his naturally serious and composed bearing; these afterwards obtained for him throughout his life the respect of those within the house and the veneration of outsiders. In humility and contempt of self, in subjection and surrender to the slightest indication of his Superiors, in punctual attendance at the ordinary exercises, in esteem for

spiritual exercises, and in the other virtues that form a perfect religious, he laid foundations as solid and immovable as if set by that plumb line of maturity and judgment with which he was accustomed to level all his works. For even from his novitiate it was remarked in Father Luis that prudence was already becoming the principal character of his spirit, and that the governance of his actions had no other motive than a right discretion conformed to the spirit of God, by which he knew how to separate the precious from the vile and to set value and esteem upon even the least points of regular observance. His ruling passion was always the natural desire to know; and since there he found nothing on which to feed this passion except books teaching the science of the saints, he devoted himself to reading them with an affection all the greater because the food of his curiosity was more innocent and profitable. He drank in abundantly the most vivid and effective lessons against illusion, the most heroic examples, the most practical instructions, the most prudent maxims for his own direction and that of others, and the surest rules of all perfection. His greatest recreation and chief delight were the annals of our Society, the lives of the great men who adorned it by their doctrine and sanctity, the spiritual conquests of the Indies, the undertakings of our men in China, and their glorious persecutions and labors. With particular attention he turned over the Pontifical Bulls concerning our privileges and everything that might conduce to a thorough knowledge of our Institute.

6. From this kind of study he derived the proof most characteristic of a novice who has profited well: a most exalted conception of the religious state of the Society and so deeply rooted an esteem for his vocation that I once heard him declare with the greatest emphasis that he would not exchange the humble state of a Jesuit even for the supreme dignity of the Church. Of seven brothers whom he left in the world, although some already enjoyed very rich ecclesiastical revenues and dignities, he would rather have had them all follow him in so happy a state. But only one, being younger and therefore in a position to follow him, resolved to imitate him; and with him the Province of Castile thus possessed three Lossadas fully capable of forming among themselves the most learned and religious triumvirate. For had the other two not died in the flower of their years, it is believed that by their example they would have greatly adorned the Order, since they were brothers of Father Luis no less in gifts than in blood. Corresponding to his esteem for his vocation was the ardent zeal that he later showed in upholding the Society's good name and protecting it against every malicious rivalry. No one is ignorant that zeal for the house of God consumed a great part of Father Luis's vital spirits. His desire to increase it and facilitate its

foundations cost him immense vigils. To speak to him against his Institute, or in any way to distort its sound interpretation, was to provoke him to holy indignation and immediately put him under arms to dispel with the lights of truth every shadow of error or malicious ignorance. He kept before him the examples of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, most zealous for the honor of their sacred religious orders; and with humble confusion over the difference of his lot he would lament that, although he felt within himself lively impulses to imitate the zeal of those saints, he found himself deprived of their spirit. Yet the truth is that, in imitation of those most holy and most wise Doctors, he refused no fatigue or labor for so just a cause. Many times he risked his health, esteem, and reputation for the honor of his beloved Society; and as patient and long-suffering as he was under injuries and insults spoken against his own person, so sensitive was he to injuries done to his Mother. These struck him in the apple of his eye; and once, while the two of us were speaking alone about the persecutions and storms then suffered by our sacred Order in various parts of the world, I clearly heard his sobs and saw all the fortitude of his breast softened by grief.

7. In proportion to this special love for the Society was the application that, once his novitiate was completed, he showed toward the study of letters. He understood well, and frequently said, that a Jesuit without learning is a soldier without arms; that learning and virtue are the two poles around which the axis of this religious sphere revolves, and that if either is thrown out of place, its ordered motion will fail and its useful and salutary influence for the benefit of one's neighbors will cease. Father Luis therefore endeavored to attend to these two poles with such equality that I would not know how to discern toward which he inclined more: whether to adorn his spirit with religious virtues or to imbue it with the faculties and sciences proper to his state. There was none in which he did not acquire a reputation for outstanding ability; and what is more admirable is that, after completing the Arts at the College of Santiago and Theology here at Salamanca, he was found as well instructed in the principles of many other sciences as though each had been his principal occupation. God had endowed him with a soul most capable of gathering them all without confusion or disorder; and so extensive a capacity, driven by an insatiable affection for study and a holy greed to make use of time, could not confine itself to a single faculty. Thus that intellect became an animated library in which the sciences and arts were found, as though in a single chamber, not only with distinction and symmetry, but with the spirit proper to each.

8. Thus it was the common judgment of those of us who knew him closely that Father Luis was a universal man, that nothing resisted his

intellect: whatever subject he applied himself to, whatever matter he undertook, and in whatever faculty, he mastered everything, and everything with perfection and the applause of those most competent to judge. In him we had a consummate philosopher in both Peripatetic and Modern Philosophy; a perfect theologian in the three principal parts of Theology, Dogmatic, Scholastic, and Moral; an impregnable controversialist in defending the truths of the Faith; a subtle interpreter of Sacred Scripture; a most learned advocate capable of grounding any cause in both Canon and Civil Law; an elegant orator; an excellent poet; a most exact geographer; in matters of ecclesiastical and profane history, the most exact and judicious critic; and in every respect a most erudite humanist. Mathematics was not foreign to his comprehension, nor Hebrew or Greek grammar, nor the Latin, French, Italian, and Spanish languages. These four he understood with consummate mastery, and in all four his pen moved with equal beauty and brilliance in prose no less than in verse; for besides being a rhetorician most accomplished in every part of eloquence, he possessed a poetic genius so distinguished and so flexible for every variety of meter that it is not easy to determine what is most exquisite in his compositions: his invention in comedy, his harmony in lyric poetry, his wit in humorous verse, his vividness of feeling in funeral poetry, or his elevation in the heroic. What is palpably perceived in all of them is the polished fluency of the style, the sonority of the cadence, the purity and aptness of the words, and the soul of the conceptions.

9. The only thing one could have wished in Father Luis for the complete perfection of so many gifts was somewhat greater promptness and facility in speech. His pronunciation was often impeded by a kind of speech defect; he seemed to lack breath and made painful efforts fully to articulate words that were already upon his lips and had been indicated by their initial sounds, yet he could not finish pronouncing them. Many lamented that this defect of the tongue diminished the value of so precious an intellect; to which a discerning man aptly replied that God had garrisoned that citadel of wisdom, making communication from it difficult and placing obstacles at its gate, lest pride and swelling, the bane of learning, should enter to despoil it. And indeed God does nothing by chance. It belongs to His providence to restrain the tongue of man lest it rush headlong; and if Father Luis's tongue had possessed a speed and promptness corresponding to the fertility of his cultivated intellect, perhaps it would not have been so restrained in its words. At least it would have given its owner more occasion for presumption and vainglory by giving his hearers still greater matter for applause and admiration. The truth is that in everything he had carefully premeditated or

had repeatedly brought to his tongue, no impediment was ordinarily perceived in him; rather, his eloquence seemed a mighty river whose crystalline waters flowed gently, with repose and command, without any sign of stumbling. Only in casual conversation and in the heat of argument, when the very vividness of the conception or the impetus of scholastic ardor gave no leisure to polish his words so much, did he feel the inconvenience of the impediment more strongly. This gave occasion to think that in these sudden situations, and therefore those more liable to error, either his excessive reflection restrained him or his great humility and lack of confidence impeded him.

10. In any case, this defect was no considerable obstacle to the good use of his gifts. His conversation, though slow, became delightful through the breadth and variety of his excellent ideas. His argument, though interrupted or more deliberate, became formidable through the force of the difficulty he proposed. His explanation from the chair was succinct, clear, and intelligible. His eloquence in the pulpit was delightful, affective, doctrinal, and penetrating. Thus, if God placed the stumbling block of his tongue as ballast for his humility, He did not therefore cease to exalt him and make him most eloquent in whatever he had to say and do for the purposes of His glory. Divine Providence chose Moses, slow of speech and stammering, to free the people of Israel; and He assured the Prophet who did not know how to speak that he would go wherever he was sent and would speak whatever he was commanded. I do not know whether the application will seem rash. The fact is that our defense and protection were entrusted, and could safely be entrusted, to Father Lossada's zeal, discretion, and judgment; that notwithstanding his certain impediment of speech, he was always found able and ready for the occupations to which obedience assigned him; and whenever he was commanded to speak, he spoke well whatever he was commanded to speak. For two years he taught humane letters to our men at the Seminary of Villagarcía, for three Philosophy at Medina del Campo, for seven Scholastic and Moral Theology at San Ambrosio in Valladolid and at this College of Salamanca; and here he continued for the rest of his life in the office of Professor of Sacred Scripture, completing in all, and always with the greatest applause, nearly forty years of teaching.

11. To the labors of the chair he added those of the pulpit, made unavoidable by the reputation of his talents not only in this city but in others to which the echo of his praises reached. Many sought him to lend greater luster to their solemnities, and especially some of our Colleges, to ensure the successful celebration of the Beatifications and Canonizations of our Saints. At the mere report that Father Luis was preaching, anyone who

failed to attend was at once reputed to have bad taste; and so the gatherings of the most learned and distinguished people were extremely numerous, because all thought they would gain something from the erudition, piety, and solidity of his discourses. Not many years ago, while he was preaching in this church, I noticed the hearers leaving and expressing their astonishment in a thousand different ways. But those who most drew my attention were two Most Reverend Fathers, Masters of a certain illustrious Order, no less celebrated in the pulpit than in the chair, who as they walked familiarly expressed their amazement to one another. "Every day this devil of an old man astonishes me more," said one. "This man has the Devil in him," replied the other. Clearly they did not mean what these expressions signify literally, but much more than the words themselves sound; for in our Castilian it has already become a common exaggeration, when speaking of something admirable and difficult to imitate, to attribute it to the art of the Devil and to say that only the Devil could do as much.

12. For the rest, no one could be unaware that those lights of wisdom which everyone admired in Father Luis were very foreign to the spirit of darkness. Much more than by themselves, the treasures of his intellect were made venerable by the rich enamel of his virtues. And although this enamel must necessarily remain much dimmed in this account, because the most just considerations restrained me from particularizing those occasions in which its splendor shone out most brilliantly, I shall nevertheless indicate enough to disclose something of the depths of his spirit. He always regarded the virtue of obedience as the fixed north of his labors and fatigues, with so perfect an abnegation of his own judgment and will that excuses, replies, representations, or even signs of a contrary opinion were never heard from him. His inclination drew him toward producing works extremely useful, exceedingly pleasant, and attractive, which, in proportion as they delighted the public, would more effectively banish common abuses and forms of ignorance worthy of remedy. The mere conception of these works, judging from the titles he wished to give them and the rough sketch he made of them in conversation, aroused such desire to see them completed that one of the most distinguished men of the Province was accustomed to say: "Father Luis ought to be given a free hand to work on whatever he pleases; anything else is not knowing how to make use of his gifts." Yet no one complained less than he himself, who suffered the constraint, that obedience did violence to his inclination. And although it kept dragging him into tedious tasks repugnant to his disposition, he never represented his great repugnance to the Superiors. Rather, with remarkable indifference he submitted to whatever they commanded, repeatedly laying aside what he had begun to

write and interrupting his principal task—whose delay made everyone impatient—to attend to others newly imposed upon him and urged with greater haste, without concern for the accusation that many, ignorant of these necessary interruptions, blamed him for slowness in the principal work entrusted to him.

13. Knowing his prompt subordination and submission, the Superiors, so as not to constrain him to obey, did not resort to authority but to request and supplication; and they even tried to avoid this, because they knew that he took requests as commands. The means they ordinarily used was to propose their intention to him as though they were consulting his prudence and seeking his judgment. But from the very reasons of expediency alleged by the Superior, Father Luis divined his will, and he needed nothing more in order to approve it and immediately set to work. This veneration for every Superior and his great esteem for obedience could be seen in the outward respect and humble and reverent submission with which he stood in their presence. He was so zealous that others should show the same veneration that he would admonish some in whom he had special confidence whenever he noticed any fault in this respect. On one occasion a disciple of his confided to him the natural regret with which he was leaving a more distinguished occupation for another of less esteem to which obedience assigned him, and that he was considering making a representation. Father Luis answered him: "This is no reason to make a representation." And to encourage him he added: "If, at the age of seventy, they were to send me to an elementary class or a grammar class, I would go with greater pleasure than to be General of the Society; for excepting offices of government, all the other occupations to which obedience may send us are equal in my esteem."

14. In religious poverty his conscience was most delicate; for not content with the written permissions he had from the Provincials to give and receive, he always had recourse to his immediate Superior even for very small things of the least value. He almost always had much at his disposal, both because of the substantial assistance sent by his brothers and relatives and because of the liberality with which various princes and persons of authority made him gifts, which he could not refuse without fear that the rejection might be taken as a slight. Seeing that for this reason he did not exercise poverty by lacking what was necessary, he endeavored to exercise it in its most heroic form: to use things as though he did not use them, without any appearance of display or vanity, and to have them as though he had nothing. For in truth it may safely be said of Father Luis that he possessed nothing of his own. Everything there was available to whoever came; and he rejoiced to have everything more for the exercise of charity than for his own convenience.

15. In the virtue of charity, since it is the summary and compendium of the law, he seems to have placed the whole of his perfection, exercising it with remarkable disinterestedness and rare generosity. He assisted the needy of the College with such skill and concealment that His Reverence avoided the display of giving and spared them the embarrassment of receiving. He would hand the assistance to some friend or companion of the needy person, charging him secretly to place it in the latter's room and to make him accept it without scruple, since all the necessary permissions had already been obtained, but in no way to tell him where it had come from or who had given it. At other times he would use as a pretext some service that had been done for him—for example, if someone had substituted for him in the material labor of the chair by dictating his lecture notes—and would then cloak his charity under the name of a courtesy or act of gratitude. He gave such assistance or tokens of appreciation on the slightest pretext to every sort of person, whether religious or secular, provided he knew of their need; and he gave them with so open a hand that a Coadjutor who observed and experienced it on various occasions was accustomed to say: "This Father Luis is like God, who gives a hundred for one." When he brought money to the common deposit, he earnestly begged the Father Minister that, if he knew of any need either his own or another's, he should relieve it from that money, that he should not hesitate to spend it all, and that he did not need to tell him on whom or how he had spent it.

16. At times this liberality of Father Luis came to seem waste or profusion insufficiently conformable to religious poverty. But on points concerning poverty His Reverence held such lofty maxims that, loving it according to the Rule as a Mother, he wished it also to be the Mother of mercy, liberality, confidence in God, mutual charity toward one another, and all the virtues. He said that the poverty of a religious is not to be measured by what he does not possess, because that may be necessity rather than voluntary poverty; nor is it to be measured by what he retains or refrains from spending, because that may be avarice or excessive fear of coming to experience the effects of poverty itself; nor is it to be measured precisely by what he does not ask for or receive, because that may be narrowness of spirit. Asking and receiving with the permission of Superiors has never been opposed to the perfection of poverty; rather, it is often an exercise of it, as is seen in many religious orders. The poverty of a religious must therefore be measured by the good use he makes of what he licitly possesses and by the liberality with which he expends it on works of piety and mercy. This liberality is what proves a heart truly detached, resigned to Divine Providence, in no way possessed by love of its own conveniences and in no

way preoccupied by fear that what is necessary will fail it. Moreover, such liberality toward those of the house serves to foster religious charity and brings many other advantages, both one's own and those of others, in enumerating which his excellent capacity would unfold itself with great energy and delicacy of spirit. As Father Luis said, so he acted. His generosity several times reduced him to the point of lacking what was necessary for his modest relief; yet he did not therefore ask for anything or disclose his need to anyone, although it could not remain hidden long, for the surest sign that this spring had run dry was to see that its streams had ceased to flow, since everyone knew that in the nobility of his heart they could neither be held back nor dammed. He had many friends who frequently and very solicitously inquired whether he lacked anything, and at once supplied him abundantly. What they and his relatives sent him he received, always with the prior permission of the Superiors, and with the same permission he spent it freely, regarding every kind of attachment or adherence to anything as base and making his charity common to all, which did not allow him to reserve even the love of poverty as something exclusively his own.

17. As liberal and generous as his charity was, so attentive and benign was it in every kind of good office toward his neighbor. Few will have dealt with Father Luis de Lossada without acknowledging themselves debtors to his benevolence, whether because he favored them through his influence, contributed to their greater reputation and distinction in their functions, or bestowed some other benefit upon them. He had not yet passed beyond the state of a Scholastic Brother when he learned that one of his fellow students had received a strict order from the Father Provincial to leave for another College as soon as possible and abandon his studies because he gave no sign of profiting in them. Brother Luis was moved with compassion, for he had accurately gauged his fellow student's aptitude and understood that his failure to profit was due either to laziness or to not studying according to the proper method. He went to the Father Rector and said to him: "I beg Your Reverence to intercede with the Father Provincial so that he does not remove this Brother from his studies. I take him into my charge, and if he does not perform adequately in the next examinations, I offer myself for whatever penalty the Father Provincial may impose upon me." The Father Rector wrote how greatly the charity and zeal of Brother Luis had edified him and that out of regard for him he was suspending the dispatch of that drone or blockhead until it could be seen whether he would do better thereafter. The Father Provincial agreed, because even then Brother Luis's proposals were regarded as resolutions of great judgment, born of so prudent a zeal that they deserved the esteem of the Superiors. The result

proved the correctness of the judgment. Out of charity toward his fellow student, Brother Luis made himself his teacher: he gave him rules for studying with greater comprehension, assigned him tasks, explained what he did not understand, and instructed him in such a way that he gave a very good account of himself in the examinations, continued his studies, and afterwards was approved to teach Philosophy and Theology satisfactorily—the same man who had previously given no hope even of learning them. So early did Father Lossada possess a benign and compassionate heart.

18. From such attentive solicitude in procuring the advancement of his Brothers in their studies, one may readily infer how vigilant he was in seeking to banish from souls that voluntary blindness which arises from perversity of morals and is beyond comparison more lamentable than ignorance of the sciences. His literary labors did not permit him to pour out his zeal amid the noise of the Missions or in those conspicuous ministries which, like great flames, make public all the fire of a fervent Jesuit. But the more he kept it covered and concentrated within his breast, the more active and vigorous he preserved it for occasions when an opportunity arose to manifest it—as when some grave spiritual necessity of his neighbor, demanding prompt and effective remedy, came to his knowledge. He then made no account of the loss of time assigned to his occupations, in order to attend to the greater necessity. When he was already Professor of Scripture and heavily occupied, he learned that a man bound by serious obligations, forgetting God and himself and slipping from one fault into another, was advancing by long strides toward the final precipice, resolved to abandon the secure path of his predestination by abandoning his state, to the dishonor of his own person and the grave shame and sorrow of his relatives. For Father Luis to learn of it was at once to feel himself wounded by extraordinary compassion and immediately to devote all his efforts to seeking a remedy for that unhappy man. It cannot be exaggerated how much he labored to bring him back. He went to visit him every day, speaking to him with such gentleness that he induced him to reveal with the closest confidence his most hidden thoughts and the deepest roots of the temptation and disturbance he was suffering. He attempted to tear them from his heart by placing before him the human and divine considerations that ought to restrain him and by addressing to him exhortations so penetrating and vivid that reason already acknowledged itself convinced. But the will remained rebellious. The fervent Father did not desist from the undertaking, always trusting in Divine grace and in those means through which God is accustomed to communicate it more abundantly. He prayed for his conversion and made him pray as well, teaching him the manner of praying

and meditating fruitfully. He gave him spiritual reading, deliberately choosing the warnings most apt to disabuse him; and making brief pauses, he would weigh them for him and cause them to sink more deeply into his soul. He made him recite the Rosary, the sorrowing Father alternating with him with an affection so tender and fervent that it would have sufficed to set a heart of ice on fire. He instructed him to make an exact and sorrowful confession of all his sins. And not judging himself defeated by the man's stubborn obstinacy after two or three weeks, he continued for whole months in this holy and persistent undertaking until he succeeded in opening a breach in that hardened heart and brought him to confession with signs of repentance and a firm resolution to abandon his aberration. He remained for some time in this resolution, but, admitting his former thoughts again, he lacked firmness and finally plunged headlong into his folly—to the sorrow, indeed, of the zealous Father, but with the consolation that the merit of the labor is not lost merely because its fruit does not endure.

19. His charity did not stop here. To be perfect it rose to the degree of being most affable toward all, meek, patient, humble, mortified, contemptuous of injuries, and entirely free from envy. He concealed in profound silence whatever displeased him in others, and it cannot be said how greatly in this matter he triumphed over himself or how much exercise he found for mortification and prudence. The truthfulness and straightforwardness of his disposition abhorred every kind of duplicity, deceit, and artifice. The nobility of his heart could not endure the slightest shadow of ingratitude, baseness, or coarseness. The solidity of his spirit never knew how to be content with what is mere surface or appearance of goodness; and the more he loved the common edification, the more distasteful to him were ingratiating virtues and affected externals, which are ordinarily ill-woven lattices through which the very passions that seek to hide themselves become visible. Nevertheless, Father Luis appeared blind to these defects in others; and although he clearly discerned differences of temperament and the variety of their inclinations, he maintained toward all so uniform an equality in the gentleness and affability of his dealings that he seemed the particular friend of each. Those whose dispositions least agreed with his he sought to serve and please with greater care; and his attention anticipated everyone with demonstrations of civility and courtesy, without preferring himself to anyone, without showing a low opinion of anyone, and without in any way disdaining another's ability, however notorious the limitation of his gifts might be.

20. Hence it was very rare for anyone not to seek Father Luis as a secure repository of his secret confidences, whether for consolation in afflictions

and sorrows, for success in his resolutions, or for relief and remedy in his necessities. "We all loved and respected him," says one of his fellow students in Arts, "because even then he was the consolation and relief of all." Even those who most exercised his patience received singular benefits in return. For one who had gravely insulted his person and treated him with great contempt, and for others who in his absence had caused him serious vexations, he performed the offices of a true father and protector, fully aware that they had not deserved this from him. But his noble heart extended still further, for even offenses committed against his greatest rivals pained him more than injuries done to himself. There came into his hands, under a plain wrapper, an anonymous printed pamphlet highly defamatory of a certain person who shortly before had written and published very many insults against His Reverence. He read the paper, showing at every clause notable displeasure in his face; and after reading it he threw it away, saying: "The author of this pamphlet will think he pays me a great compliment by treating D. N. so unworthily. He is deceived like a fool. I value my neighbor's honor more highly, and I renounce at once all esteem for myself if it must depend upon another's infamy."

21. With this same spirit Father Luis wrote whenever he took up his pen in defense of what he loved most, namely the honor and reputation of his Mother, the Society. In his writings one will not see him answer injuries with injuries or insults with insults; nor will one see him heap reproaches upon the opposing author, impose defamatory nicknames upon him, or make public hidden defects concerning his person or conduct. The most he does is to set before him the most serious defects and errors of his own writings, making them manifest so that, seeing them, he may blush and be ashamed. If his opponent gives free rein to abuse and injurious words, he restrains him and warns him of his fury with playful serenity, showing by the very manner of his response that such blows do not wound him; for nothing repels the impulses of anger better than the unalterable meekness of the person injured. If the opponent falls carelessly into arrogant expressions of presumption or boasting, he sometimes opportunely repeats them to him and casts them back in his face with that kind of irony employed in their defenses by the finest writers and also found in Sacred Scripture. For the rest, he demolishes his foundations with the greatest clarity, force, and solidity; and to show everyone, learned and unlearned, how futile and contemptible they are, he applies them, imitating his opponent's own manner of arguing, to trivial and ridiculous matters in which, because they are more obvious and commonplace, even the least educated person

understands without difficulty the disproportion of the opposing foundation.

22. This is the whole art of that pen which some without reason accused of being satirical. For in reality a pure refutation of an author's writings is neither satire nor invective against the author's person, especially when no personal defects are disclosed other than those made public by his own mistakes. To place a mirror before the man being refuted so that, ashamed of his ugly disorder, he may restrain and compose himself, is not to satirize him but gently to correct him. To display a playful contempt for injuries received is not the effect of satirical malice but greatness of heart most worthy of applause, because there is scarcely another way to repress an opponent's pride. To answer with an equal number of injuries is resentment unworthy of Christian charity. To show oneself offended would leave the aggressor vainly glorious that he knows where to strike so as to cause pain. To remain entirely silent would leave the cause to the judgment of the vulgar and the easy credulity of the unlearned. To answer with complete seriousness would fill the rash man with presumption and further inflate his temerity, seeing himself treated like a Prince or Monarch and his biting invectives regarded with as much respect as the most justified complaints might deserve.

23. All this was foreseen by the admirable discretion of our wise and skillful apologist, whose charitable zeal sought to cure without drawing blood and to repel the blows of slander without any injury or offense other than rendering them vain and ridiculous. Very differently did his well-ordered charity rebuke those whom he supposed docile to his counsels and whom he knew would value his judgments because of their friendship and confidence. He then used few words, but words so significant that each contained much instruction and counsel. As an example, omitting many others, let what he wrote to a certain Confessor suffice. It was rumored that this Confessor had almost daily and frequent communication with a nun, with no other pretext than hearing her confession and directing her on the way of perfection. Father Luis warned him that such frequency could not fail to attract notice with more than sufficient reason, "for I," he said, "renounce a clock that gives the clockmaker so much work." Thus he made him understand that, however much he might seek to justify his communication with that nun under color of zeal, it would always give cause to suspect that his own spirit was very much out of order.

24. Father Luis's humility was all the deeper as his wisdom was more elevated; for although he had come to know so much, he never knew how to recognize, much less esteem, the excellence of his own gifts and talents. In his own judgment alone was the man ignorant whom all of us acknowledged

to be wise. He made much of his own dullness because of the difficulty he found in being satisfied with his work, and for this reason preferred to submit himself to another's judgment rather than govern himself by his own. One of his disciples assures me that a few years ago he was astonished and filled with confusion on seeing a man such as his master Father Lossada asking him for rules and instructions for reducing his Philosophy to a compendium; and when the disciple tried to excuse himself, the Father showed such distress and repeated his requests in words so humble that in the end, in order not to grieve him, he found himself compelled to state whatever opinion he could. From this low confidence in himself there followed, as natural effects, a complete indifference as to whether his works were published or remained buried in oblivion; great insensibility as to whether other Masters attacked or followed his opinions; and the most sincere docility toward the appointed Reviewer, to whom he himself sent his papers, submitting them entirely to his judgment and indicating the pleasure he would take in his adding or removing whatever seemed proper to him. Father Luis was the exception to that rule: "There is no mother who does not fall in love with her children." He regarded his own offspring with the same lack of attachment and neutrality of affection as though they concerned him in no way, for neither the esteem shown toward his works moved him nor did contempt for them disturb him, as though he had entirely lost his taste for praise and his sensitivity to blame.

25. On various occasions anonymous papers were attributed to him that were very foreign to his religious character and prudence, because they were offensive to particular persons, some of them persons of rank. Led by this false rumor, either those offended or their partisans, without first ascertaining the truth, filled public printed works with reproaches and calumnies against him. Yet neither seeing his honor so unjustly trampled upon nor the ease with which he could prove how rashly his innocence was accused moved him to undo the calumny or defend his own cause. He entrusted everything to God, seeking no other consolation or glory than the testimony of his conscience. Only once, when the Superiors compelled him to disabuse many who do not know how to distinguish authors by the quality of their writings, did he have to sacrifice his humility to obedience by signing with his own hand a simple public declaration that he had not been the author of a certain paper. Others were circulated in which discredit to him was mingled with discredit to the whole Society; and when a friend came to console him out of compassion for the injury, he answered: "No account is to be made of me. Separate my cause from that of the Order; let the latter be secured, and I regard the dispute as concluded." He thus gave it to be

understood that, as far as his own injuries were concerned, he would answer only with silence, as he had done on other occasions. This contempt and low opinion of himself reached such a point that he looked with horror upon everything that might lend authority to his person; and from this arose the invincible repugnance with which he resisted government. When the patent appointing him Rector of the College of San Ambrosio in Valladolid arrived, he did not hesitate to say that, to escape the three years of being Rector, he would choose instead three years as a paralytic or cripple confined to bed. Nevertheless, he wished those whom he considered capable of governing successfully not to excuse themselves from it; and when one of these men confronted him with his own repugnance, he answered in the tone of someone annoyed by an absurdity: "Your Reverence does not know me. I am unbearable; my subjects could not tolerate me for a single day." An expression well worthy of note in a man who made himself so lovable to everyone and whom so many sought for consolation.

26. Yet although he was so entirely at odds with his own esteem and fled whatever might increase it, his humility was not at odds with his prudence; and he knew how to distinguish those occasions on which his reserve or lack of condescension would appear ungrateful and might offend persons of authority who honored him according to his merit. For this reason he several times left the quiet of his retirement in order to yield to repeated requests from various Most Illustrious Prelates who summoned him with demonstrations of singular esteem—some because they wished to know him, and others because, already knowing him, they wished to enjoy his company. Each of these journeys cost him many months of deliberation, and he never succeeded in resolving upon one as long as the matter was left to his own choice. It was necessary for the Father Rector, after obtaining permission from the Father Provincial, to urge him to leave and to propose reasons such that he understood his departure to be indispensable and that the Superiors judged it so. Obedience would then enter to moderate the apprehensions of his humility, which always feared the honors awaiting him everywhere. The Most Illustrious Bishops and Archbishops paid him very great honors, and by their example many other distinguished persons were moved to court him and procure his diversion and recreation, taking him now to their estates and country houses, now to neighboring seaports, now to the more populous cities. Thus, the esteem of one becoming linked with that of another, they caused him to travel through most of Biscay, Aragon, Navarre, and Galicia. He returned from these pilgrimages to his retirement with the same inclination with which a stone returns to its center, carrying away from so much courtship and popular applause nothing except the

obligation of gratitude and the unavoidable burden of maintaining, at the expense of time and the cost of labor, the most gracious and attentive correspondence with his benefactors and friends.

27. These departures and excursions were in no way inconsistent with Father Luis's religious character. His continual laboriousness at times required this kind of relaxation, all the more because his love of solitude and retirement did not arise from a harsh and uncultivated nature, but from a religious and well-disciplined spirit. His disposition was neither gloomy nor austere, but affable, entertaining, inclined toward society, and most thoroughly instructed in the rules of virtuous eutrapelia, which made his company desirable and delightful; for without affectation he knew with the greatest exactness how to avoid the vicious extremes of tiresome seriousness and immoderate jesting. Hence those who knew him best judge that the greatest proof of his continual mortification is that he voluntarily reduced himself to such narrow confinement, condemning his disposition to deprivation of the company it naturally desired and his person to the prison and almost perpetual enclosure of his room. With this mortification of the spirit the mortification of his senses was in harmony. In drink he was sober and very abstemious; in food sparing and abstinent, using coarse and common foods under the pretext that they were more natural to his hardy constitution. In his sight he was most guarded, through the acquired habit of keeping his eyes almost closed even when speaking with members of the house. A man who accompanied him for six years, dealing with him familiarly and frequently, testifies that he was never able to discern the color of his eyes. The same reserve, modesty, and composure were always observed in his steps, actions, and words, his whole exterior indicating how well fortified his heart was against the assaults of the seductive enemy of purity, just as exterior fortifications and vigilant sentries indicate how well defended a fortress is. Although his body was of perfect stature and by natural disposition upright and free in carriage, it was evident that he kept it severely oppressed, chastised, and reduced to a violent servitude; and no less upon the emaciation of his face could be read the rigors of his mortification and penance. But how far these rigors extended is not easy to ascertain, since no indications remain to us except the well-used instruments of his mortification. Neither did the Father Rector, who intended to give his life the title *Austere*, leave us any note concerning it, nor do those Confessors still live to whom Father Luis entrusted his principal direction and who, had they survived him, would undoubtedly have given us most valuable information concerning the more hidden parts of his spirit.

28. But what could be hidden from no one was the firmness and unvarying constancy with which throughout his life he bore the weight and rigor of observance, as his fellow students, disciples, and fellow Masters attest with one voice. Here we observed with particular edification many times that, even when Father Luis was greatly burdened by extremely serious commissions from the Superiors in addition to his ordinary tasks, and by arduous and difficult consultations to which he had to give prompt answers, he did not therefore exempt himself from the talks and sermons distributed among the members of the house either by rule or custom. Rather, if the person who was to address the student gentlemen and professors in the chapel of their Congregation fell ill, Father Luis spontaneously offered to substitute for him and give the morning conference even when he was to preach that same afternoon in our church. On various occasions he supplied for those charged with these functions, contributing to the relief of others at the cost of greater fatigue to himself and sometimes with much risk to his health, for during the preceding twenty years he had already lost much of his natural robustness. The silent file of so continuous and intense a study, together with the harsh treatment of his own person, was weakening the vigor of his strength in such a way that signs of old age anticipated their proper time and proclaimed upon his countenance the impression labor was already making upon him. Nevertheless, when Missionaries of our Society came to this town, he did not cease to assist them by punctual attendance in the confessional and in the first nighttime outings through the streets to summon the people. I myself heard ecclesiastics and laymen of the highest distinction emphasize how deeply this Venerable Father—as they respectfully called him—had moved them during the last Missions, when on a very inclement and cold night they saw him riding a mule under the open sky, beaten on every side by the violence and cruelty of the wind, his decorously bald head uncovered, armed with a holy Crucifix, crying out the most fervent warnings against illusion and striking his breast in time with the most tender and devout affections, sparing neither his years nor his already weakened health. The result showed how worthy of notice Father Luis's fatigue on that night had been, for as a consequence he returned to the College gravely stricken by a severe attack of pleurisy that placed him in manifest danger of losing his life. God willed to prolong it for some further years so that through the continuation of labors and illnesses the accumulation of his merits might be greater; for nothing sufficed to make him relax his rigors by a single point or seek any relief for himself. With the same constancy and firmness he lived in

old age as in youth, never permitting any exemption or singularity in his manner of life.

29. Only in the last third of his life did he ask for three exemptions which, rightly considered, conduced not to his relief but to his greater austerity, mortification, and penance. He asked to abstain from supper, to rise early, and to retire, in order to give more time to work, to the pasture or farm of Miguel Muñoz, a place so uncomfortable that only someone who found his recreation in greater hardship could have sought it for repose; for besides the intemperateness of that climate and the notable lack of shelter in the dwelling, what was common and ordinary in the College would there have been regarded as a luxury. There he distributed the hours of the day in this manner. He rose at two in the morning and prepared to celebrate with a very long hour of prayer. At half past three he went down to say Mass and made his thanksgiving at leisure. He took a light breakfast and, after reciting the Little Hours, set to work until half past eleven, when he went down to eat. His meal was reduced to a dish of vegetables and a cup of broth. He scarcely tasted meat; and with this scant nourishment he withdrew to rest for the space of an hour. Whether or not he slept, no one knows, because no one witnessed what he did then. When that hour, or a little more, had passed, he went out provided with his Rosary, Breviary, Psalter of Our Lady, and some spiritual book, to pray, read, and meditate while walking through the fields if the weather permitted, and otherwise within the narrow bounds of the house. This exercise lasted until half past four in the afternoon, when he returned to continue his study until nine at night. In place of supper he then took a glass of water chilled with snow, for he had entirely deprived himself even of the boiled greens he had used at the beginning of his retirement. After this refreshment he examined his conscience with particular care and unfailingly recorded his faults in the little examination book he always kept at hand upon the lectern where he studied. With great calm he prepared himself for the meditation of the following day; and a good part of the night passed in these exercises, so that by the time he retired it was already late. Since he rose so early, his sleep amounted to very few hours. The hours he assigned to walking in the fields sometimes varied according to the season or condition of the ground; but this variation in no way overturned his customary exercises, because those proper to those hours he transferred to others. Nor was he idle while walking, but read, meditated, or studied.

30. In this manner Father Luis's life became one continual fast, a perpetual vigil, an unceasing study of letters and virtue; for in the distribution I have described he never dispensed himself except because of a

notable indisposition of health, or from civility and attention toward someone who came to visit him, or from charity toward the poor farmers of the district who came to seek his protection. He received these with singular humanity, accommodating himself to their uncultivated manner and using their rustic expressions without affectation, as though they were native to him. Even in this his discretion knew how to yield to his great charity, since it seemed to him, as indeed it was, that by making himself one with them in language he gave greater courage to their natural reserve, so that they might speak freely and deal openly with him. But these poor people, since they already knew how much Father Luis loved time, tried to find opportunities to speak to him without interrupting his tasks. They waited for him on his way when he went down to or returned from eating, or when he went out into the fields. His Reverence listened to them lovingly and dispatched their matters promptly, always giving them the consolation either of the alms they sought, the counsel they requested, or the influence they solicited for the successful outcome of their affairs; and thus they altered his schedule little or not at all. Those of us from the College who sometimes came to the farm, since we too were not ignorant of his manner of life, sought to show gratitude for his good reception and for the care he took to entertain us by not robbing him of the time he valued so highly.

31. On one of his outings or walks through the countryside there happened to him an adventure that has the appearance of an exploit more proper to a brave and vigorous warrior than to a modest and studious Jesuit. But because it gives us occasion to praise the protection Heaven exercised over his life, and because it displays well Father Luis's greatness of heart, superiority of spirit, and singular presence of mind even in sudden emergencies, I do not judge it inappropriate to relate it. The event was as follows. Walking pensively, with his eyes lowered and his imagination recollected, as was his custom, he came without noticing it to within a short distance of a bull which, having strayed from the herd, had made itself master of the road. On perceiving the shape, he raised his eyes and, seeing himself so near that brute, which faced him with a fierce aspect and made ready to attack, he no longer knew what to do. To turn his back upon it was to increase the danger, because within a few steps it would quickly overtake him. To proceed and face it seemed rash, since he could not trust his agility to evade the blow by a fortunate maneuver. To throw stones or anything else that might frighten it was likewise impossible, because there was nothing there at hand. The quickest means that occurred to him was to frighten it away with feints. He began to drive it off in the manner of a cowherd, imitating with the movements of his arm the cast of a sling, which is the

punishment these animals most fear. But nothing availed. The bull persisted fiercely in its threats, tearing up the earth and brandishing its horns in the air as though displaying its weapons. Here, if ever, all Father Lossada's reasoning was exhausted. He resolved to sit upon the ground in sight of his enemy, trusting only in the protection of that Lord whom fat bulls surrounded, as the Royal Prophet calls the enemies of Christ. But scarcely had he sat down when the beast charged with such impetus that it seemed impossible for him to escape with his life. Here Father Luis's courage and heart showed themselves. He planted himself on his knees and, avoiding the first blow by bending his body to one side, prepared for the second with such skill that, stretching out his arms and directing his hands with full deliberation, with one hand he succeeded in grasping the right horn firmly and with the other in compressing the nostrils so as to obstruct its breathing, remembering that those who wrestle with these beasts when branding them use this device to break their strength. In fact he broke its strength to such a degree that it could not harm him; it was able only, by the violence of its impetus, to throw him backward and give him some slight bruises against the ground. Yet the afflicted Father did not release his grip. He continued struggling for nearly a quarter of an hour to subdue the brute's ferocity until Providence arranged for people to arrive to assist him. Freed at last from fear and danger, Father Luis rose covered in dust, bathed in sweat, and exhausted by the struggle, but without wound or injury, although his cassock was torn in places and shredded. He did not know how to express what had happened to him, nor did his grateful heart know how to praise and magnify the providence of the Lord, who had so manifestly protected him, except by offering Him anew that very life which He had just restored to him in so evident a danger.

32. He survived this event for nearly twenty years, continuing in the same laboriousness and austerity he had undertaken, without making any account of human judgments. He was not unaware that some censured as irregular his manner of life, so withdrawn and retired even from members of his own house. But he never showed himself sensitive to this criticism, judging that he owed no one an account of what he did with the manifest approval of the Superiors, and that there was no reason among us to regard retirement, solitude, and abstinence as irregular when other learned writers and distinguished Jesuits had practiced them and justified them by their example. He did think, however, that if he imitated them in this, he ought also to imitate them in the exercise of the other virtues, and that his retirement would decline into vice only if it deprived him of attending to the common good or alienated him from the love due to his Brothers. He

therefore took care to live in such a way for himself that no one lived more for everyone. No one was more attentive to the good of the Order or to that of any individual who sought him. A letter left unanswered because of illness or excessive occupation became a torment to him, because he said there was no other way to exercise charity toward those absent. Nor in his retirement did he forget the holy customs of the College; rather, he added other exercises of self-abasement, such as sweeping on Saturdays, in honor of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, the oratory in which he said Mass, going down with a pitcher to fetch water from the fountain, caring for the neatness and cleanliness of the church, and other humiliations of this kind.

33. Among the many grave illnesses by which God purified him, the most habitual and frequent was a most acute pain of the stomach, preceded by an atrabilious humor which, diffusing itself through the lower region, placed him in an indescribable torment and agony. He had experience of the fatigue and discomfort caused by a severe and dangerous spotted fever; yet he said that it would be more tolerable for him to suffer those discomforts for a month than the torture of this furious pain for a single night. To moderate the force of these pains he found no remedy more effective than the use of the waters of Tamames, which, if they do not owe Father Lossada their discovery and original name, owe to him at least a great part of their credit and the spread of their fame. He took them in the proper season when necessity required it, and with such good effect that they secured a perceptible relief for many months. But if the pains returned in the severity of winter, when the inclemency of the weather did not permit recourse to this remedy, the illness became more stubborn and more formidable, because its violence did not yield to the best and most accredited specific remedies of Medicine.

34. Thus it happened to him in the last December of 1747. The stomach pains arose toward the end of that month and persisted in afflicting him throughout January and February with such tenacity that, although medicines from time to time succeeded in obtaining some suspension, the cause was never removed. They returned to torment him anew and with such biting severity that, while imitating holy Job in patience, resignation, and endurance, he could not refrain from imitating him also in expressing his affliction with sorrowful words and pitiable groans, calling upon Jesus and His Most Holy Mother and asking for constancy and strength not to faint under such torment. The Father Rector was moved with compassion at seeing him in so much pain; but Father Luis would recollect himself and say: "Thanks be to God that I do not suffer so many ailments, nor such cruel ones, as others of my age suffer." Yet I do not know what ailments of others

could be more cruel, since they can do no more than take away life. Father Luis's ailments weakened him in such a manner that even after the pains had diminished the damage was recognized as irreparable. Seeing his weakness, he asked that the Holy Sacraments of Penance and Viaticum be administered to him. He received them with singular awareness, tenderness, and devotion, as one who from the first day the physicians came to see him had foretold his departure for eternity, saying emphatically: "I am to die of this one." It was thought that, since the principal enemy had ceased, this prediction might prove false, especially if every effort were directed to restoring his strength. But everything done for this purpose was in vain, because his pulses, although they indicated no malignity that ought to cause alarm, always remained weak and languid. Nevertheless he awoke more cheerful on February 27, and that morning no immediate danger was feared; rather, better hopes were entertained. Only the patient perceived in his heart the nearness of his death, and at half past two in the afternoon he asked that the Confessor be called quickly. He was reconciled with great tranquility and full consciousness; and when this was finished, not considering the untimeliness of the hour, because his weakness and danger no longer permitted him to attend to time but only to eternity, he manifested ardent desires to receive the Sacred Eucharist in Communion, while recognizing that some days earlier he had received it as Viaticum. They consoled him by promising that he would receive Communion on the following day, Ash Wednesday. But God anticipated them by calling to Himself the man who so fervently asked for and sought Him; for scarcely had he finished expressing his longing to receive Him when he began to feel the pangs of the final agony in a cold sweat that barely left time to administer Extreme Unction. Having received this Sacrament, he gently surrendered his soul to that Lord for whom only a few minutes before he had sighed, making no other extreme movement or grimace than raising his eyes toward Heaven and opening his lips to release his breath, like one going to rest with his final sigh.

35. To this final sigh the tenderness of the many of us who were present responded in echoes of tears and sobs, together with the universal grief of the entire College, there being no individual who did not manifest by tears and a sorrowful countenance both his grief and the esteem in which he held the deceased. Because of the desire we all had for his long life, the sixty-seven years he had completed seven days before his death seemed brief to us. Of these he had spent fifty in religion and thirty-three as a Professed Father of the Four Vows. The first of his papers that came to hand was his certificate of Baptism, and from it there was observed the particular circumstance that his passage to glory, as we hope, occurred on the same

day, February 27, on which he had been born to grace. The mournful tolling of the bells was delayed in giving the sorrowful notice of his death because they were being used to summon the people to the celebration of the Forty Hours. But when these were concluded, those same people who had attended spread the news throughout the town. On the following morning, despite a terrible squall of snow, wind, and rain which kept many away, people of every class did not cease coming to see and contemplate the body, already placed upon the bier in the Chapel of the Relics at the foot of the sacristy. His face inspired in those who looked upon him a certain kind of veneration which I do not know how to describe; and it seemed to invite everyone to regard him attentively and willingly, or at least without that horror which corpses commonly impress upon the imagination and sight. For death, instead of disfiguring him with a withered pallor, improved the color he had possessed in life, changing it from dark and ashen into a clear and smooth complexion that adorned rather than disfigured him. The grave, serene, and peaceful expression of his face indicated not so much the absence of the soul as though he held it suspended or entranced in the attitude of one profoundly absorbed in thought. The praises of the deceased were the subject of the confused murmur of those who contemplated him. "What a man!" some said. "What a mind!" said others. And among the Portuguese who study at this University there was one who, although he had never before seen Father Luis, could not restrain his tears while contemplating him attentively. Asked why he wept, he answered in his own language that he had not enjoyed the fortunate lot of seeing Wisdom herself standing upright. Those who came to offer us consolation, after heartfelt expressions of condolence, took no other subject in their conversations than to make honorable remembrance of those rare gifts and virtues, telling us that this man ought to have been immortal in order to perpetuate the glory of Spain, and extolling him as one of those rare intellects whom from time to time God sends into the world to show that His Divine hand has not yet been shortened in distributing the gifts of nature and grace.

36. But the one who most promptly came to sympathize with our loss by demonstrations truly generous and entirely free of affectation or mere courtesy was the Most Illustrious Don Francisco Santos Bullón, Penitentiary of this Holy Church and Bishop-elect of Barcelona. Seeing us more disposed to weep than to sing the funeral rites, he at his own expense brought the musicians of this University, regretting that neither the circumstances of the day permitted him to bring those of his Cathedral Church nor did the great moderation of the Father Rector allow other measures of greater solemnity which his pious generosity attempted. On the following day the piety and

affectionate devotion of various Most Reverend Father Masters, Doctors, and priestly gentlemen continued the suffrages for him, as they came to offer sacrifice for his soul in this our church. On the third day there followed the whole respectable and distinguished body of Reverend Father Masters of Theology from the religious communities. Following their praiseworthy custom toward those who had belonged to their body and making particular remembrance of Father Lossada's distinguished merit, they promptly assembled to celebrate his funeral rites with solemn Offices of Vigil and Mass. On the next day the very religious, grave, and numerous community of the great Royal Convent of San Francisco of the Province of Santiago did the same, with demonstrations of particular esteem for the deceased. This was undoubtedly a most singular demonstration, which, as much as it attests the special esteem of the Seraphic Order for Father Luis de Lossada, always its most heartfelt devotee, so much does it oblige my attention not to pass it over in ungrateful silence. But those who expressed the simplest and most pious grief at the death of their beloved and venerated Father were the villagers from the hamlets surrounding the farm of Miguel Muñoz. They went to seek consolation for their loss among our farmers, emphasizing their sorrow with such tender exclamations concerning their good Father Luis that they moved the hearts of those who heard them; and all asked for their consolation some little holy picture, medal, Rosary, or any rag that he had used, so that they might carry home some remembrance of one whom they had loved so much.

37. And in truth, if I were to set forth here the extremely high esteem Father Luis deserved within and outside Spain, it would be necessary to transfer into this summary the singular praises with which from every quarter he was exalted and applauded while alive, whether in manuscript letters, printed works, or public theses dedicated to his name. His heroic humility made no display of these, and they have now been found among the remains of those papers he had destined for oblivion. But in order not to exceed the limits I proposed for a brief epitome, let it suffice to say that from the remarkable expressions alone by which many persons of great authority signify in letters their grief at his death, one could form the most honorable epitaph or eulogy for his tomb. Let the following response from a Most Illustrious Archbishop, written from his metropolitan see outside the boundaries of the Province of Castile to one of his trusted household, serve for all as the most sincere and least suspect of flattery: "The news you give me of the death of my beloved Father Luis de Lossada has made an extraordinary impression upon my heart, yet one proportioned to the great love and veneration I professed toward this distinguished Jesuit, who, being

the Glory of Spain and Ornament of this Province, was also an object of admiration to all who knew him either personally or through his works. This loss grieves me deeply, and in it I grieve with this Province, which has lost an Atlas, a most glorious Defender, and a consummate Master. I thank you for the promptness of this notice, painful though it is, so that I may at once anticipate for him those Suffrages and Sacrifices in which my affection for his person ought to express itself."

38. Thus far this Most Illustrious Prelate, whose illustrious and highly esteemed name, if I had permission to publish it, would suffice to confer renown upon Father Lossada even if the envious world sought to hide or disguise him. But his fame is so far from being disputed that a gifted wit with good reason introduces the World in an Epigram, laughing at the Muses and Sciences for seeking to give Father Luis after his death the deserved fame which the World itself had already given him in life by giving him all that earth can give. The Epigram, already circulating in print on a separate sheet, demands of our gratitude to the cultivated genius of its author that it be reprinted and placed here as the ornament and crown of this description or portrait of Father Lossada.

Epigram

If any mortal deserved to thwart the threefold Sisters,
Lossada deserved to live forever.
He had seen your hidden chambers, skillful Nature;
He had seen your depths, divine Grace.
He alone could settle without quarrel the quarrels of criticism,
And speak truth without envy.
And easily compose verses filled with spirited turns,
Verses which Phoebus might have called his own.
All the goddesses wept for him whom the simple nation
Of the learned worships with the due honor of incense.
I speak of what is known: the goddesses wept; for we all saw it,
Saw it upon cheeks wet as though with rain.
Indeed, they wished after death to give the man his merited fame
And make his name known throughout the whole world.
But the most just World at once heard their pious wishes,
Laughed, and straightway amid its laughter said:
"What earth can give, I gave him while he lived.
If you wish to give what is worthy of the man, give him the stars."

The pious wish with which this poem elegantly concludes, desiring that the stars reward the merit of so celebrated a Jesuit, seems already assured of its fulfillment in the very common maxim that "the wise man will rule the stars"; especially since Father Luis knew so well how to govern the lights of his cultivated intellect and conduct them along the secure ecliptic of solid piety, so as to illuminate his own spirit more with the splendor of the virtues than to dazzle the world with vain displays of intellect.

39. Nevertheless, I seem to hear Posterity complain bitterly that, although the laboriousness of this great Master was so notorious and his gifts so choice, he did not therefore leave it enriched with many precious monuments. Of the faculties he taught, only his philosophical courses were printed; and although they are worthy of the greatest esteem, being a most perfect work in their kind, they cannot be regarded as capable by themselves of exhausting so fertile a mine, much less as having deserved from his profound penetration the expenditure of so many years. It is surprising that upon the foundations of so solid a Philosophy he did not compose a *Summa Theologica* corresponding in clarity, subtlety, solidity, and concision to what might have been expected from the rare diligence with which he had examined ancient and modern authors; from the most faithful comparison he made of their diverse opinions; from the skill with which he chose the opinions best proportioned to forming a system of doctrine uniform and well sustained throughout; from the purity and propriety with which he employed technical terms; and, above all, from his extensive knowledge of the Councils, Fathers, and Pontifical sanctions, upon whose decisions and dogmas the whole scholastic edifice rests.

40. So would anyone reason who lacks more particular information concerning the many works in which Father Luis exercised the universality of his talents. Several were published which scarcely give any other testimony to their author than their own excellence, force, and solidity, so that anyone who has sufficiently examined the method and character of his style will easily recognize that they are the offspring of no other mind. Others display at the beginning or end of their dedications two Ls, the initials of his name and surname, because his modesty robbed just praise and the common applause with which the works were received of the remaining letters. Others, which reveal more deeply the resources of his doctrine, would undoubtedly have enjoyed equal esteem had they been given to the press. Of these, only the learned Dissertations he dictated upon Sacred Scripture remained written in his own hand, a most select work of singular utility; for in them he treats with the greatest success extremely curious points which, because they were disputed matters or inventions of

the Moderns, the most celebrated controversialists either did not treat or did not deliberately examine. Of the many well-founded resolutions he gave, with prolonged study and sound judgment, to the great multitude of consultations that occupied his attention, not the slightest copy is found. But what admits no doubt is that, if his apologies, moral resolutions, legal defenses, sacred dissertations, memorials, theological materials, sermons, conferences, academic contests, and the various other pieces he composed were gathered together, they would form very large volumes that would set before the eyes the precious and abundant fruit of his laboriousness. Add to this the almost indispensable reading of all the Spanish, Latin, and French books produced by the itch to write in this century, for scarcely was there one of particular note that did not come to Father Lossada for testing and did not disclose upon this touchstone the purity or adulteration of its doctrine. Add also his serious and scrupulous examination of various works by others which sought to come into the public light and were not to appear except through the horizon of that sound Criticism which knew how to divide error from truth. These occupations, so prodigal of time, amid health never robust and repeatedly broken by severe illnesses and most grave pains, suffice not only to moderate surprise at the small number of his works but to convert it into wonder that his indefatigable application produced so many.

41. I shall nevertheless confess that Father Luis was slow and deliberate in his work, but not from scarcity of materials; rather, their very abundance made selection difficult. Nor was it from lack of facility of style, but from an excess of reflection and attention. On one occasion, under a superior prompting, I entrusted to him a new and difficult subject and asked him to work on it carefully. He took charge of the subject and promptly formed an admirable and splendid conception of it. He told it to me and proceeded during three hours of conversation to indicate so many and such varied proofs that occurred to him, and so many beautiful treasures with which to clothe and adorn them, that I said the work was already done and that he would need to omit much lest what was to be only a brief booklet grow into a very bulky volume. Thus supplied with materials, I left him with pen in hand ready to begin the work and expected to see it completed within eight days. But he took more than three months; and when I went out of curiosity to examine it, I found that he had added nothing, but rather had omitted many of the ideas he had mentioned in conversation. I wished to know why he had left out this or that proof which seemed to me appropriate, and he answered me with such reasons that I marveled at the serious and prudent reflection with which he weighed and examined even the smallest matters. At last he said: “Your Reverence need not be surprised at my slowness. I am

an inexperienced craftsman who must never let the compass, rule, and level leave my hand, and this takes me much time." In reality it was not so much this as his attending more to the security and solidity of the work than to its external surface, properly imitating excellent sculptors who at every stroke of the chisel step backward to look and look again from every side whether the work corresponds to the conception and whether or not it falls short of what they have already accomplished.

42. So high an opinion did Father Luis's prudence and maturity deserve in this respect that the Superiors judged he could safely be dispensed from the strict and rigorous law common among our men, according to which their works, before being published, must pass through the censorship of three learned and impartial Reviewers unknown to the writer himself. They were content that Father Luis entrust his writings to the Father Rector of this College or to another whom the Father Rector might designate at his discretion, because they were firmly persuaded that his prudent, learned, and judicious file left nothing for any other, however subtle and delicate, to accomplish. His mature judgment, while serving as a spur to his hand, placed a bridle upon his pen; and though he surpassed all in breadth of intellect, in art he was more exact and more restrained. His mind was better expressed by his deeds and writings than by the slowness of his words; and if any hieroglyph is capable of symbolizing his spirit, none is better than a hand equally generous in liberality and with the pen—that is, a hand displaying a most abundant Cornucopia of gifts and among them a most precious golden pen. For abundance is not unbecoming to a wise man, since all goods dwell with Wisdom, nor is the pen foreign to a virtuous wise man, since Christ compared one who understood His doctrine to the learned scribe in the Kingdom of Heaven. In this class our piety regards the most religious Father Luis de Lossada, already enjoying the reward of his generous charity and having already converted into rest the horror he felt for idleness and his unceasing application to that most burdensome occupation of seeking the truth which God imposed upon the sons of men. To this alludes the epigraph or inscription read at the foot of the material portrait or painting of his person which our affection caused to be drawn here, desirous of having continually before our eyes the remembrance of his laboriousness, since it is not easy to transfer to a panel his virtues, which are the most honorable features of his spirit.

The Epigraph reads thus:

Behold the features: a briefer image will show you his mind,
A hand equally generous with the pen and with gifts.
Words here are slow to represent the mind; but that mind

Illustrious works, excellently written or done, make clear.
His deeds remain equal to his writings in number and excellence:
Judgment was a bridle to the pen, a spur to deeds.
More expansive than all in intellect, yet more concise in art,
Able to write much, he compressed himself to write only the best.

Honor and Glory to God.

To the Venerable Francisco Suárez, S.J.[1]

No hesitation of a wavering mind restrained me, Eximious Doctor and Father venerable under a thousand titles, from publishing the Philosophical Course of the Royal College of Salamanca under your auspices, and thereby taking care that it should nowhere perhaps be read beneath an unfavorable light. For "To the place whence the rivers come forth, they return" (Eccles. 1), as the Oracle of Divine Wisdom declares; and the lot of slender streams ought to be no other than this: after completing their course through barren and unpleasant soil, they return again to their source, crown themselves with a glorious end, and there wash away at their native origin of purity whatever defect of foreign savor they have contracted. Whatever there is in this Work-if anything there is-which the public light might begrudge to darkness or willingly receive to be illuminated, is yours, O Doctor Eximious in every respect, as derived from the most abundant fountain of your wisdom, or rather, I should say, from its Ocean; for I have held nothing of greater importance than to conduct the heavenly streams of Suárezian

[1] Formerly a most celebrated Master of Theology at Ávila, Segovia, Valladolid, Rome, Alcalá, and Salamanca; thereafter adorned at Évora with the Doctor's laurel; for a long time holder of the primary chair at the Royal University of Coimbra, at the repeated insistence of the Catholic King and the earnest petition of the whole University, and finally Emeritus; author of twenty-six or twenty-eight large and most learned volumes; while still living adorned by the Apostolic See with the title of DOCTOR EXIMIUS, PIOUS, and, by Divine grace, EMINENT in the Church of God; most illustrious for heroic virtues and complete holiness of life; and now, so far as human evidence can attain, reigning most gloriously in Heaven.

wisdom, by whatever ways I could, into my little gardens, and from them to obtain a most blessed fertility for soil however unfruitful.

"Heavenly streams," I say; for neither the judgment of all who knew your moral character and thereafter peruse your immortal writings, nor that miracle clearer than daylight by which, from a kind of darkness and night of intellect, with scarcely any twilight between, you suddenly became a most brilliant Sun, nor the very character of your wisdom in itself permits any other judgment. It claimed as though proper to itself whatever, when divided among excellent gifts, makes other Doctors most celebrated. This is almost a perpetual law of the human condition: no wise man holds first place in everything, and even the most learned man lacks something in himself which he envies or admires in another, whether it be the gift of a more fortunate nature or some brighter pearl from the jeweled treasury of the sciences. But that you were exempt from this common law, Venerable Doctor, is proved more than sufficiently by the most eminent gifts both of nature and of Grace which meet together in you. For who was loftier in intellect, more mature in judgment, deeper in penetration, readier in erudition, more fortunate in abundance and clarity of disputation?

All the alliances of the sciences vie to adorn you alone and are joined in so new and marvelous a bond that, without injury to their equality, each appears either uniquely or supremely eminent. Thus you are so great a Theologian that the admiration of theologians names you Father of sacred Theology; thus you so excel in Philosophy that the schools of philosophers salute you as their common Master; thus you reign in Canon Law that the most skilled canonists boast repeatedly of having learned from you the mysteries of a more sacred Astraea; thus you are versed in Civil Law that no one regards you as a stranger, all acknowledge you as one of the household, and confess that the golden keys of jurisprudence were plainly entrusted to you. Thus, whenever occasion presents itself, you employ with ease and wisdom all the other disciplines worthy of a liberal intellect, moving them at will as though all stood ready for your service, whithersoever you please. Thus at last, so far as the human condition permits, you were all-knowing, so that if ever any mortal possessed the fullest encyclopedia, no sincere man who has read and examined you can doubt that the most complete one came to you from Heaven.

With the fullest justice, therefore, the Supreme Pontiff, in four Apostolic Letters filled with honor and benevolence, besides bestowing upon you other exquisite praises, called you in a learned age abounding in most learned men the EXIMIOUS DOCTOR (Paul V, brief to Fr. Suárez, 9 Oct. 1607). By this title the most discerning Head of the Church expressed in

summary how greatly you rose above others in stature of mind, even when account is taken of the greatest sages, and how you displayed nothing commonplace, nothing that was not excellent, outstanding, singular, eminent, incomparable, gigantic. These and other qualities of still loftier force are vividly contained in the designation EXIMIOUS DOCTOR, a title which Giles of Rome judged worthy of St. Thomas, Cassiodorus of the great Augustine, and Chrysostom even of the Apostle Paul, Doctor of the whole world.

Thereafter the Republic of Letters established the title as permanently yours by common suffrage, most gladly receiving and confirming by its own observation the Pontifical Oracle, in which, to speak with the Poet, "Weight attends the words, and the fates follow the utterance." Nor did Christ's Vicar attest only once your eminence in the Catholic world. For elsewhere, after receiving your writings through the Apostolic Nuncio (Paul V, another brief to Fr. Suárez, 25 Aug. 1617), he said: "These writings, being consonant with your great piety and learning, were most welcome to us; for this reason we praise your work, as we ought, and exhort you in the Lord to continue serving the honor of God and the liberty of His Church, in which you so greatly EXCEL by Divine grace. For we know how much your authority can accomplish toward rooting out the cockle." In these words it is pleasing to observe with what vicarial brilliance you were distinguished in the Church of God; for in place of the Cardinal's purple, which you steadfastly refused when offered more than once, Divine grace, according to the testimony of the supreme Judge of truth, bestowed upon you a more precious EMINENCE.

But nothing more proves that your wisdom was friendly with Heaven, or descended from Heaven, than its closest association with every kind of virtue, that is, the conjunction of "your great piety" with "learning"; for which reason, when the Pontiff called you "Eximious," he added "and Pious." Hence you appear especially admirable because you shone forth no less Eximious in holiness than in wisdom; because you completed so many and such great books, filled with the most subtle speculation, that you would seem to have been able to think of nothing day and night except the School, and yet at the same time you excelled in so many and such great virtues of a religious man that one might believe that at every moment you desired nothing in your soul except the pursuit of evangelical perfection; because in the flight and perspicacity of intellect you seem altogether an Eagle, while at the same time in the conflagration of Divine love you appear altogether a Phoenix.

Without doubt, by continual contemplation you drank in the rays of the Divine Sun, who wished Himself to be called both Light and Fire, at once Wisdom and Charity. You were once observed in your study while at prayer, your body raised approximately two cubits from the ground and surrounded as though by a solar radiance, receiving upon your whole face and breast rays emitted from the image of the Crucified. Thus Christ the Lord certainly seemed, to the eyes if not to the ears, to say: "You have written brilliantly of me, Suárez," so that by this marvelous event also, just as in the other periods and actions of your life-which I find carefully recorded by others-you approached more closely to the likeness of the Angelic Doctor. That exchange of rays, in which the breast corresponded to the head, plainly showed that the abundance of fiery light sent by God belonged equally to your affection and your intellect. Hence that flame of Charity with which you burned in your inmost being, a "lamp" at once "burning and shining" (John 5).

Hence the most ardent love of the Catholic Religion with which, among your other Works, you published especially the *Defensio Fidei* against the errors of the Anglican sect, soaring far above the powers of human intellect: that admirable Work, I say, by which you both merited the approval of the Supreme Pontiff, expressed in paternal Letters, and stirred up the applause of Catholics together with the fury of heretics raging on every side. Hence that ardor to suffer martyrdom for the orthodox Faith, which often burst forth on other occasions, but especially when, upon hearing that your Book had been burned by heretics in the public square of London, envying it its pyre and its honorable disgrace, amid tender groans you sang that line of Ovid: "Without me, Book, will you go into the fire? Alas for me, that your master is not permitted to go with you!"

Hence also your zeal for defending ecclesiastical authority, by which first, in the Venetian controversies, at the urging, approval, and congratulation of the Apostolic See, you wrote more vigorously and more learnedly than all others; and afterward, during the disturbances at Lisbon, while the Vatican summit again multiplied its thanks and applause, you sustained with the whole strength of your wisdom and authority, and vindicated by their light, the oppressed or obscured cause of the Church, until you sacrificed to it a life consumed by glorious labor.

Passing over the other singular and very frequent examples of heroic virtues which the historians of your Life committed to writing, I appeal merely to the readers of your writings as witnesses, that I may exhibit the heavenly temperament not only of your intellect but also of your heart. There one sees your piety toward the Savior of the World, at once tender and

solid; and you show that the mysteries of His redeeming the human race and feeding it with His most sacred body were no less loved than understood by you. Your most ardent love toward the Most Blessed Virgin Mother of God seems to impart its warmth even to the written characters themselves. You loved her who loved you: for the mystical Star of the Sea favored you and the ocean of your wisdom with her light, especially after she saw you first defend in public contest at the school of Salamanca the excellence of the august Mother in grace and merits above all the heavenly citizens and even above the accumulated merits of all of them together; and the Queen of Heaven herself revealed to the Venerable Fr. Martín Gutiérrez that this homage had been most pleasing to her.

Your mastery in mystical Theology also, especially when you treat of Prayer, appears there with such clarity that everyone sees you speaking no more from the comprehension of the mind than from the abundance of the heart. A constant reverence for all the heavenly citizens everywhere meets the reader there, especially for the Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church. You nowhere abandon any of those Stars; you diligently reconcile each both with himself and with the others, or with unwearied effort vindicate him in the light of sound doctrine. Nor only these, but all classical Writers of every nation, School, and profession, you treat with marvelous courtesy, civility, and modesty. Whenever they deserve praise, you praise them generously. Wherever they speak more harshly, you receive their words with a benign interpretation. If at times it is better to hold another opinion, you let them depart either willingly or at least not unwillingly, certainly with good grace.

This signal and uninterrupted modesty, whether you defend your own views or overthrow those of others, makes you the delight of the Schools; for while they take from you the sweetest nectar of wisdom, they fear no sting whatever. Such sweetness of style fittingly belonged to a princely intellect; for the king of the bees either does not know how to plant a sting or has none. But it is pleasing to hear from you yourself what exemplar you set before yourself. In that Volume which you first published, and according to whose standard you regulated the others, you preface as follows (Pref., vol. 1, in 3. p.): "In confirming or refuting the opinions of others, I have endeavored to imitate the modesty of St. Thomas, which is supreme. Accordingly, I present the Authors themselves in such a way that due praise is given to each; and I set forth even those opinions of theirs which I do not approve in such a way that the reader can most easily judge how much weight and authority each opinion possesses, without reproach or injury to anyone."

Besides his example, you undoubtedly also kept before your eyes this precept of the Angelic Master (St. Thomas, *Metaphysica* XII, lect. 9): "We

ought to love both kinds of men, namely those whose opinion we follow and those whose opinion we reject; for both devoted themselves to the search for truth, and in this they have assisted us." Moreover, this most peaceful mode of disputing, by which you repel blows without inflicting a reciprocal wound, is the more admirable in you because your doctrine endured more numerous and quite pointed adversaries. For how many and how fierce were the critics whom you either saw in person or heard and read from afar rising against it? At the very least you were accused of novelty by those who did not dare attack you from any other quarter: as though it had not always been the lot of great intellects to be accused of novelty in doctrine; as though the writer were never worthy of praise "who brings forth from his treasury things new and old" (Matt. 13); as though the Angelic Doctor, in order to become supreme, had not opened for himself a new path by an intellect altogether rare and new.

"For he was," says a grave contemporary Author, "NEW in proposing articles in his teaching, discovering a NEW and clear manner of determining, and introducing NEW arguments into his determinations, so that no one who heard him teaching NEW things and deciding doubts by NEW arguments could doubt that God had enlightened him with rays of NEW light, since he immediately began to possess such certainty of judgment that he did not hesitate to teach and write NEW opinions which God had deigned NEWLY to inspire" (William of Tocco, *Vita S. Thomae*, c. 3, n. 15). And he was still more admirable in this, as the same Author observes, that in so short a time he was able to complete so many Books "and by writing to teach so many NOVELTIES" (ibid., c. 4, n. 18). Yet this abundance, or most fertile crop of novelties, which St. Antoninus also commends in almost the same words in the Angelic Doctor (St. Antoninus, *Historia* III, tit. 23, c. 7, § 5, 10), is turned not to reproach but to praise, nor does it detract anything from the antiquity of the doctrine.

This you yourself, Venerable Doctor, testify concerning yourself and at the same time concerning your most noble exemplar. "In matters," you say, "in which there is room for opinion, following the prudence and example of the Angelic Doctor, I made this choice: to prefer those things which are pious, weighty, and ancient to those which seem to depart from piety, gravity, and antiquity" (Suárez, cited Pref., vol. 1, in 3. p.). Nor should a novelty friendly to antiquity appear an enigma to anyone, since it was the immortal glory of Columbus to show Europeans a new World, ancient indeed in itself, but discovered by a new and previously inaccessible navigation.

Yet to this and the other accusations made against your writings you returned nothing, whether by word or writing, except modesty, humility, and truth, as became a "Doctor of a higher sphere" (Descamps, *Vita P. Suárez*, p. 4, c. 15)-for the Supreme Pontiff Alexander VII distinguished you by this title-a sphere to which the whirlwinds of the winds and the assaults of storms do not reach. Meanwhile, contemptuous of your own glory, you were zealous for the honor of others, especially the Ancients and those regarded as Princes of the Schools. Among them you deserved so well of Scotus, the Phoenix of Intellects, that it is easy to see how great was your kinship with the Subtle Doctor, otherwise sufficiently evident whether one compares your wisdom, acumen, modesty, love of the Virgin Mother of God, or the other great virtues of your souls.

But to no one did you adhere more studiously or lovingly than to the most illustrious Sun of the Schools, St. Thomas Aquinas. You chose this great Angel as protector of your studies, as though, with the Angelic Doctor designated, you regarded this oracle as addressed to yourself: "My Angel shall go before you. Observe him and hear his voice" (Exod. 23). You teach scarcely anything to which his authority does not spontaneously lend its support; he teaches nothing toward which you yourself are not borne, always in honor and almost always in judgment. And if you ever deliberate about departing from him-which never occurs in a matter of importance, especially a theological one-you tear yourself away with the greatest reverence, indeed with a certain vehement resistance of your love; nor do you permit him to depart even for a moment unless he blesses you first. Thus at such moments I seem to see the modesty of Suárez wrestling, as it were, with the authority of Thomas, and confidently saying like Jacob holding the Angel: "I will not let you go unless you bless me" (Gen. 32).

Rightly, therefore, did the Venerable Fr. Lorenzo Aponte of the sacred family of the Clerics Regular Minor not hesitate to assign you first place among the true disciples and interpreters of St. Thomas (Aponte, in Sap., c. 10, n. 13, hom. 32, 5, 3, n. 19): "Suárez," he says, "wrote with such piety, such lucidity, such acuteness, such gravity, and finally such modesty, that he truly deserves to be considered by all the foremost of the disciples and interpreters of St. Thomas; and if you add his most holy and immaculate life-as all of us know, have seen, and attest-you will render his doctrine altogether most worthy of every estimation."

While recalling this, I cannot help pleasantly remembering that here at Salamanca you recently received testimony of this praise. A few years ago a perpetual Chair was erected and endowed at the University of Salamanca for the public teaching of your doctrine, by command of the Catholic King

Philip V, but through the efforts and at the expense of the Most Illustrious Lord Francisco de Perea y Porras, Archbishop of Granada. Himself born at Granada, he gloriously ennobles and adorns the native soil of the Eximious Doctor not only by the episcopal mitre but also by the splendor of his lineage, as well as by intellect, wisdom, piety, and a most ardent zeal for the salvation of souls.

It was then discussed among the Doctors of Sacred Theology at Salamanca from what Book the text should be drawn by lot whenever candidates competed, according to custom, by lectures for the Suárezian Chair. While different men held different opinions on this matter, there was present a Dominican Master, a man of profound and acknowledged wisdom and holder of the primary Chair in the University. Pouring forth generously and liberally in praise of Suárez, he argued at length that no more suitable source could be found for drawing the theme of the candidates for the Suárezian Chair than the very Books of St. Thomas: the Eximious Doctor had been a most devoted disciple of St. Thomas, and his doctrine was no other than that of the Angelic Teacher. It would therefore readily follow that, when the genuine meaning of St. Thomas was publicly expounded, drawn from his own text or words, the very doctrine of Suárez would occupy the Chair erected under his name and auspices.

Nevertheless, lest anything be done contrary to the custom observed in the Chairs of other individual Doctors, a different judgment was reached; and it was determined that the Book of the *Opuscula* of the Eximious Doctor should serve as the text for the public lectures. I mean that excellent Work written amid the heat of the controversy concerning the Helps of Divine grace, which vigorously and successfully sustained the cause of the Society of Jesus, and which, after being carefully read by the Most Holy Clement VIII, gave him a high opinion of our doctrine, especially after there occurred an event resembling a miracle.

For while Clement was reading the *Opuscula* of Suárez late at night and, sleep gradually stealing upon him, lay overcome by it, the flame of a nearby candle happened to catch the Book. It was already boldly flying toward the bed when the Pontiff, awakened by smoke and crackling and calling for his chamberlain, had the fire immediately extinguished. “It is not a good omen,” he said, “that the Book of Suárez, now when his doctrine is so greatly disputed, should catch fire so readily and offer itself as food to the flames.” “Rather, Most Holy Father,” replied the chamberlain, “Heaven grants better things; for so far as the doctrine is concerned, the flame dared violate absolutely nothing. It consumed many margins of the leaves, indeed, but was altogether harmless to the characters: it disfigured none and touched none.”

Clement, marveling, inspected the matter with his own eyes and thereafter regarded as dearer and more precious the Book whose integrity stood forth more illustriously amid the scorched leaves.

The text of this Book, therefore, was prescribed for those aspiring to the Suárezian Chair. Yet meanwhile the testimony of that most learned Master must carry very great weight, so that the doctrine of Suárez may be believed inseparable and undivided from that which is truly Thomistic doctrine.

Let the Eximious Doctor himself also bear witness. Near the end of his completed life, while writing his most polished Work *De gratia*, after extolling St. Thomas with great praises, asserting him equal to Augustine himself and the most faithful follower and most vigorous defender of his doctrine, he adds (Suárez, *De gratia*, Prolegom. 6, c. 6, n. 28): "Wherefore, since in our other writings and theological disputations we have always regarded St. Thomas as our principal guide and master, and have endeavored according to our powers to understand, defend, and follow his doctrine, in the present Work we shall take care to do this with far greater study and affection. And with Divine assistance we hope to attain this: that in no grave matter or matter of any importance shall we depart from his true mind and opinion, drawing it not from our own head, but from his ancient expositors and followers, and, where these are lacking, from comparison of various passages of his with one another."

Thus he gives most ample testimony concerning himself, and that in a Work containing the scholastic doctrine which especially distinguishes the School of the Society from others. Whoever is not wholly ignorant of both the acuteness of his enlightened mind and the candor of his soul and holiness of life will readily believe that, in speaking of himself, he was neither deceived nor deceiving. All the more, therefore, may we wonder at the harsh and unskilled manner of proceeding of certain men who command Suárez and all who profit from his teaching not only to wander outside the School of St. Thomas, but even pronounce them adversaries of truly Thomistic doctrine and think that none are really Thomists except those whom common usage knows under the name Thomists.

Indeed, these men define the School of St. Thomas within excessively narrow bounds, although his doctrine would not so resemble an Ocean unless it washed the different shores of nations, nor would it so closely imitate the majesty of Oracles unless it admitted various interpretations. The Angelic Doctor is the Sun of the Scholastic World, and therefore withdraws himself from none who look upon him, by whatever name they may finally be called or from whatever region of the literary world they behold him.

Certainly there are very many controversies in Philosophy and Theology in which the champions on both sides protect themselves, as though with the shield of Pallas, by the authority of St. Thomas. Which side the Angelic Doctor favors is no less doubtful than which side possesses the truth. Accordingly, either both or neither may be disciples of so great a Doctor. It is universally known that even among those themselves who are called Thomists contrary paths of opinion are frequently taken. Therefore, to walk more than once by contrary paths will not be to depart from the way of St. Thomas or from his discipline.

But why should it be permissible for the Thomists, even those living outside the most illustrious Order of Preachers, rather than for Suárez or others, to open new paths within the most ample School of St. Thomas? Will embracing physical Premotion in regard to free acts-although, besides the Authors of the Society, very many others steadfastly deny that it is an offspring of the doctrine of the Angelic Teacher-be enough for them to receive thereby at once, above all others, the gift of interpreting St. Thomas? It would be astonishing if reason or equity allowed this.

Suppose Jesuit Writers had taught some opinion for a hundred years, perhaps a hundred of them, and had maintained that it was entirely conformable to the mind of St. Thomas. It is useless. All these men are outsiders; they have nothing to do with the School of the Angelic Teacher. But let some Writer arise from among those who attribute to themselves the name Thomists and deign to give his vote to that same opinion. Suddenly a new "way of St. Thomas" is opened, along which the same opinion may thereafter proceed with honor, having received the right of citizenship within the School of the Holy Doctor.

I shall give an example from Logic. Not many years ago the opinion that the angelic nature, although incapable of numerical plurality, was nevertheless a predicable Species possessed such solid authority in the School of St. Thomas that grave Thomists declared it "the opinion of all the disciples of St. Thomas, and that one who held the opposite was not to be considered a Thomist" (Carmelit. Complut., disp. 6, Log., q. 4, n. 39). But now, after distinguished recent members of the Thomist body began to agree with the Outsiders and favor the negative opinion, that opinion immediately ceased to be an exile; walking confidently along the way of St. Thomas, it became most fully consonant with his teachings.

By what fate, then, has it happened to the Doctors of the Society that they alone are blind when reading the writings of St. Thomas? They are many, they are intelligent, learned, pious, sincere, lovers of truth and haters of errors-which no one could deny without the gravest injustice. They

profess, moreover, that on almost all matters of importance they investigate, maintain, and embrace the meaning of St. Thomas, and that nothing is more earnestly desired by them than actually to be his disciples. Why are they thought incapable even of attaining probably to the meaning of St. Thomas?

Let them indeed be, if you please, Outsiders to the Thomistic School promoted by certain Masters, men altogether distinguished, wise, and grave, though not especially ancient nor all-knowing. But that within the School of St. Thomas no other schools can be found, perhaps no less pleasing to the Angelic Teacher, whose lecture halls receive Jesuit Doctors as members of the household-this is what we in good and steadfast faith deny, and shall deny even unto the consummation of the age.

I have said these things, Eximious Doctor, not that they might console you, who, if any faith is to be placed in human indications, are most abundantly endowed with heavenly beatitude and can now be moved by no murmur of detractors, but that I might indulge my own grief, which can scarcely bear without the greatest pain that you are commonly regarded as alien to the doctrine of the Angelic Teacher. I most ardently revere and love St. Thomas; and while I offer these studies of mine to you, I believe that I consecrate them equally to him. For they could not approach the sight of so great a divinity, as it were, of the sciences more acceptably than through the hands of so great a disciple. And for this reason also, while I adhere wholly to you, I have no doubt that I am wholly treading in his footsteps as well. I follow one who follows him.

Thus far I have touched upon great proofs of your heavenly wisdom and of light divinely poured forth. But others are at hand, if possible still more marvelous: for example, that you retained the sacred Bible in memory not only word for word but also with such comprehension of its hidden meaning that no question concerning Divine Scripture ever found you unprepared or hesitating. Among other witnesses, a man of unshaken authority bore testimony to this marvel; himself a most learned interpreter of the Divine Books, he often consulted you concerning the most difficult passages of both Testaments and never departed without astonishment. He repeatedly affirmed that Suárez seemed to him greater in understanding sacred Scripture than in scholastic Theology, although in the latter he was regarded as supreme.

To the same point belongs that prodigy of your immensely capacious mind by which the writings of the Holy Fathers and other Doctors were faithfully present to you, whenever you wished, as though you were beholding them with your eyes, especially those of the great Augustine, though so numerous, profound, and varied-a fact which you yourself were

once compelled to acknowledge. For when in a public disputation someone objected against you a text allegedly taken from Augustine, and, after you rejected the citation as fictitious, attacked you more forcefully and boldly, carried away by love of truth you declared that all the writings of St. Augustine were most present to your mind and that you knew with certainty that the words then objected were nowhere found in his Books.

Because of your modesty you afterward regretted having said this as though arrogantly or rashly; yet you did not dare retract it as though falsely stated. Nor was there anyone among those who knew you more closely who did not believe you, since they could constantly see that, without manuscript and without Book, you could publicly deliver from the Chair whatever lectures you wished to your disciples for transcription, and privately dictate Works for publication to secretaries, often-marvelous to say!-three or four at once, concerning matters very different from one another and deeply recondite. Thus each might say of Suárez what Baruch the secretary once asserted concerning Jeremiah dictating: "From his mouth he spoke all these words to me as though reading them, and I wrote them in the volume with ink" (Jer. 36,18).

The marvel is increased by the fact that in this manner you could dictate with such learning, subtlety, order, perspicuity, coherence, and fidelity in assigning the passages of innumerable Authors. But still more marvelous is that at the same time you employed such maturity of judgment together with such rapid and ready felicity in discourse that you dictated everything with the greatest exactness and thereafter had no need to alter even a single word of what had once been dictated.

I should become endless if I wished to follow in speech everything that shone forth in you beyond the human. Learned men illustrious for wisdom, distinguished in dignity, and celebrated in reputation expressed most of these things with a certain concise force, and through their mouths you are everywhere acclaimed (for these and other testimonies, see Fr. Antoine Descamps, *Vita P. Suárez*, p. 6, c. 1-7): "A prodigy of Theology; a man learned to the point of marvel; prince of letters; common Master of this age; most celebrated, most religious, most wise, most eminent Doctor; one man worth a thousand; Father of Theology in these times; immortal glory of Spain; glory, crown, and outstanding radiance of the Society of Jesus; splendid Sun of the Church; a Master not only most learned in Scholastic Theology but also most spiritual in mystical Theology; incomparable in Wisdom but still more excellent in holiness and heroic virtues"; finally, "the Augustine of our age and another Thomas."

I long ago determined that it was lawful for me to cherish you with love under these names and with my whole heart to venerate and honor a man not yet inscribed in the catalogue of the Saints. Hence long ago I also designated you with eager affection as the guide of my studies and my best Maecenas. This Philosophical Work, therefore, which under the auspices of Obedience I arranged and now publish, I altogether wished to be dedicated to your name, as though by some necessity of right it were owed to you. I desire and humbly pray that you receive it graciously as the eternal pledge of my study, love, and veneration.

Your most loving and most devoted servant
Luis de Losada.
IHS

Declaration of the Author.

Willingly obeying the decrees of the Most Holy Urban VIII, I openly declare that in all praises and encomia, signs and testimonies of holiness, whether pertaining to Fr. Francisco Suárez or to others not yet enrolled by the Church among the Blessed, which are contained in this dedicatory address, I do not intend in any way to anticipate the judgment of the Apostolic See or to exceed the limits of merely human faith. I profoundly submit this entire present Work and all my writings to the correction of the Holy Roman Church.

To the Lord Juan Antonio de Lardizábal.[1]

In order to discharge the duty imposed upon me by the Most Illustrious Lord Don Silvestre García Escalona, most worthy Bishop of the Church of Salamanca and Royal Councillor, I diligently applied my mind and effort to the Book entitled *Cursus Philosophicus Regalis Collegii Salmanticensis Societatis Jesu in tres partes divisus*, composed by the Most Reverend Fr. Luis Losada of the same Society and interpreter of Sacred Scripture in that same Royal College. But while I am commanded to assume the person of a Censor, I find myself reluctantly yet gladly compelled to become a Panegyrist, and, as though the censorial rod were thereby rendered idle, to free my palms for applause, even though the panegyric be unpolished. For what would be fitting for me, a disciple of the Society of Jesus-which I shall always profess with gratitude-except to receive with applause a Master of that same Society?

As soon as I looked upon the title page of the work, a certain powerful force immediately extracted my vote with cheerful violence-a force I should call innate, had not my mind, captivated by so many merits, intensified it to such a degree-so that from that moment I framed my judgment not as a rigorous censure but as a grateful encomium, this maxim continually moving

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[1] Censure of the Most Illustrious Lord Don Juan Antonio de Lardizábal y Elorza, formerly a Gowned Fellow of the Major College of St. Bartholomew, Magistral Canon in the Church of Salamanca, and holder of the Chair of Scotus in the illustrious University of the same city, now the most deserving Bishop of Puebla.

before the eyes of my mind: "The Writer is of the Society of Jesus; the work is good." Indeed, this title so completely recommends this Philosophical work to me that I regard any further examination as entirely superfluous, well aware as I am of the diligent study and most exact care with which the men of this Society examine a work intended for publication.

The individual Author himself also recommends the work to me in the highest degree, for I experienced long ago-and with what pleasure!-his judgment and skill in writing, when, portraying with an elegant brush the life of my most beloved and ever-venerable Master, the Venerable Fr. Jerónimo Datari, he traced the path of perfection itself with so subtle and straight a pen.

Yet lest I seem to indulge too much the partiality of love, I summon all Readers as Censors. Let them estimate the undertaking of the Work, weigh its plan, look toward its end, examine its workmanship: they will admire everything as most approved. Certainly its undertaking is of such a nature that, although repeated so often, it brings no less praise to Authors of this character. Indeed, although this barren field of Pallas, barren of sap and pleasantness, seemed as though exhausted and therefore bound to wither, nevertheless, irrigated by the sweat of intellects, it germinates all the more fruitfully with palms and laurels by which to wipe away the sweat of their labor.

Its plan is the very one which everywhere engages the care, labor, and study of the Society: namely, to make the arduous ascent of the sciences more level by laying their foundation more solidly; to provide freer access to the hidden sanctuaries of Wisdom by opening this doorway more widely; and thus to attain that end sought by so many arts and labors, namely the cultivated education of young men, especially students.

Nor does workmanship hold a lower place in a work complete in every respect: a suitable and properly ordered method; a skillfully adorned style, acute without bitterness, clear without prolixity, concise without obscurity; weighty grounds of reasoning; effective force of arguments; in short, all those qualities which Quintilian prescribed for himself in his writings when he said: "For us the first virtue shall be perspicuity, proper words, right order, a conclusion not deferred too long; nothing should be lacking and nothing superfluous; thus speech will be acceptable to the learned and plain to the unlearned" (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* VIII, c. 2, at end). Such indeed are the qualities which cultivate this arid soil of Philosophy so that amid the rough and thorny thickets of difficulties which it produces of itself, sharp enough to prick even the subtlest edge of intellects, the mature fruits

of truths may spring forth in cheerful down and readily answer the appetite of the mind.

Yet because all these things are less than so great an Author, others will perhaps call them mere exercises of his intellect; but I would rather assert that in publishing them he did not treat the labor as play, when I silently consider within myself how exactly he composed everything according to rule, how finely he polished it, with what usefulness the Dialectic is constructed, with what delight the secrets of Physics are disclosed, with what subtlety Metaphysics is investigated and with what perspicuity its difficulties are resolved, and finally with what brilliance and sublimity everything has been elaborated.

O immortal God! By what services has this most accurate Writer not deserved well of the Republic of Letters! At least I profess nothing else, nor, when asked for my judgment, would I dare pronounce anything else than that this is a work most worthy for all to desire and possess. Therefore I shall reduce the sum of my entire Censure to prayers by which I beseech that the Physics and Metaphysics also may see the light as soon as possible, meanwhile certain both of the usefulness which the work commands us to expect and of the glory which the Author rejects but the work deserves; for, to speak with Barclay, "this book will endure through many ages and transmit to posterity an Author full of glory" (John Barclay, *Argenis* II). At Scrabi in Cantabria, 12 March 1723.

Juan Antonio, Bishop of Puebla

To the Most Reverend Father Andrés Cid[1]

In obedience to the decree of the Supreme Council of Castile, I began to examine and, drawn onward by the inclination of a captivated mind, read to the end the Book entitled *Cursus Philosophicus Regalis Collegii Salmanticensis Societatis Jesu in tres partes divisus*, recently composed by the Reverend Father Master Luis Losada, Theologian of the same Society and Interpreter of the Sacred Bible in the aforesaid College.

And while my pen was eager to burst forth into praises of the Book-nor should you suppose that by breathing forth such praises it neglected the severe duty of a Censor, for I ask, what labor of so approved a Writer could be subject to censure without extorting a panegyric?-while, I say, I am compelled to express my preconceived judgment, I sincerely declare that the very dignity of the work almost draws me away from my purpose. For although this Course may rightly be called a Nile, fertilizing minds with profitable waves of wisdom, it by no means permits the limpid fountain from which it took its origin to remain hidden: on every page it both shows and professes itself to be a stream of Jesuit doctrine.

But who would attempt to pursue with praise the doctrine of that most illustrious Society without fearing that he would rather obscure its glory

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[1] Censure of the Most Reverend Father Master Fr. Andrés Cid, Master General of the Cistercian Order, more than once also Definitor General, repeatedly Abbot of the College of Salamanca, adorned with the honors of Supreme Superior of the whole Order, Doctor of Theology in the University of Salamanca and holder of the primary Chair of that Faculty.

than augment it with new splendor? I prefer to offer the testimony of one to whom, although he belongs to the household, no one, I think, will refuse the fullest credit. St. Francis Xavier, Apostle of the Indies and illustrious glory of the Society, speaks thus beforehand concerning the doctrine and letters of the Jesuits (St. Francis Xavier, lib. 3, Epist. 4, to the companions residing at Rome; apud Peralta in his life, division 4; Gen. 1): "I trust that the indwelling Spirit of the Lord rules over the doctrine and learning of our Society."

What, I ask, can be more excellent than that doctrine over which the spirit of true wisdom holds dominion? Already then, as formerly at the cradle of the world, "the Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters"-over, I say, that great sea of every kind of wisdom which was being prepared in the very beginnings of the Jesuit Family, that thereafter it might spread with the richest influx throughout the whole terrestrial globe, lest in any part of it the "earth" should be "empty and void" of the flowers and fruits of a more fortunate age.

But let us hear the instrument of the Most Holy Spirit Himself, namely Pius IV, Supreme Pontiff of the Church, speaking these words concerning the members of the Society (Pius IV, Bull *Est ex debito*, 13 Apr. 1561): "As they have assumed the name Companions of Jesus, so by work, doctrine, and examples they strive to imitate our Lord Jesus Christ."

No one, therefore, should henceforth regard it as extraordinary that our Most Illustrious Caramuel repelled the calumny imposed upon Jesuit doctrine with these very sharp words (Caramuel, *Theologia fundamentalis*, fundam. 55, § 16): "Let an owl call the Sun dark; I, who see the contrary with my own eyes, do not therefore esteem the rays of the Sun less, but shall say that the owl is blind.... For as many rays as the owl took from the Sun, so many did Jansenius take from the Society.... The piety of the Society, established over a whole century and adorned and strengthened by the blood of so many Martyrs, is not something that can be obscured by the foul breath of one or another Dutchman."

Nor should one wonder that Jesuit doctrine advances surrounded by rays of the Sun, since the Jesuits themselves strive with innate piety and unwearied labor to drink in and distribute the rays of the Sun of the Church, namely the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas, as the illustrious Dominican Natalis Comes says (apud Theodorus Eleutherius, *Historia controversiae de auxiliis* I, c. 4): "Certainly the veneration of the Society of Jesus for Thomas moved the most learned theologians whom it possessed, most sagacious and grave critics, to investigate the works of St. Thomas, the study of whose doctrine had been imposed upon them by law. And the fruit answers to the labor, because through the works of the Jesuits this

beneficent Sun illuminated very many regions of the world and freed them from the clouds of errors."

Here it is useful to add the very acute observation of a learned and grave Writer of Pontifical History, Doctor Luis de Bavia. After relating the inscription which Gregory XIII wished to have carved in permanent characters upon the façade of the Roman College, most magnificently built by him, in these words, GREGORY XIII, SUPREME PONTIFF, TO RELIGION AND THE LIBERAL ARTS, he adds no less truly than ingeniously (Bavia, en la vida de Gregor. XIII, cap. 57): "And I think that this inscription is a quidditative definition of what the Society is, and that the Pontiff's clear judgment could not have found one more fitting; for all the other virtues accompany Religion and Letters, and when Gregory built a house for these two, he entrusted them to this Religious Order."

Such sublime testimonies would more than suffice for the excellent School of the Society to come forth adorned with still brighter glory. But that it may shine more brilliantly, let us pass from the flowers by which it is surrounded to the rich fruits which it has produced for the world; for, as our mellifluous Father Bernard very rightly admonished, "The more abundant production of fruits is indeed a great testimony to fertile soil" (St. Bernard, Serm. 23, in *Cantica*).

Certainly there would be no end to speaking if I wished to enumerate how many benefits the Church has drawn from the doctrine of the Society, or how many abundant fruits of usefulness daily spring from Jesuit wisdom in aid of the Christian Commonwealth. Indeed, the Most Holy Paul III addressed the Society in this manner (Paul III, Bull *Cum inter*, 3 June 1545): "Considering the abundant fruits which you have thus far produced in the House of the Lord and do not cease producing by your Religion, Integrity, Knowledge, and doctrine."

Gregory XIII speaks not unlike him (Gregory XIII, Bull *Salvatoris*, 30 Oct. 1576): "And long since, because of the Society's functions, so useful and so necessary, which it exercises in its Colleges through instruction both in the humanities and in Philosophy and Theology for imbuing youth with good morals and learning... to the great benefit of God and spiritual advantage of the Church."

Nor should we pass over St. Pius V, who wonderfully advances this matter. "Often revolving in our mind," he said, "the innumerable fruits which, with the Lord's blessing, the Society of Jesus has most happily thus far brought to the Christian world, by producing men distinguished especially in knowledge of sacred letters... and which with diligent studies it still does not cease to bring" (Pius V, Bull *Innumerabilis*, 28 Apr. 1568).

Appropriately, therefore, the most learned Master Gravina wished the great Father Ignatius to be represented under the symbol of the fruitful vine and fruit-bearing olive, thus beautifully extolling the fruits of the Society (Gravina, *Vox turturis*, part. 2, c. 30): "As cooperators, the Jesuits cultivate the soil of the human heart by sermons, lectures, and catechism... and with leaves, flowers, and fruits-that is, with doctrine, word, and example-they display the living branches of so great a vine.... To this tends the Institute of St. Ignatius and his sons: that... from disputations and encounters with Heretics victory may be obtained. To the olive belongs the erection of Schools, Colleges, and Seminaries for nurturing youth, for cooperation... in the most divine learning of all and in the education of adolescents.... Everywhere you will encounter most learned Theologians, Scholastics, and Interpreters of the Scriptures."

Let Romanus Hai, a distinguished offspring of our Benedictine stock, close the line, making plain to all the end which the wisdom of the Society sets before itself and the fruits which it strives to produce (Romanus Hai, *Astrum inextinctum*, q. 8, n. 9): "What else do so many volumes published by the most learned theologians of the Society, so many treatises, so many... works made public, proclaim except that each should receive his due, that errors and vices should be eliminated, and that Christian Charity and the virtues should be implanted in the souls of mortals?"

We therefore present this Course as especially commended precisely when we recognize it as the genuine offspring of the Jesuit School. Yet it is disclosed as commendable under still another name, namely that of its Author, a man not only most deeply versed in the vast Ocean of every kind of wisdom but also distinguished by uprightness of morals and Religious circumspection, to whom the maxim of St. Peter Chrysologus is most fittingly applied: "Mastery rests upon knowledge; the authority of a Master rests upon life" (Chrysologus, Serm. 167).

Indeed, we should undertake an immensely broad province if we wished to ascend from the leaves to the lofty tree, from praise of the Work to praises of the Author; or even to taste the immortal praises of the College of Salamanca, Royal not more in its structure than in the splendor of its virtues and majesty of doctrine, by whose name this Work is adorned: namely, that Heavenly Sphere upon earth which grows illustrious day by day through new and most worthy alumni, that is, through stars most brilliant in religion and wisdom.

It is better to restrain the boldness of veneration and love; for deservedly would that astronomer be mocked who boasted that he had discovered the number of the stars shining in the heavens. Approaching

more closely, then, to the duty imposed upon me, I judge this Work most worthy of the public light, since it is most consonant with the dogmas of the Most Holy Faith and excellently provides for the usefulness of Philosophy both to those who expound it and those who learn it. Such is my judgment, "saving, etc." At Salamanca, in this College of our Holy Father Bernard, on the 2nd day of April, in the Year of the Lord 1723.

Master Fr. Andrés Cid

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY[1]

— PROOEMIUM —

If one considers the magnificent encomia by which Logic is everywhere proclaimed by the sages as the art of arts, the instrument of the sciences, the mistress of the mind, the touchstone for investigating truth, the safest guide of human reason through the vast sea of knowable things, and the brightest cynosure amid the gathering tempests of errors, in my judgment they apply most especially to the Dialectical Institutions. That work, content with the title of Little Logic, or Summaries, grows greater in utility than in name or bulk. Here almost the whole art of reasoning is contained; here unshaken rules are handed down, by which the mind, once instructed, may everywhere recognize the true by its proper marks, and may not easily suffer errors disguised beneath the appearance of truth to be foisted upon it. Yet the same praises may deservedly be applied to the work which we now undertake, and which is called Great, or Major, Logic because it is both greater in volume and far more difficult in the matters themselves, both its own and those borrowed, according to the common method of the Schools, from Psychology and Metaphysics. For whatever we shall treat in it greatly assists

[1] As stated above, the present course opens with Major Logic. The reader is therefore presumed to have already mastered Minor Logic; for a thorough treatment of the latter, we refer him to our Most Beloved Fr. Juan José Urráburu, S.J., who treats it at length in his *Institutiones Philosophicae*.

the use and understanding of the logical art, and lays down certain general foundations most useful to all the sciences. Following, therefore, the received method, I shall divide the whole work into six Treatises. The last will be the most properly logical and necessary for completing the Dialectical Institutions. The first is called, and is, Introductory: both because it discusses not a few matters preliminary to all disciplines and to be known beforehand at the threshold of every science, and because in it our mind, before hearing Logic teach, pauses for a while and reflects upon its own mistress, so that it may at least know by sight her from whom it receives so much assistance. Hence this Treatise will not undeservedly be called "Reflex Logic."

TREATISE I.
ON THE NATURE AND OBJECT OF LOGIC.

DISPUTATION I.
ON THE NATURE OF LOGIC.

Since no faculty can be known without knowledge of its object, someone may perhaps think that the right order is departed from when the nature of Logic is discussed before its object. But since it is sufficiently clear from the Dialectical Institutions that this faculty is concerned with the operations of the intellect as with its proper matter, and that its proper office is to instruct the mind by precepts and rules so that, by correctly defining, dividing, and arguing, it may investigate the natures of things and discern the true from the false, the object of Logic is already sufficiently known for the present Disputation not to labor over an unknown or uncertain matter. Moreover, since the discussion of the object of Logic is subtler and more intricate, it will more conveniently be deferred for a little while; for it is better, so far as possible, to begin with easier matters.

CHAPTER I.

On the Notion, Existence, Quiddity, Utility, and Origin of Logic.

1. The faculty which we undertake to explain is known by these three names: "Logic, Dialectic, Rational Philosophy." The name "Logic" derives from the Greek "logos," to which in Latin correspond "reason" or "speech"; and therefore it suitably belongs to the faculty which systematically refines reason and perfects internal speech. "Dialectic" likewise has a Greek etymology, common to "dialogue," by which it was customary in ancient times to teach and explain. Some hold that this name belongs not to the whole of Logic, but only to that part of it which teaches how to reason from probable premises; and Aristotle and St. Thomas more frequently speak in this way. Others distribute the names so that "Logic" designates what treats of the demonstrative syllogism, while "Dialectic" treats of the probable. But present usage, already long ago approved by Cicero (L. *De Fato*, et I, *De Finibus*; cf. Conimbric., q. 4, prooem.), has prevailed, so that either name signifies the whole art which is occupied with the governance of reason, and which from this office is also called "Rational Philosophy."

2. Some of the ancients, who chose to be blind in the midday light, denied that this art exists or is possible. The reason for this paradox may have been: 1º, that the operation of the mind is natural and, once the object is proposed, necessary; but a natural and necessary operation cannot be directed by art; therefore there is no art which directs the mind in operating, or thinking, just as none is possible which gives the stars rules for illuminating or the eyes precepts for seeing. 2º, that the intellect of its own nature always tends toward the true as toward its objective sphere, whose limits it cannot overstep; therefore it needs no art to keep it from departing from the true.

3. But the existence of Logic is more evident than to require proofs, unless one wishes so many philosophers of every age and nation, so many universities, so many masters, and so many disciples as have hitherto undertaken, and daily undertake, either to learn or to illustrate Logic, to have been grasping at an empty shadow. Nor are the opposing reasons of any weight. To 1º, we grant that natural operations which are always uniform are directed by no art; the illumination of the stars and the vision of the eyes prove this. But the operation of the mind, although natural, is nevertheless indifferent as to being elicited in various ways, now rightly, now disorderly. For although the mind necessarily apprehends in some fashion an object

proposed to it, it does not thereby always necessarily judge concerning its nature, causes, and effects; nor, if it judges, does it necessarily observe a determinate mode. Hence it must be denied that the operation of the mind is necessary in this sense, since it is very often subject to the command of the will.

4. To 2º. If our intellect can never depart from the true, it can never be deceived or err. Would that this were true and were not refuted by all too daily an experience! It is therefore everywhere deceived, and undoubtedly errs by an error opposed to the formal truth of cognition; for it often judges that an object exists which does not exist in reality, and often believes that something is what it is not. Hence, in order to avoid errors of this kind, it is assisted by the art of Dialectic. It is nevertheless said always to tend toward the true because it never assents to an object which does not present some appearance of truth, though this appearance can be false and deceptive, and it never apprehends anything unless it is in some respect transcendentally true; concerning which elsewhere.

5. Logic, or Dialectic, having thus far been outlined, is commonly defined by ancient and modern philosophers as "the faculty of reasoning correctly." Now "to reason," as the term is here taken, is "to make known something unknown from things that are known," namely by defining, dividing, and arguing; this the Conimbricenses prove from Cicero, an excellent authority on Latin usage (Q. 4, Prooemial., art. 1). Other definitions current among ancient and modern philosophers agree with this one, namely: "The art of judging the true and the false"; or, "the arbiter and judge of the true and the false"; "the faculty prescribing to the intellect the manner of investigating truth"; "right reason in thinking for the discovery of truth"; "the art of rightly using reason"; "the faculty of rightly defining, dividing, and arguing"; and, to omit others, "the directive art of the very act of reason, so that in the act itself one may proceed orderly, easily, and without error," which is taken from St. Thomas, I *Posteriorum Analyticorum*, lect. 1.

6. From these things it is clear that the office of Dialectic is, as it were, to form reason, so that it may judge of any proposed matter not rashly, confusedly, or disorderly, but maturely, wisely, and in an orderly manner, and may take up a certain path for investigating truth. This is not because Dialectic alone reasons correctly, or alone seeks truth by reasoning, for this is the concern of all the sciences; rather, it hands down the manner, path, and rule which the other sciences must use so that, each in its proper matter, they may seek truth, find it, and distinguish it by certain marks. Thus all the sciences reason correctly, but not all teach how to reason correctly. This belongs to Logic alone.

7. Nevertheless Epicurus, together with his followers, formerly despised and ridiculed this art, than which nothing seemed more useful (ap. Cicer., L. 2, d. ad., et saepe alias); and several Fathers of the Church seemed to condemn it not only as useless but even as harmful and to be avoided by a Christian, drawing to this meaning the words of the Apostle, Col. 2:8: "See that no one deceive you through philosophy and empty deceit." Yet notwithstanding these things, the utility of Logic is proved by the authority, or suffrage, of all the universities flourishing throughout the whole world. 2º, by an *a priori* reason: for an art which, resting upon principles known by the light of nature, perfects reason cannot fail to be highly useful; but Logic perfects reason and rests upon principles known by the light of nature; therefore, etc. The minor premise, as regards its second part, is clear from the Summaries; as regards the first, it is proved by the experience of all who, provided they are not of utterly dull intelligence, devote themselves to the rules of Logic. For all perceive reason to become more ready, so that it proceeds methodically and clearly, and readily detects the faults of false or fallacious reasoning.

8. Nor should Epicurus's censure cause difficulty, for his manner of judging both in this matter and in others of greater importance was equally despised and ridiculed even by the better pagan philosophers. "While Epicurus," says Cicero (*De Finibus*, L. 2), "despises Dialectic, which alone contains the whole science both of discerning what there is in each thing, of judging what each thing is like, and of disputing by reason and method, he rushes headlong in speaking, as it seems to me, and does not wish what he teaches to be distinguished by any art." The Apostle, however, does not condemn that philosophy which is founded upon right reason and serves, as it ought, as a handmaid to doctrine revealed by God, but only that philosophy which attempts to overthrow the truths of Divine Scripture, whether by certain principles badly established by pagan philosophers or even by "empty deceit," arising not so much from the use as from the abuse of Dialectic. See Cornelius a Lapide and Benedictus Justinianus on that passage of Paul; the latter also learnedly records and explains in the same sense the censures of the ancient Fathers against Philosophy, and sometimes against Dialectic and Aristotle himself by name.

9. There are, however, other Fathers, lights of the Church, by whom Dialectic, especially as handed down by Aristotle, is greatly commended. St. Jerome not only extols this art elsewhere more than once, but in Epist. 108, ad Paulinum, praises the Book of Job because it observes the laws of Dialectic. St. Augustine published books on the Principles of Dialectic and on Aristotle's Categories, and elsewhere frequently mentions the same art

with praise, especially L. 2, *De Doctrina Christiana*, c. 31, where he says that Dialectic "is of the greatest power for every kind of question that must be penetrated and resolved in the sacred books." And, to omit others, the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas was a most diligent student of Aristotle, whose philosophy he also illustrated almost in its entirety with golden commentaries. Dialectic indeed teaches the various tricks and subtleties of syllogisms, but so that they may be guarded against, not fabricated from a desire to deceive. Hence if anyone takes from it an occasion to deceive the unwary or attack truth, the fault belongs not to the art but to the one who abuses the art. "What is more useful than fire? Yet if anyone sets out to burn roofs, fire arms his daring hands."

10. But one may object from the censure of the great Augustine (*De Doctrina Christiana*, L., c. 37) concerning dialectical rules, which he criticizes as of little utility in these words: "It very often happens that men more easily attain the things for the sake of attaining which these rules are learned than they master the most knotty and thorny disciplines of such precepts." He adds the example of walking, which would uselessly be assisted by an art, since men learn to walk more easily by experience than by learning rules. Hence he concludes: "Thus a clever man generally sees sooner that a conclusion is invalid than he grasps the rules concerning it; but a slow man does not see that it is invalid, much less what is prescribed concerning it. And in all these things the very spectacles of truth often delight us more than we are assisted by them in disputing or judging."

11. I answer: Let those apply this censure to themselves who in the Summaries multiply superfluous precepts, which either are never reduced to practice, such as are for the most part the rules of Syllogistic Reduction, or which set forth in minute and prolix detail matters clear of themselves, burdening the memory with a load of rules and oppressing the intellect. I do not think this kind of fault entirely foreign to our *Institutiones Dialecticae*, where something was conceded to the example and custom of others. But the precepts of Logic, when given soberly and at the proper time, are in no way censured by Augustine. First, because otherwise the art of Rhetoric, Grammar, and every other art could be censured with the same right and by the same example of walking, which is far from Augustine's intention. Secondly, because Augustine himself, immediately before the words quoted, says: "The discipline of conclusions, definitions, and divisions greatly assists one who understands." Thirdly, because elsewhere he himself calls Logic the "discipline of disciplines" (L. 2, *De Ordine*, c. 13), concerning which he adds: "This teaches how to teach, this teaches how to learn; in this, reason itself

manifests and discloses what it is, what it wills, and what it can do. It knows how to know; it alone not only wills to make men knowing, but can do so."

12. As regards the origin of Logic, it was first infused by God, together with the other sciences, into our first parent Adam, as all commonly hold with St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae I, q. 94, a. 3). The proof is that God created the first man perfect in soul just as in body, "for the works of God are perfect" (Deut. 32, 4). Therefore, just as He immediately gave him the whole bodily perfection which his descendants acquire through the stages of age, so also He bestowed upon him every perfection of soul which his descendants obtain for themselves by study and labor, and consequently all knowledge of created things; especially since He created him to be the Head, Teacher, and Prince of the whole human race, an office which he could not discharge unless endowed with every discipline suitable for teaching and properly instructing men. All this Sacred Scripture teaches sufficiently clearly in Sir. 17, where among other things it says of our first parents: "God filled them with the discipline of understanding." But what can more truly be called the "discipline of understanding" than Dialectic? Yet one must not therefore think that the Logic infused into Adam was not of the same species as ours; for although it is called supernatural as to the mode, it was not so as to its substance, since it was not among the habits infused of themselves.

13. Yet because in the course of time Logic was almost entirely obliterated, especially among the pagan nations, there was room for human inventors by whose work it might gradually, or piecemeal, revive and come forth into the light as though new. This could occur in the manner indicated by St. Augustine (L. 2, *De Ordine*, c. 13) in these words: "Once Grammar had been perfected and set in order, human reason was prompted to seek and attend to that very power which had produced the art; for by defining, dividing, and inferring, it had not only arranged and ordered it, but had also defended it from every incursion of falsity. When, therefore, would it pass on to constructing other things unless it first distinguished, marked, and ordered its own machinery and instruments, as it were, and brought forth that discipline of disciplines which they call Dialectic?"

14. Critics and historians, both ancient and more recent, attribute the palm of this invention to various philosophers, or rather divide it among several. But although Zeno of Elea, Socrates, Plato, and others before Aristotle gave certain precepts of Logic, Aristotle himself is nevertheless with the greatest justice called, as it were, the first inventor of this art. For he was the first to reduce Dialectic to the form of an art, to augment it in many parts, to perfect it, and to complete it in every respect. Thus in the books *Perihermenias* he explains the elements, nature, and properties of the

proposition. In *Topica* he abundantly sets forth the places, or seats, of probable arguments. In *Elenchi* he distinctly reveals every kind of sophism. In *Categoriae* he teaches how to form general notions, or ideas, of things suitable for defining and dividing. He also discusses definition and division at length in various places in *Metaphysica* and other books. Finally, in *Analytica* he establishes from its foundations the syllogistic art, in which he had no predecessor to light his way (as he himself testifies, L. 2, *Elenchi*, c. ult.), and completes it with a marvelous felicity of genius.

15. Aristotle was born at Stagira, a town of Macedonia, in the 99th Olympiad. He studied Philosophy at Athens under Plato as his master, in whose school he was already called "the Philosopher of truth." "A man of singular and almost divine genius," as Cicero says (L. 1, *De Divinatione*), he excelled wonderfully, so far as humanly possible, in almost every kind of discipline; but especially in Philosophy, throughout its whole breadth, he became supreme, so much so that by the judgment and applause of posterity he is called, and is, "the Prince of Philosophers" and, by antonomasia, "the Philosopher." He died in the sixty-third year of his age, in the 114th Olympiad, two years after the death of Alexander the Great, whose teacher he had been. Because in the Lyceum, an Athenian gymnasium, he taught his disciples while walking, his School took its name from walking and was called "Peripatetic."

16. Nevertheless Aristotle's writings did not immediately obtain the public light but, as Strabo records (*Geographia*, L. 13), remained for a long time hidden in subterranean hiding places and afterward shut up in private libraries, wholly unknown and unpublished until the age of Cicero. At that time Andronicus of Rhodes first published them at Rome, and for that reason he is regarded as the first restorer of Aristotle. Aristotle thereafter underwent varying fortunes, especially in Europe; concerning this matter Fr. Rapin treats with curiosity and learning, tom. 1, part. 4, c. 2, in *Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis*. It is enough for us to have touched briefly upon these things, lest the Philosopher whom we cite and follow throughout should be wholly unknown to beginners.

CHAPTER II.
On the Division of Logic, Especially into Teaching Logic and Using Logic.

1. Logic is either natural or artificial. Natural logic is "an innate vigor," or "native light of the intellect," inclined toward truth and tending by a certain natural weight toward reasoning appropriately. Artificial logic is "a doctrine

acquired by study and labor, by which the intellect is rendered prompt and ready to reason artfully." For just as there is a certain natural rhetoric by which some speak eloquently and suitably for persuasion without having learned the precepts of the art, and besides this there is another, artificial rhetoric, which perfects natural eloquence by precepts and rules, so besides natural logic, or the innate acuteness of mind by which one ignorant of the art sometimes defines, divides, and reasons appropriately, artificial logic has been devised, which by its teachings perfects talent and wonderfully assists even the most acute, so that they may more easily, and without danger of error, disclose unknown things from known ones.

2. Now artificial logic, to which we devote this whole work, is divided 1º into actual and habitual logic. Actual logic consists of rules and precepts for reasoning, that is, dictates by which an intellect imbued with logic is guided in reasoning, as when it determines within itself: "A definition must consist of genus and difference." Habitual logic is a quality generated in the intellect from frequent repetition and proof of the rules. This division is common to all sciences and arts, and even to virtues and vices. For in all of them we experience that from frequently repeated acts there is gradually acquired a custom, or permanent facility, for other acts of the same kind. This facility is regarded as a certain quality and is called an "acquired habit," whose function is to assist the potency so that it may more promptly and easily repeat acts similar to those by which the facility itself was generated. This division also in a certain way belongs to natural logic: for acuteness of talent is analogous to the habitual, while dictates acquired by the light of nature concerning the manner of investigating truth are analogous to actual logic.

3. Artificial logic, considered in either way, is divided 2º into definitive, divisive, and argumentative logic, according to the three principal modes of knowing; this is an integral division, though not a complete one. It is divided 3º into analytics, topics, and sophistics. Analytics treats of the demonstrative syllogism, topics of the probable syllogism, sophistics of the fallacious. This division likewise is not of the whole of logic, but of its syllogistic part. To this St. Thomas refers another ancient division of logic into judicative and inventive logic (*In Posteriora Analytica* I, lect. 1). More fittingly, from the same St. Thomas (*ibid.; In Perihermeneias* I, lect. 1), artificial logic is divided 3º into three parts corresponding to the threefold operation of the mind. For insofar as it treats of universals and predicaments, it concerns the first operation of the intellect; insofar as it treats of enunciation, it belongs to the second; and insofar as it treats of argumentation and syllogism, it belongs to the third.

Teaching Logic and Using Logic.

4. To the foregoing divisions is added another celebrated and ancient one, distributing logic into teaching logic and using logic. Teaching logic is that which delivers the precepts and rules of reasoning; using logic is that which uses this doctrine, or reduces the rules to practice. How far using logic extends, however, and insofar as it is distinguished from teaching logic, is an obscure and lengthy question among dialecticians, almost wholly concerning terminology or manner of speaking. Yet so that it may become clear and shorter, I first note: "The use of some thing," as St. Thomas teaches (Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 16, a. 1, c.), "implies the application of that thing to some operation; hence the operation to which we apply some thing is also called its use." Thus singing to which you apply the rules of music will be the use of the musical art.

5. I note 2^{o}: use is either active or passive. Active use is the application of a thing considered on the side of the potency or faculty applying it; hence that potency or faculty which applies the rules of music to singing will be "actively using," or that which uses the rules. Passive use is the operation itself according to its relation to the thing applied. Thus the singing itself is the use of music, which it denominates as "used." I note 3^{o}: "to use rules," or "to apply the rules" of some art, is nothing other than to operate with attention or reflection upon the rules, and in the manner which they prescribe. I note 4^{o}: since the will is that which moves the other potencies and applies them to operation, it is that which "first and principally" uses, or is the user; the other potencies and faculties, both internal and external, are called "users" only secondarily, or with the qualification "as executing." This is likewise the doctrine of St. Thomas (*ibid.*).

6. From these points, which seem deniable by no one and can be confirmed by obvious examples, it follows that every act conformable to the rules of logic and performed under their prior direction is a use of logic, but a passive use, from which logic, under this precise aspect, is not denominated "using," but "used"; whereas the faculty which executes such an act as its own is actively "using" logic. Therefore, for logic to be not merely used but using, it is required not only that it give rules to which the act is conformed, but also that it itself execute the act as its own. I say "execute"; for since logic is not the will but a habit subject to the will, it can be "using" only under the title of an "executor," as is clear from note 4^{o}.

Various Opinions Concerning Using Logic.

7. The first opinion, then, holds that all acts of the other sciences which are performed according to the rules of logic are using logic. But this is commonly rejected, and rightly so. For 1º, although every science uses logic, insofar as it uses the doctrine of logic, it is not therefore using logic; just as, although every disciple uses the doctrine of his master, the disciple is not therefore a using master. 2º Physics, for example, is not logic, unless one wishes logic to be confused with the other sciences and its division into teaching and using logic to be a division of science as such, than which nothing could be more absurd. Therefore physics is not using logic, just as what is not a man is not a speaking man.

8. You may say: although the habit of physics is not logic, nevertheless the act insofar as it is artful, for example a syllogism in physical matter, can be a proper use of logic, from which logic is denominated using. 1º Because the habit of logic efficiently concurs in acts of the other sciences, which it therefore truly executes, not by reason of the object but by reason of the artifice. 2º Because, granting that it does not concur efficiently, it certainly concurs by directing; but to direct toward use is truly to use; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: both because, according to St. Thomas (*loc. cit.*), "to use" belongs not only to the "will as moving," but also to "reason as directing"; and also because an eloquent external speech is truly called the proper use of the art of rhetoric, and an external painting is the proper use of the art of painting, although these arts, insofar as they reside in the intellect, do not produce but merely direct the external work. It is confirmed: St. Augustine calls the Apostle Paul a dialectician because he uses dialectical rules. Therefore, since a physical syllogism truly uses the rules of logic, it will be a truly logical act; not teaching; therefore using.

9. I answer: a syllogism in physical matter, insofar as it is artful, is indeed a use of logic, but a passive one; and it is a truly logical act objectively, namely one which logic regards as an object, just as man is a truly physical being objectively, namely one which physics does not produce but regards as its object. Nor do the opposite proofs stand. To 1º. The common opinion, which is to be approved below, denies such efficient concurrence to logic. But granting that it be allowed, it does not immediately follow that a physical syllogism is attributed to logic as actively using; for it is not sufficient for this that logic execute the act in just any way. It is required that it execute the act as its own, that is, that it claim for itself the principal role

in it under the title of efficient concurrence. This belongs not to logic but to physics, which uses the auxiliary concurrence of logic in such a way that it also co-produces as the proper, specific, and in its own genus principal cause, and claims the whole act for itself as proper by reason of the matter and the formal object. Thus, according to the old saying, "The sun and man generate man"; and yet the generated man is said to be the proper effect of man, not of the sun.

10. To 2º, I deny the minor. For if to direct is to use, then whoever as a master directs a disciple so that he may rightly use a book, pen, food, or drink could not fail himself to use those same things, which is ridiculous. According to St. Thomas, "to use" belongs to reason "as directing," but not as using; just as "to will" and "to love" also belong to reason as directing, but not as willing and loving. That is: to a directing cause, such as one that gives counsel, a precept, or a rule, the use and execution of the counsel, etc., is truly attributed by moral imputation; but under this heading it is never attributed to it as to a user, because the denomination "user" is not reflected back upon every cause of the use, but only upon those which apply or execute. Thus a syllogism elicited by a disciple according to the doctrine of his master is attributed to the latter as a directing cause, but not as a user; because it is not the master but the disciple who applies the doctrine and executes the act.

11. For the same reason, the external use of rhetoric and painting is not attributed to these arts as using, but only as directing. What then uses is the will as applying, and the tongue or hand as executing. Yet because there is no other science or art which claims such use for itself as proper, that whole use is therefore considered proper to these arts, although it does not denominate them as using, unless perhaps some habit is found in the executing potencies themselves; for this habit will be a certain accessory using rhetoric or painting, according to what is to be said below in the second conclusion of our opinion. To the confirmation: the Apostle is rightly called a dialectician, not precisely because he uses the rules of logic, but because he knew those very rules and was highly skilled in them, as is gathered from his dexterity in using them.

12. The second opinion contends that every use of logic in probable matter of the other sciences, or all merely probable acts in any matter whatsoever endowed with logical artifice, are using logic; but not demonstrative acts. The reason for this opinion is 1º because a probable syllogism properly belongs to no science by reason of its matter. For every science concerns necessary and immutable things, and just as it is acquired by demonstration alone, so it produces demonstration alone. It remains,

therefore, that by reason of form the probable syllogism belongs to logic. 2º Because, although the matter of a probable syllogism in some way belongs to other sciences, nevertheless since it is base and of little value, it ought to yield to the form or logical artifice, and thus pass entirely into the dominion of logic. Thus civil law provides that the board yields to the painting, so that one who has painted upon another's board acquires ownership of it. "For it is ridiculous" (*Institutiones*, l. II, tit. 1, *de rerum divisione*) "that a painting of Apelles or Parrhasius should yield as an accession to a most worthless board."

13. But this opinion is rejected 1º because if the other sciences are despoiled of every probable act, since most of them have demonstrations only very rarely, they will be confined within excessively narrow limits, while on the contrary the domain of logic will grow immeasurably. Certainly the common usage of speech in the Schools holds otherwise: it assigns questions, syllogisms, and conclusions concerning probable theological matter to theology alone; and it does the same in the other sciences. They say that logic, as serving the other sciences, acquires for the others whatever it acquires, just as a slave acquires for his master; whence it comes about that the probable acts which logic makes its own are said to be proper to the other sciences.

14. But against this, 1º: then all acts of teaching logic will properly belong to the other sciences, which logic as teaching most of all serves. Against this, 2º: then not only a probable act, but every demonstration of any matter whatsoever could also be acquired by using logic without detriment to the other sciences, to which logic would restore its resources by the law of servitude. Against this, 3º: then logic would have no right to probable acts of foreign matter, just as a slave has no right to those things which he acquires for his master. But all these consequences are absurd even to the opponents. Therefore logic ministers to the other sciences not as a slave-girl, but as a free servant, who is permitted to have property of her own.

15. It is rejected 2º from Aristotle's teaching (*Rhetorica ad Theodecten* I, c. 1), that "the consideration both of the true and of the verisimilar belongs to the same virtue," that is, faculty. Therefore the same science which demonstrates the true also reasons about the verisimilar or probable in its own matter. This at least must be true when a probable syllogism not only concludes in the proper matter of some science, but also rests upon principles proper to that same science; for example, when it is probably concluded that there is not in living things a subordinated substantial form, from the principle: "A substantial form is the first act of a natural composite." Then, I say, since both the principle and the matter of the

conclusion belong to physics, the probable syllogism becomes wholly proper to physics. Both because, as Aristotle says (*ibid.*, c. 2), "If it happens to have principles, it will no longer be rhetoric or dialectic, but that" science or faculty "whose principles it possesses." And because it is proper to using dialectic "to proceed from extraneous principles" in the matter of the other sciences, as St. Thomas proves and explains in *In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4. Therefore a syllogism proceeding from principles not extraneous but proper to the science of physics is by no right attributed to dialectic, but must be left wholly to physics.

16. The reasons objected do not press. To 1º. If a probable act, because it is not concerned with necessary things, belongs to no science, neither will it belong to logic, which according to the opponents is a science. Therefore science, strictly taken, concerns necessary things alone; but taken in a broader sense, as it commonly is, it also claims for itself its probable matter as something accessory, as may be seen in logic itself.

17. To 2º. First, it may be denied without fault that probable matter, especially in theological matters, is less valuable than logical artifice. Next, granting that it is less valuable, it does not therefore have to pass into the dominion of logic. Both because that provision of civil law is not a general rule for every artificial form; for in *Institutiones*, *eod. tit.*, it is decreed that a building erected on another's land is acquired by the owner of the soil or site, and that letters, even if golden, yield to parchments, so that if Titius writes a poem or history on your papers or parchments, not Titius but you are owner of the whole work. It is therefore a prerogative and special favor granted to painting. And especially because the artifice of a probable syllogism in physical matter is produced by the habitual physics itself, without the efficient concurrence of logic, as we shall see below. Hence logic does not paint upon another's board; rather, it gives rules so that the owner of the board, namely the habit of physics, may produce the painting. Aristotle and St. Thomas are also commonly objected here. But they do not attribute to logic every probable use in foreign matter, but only a certain use, as will appear in our second conclusion.

18. A third opinion, omitting others, recognizes no using logic except that which uses logical precepts concerning its own matter, that is, concerning definition, division, syllogism, etc. This opinion, which has especially prevailed among our more recent authors, displeases us for no other reason than that it excludes another kind of using logic, contrary to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas, as will soon appear.

First Conclusion of Our Opinion.

19. What we are to think in this dispute will be made clear by two conclusions. Let the first be: "Logic is, and is said to be, using in an altogether proper sense concerning its own matter." It is proved briefly. Logic applies its own rules and reduces them to practice concerning its own matter; therefore under this function it is properly said to be, and is, using. The consequence is clear from the notes in nn. 3, 4, 5. The antecedent is proved. Logic, by reasoning, teaches the manner of reasoning; that is, by rightly defining, dividing, and arguing, it teaches and explains the manner of rightly defining, dividing, and arguing. But these acts by which logic reasons in its own matter are without doubt conformable to logical rules and for the most part are performed under their prior direction, as experience testifies. They are therefore the use and practice of the rules. Since, then, habitual logic produces such acts as its own, it is that which then applies its doctrine and reduces it to practice.

20. But although this conclusion seems clear of itself, it is attacked by some: 1º Because a demonstration in logical matter is the second act of the scientific habit of teaching logic; but the second act of a scientific habit is not properly a use, otherwise the second act of the habit of physics would properly be a use and there would be using physics; therefore, etc. 2º Because a demonstration in the matter of logic is formally doctrine; but doctrine is not the use of doctrine; therefore such a demonstration is not properly a use. 3º Because according to St. Thomas (*In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4), "In the part of logic which is called demonstrative, doctrine alone belongs to logic, while use belongs to physics and the other particular sciences"; and elsewhere the holy Doctor frequently distinguishes using logic from demonstrative logic. Therefore logic producing a demonstrative syllogism in its own matter is not properly using, but purely teaching.

21. These objections, however, are easily met. To 1º, I deny the minor. For what prevents the second act of a scientific habit from being the use of the syllogistic doctrine under whose prior direction it is performed? Nor is there any doubt that a demonstration concerning a physical object is also a passive use of logical doctrine, and that the science of physics itself truly uses the same doctrine no less than logic does, with this one difference: physics uses rules belonging to another, logic its own. To 2º, I grant the major and distinguish the minor: doctrine is not the use of doctrine indistinct from itself, I grant; of doctrine distinct from itself and previously

illuminating, I deny the minor and the consequence. The same act is doctrine and use in relation to different things. For when logic defines syllogism, that definition is doctrine with respect to syllogism and is a use with respect to the rules of rightly defining which it observes. Likewise, when logic demonstrates the properties of definition, such a demonstration is doctrine with respect to definition and is a use with respect to the general doctrine of rightly demonstrating which it employs. There is no shadow of absurdity in this.

22. To 3º. St. Thomas plainly speaks of the objectively demonstrative part of logic, that is, of demonstrations in foreign matter, which logic regards as an object and in which it has no active use, but doctrine alone, because it concurs in them only by teaching how they ought to be made. But we are now speaking of subjectively logical demonstrations, namely those which are proper acts of teaching logic. In these both use and doctrine undoubtedly belong to logic, and in no way to physics or the other sciences. In what sense St. Thomas distinguishes using logic from demonstrative logic, we shall say immediately.

Second Conclusion.

23. "Logic also outside its own matter is using, by a certain extension or accession, in the topical part." This is proved and explained. The topical part of logic, which Aristotle and St. Thomas especially call "dialectic," may be considered either as teaching or as using (*cf. In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4). Teaching topics is that which gives the rules and method of reasoning probably in any matter, especially from common Topics, whence it was called "Topics," that is, "Local"; these Topics we indicated in the *Summulae*, last chapter. For that purpose it prescribes certain propositions, called "Maxims," adapted to the several Topics: for example, for the Topic of Definition this maxim, "That to which the definition does not belong, the thing defined does not belong"; and for the Topic of the Consequent this one, "When the consequent is removed, the antecedent must be removed." Aristotle treats at length of maxims of this kind in the *Topica*, and our Fonseca by an easier method in *Institutiones Dialecticae* VII, from c. 10. This teaching topics truly and properly is logic, or a part of logic.

24. Using topics is that which argues probably according to the doctrine of teaching topics. This also is properly a part of logic when it argues probably in its own matter, as when it proves that "Bicfiri" is a logical term, or that there is no fourth, or Galenic, figure. But when it argues outside its own matter from common Topics or Maxims, it is then called "using logic,"

not properly and strictly, but by extension or accession. First, that such use belongs to logic or dialectic and that dialectic is denominated using from it is clear from Aristotle, who everywhere teaches or supposes that it belongs to dialectic to reason probably concerning any proposed thing, and in this sense says that dialectic has no determinate object but ranges through every genus of things. See *Metaphysica* IV, c. 2; *Posteriora Analytica* I, c. 8; *Rhetorica ad Theodecten* I, cc. 1, 2, 3. It is likewise clear from St. Thomas, whose words in *In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4 are these: "Using dialectic is so called insofar as it uses the manner adjoined" namely, handed down by dialectic or teaching topics "to conclude something probably in the several sciences." Read him there, and also *In Posteriora Analytica* I, lect. 20, and *Opusc.* 70, q. 6, a. 1, where he teaches this matter so plainly that it can in no way be otherwise explained.

25. Next, that such using dialectic is not properly and strictly logic is proved from the very diversity of objects. For the object of logic is the artifice of the mode of knowing, or the rectitude of the operations of the intellect; but using dialectic is bound to no determinate object, but pours itself through every genus of things, as we have just seen from Aristotle. St. Thomas likewise noted this distinction in *In Posteriora Analytica* I, lect. 20, where he distinguishes the object of logic from the object of dialectic and says that logic is not concerned with common things, but with syllogism, enunciation, and other such things, "and does not proceed to show anything about the things that are subjects of the other sciences. But dialectic does this, because from common intentions it proves by arguing toward those things which belong to other sciences, whether they are proper or common." And a little below: "Dialectic, therefore, concerns common things, not only because it treats the common intentions of reason, which is common to the whole of logic, but also because it argues concerning common features of things."

26. Why then, you ask, is this faculty designated by the name "using dialectic," or "using logic"? I answer: for two reasons. 1º Because the syllogisms belonging to this faculty are those which conclude in foreign matter from at least one logical premise; for example: "That to which the definition does not belong, the thing defined does not belong; but the definition of virtue does not belong to envy; therefore envy is not a virtue." Here the conclusion is in foreign matter, but the major premise is wholly logical and the minor also partly so. It is well known that conclusions belong to that faculty from whose principles they are proved (cf. supra n. 14; St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. [citation incomplete in source]). 2º Because if a syllogism happens to conclude probably in common matter, or

matter proper to no science, it is under a new title assigned to using dialectic, because matter subject to the dominion of no one belongs to the first occupier; and then it is first, or uniquely, occupied by logic by reason of the syllogistic form and artifice by which it is, as it were, stamped with a certain seal.

27. For these reasons, then, the name "logic" or "dialectic" has been extended to syllogisms of this kind by a certain reasonable fittingness. Hence both the acts themselves and the habit from which they flow may be called "accessory" or "adventitious logic." But to remove some scruples, note 1º: this accessory dialectic alone, among the ancients and especially in St. Thomas, is called "using dialectic," because logic, although it is "using" within its own matter and more properly so, is at the same time, in all its acts, "teaching"; and this denomination prevails as the nobler. But in foreign matter, since it is "purely using," it is denominated only from this function. Thus "vegetative" is predicated absolutely of plants and distinguished from "sensitive," although every sensitive thing is also vegetative.

28. Note 2º. A syllogism concluding from common principles in the matter of the other sciences, if it is demonstrative, will not be proper to using logic, but to that science to which the matter of the conclusion belongs. For as the Philosopher says, *Posteriora Analytica* I, c. 8, "All sciences communicate according to common" principles "which they use as things from which they demonstrate"; St. Thomas confirms the same there, lect. 20. I think the same of a probable syllogism which concludes from merely common principles in matter not common but proper to some science. Merely common principles are those which savor of the proper object of no particular science, but lie open indifferently to all; for example, "The whole is greater than its part"; "Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another."

29. Therefore probable conclusions in the matter of the other sciences belong to using dialectic only when they are drawn from general principles which are not merely common, but savor of "intentions," which are the object of logic, such as you have above in n. 26. Hear St. Thomas in *In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4: "The dialectician proceeds to consider these things" namely the common accidents of being "from intentions of reason which are extraneous to the nature of things; and therefore dialectic is said to be tentative, because to proceed from extraneous principles is proper to testing." And if dialectic is said to concern "common things," this is because "it argues about the common features of things," as the same St. Thomas taught us in n. 25; nevertheless it always argues from logical intentions of "genus, difference, definition, consequent," etc.

30. Note 3º. The doctrine we have given concerning the topical part is taught almost identically in the same places by Aristotle and St. Thomas concerning the sophistical part of logic. If this is considered insofar as it teaches the deceits of paralogisms so that they may be detected, it truly is teaching logic; but if it is considered as constructing paralogisms in any matter whatsoever, it is called "using sophistics," or "logic using sophistically." Yet logic is alienated into this improper sense in the way that a man is when called "painted"; nor is it so much "using" logic as "abusing" logic, because a sophism, at least one which sins in form, is more an abuse than a use of logical doctrine. Note 4º. Among the Greeks especially, teaching logic is called "separated from things," while using logic is called "concreted with things," because the former gives a general doctrine indifferent to any matter, whereas the latter applies and contracts the doctrine to determinate matter.

CHAPTER III.
Whether, and to What Extent, Using Logic Is Distinguished from Teaching Logic.

1. The proposed question concerns using logic both within and outside its own matter, and both actual and habitual logic. As regards actual using logic within its own matter, two things are easily gathered from what has been said. 1º There is no act of using logic which is not also an act of teaching logic. For logic, concerning its own object, always proceeds by teaching something; therefore every using act concerning the object of logic is at the same time teaching, yet in such a way that it is teaching and using with respect to different things, and is always distinguished from the act whose doctrine it formally uses, as is clear from the preceding chapter, n. 20. I said "formally," because materially, or in exercise, some act may be called a use of itself; for example: "A definition is a discourse explaining the essence of a thing." For it teaches what a definition ought to be and at the same time observes in exercise what it teaches. Nevertheless it is not formally a use of itself, because formal use presupposes the thing of which it is the application; but nothing presupposes itself.

2. You will gather 2º that there are some acts of teaching logic which are not formally uses or using acts, namely those first dictates by which the intellect is initiated into this art, or by which logic begins to be acquired. These dictates may differ according to different intellects. One person will begin from this act: "An enunciation is a discourse affirming or denying one thing of another"; another from this: "Division ought to distribute a whole

into its parts"; others from still other acts. These first dictates of artificial logic, therefore, presuppose no logical rule in the intellect in which they arise; therefore they are directed by no pre-existing rule; therefore they are the formal use of no rule, since every formal use must be performed with attention to a previously illuminating rule. Nevertheless in these first acts there is found a material or, as it were, fundamental use, that is, an intrinsic and passive rectitude which would be conformed to logical rules if they had preceded. For such acts at least contain the artifice of a proposition of the sort prescribed by logical doctrine. Hence in this fundamental and improper sense there is no teaching act in logic which is not using.

3. As regards habitual using logic in its own matter, I say 1º: "There is no habit in logic which is formally using and is not at the same time teaching." It is proved: every act formally using in logical matter is at the same time teaching, as is clear from n. 1; therefore a habit generated from using acts is at once a teaching and a using habit. The consequence is clear, for according to all, an acquired habit savors of the nature of the acts from which it is generated and produces other similar acts. Yet, just as the act, so also the habit is teaching and using with respect to different parts of logic; for example, teaching with respect to the syllogistic part, using with respect to the definitive part, and likewise in the others.

4. I say 2º: "There is in logic a teaching habit which is not of itself formally using." It is proved: there are acts of teaching logic which are not formally using, as is clear from n. 2; but the habit generated from these acts must savor of their nature; therefore such a habit will be teaching without being of itself formally using. It is objected: every teaching habit facilitates the use of the doctrine it delivers; but every habit facilitating the use of doctrine is a using habit; therefore every teaching habit is using. Hence if the first dictate of logic is: "Division ought to distribute a whole into its parts," the habit generated from it will be not only teaching with respect to division, but also using with respect to the same doctrine of dividing, since it facilitates the execution of particular divisions, at least within logical matter. This objection will return a little below and will be answered more distinctly, and likewise in the following chapter. It will also be dissipated in chapter 5, where we shall treat of the simplicity of habitual logic; for there the question commonly disputed in the present context will be more fittingly decided, namely: "Whether the habit of teaching logic is using with respect to the doctrine which it itself delivers within logical matter, or whether such use requires a really distinct habit?" I say using within logical matter; for what is to be held outside it we shall say immediately. Meanwhile I distinguish the major: it facilitates mediately, namely by means of the directing act which it

produces, I grant; immediately, namely by executing the use of the doctrine, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: if it facilitates immediately, I grant; if mediately only, I deny the minor and the consequence.

5. But note that in the assertion stated it is denied only that a teaching habit generated from the first acts of logic is using "of itself." For accidentally it can be formally using. The custom of repeating acts without attention to a previously illuminating rule, although of itself it does not require operating with such attention, nevertheless is not incompatible with it. Hence if in the course of time it accidentally happens that some rule illuminates beforehand, the habit will not therefore cease to operate. To explain: let the first logical act be: "Division is a discourse distributing a whole into its parts." Let a habit of repeating it without attention to rules be acquired. Then let this rule supervene in the same intellect: "Every definition must consist of genus and difference." I ask: if, with attention to such a rule, you wish to define division as such, why could you not with the aforesaid habit acquired without rules repeat an act wholly similar to the former one: "Division is a discourse," etc.? Certainly an act of this sort is not rendered more difficult because the rule of defining illuminates beforehand. Therefore that habit will then produce a formal use and will be formally using.

What Is to Be Said of Using Logic Outside Its Own Matter.

6. There remains accessory using logic, namely that which argues probably outside its own matter. There is no difficulty concerning actual logic, or the acts themselves or conclusions which are attributed to using logic in the matter of other sciences; for they are without doubt really distinct from the acts of teaching logic. The doubt therefore concerns the habit from which they proceed: whether it is really distinct from the habit of teaching logic. You will find two opinions on this matter, each having patrons throughout the Schools. The first holds that for the active use of logic outside its own matter no habit is required besides the habit of teaching logic, which alone is denominated using from such use. The second, on the contrary, requires a habit really distinct from the teaching habit. I judge the latter true.

7. Proof 1º. The use of logic outside its own matter is not concerned with the formal object of teaching logic; therefore the habit of teaching logic does not execute a use of this kind; therefore a distinct habit must be posited which executes such a use. The second consequence is clear, because such use, frequently repeated, necessarily generates some habit which afterwards

executes similar acts. For "to be ignorant that the habits themselves arise from operations performed concerning singular things is the mark of a very dull man," as Aristotle says (*Ethica* III, c. 5). Hence, if this habit is not the habit of teaching logic, it is another. The first consequence seems no less clear, because no habit extends efficiently beyond the sphere or ambit of its formal object. This is clear both by induction through the habits of all sciences and from the fact that habits differ from one another according to the differences of acts, as Aristotle (*Ethica* II, c. 1) and St. Thomas (*ibid.*, lect. 1) teach. Hence, since a use or act which does not regard the formal object of teaching logic undoubtedly differs in species from an act of teaching logic itself, it follows that it requires a different executive habit.

8. The antecedent is therefore proved. To be concerned outside the proper matter of logic is consequently to be concerned outside its formal object; for by the name "formal object" in any art or science is understood some aspect of artifice or knowable object restricted to a determinate genus of matter. Since, therefore, the use of which we speak is concerned outside the proper matter of teaching logic, it cannot fail to be outside its formal object. It is confirmed and explained. The formal object of logic is the artifice of the mode of knowing, whether it be called a subjective being of reason or purely objective; but the act of using logic outside its own matter is not concerned with such artifice, that is, it does not regard it as an object; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: for example, this syllogism, "When the antecedent is posited, the consequent is posited; but fire is posited or exists in reality, from which follows heat in the highest degree; therefore heat in the highest degree exists in reality." This discourse, I say, belongs to accessory using logic, from what was said in the preceding chapter; but its conclusion regards no artifice of the mode of knowing, but discloses a purely physical truth, as is evident; therefore, etc.

9. You may say: although the material object of the conclusion is purely physical, nevertheless its formal object or motive is the same as that of the premises, for in general we assent to conclusions because of the premises. But the formal object of the premises, at least of the major, is truly logical. Against this: granted that the major in the syllogism given is a truly logical act and regards a logical object, the same is not true of the minor and conclusion. Not of the minor: for whether fire exists in reality and whether from fire there follows heat in the highest degree are matters logic does not care about, nor does it possess any principle or rule by which one is moved to assent to these truths. Therefore the motive or formal object of such assent cannot be logical. Nor of the conclusion: for this is not moved by the object of the major in just any way, but by it as modified by the minor and

contracted to physical matter extraneous to logic. Therefore the motive of the conclusion as such already contains something extraneous to logic and consequently exceeds its objective ambit and sphere. Add that the formal object or motive of the conclusion is not precisely the middle term from which it is proved, at least when the middle is not purely extrinsic, as when it is proved solely from authority, but is also the objective truth itself which it discloses, as the Excellent Doctor wisely teaches and explains (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 44, sect. 11, nn. 46-47), and as we shall elsewhere teach, God willing.

10. Proof 2º. The habit of teaching logic is scientific; but the using habit outside logical matter is not scientific but opinative; therefore it is not the habit of teaching logic. The major is conceded to the opponents. The minor is proved. The using habit outside logical matter produces opinative or merely probable acts; but no scientific habit produces merely probable acts; therefore, etc. Both premises must be proved. First, the major is expressly presupposed by Aristotle and St. Thomas in the places cited in the preceding chapter in the second conclusion. For these Princes of Philosophy continually teach that it is proper to dialectic to argue "probably" in any matter whatsoever and to conclude "from probabilities"; and therefore they deny that dialectic, insofar as it is using in any matter, is science. The reason is either because, as St. Thomas teaches in *In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4, this use of logic rests upon "extraneous principles," which are not apt for demonstrations; or because dialectic, although it sometimes uses premises which are in themselves certain and perhaps demonstrative, does not use them because they are certain, but because they are commonly regarded as verisimilar, or because they appear true to those with whom one disputes. Fr. Fonseca aptly noted this (*Institutiones Dialecticae* VII, c. 9).

11. Next the minor is proved: every scientific habit produces demonstrative and evident acts and is generated by them; therefore none can produce acts specifically diverse and dissimilar in formal object from those by which it was generated. But probable acts differ specifically from demonstrative acts and are dissimilar to them in formal object or motive; therefore, etc. The major is accepted as a philosophical principle. The minor likewise ought to be undoubted, for the motive of probable assent is a middle either uncertain in itself or proposed as fallible; the motive of demonstrative assent is a middle precisely as certain and infallible; and there is a highly formal diversity between these middles. Hence no one fails to recognize a formal and specific diversity between science and opinion (cf. Conimbricenses, *In Posteriora Analytica* I, c. 26, q. 1, a. 3).

12. Confirmation 1º. A scientific habit is an intellectual virtue, as all concede with the Philosopher and St. Thomas; but an opinative act cannot proceed from an intellectual virtue; therefore neither can it proceed from a scientific habit. The minor is proved from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 57, a. 2, ad 3: "Only those habits are called intellectual virtues by which the true is always said and never the false." But if an opinative act proceeded from an intellectual virtue, then by that virtue the true would no longer always be said and the false never be said, since an act of opinion can be either true or false, as the Angelic Doctor teaches there and no one denies.

13. Confirmation 2º. Probable syllogisms of accessory using logic generate a habit which is not science but purely opinative and consequently distinct from the scientific habit of teaching logic. The assumption is proved: if someone not yet endowed with teaching logic elicited such probable syllogisms by the instinct of natural logic, through them he would acquire an opinative habit; this seems certain of itself and can be confirmed by Aristotle's authority cited in n. 7. Therefore one who elicits such syllogisms while endowed with teaching logic will acquire the same habit, since the presence or direction of teaching logic certainly does not deprive probable syllogisms of the power of generating a habit.

Contrary Arguments and Solutions.

14. Among the authors of the contrary opinion, some attribute to the habit of teaching logic an efficient concurrence concerning the use proper to dialectic in any matter whatsoever. Others attribute to it only directive concurrence, which they think sufficient for the teaching habit to be called using outside its own matter, without requiring another using habit from which actual use proceeds efficiently. This latter manner of thinking, however, is incredible. First, insofar as it teaches that there is no habit from which acts of using dialectic efficiently proceed, however much the intellect may become accustomed to them. Recall what was said in nn. 7 and 13. Second, insofar as it says that directive influence suffices for a habit truly to be called using. For besides what was said in the preceding chapter in refuting the first opinion concerning the extension of using logic, it would follow that every counselor or legislator would truly be said to use his counsels or laws precisely because others act according to those counsels or laws. Why then do we commonly say that there are physicians, preachers, and confessors who, although they give excellent counsels and instructions by which others profit, nevertheless do not themselves use them? But from

whichever side they oppose us, we shall now briefly endeavor to solve their arguments.

15. Objection 1º: where there is no new difficulty to be overcome by a habit, there is no new habit, for a habit is posited only for overcoming some difficulty. But once logical doctrine and the teaching habit are present, no difficulty remains in the use of the doctrine which must be overcome by a habit. Therefore use, that is, an act of using logic, requires no habit distinct from the teaching habit. The minor is proved: one who possesses a doctrine and its rules experiences no difficulty in their use and application except from defect of matter, which perhaps is not readily at hand. But a difficulty arising from defect of matter is not to be overcome by a habit; therefore, etc. The major seems certain: for what can delay one who has at hand both the rules of the art and suitable matter? Especially if the use and execution of the rules belongs not to another potency but to the same intellective potency. The minor, moreover, is clear: for it does not belong to the habit of logic to seek matter, but readily to reason concerning matter supplied from elsewhere. Matter is supplied through intentional species acquired by hearing, reading, and manifold experience.

16. To the argument I answer 1º: granting the major, I deny the minor. To the proof I deny the major. The reason for the denials is that the use of doctrine of which we speak implies assent concerning a formal object diverse from the object of the doctrine, as is clear from our proofs. In this assent there is a new difficulty, not precisely from defect of matter, which can be supplied immediately without the intellect thereby applying syllogistic examination and giving assent, but also from lack of custom in embracing these new motives and truths, especially when probable, which retard the mind's assent by their uncertainty. Hence it matters little that the doctrine and use of logic belong to the same intellective potency; for this potency needs different habits according to the variety of formal objects to which it applies logical rules. Otherwise the habit of the other sciences would be superfluous and the logical habit alone would suffice for reasoning, whether demonstratively or probably, in every matter, together with species acquired by study and experience.

17. I answer 2º: granting that there is no new positive difficulty in the use of logic when both rules and matter are at hand, nevertheless there is a new negative difficulty, that is, lack of a new and greater facility which can be acquired by repeated acts. For it is well known that facility and habit are generated by use even in matters toward which men are naturally easy and inclined. No one fails to see this especially in vicious habits, as in pride, anger, intemperance, and other vices, toward which the impulse of the

passions makes men too easy even without habit. It is therefore false that habits are posited only for overcoming positive difficulties. For from some acts which are without doubt easy it frequently results that similar acts are thereafter elicited more easily; then either a pre-existing habit is intensified, if it had already been initiated concerning the same object, or a new one is generated, if the prior facility arose from nature alone or also from circumstances and cognate habits.

18. Objection 2º: the habit of teaching logic facilitates the use of the rules, as experience testifies; therefore this use is attributed to that same habit as proper; therefore there is no need of a new using habit to which it may be attributed. I distinguish the antecedent: it facilitates immediately, I deny; mediately, I grant. Or otherwise: it facilitates by instructing, I grant; by executing, I deny the antecedent. Next I distinguish the first consequence: it is attributed to the same habit as directing, I grant; as using, I deny the first and second consequences. The solution is explained. The habit of teaching logic facilitates the use of doctrine not immediately, namely by augmenting the powers of the intellect or by inclining of itself toward the use without the intervention of another effect, but only mediately, namely by means of the doctrinal act which it elicits. For this act, by illuminating beforehand and directing, renders the use easier or less difficult. This suffices for the use to be attributed to that habit, not as using, but as directing; just as the conduct of subjects using laws is indeed attributed and imputed to the legislator who prescribes to them the manner of living rightly, yet he is not therefore said to "use" the laws unless in addition he applies the doctrine of the laws to his own acts, which he immediately executes. Unless, therefore, it is proved that the habit of teaching logic of itself immediately executes the use of the doctrine, it will not be proved to be using, and a new habit must be posited.

19. It is replied: a habit executes an act in no other way than by facilitating it, nor for any other reason is, for example, the habit of temperance said to concur in or execute its acts except because it facilitates their execution. Therefore if the habit of teaching logic truly facilitates the use of doctrine, it follows that it truly executes it. I answer: not everything which facilitates some operations is an executive habit of them. First, one moral virtue facilitates the acquisition of others, yet does not execute the acts of the others. The same can be seen in vicious habits and in scientific habits, which because of a certain kinship mutually assist one another. Next, when it is certain that the facility arises from prior direction or light which removes the obstacle of obscurity, it is much less to be attributed to an executive habit. Otherwise the habit of faith would execute an act of charity, toward which it directs; and whoever instructs others to make a journey

could not fail himself to execute the journey. Facility therefore coincides with an executive habit, when speaking of an acquired habit, when it is clear that it arises from no other source than the frequent use and exercise of acts of the same species.

20. Objection 3º: the doctrine and use of logic are acts subordinated to each other, as are love of God and love of neighbor, or even desire and joy concerning the same object. Therefore, just as love of God and neighbor, and likewise desire and joy, arise from the same habit, so doctrine and use ought to arise from the same habit of logic. I deny the antecedent; for doctrine and the use of which we speak regard diverse formal objects. But love of God and love of neighbor, when the latter is also for God's sake, rest upon the same motive, which is proper to the habit of charity. Likewise desire and joy concerning the same object, if they proceed from the same habit, do so because they have the same intrinsic and direct motive, namely the same goodness of the object, although the act of desire presupposes that goodness as absent, whereas the act of joy presupposes it as present.

21. It is replied: the same habit suffices for a universal proposition and for all the particular or singular propositions contained under it; therefore the same will likewise suffice for doctrine and use. The consequence is clear because use is an act virtually contained in an act of doctrine, just as a particular proposition is virtually contained in a universal one. I answer by denying the consequence; for from the antecedent it follows only that the same habit suffices for a universal act of doctrine and for all particulars of the same doctrine. For example, the same habit which elicits this act, "Every definition ought to consist of genus and difference," can elicit these also: "The definition of man ought to consist of genus and difference; the definition of lion ought to consist," etc. And the reason is that all these assents in reality regard the same formal object, namely the artifice of right definition, and all rest upon the same motive of rightly explaining the essence of the thing defined.

22. But the use of doctrine outside logical matter identically implies assent concerning a diverse formal object. For who does not see that widely diverse formal objects are regarded by these acts: "A definition must consist of genus and difference," and "Man is a rational animal," the latter of which contains the use of the former? Therefore a particular proposition is contained in the universal in one way, and use is contained in the act of doctrine in another. The former is, as it were, the containment of a part in the whole; the latter is the containment of a regulated act in its rule, in the way in which the use and practice of laws is contained in the laws themselves. Such practice certainly requires a distinct habit.

23. Objection 4º: St. Thomas, when speaking of teaching and using logic, employs reduplication, for example in *In Metaphysicam* IV, lect. 4, in these words: "Dialectic can be considered insofar as it is teaching and insofar as it is using." But this reduplication, "insofar as," sufficiently indicates that using logic is distinguished from teaching logic not really, but only formally, in the way that man insofar as he is rational is distinguished from himself insofar as he is animal. I answer: reduplication often indicates a formal sense, but not always; for it not infrequently denotes really distinct parts or extremes, as when the maritime coast of Spain is said to be fertile insofar as it faces the south, and sterile insofar as it faces the north. St. Thomas therefore employs the reduplication in this sense in the present matter, and it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that he favors us.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of the Other Sciences.

1. The proposed question concerns habitual logic, not actual logic or the doctrinal acts proper to logic; for the common opinion, which is presupposed at present by the authors, holds that these purely direct and do not efficiently influence the acts directed by them. The sole question, therefore, is whether the habit of logic not only produces the directing rule and shows the manner of constructing, for example, a demonstrative syllogism concerning an object of physics, which is to concur directively, but whether the habit itself also immediately operates this demonstration together with the habit of physics, which is to concur efficiently or elicitively. And the same reason for doubt applies to definitions, divisions, and probable syllogisms of the other sciences when they conclude from principles proper to those sciences.

2. I say the habit itself of teaching logic, for the question among authors of every School is instituted concerning this habit, whatever one or another may protest in contending that the present dispute concerns a habit of logic which is not teaching but purely using, and that such a habit, really distinct from the teaching habit, must be admitted as efficiently concurring in acts of the other sciences. Mastrius expressed this meaning in *Quaestiones Prooemiales de Natura Logicae*, n. 9, at the end, where he teaches that three habits concur for the easy construction of a syllogism in physical matter: the habit of teaching logic, the habit of using logic, and the habit of physics; in such a way, however, that the first concurs only directively, the second

elicitively, that is, efficiently, as to the syllogistic form, and the third elicitively as to the matter.

3. But this interpretation seems altogether to be rejected. For either this habit of using logic is the very same habit that uses the rules within logical matter, or it is another habit really distinct from it and precisely ordained to producing the syllogistic form in acts of the other sciences. If you say the first, that habit is really teaching, since it produces teaching acts; for no act within logical matter is pure use, but is at the same time doctrine or a rule concerning some part of logic. Therefore, if the present question concerns such a habit, it in reality concerns a teaching habit, although efficient concurrence in foreign acts is attributed to it not insofar as it is formally teaching but insofar as it is using. This is true once such concurrence is admitted and does not alter the common sense of the question.

4. But if you maintain the second, that fictitious habit appears untenable for two reasons, omitting others. 1º Because such a habit can be generated only from repeated syllogisms of the other sciences, for example of physics; but it is incredible that a physical syllogism should first generate two really distinct habits, one of physics and another of using logic, the former by reason of matter, the latter by reason of form, especially since this form either consists in a fictitious being of reason, as the Thomists maintain, to which being no real effect corresponds, or according to our principles is identified with the matter from which, and consequently the habit of physics facilitates toward it if it facilitates toward the matter.

5. Second, because an intellectual habit which regards no object is repugnant; but such would be that using habit. It is proved: a habit regards an object only through the act which it elicits, as is known; but the act, insofar as elicited by such a habit, would regard no object; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: according to the opponents, an act of physics is elicited by that using habit only according to the form, insofar as this is really or formally contradistinguished from the tendency toward the object; for the opponents ascribe this tendency to the habit of physics alone. But that form, insofar as it is contradistinguished from the tendency toward the object, regards no object, as is evident. Therefore the act, insofar as elicited by the present using habit, would regard no object.

6. It is otherwise with a teaching habit posited as using, or as efficiently concurring in a physical act with respect to form. For since that habit elsewhere also produces teaching acts tending toward the object of logic, it is not entirely destitute of an object with respect to all its acts, although such efficient concurrence must be rejected for another reason from what will be said below. You may say: do not we also posit a habit of using logic

uniquely destined to eliciting acts outside logical matter? We do; but it is an opinative habit which is logical not properly, but by reduction or accessorily; nor does it in any way concur in acts proper to the other sciences, but only in those which are deduced from some logical premise and in which such a habit produces not only the form but also the matter, or tendency toward the object. The present question does not concern a habit of this kind, but only one which is properly logical and elsewhere regards a truly logical object.

7. Several Thomists teach that this habit efficiently concurs in acts of the other sciences, such as Massius, Lerma, Dominic Lynce, whom Gabriel a Conceptione follows, l. IV, dub. 6, conf. 1. These authors indeed admit that an act concerning a physical object is produced by the habit of physics alone with respect to substance, that is, with respect to the assent and tendency toward that object; yet they judge that it is produced by the habit of logic alone with respect to the artificial form of syllogism, definition, etc. The contrary opinion is commonly defended by our authors, with many Thomists also subscribing, such as Bayona, Palanco, Froylan, and most recently Aguilera, l. I *Logicae*, q. 2, n. 9. This opinion is pleasing, and:

8. Proof 1º, by a common but efficacious reason. No habit immediately produces an act which does not tend toward its formal object; but acts of physics, for example, do not tend toward the formal object of logic; therefore they cannot be immediately produced by the habit of logic. The consequence is legitimate and the minor established. For since acts of natural philosophy tend toward purely physical things, which logic does not formally regard, as we now suppose with the opponents, they do not attain the formal object of logic. The major is easily shown, both by reason and induction. By reason: a habit has the same object as the act which it produces; for the act is the actual tendency by which the habit is said to attain the object. Therefore whatever is the formal object of the act will also be that of the habit, and conversely; therefore an act cannot be the immediate offspring of a habit whose formal object it does not regard. By perpetual induction through all habits of the other sciences, and likewise of virtues and vices: there is none which efficiently concurs in acts which do not tend toward the formal and specifying object of itself.

9. You may say: an act of physics, although taken according to its substance it does not tend toward the formal object of logic, nevertheless does so when taken according to its form or insofar as it is artful; and it is produced by logic only in this sense. Against this. Just as the artifice of a painting expressed on a panel is an object which the art of painting regards by its acts, yet is not an act tending toward the object of painting, so the

artful form of a syllogism is indeed the very formal object which logic regards through other directing acts, but is in no way an act tending toward the object of logic. Both because according to the Thomists such a form consists in a purely objective being of reason, which is not an act but results from an act; and because, whatever it consists in, it does not proceed of itself from the habit of logic except insofar as it is contradistinguished from the substance of the physical syllogism and consequently from its tendency toward the object. Hence it proceeds from logic not insofar as it is a tendency, but precisely insofar as it is an artful mode of tending, really or formally distinct from the tendency itself. Therefore it is in no way verified that it is an act regarding the formal object of logic.

10. Proof 2º. No acquired habit immediately operates except acts similar to those by which it was generated. For this reason an acquired habit is called "the seed of acts," because just as from the seed of trees only similar trees are propagated, so it happens in acts propagated from a habit. For this reason also Aristotle said (*Ethica* II, c. 1): "All habits are made from similar operations; therefore it is necessary to perform operations of such a kind, for the habits themselves follow the differences of the operations." But acts of physics are dissimilar to the acts by which the habit of logic was first generated, since they regard a diverse formal object, upon which the dissimilarity or diversity of acts chiefly depends; therefore, etc.

11. You may say: acts of physics and logic are similar in the artifice of, for example, a syllogism, which is enough for them to proceed under that aspect from the same habit. Against this. The similarity absolutely required for acts to be called offspring of the same habit consists in their tending toward the same formal object. Both because, when this similarity is absent, the acts remain absolutely and simply different and consequently cannot flow from the same habit, as we have just seen; and because, although acts of physics and metaphysics are similar in evidence, certitude, and efficacy for generating science, nevertheless they do not flow from the same habit, for no other reason than that they do not tend toward the same formal object.

12. Proof 3º, by parity with the intellect concurring only directively in acts of the will; with faith in an act of charity; with prudence in the acts of the other virtues; indeed with all arts in those works which are performed according to their rules. Likewise, therefore, it will suffice that logic concur directively in acts which the other sciences perform according to its rules.

13. Finally, it is proved expressly against the opposing Thomists. Logic does not concur efficiently in the substance of a physical demonstration, as you say; but it cannot produce the artful form except by producing the substance or the very assents of the demonstration; therefore neither does it

concur efficiently in the artful form. The minor is proved. According to the Thomists, the artful form is a being of reason resulting in the object from cognition. But this being, since it is nothing, is incapable of immediately terminating any efficient concurrence; and it is said to be produced insofar as the cognition from which it results is produced. But the cognition from which the logical being of reason results is the very substance of the physical act, that is, the real tendency toward the direct object and as that which. Unless logic produces this substance or tendency, therefore, it cannot produce the artful form. It is explained and pressed. The habit of physics by itself produces the tendency of this assent, "Man is an animal"; but from this tendency, according to the modern Thomists, there necessarily results in exercise and indirectly the fictitious relation of animal to man, which they call the artful form, since that assent in exercise distinguishes and relates subject and predicate to each other. Therefore the concurrence of logic is superfluous for that artful form to result.

Objections Are Solved.

14. Objection 1º: the habit of logic facilitates acts of the other sciences; but every habit efficiently concurs in acts which it facilitates; therefore, etc. The minor is proved because, as our Excellent Doctor expressly teaches (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 44, sect. 2, nn. 7, 10), it cannot be understood how a habit facilitates a potency toward an act unless by simultaneously producing that act with it, or by augmenting the potency efficient of such an act of itself. It is confirmed: for everyone experiences himself becoming more proficient in logic through the exercise and practice of its rules in the other sciences. Therefore acts of the other sciences augment the habit of logic. But no habit is augmented except by acts which it itself produces. This argument was abundantly solved in the preceding chapter, nn. 18 and 19. Hence now briefly:

15. I answer: the habit of logic facilitates foreign acts not immediately, but only mediately, namely by means of the directing act which shows the manner of reasoning; in the way that the intellect facilitates acts of the will, prudence facilitates acts of the virtues, and the art of painting inhering in the intellect facilitates the execution of an external painting. Hence the minor of the argument must be denied if it speaks also of mediate facility. Nor is the appended proof relevant. For in that place the Excellent Doctor intends only to establish the common opinion, namely that a habit facilitates a potency not precisely as certain dispositions or conditions for acts, but as virtues or faculties co-producing together with the potency. He is speaking,

however, of immediate facility concerning the proper acts of each habit; for example, of the facility which the habit of physics gives toward acts concerning a physical object, the habit of justice toward acts rendering to each his right, and so in the others. Such immediate facility is proper to a habit as such; for mediate facility, consisting in direction, is more properly conferred by the mediating and directing act than by the habit. To the confirmation I answer: the habit of logic is indeed augmented through foreign acts, but accidentally, insofar as on occasion of reasoning concerning the matter of other sciences the acts of teaching logic are repeated more often, through which, and not through the others, facility in logic is immediately augmented.

16. Objection 2º: acts of physics are similar to acts of logic in artifice; therefore the habit of logic ought efficiently to concur in them. The antecedent is proved: for the aspect of artifice under which logic tends, namely that of syllogism, definition, etc., is found equally in physical and logical acts. Confirmation 1º: because, as the Excellent Doctor says (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 44, sect. 11, n. 32), "The inclination of a potency insofar as it is under such a habit is of itself not toward this or that thing by reason of matter, but by reason of form, or because of such a motive as is found in it. Therefore if this aspect is wholly the same, although applied to different matters, the inclination of the potency is perfected indivisibly in relation to it, in whatever matter it is found." But the artful form is wholly the same in physical and logical acts, although applied to diverse matters. Therefore the inclination of the potency insofar as it is under the habit of logic is borne indiscriminately toward both kinds of acts; therefore the habit of logic efficiently concurs in both. Confirmation 2º: the artifice of, for example, demonstration is wholly outside the sphere of the habit of physics; therefore it must be produced by logic, just as the beatific vision insofar as supernatural is produced by the light of glory, because supernaturalness is outside the sphere of the intellect.

17. To the argument I distinguish the antecedent: they are similar in artifice considered separately, I grant; in artifice precisely as contracted through tendency and order toward the object, I deny the antecedent and consequence. For, as we showed in n. 11, the similarity required by a habit in the acts which it produces must consist in order and tendency toward the same formal object. Otherwise, if any similarity whatsoever sufficed, a single habit would produce all scientific acts concerning all objects, since they are similar in evidence; one supernatural principle would produce all supernatural acts, alike in supernaturalness; and one moral virtue all honest acts, alike in honesty or conformity with right reason.

18. To the proof I answer: in both kinds of acts there is indeed found the aspect of artifice under which logic regards its object; but there is not found the aspect under which logic produces its own acts. Hence it does not follow that logic produces physical acts, but that it regards them as an object, just as it reflexively regards its own acts insofar as artful. Therefore both actual and habitual logic regard their object under the aspect of artifice; but habitual logic produces its acts under the aspect of tendency toward that artifice. For it is a general rule that no habit produces acts which do not tend toward its formal object. Thus moral philosophy tends toward acts of the will under the aspect of honesty as an objective aspect; yet, since it is an intellectual habit, it does not produce those acts, but only acts which regard such honesty as their object.

19. The first confirmation is irrelevant. For the Excellent Doctor there intends something very different, namely that habits are not multiplied according to material objects when the formal object, which he calls the "form" and "motive," remains wholly the same; for example, that the habit of eating meat temperately is the same habit which inclines one to eat fish temperately, when the aspect or motive under which it tends applies equally in both matters. We freely concede this. But from it there follows only that the same habit of logic teaches one, for example, to syllogize in any matter, whether physical, metaphysical, etc. That the same or similar aspect of artifice found in physical and logical acts suffices for both to be produced by the same habit, notwithstanding the immense diversity of formal objects or motives, was nowhere taught by our Suárez, nor is it gathered from his doctrine.

20. To the second confirmation. Artifice is outside the objective sphere of the habit of physics, which does not regard it as an object; but it is not outside its efficient sphere, that is, it does not exceed the productive power of the habit of physics, which, since it is generated by artful acts, necessarily has the power of producing other similar and consequently similarly artful acts. The matter happens thus. The intellect, instructed by logic, begins to investigate a natural body by such acts as logical doctrine prescribes, namely acts endowed with the artifice of definition, argumentation, etc. The intellect alone produces these first artful acts with a concurrence of logic that is purely directive, but with difficulty or less easily, until from their frequent repetition it acquires custom and facility. This facility, since it arises from artful acts, is itself productive of other wholly similar acts, that is, acts artfully tending toward natural body. And this very facility is what we call the habit of physics acquired under the direction of logic. Its objective sphere is the aspect of sensible body; its efficient sphere is the aspect of

artful cognition tending toward sensible body. The parity with the beatific vision is null, because supernaturalness is in no way contained in the natural potency of the intellect; therefore it requires a supernatural principle.

21. Objection 3º: the artifice of acts of physics is an object of logic; but logic, since it is an art, produces its own object; therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º: a physical demonstration is an artful effect; therefore it is the effect of an art. But physics is not an art; therefore such a demonstration with respect to its artifice is the effect not of physics but of logic alone. Confirmation 2º: logic ministers the instruments of knowing to the other sciences as the art of bridle-making ministers a bridle to horsemanship; therefore it belongs to logic to produce these instruments, as it belongs to bridle-making, not to horsemanship, to produce the bridle.

22. To the argument I deny the minor. For arts are said to tend toward the production of their object, not because they immediately produce it, but because they direct so that it may be produced by other habits or potencies. This is clear in every art concerned with an external work, whether mechanical or liberal, which, since it resides in the intellect, cannot immediately produce an external artifice, but regulates the tongue, hands, and feet so that by command of the will they execute it. To confirmation 1º, I distinguish the first consequence: it is the effect of an art as directing, I grant; as efficiently concurring, I deny. Then I grant the subsumed minor, under the same distinction, and deny the second consequence. For an effect to be artful is for it to be produced under the direction and according to the rules of an art, without any need for efficient concurrence of the art. Thus for the will to love prudently is to love according to the rules of prudence directing, without prudence efficiently concurring in the love. Likewise speech will be grammatically artful if it follows the rules of grammar, although it does not flow efficiently from the intellectual habit of grammatical art.

23. To confirmation 2º. Logic ministers instruments of knowing, not because it produces such instruments in any matter whatsoever, but precisely because by its doctrine and rules it shows the form and manner of constructing them. The parity with the art of bridle-making proves too much, namely that the habit of physics in no way concurs in producing a physical demonstration, just as horsemanship in no way concurs in the bridle but presupposes it as already made. Hence, first, as regards the concurrence of the ministering art, the parity favors us; for bridle-making does not execute the bridle but only provides rules. Next, as regards the art or science which is served, it does not favor the opponents at all, who must give a reason why physics produces the instrument of knowing at least as to

its substance, whereas horsemanship produces nothing of the bridle. The reason for all this is that horsemanship produces only acts of controlling a horse, which presuppose the bridle already made, since the bridle is of itself producible separately from those acts. But physics produces acts tending toward natural body, which do not presuppose but identify with themselves the instruments of knowing; nor are these of themselves producible separately from the substance of the acts.

24. One may object 1º: an instrument precedes that which it serves; therefore an instrument of knowing ought to precede scientific demonstration. I answer: this also works against the opponents, who certainly teach that the instrument of knowing, that is, the artifice of demonstration, is made neither beforehand nor separately, but simultaneously with the substance of demonstration. Further, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence, because the instrument of knowing, taken for the artifice of demonstration, is not an instrument for the act of demonstrating, since it either is identically the act itself or results from it. It is therefore an instrument or means for habitual science, which it truly precedes, and also for the formal effect of one actually knowing, in the sense in which vision is the instrument or means of seeing; and every form in some way precedes its formal effect.

25. One may object 2º: then physics contains the artifice of its acts, since it produces it without the efficient concurrence of logic; therefore physics will be an art, which no one concedes. I distinguish the first consequence: it contains it purely virtually, I grant; doctrinally, I deny the first consequence and the consequence. Not everything which virtually contains artifice, or whatever has the power of producing artful effects, is an art; otherwise the tongue speaking artfully and the hand painting skillfully would be called arts. The proper character of an art is therefore to contain the artifice doctrinally, that is, to contain the doctrine and rules for constructing the artifice. In our matter this belongs not to physics but to logic.

26. One may object 3º: logic directs physics and the other sciences, but it cannot direct otherwise than by producing the artifice which shines in their acts, since, for example, the habit of physics does not perceive the direction of the rules; therefore, etc. But this objection is effectively retorted thus: physics is directed by logic; but it is not directed toward the substance of the act insofar as contradistinguished from the artifice, as is certain; therefore it is directed toward the artifice. But no faculty is directed toward that which it itself cannot produce; therefore physics can produce the artifice of its acts, which you deny with all your might. Accordingly I deny the minor, notwithstanding the appended proof. For in order that the habit of physics

truly be said to be directed by rules, it is not necessary that it perceive them; it is enough that the will and intellect, whose motion the habits follow, perceive the rules both in their own name and in the name of their instruments. Thus the habit of justice is directed by the rules of prudence, and the hand by the rules of the art of painting.

27. Objection 4º: where two acts are compared to each other as primary and secondary, they proceed from the same habit; for this reason both love of God and love of neighbor for God's sake proceed from the habit of charity. But the rule of defining and the use of definition in physical matter are compared to each other as a primary and secondary act; therefore both are produced by the same habit of logic. This objection was fully solved in the preceding chapter, nn. 20-22. Now briefly I say: whatever be the terminology "primary" and "secondary," the major is not true unless both acts regard the same motive or formal object. This occurs in both acts of charitable love and does not occur in our matter. Moreover, the objection is pressed in reverse: both acts of charity proceed from the habit of charity also with respect to substance; therefore both the rule of defining and a physical definition will also flow from the habit of logic with respect to substance, which you yourself deny.

28. Finally, to meet other little objections, note 1º: although physics applies the rules of logic to its acts, it is not therefore using logic, unless "logic" be taken in the ablative sense; because, as we saw in chapter 2, not every faculty directed by teaching logic and applying its rules to practice is using logic, but only that which applies the rules to acts truly logical with respect to substance, that is, acts tending toward the formal object of logic, such as those which are performed artfully within logical matter. Note 2º: for logic to be called the "servant and minister" of the other sciences, no efficient ministry of it concerning foreign acts is required. It is enough that logic be like a servant carrying a torch before a master walking through a dark place. Furthermore, logic may be said to serve the other sciences because the others are sought for their own sake, whereas logic is sought only as a directing means toward attainment of the others. Logic is indeed the "teacher" of the others; but one also serves by teaching, as when a subject who is tutor instructs a boy king.

29. Note 3º. There are some mixed acts tending simultaneously toward the formal objects of two habits and consequently produced simultaneously by both. Thus love of fasting from the motive of penance and chastity is elicited simultaneously by these two virtues. Therefore there can be some acts proceeding simultaneously from the habits of logic and physics because they regard the formal object of each, such as this one: "Animal, prescinded

from its inferiors, is a genus with respect to man." For it tends toward a physical object and also toward a logical one, namely the aspect of genus. But just as it does not follow from this that the habit of penance concurs in acts which precisely regard the object of chastity, neither does it follow that the logical habit efficiently concurs in acts concerning a purely physical object. Note 4º. The solutions to other arguments which may be brought here should be sought from the preceding chapter from n. 15 onward.

CHAPTER V.
Whether Logic Is a Simple Quality.

1. That actual logic is a collection of many really distinct acts is more certain than certain. The doubt concerns habitual logic: whether it is really one simple quality. That is, whether all the acts by which logic reasons concerning its whole object throughout its entire extension proceed from a single habit, which is called a "quality" because habit belongs to the predicament of quality; or whether they proceed from several really distinct habits, so that the habit of reasoning concerning the nature and properties of definition, for example, is diverse from the habit of reasoning concerning the nature and properties of syllogism. The question is common to all sciences, but according to custom it is to be treated here. It must be presupposed from psychology that an intellectual habit is a quality distinct from intentional species. The Thomists commonly hold, therefore, that logic is a single habit which, once acquired through the first demonstration, suffices without the addition of another habit to produce all demonstrations concerning the whole object of logic. But that it is a collection of many really distinct habits is defended, besides the Nominalists, by all Scotists with the Subtle Doctor, and by almost all of our authors with the Excellent Doctor (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 44, sect. 11, from n. 45). Their opinion is to be held by us. And:

2. It is proved by a common and efficacious argument. An acquired habit is an immediate facility toward acts; but a habit acquired through acts, understand demonstrative acts, concerning definition is not an immediate facility toward acts concerning syllogism; therefore it is not the habit of reasoning concerning syllogism, but another habit distinct from it. The minor is proved by reason and experience. By reason: an acquired habit is an immediate facility only toward acts similar to those by which it was generated; but acts concerning syllogism are dissimilar to acts concerning definition; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: acts which show diverse truths concerning diverse objects and from diverse principles are dissimilar

to one another; but demonstrative acts concerning definition and syllogism show diverse truths from diverse principles; therefore they are dissimilar to one another. The other points are clear, and the minor seems undoubted; for who does not see that these truths, for example, are very diverse: "A definition is clearer than the thing defined," and "A syllogism consists of three terms," and that they are demonstrated from very diverse principles, namely: "An explanation is clearer than what it explains," and "Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as one another"?

3. Indeed, that this dissimilarity of acts is notable and argues for diverse habits is clear because for no other reason does the dissimilarity of acts of physics and logic argue for diverse habits. Hence the Philosopher teaches generally (*Posteriora Analytica* I, c. 23) that "Sciences are diverse whose principles are not from the same principles, nor do the principles of one proceed from the principles of the other." Indeed, although the conclusion concerns the same object, if the principles or middles by which it is proved are diverse, it cannot flow from the same habit. Hence according to St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 54, a. 2, ad 2), the habit of demonstrating that the earth is round is diverse in the physicist and the astronomer, because the one proceeds from physical principles or middles, the other from mathematical ones. "But the whole power of demonstration," continues the Angelic Doctor, "which is a syllogism making one know, depends on the middle; and therefore diverse middles are like diverse active principles according to which the habits of sciences are diversified." Therefore, with still greater reason, conclusions which concern diverse objects from diverse principles require diverse habits, as occurs in our matter.

4. Experience likewise proves the same first minor. After a habit has been acquired from the first demonstration concerning definition, one may still experience difficulty in explaining and proving what a syllogism is, what its figure and mood are, and how the force and efficacy of concluding are to be reduced to their principles. This the opponents neither deny nor can deny for any reason. That habit, therefore, is not a facility toward acts concerning syllogism, for facility and difficulty toward the same acts cannot coexist in the same intellect. It is confirmed: with the habit of reasoning rightly concerning definition there can coexist error concerning syllogism, both actual and habitual from frequently repeated erroneous acts, as even the opponents admit. Therefore the scientific habit concerning definition is not habitual science concerning syllogism. The consequence is proved because science and error concerning the same object are incompatible in the same intellect; for error destroys the habit of science, as St. Thomas teaches with

Aristotle (*De longitudine et brevitate vitae*; Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 53, a. 1). But these proofs will gain greater force from the refuted solutions.

5. The Thomists answer 1º that all acts of logic are sufficiently similar to proceed from the same habit, since all tend under the same formal motive, namely under the same common aspect of mode of knowing. Against this: although all objects of logic, for example syllogism and definition, agree in the generic aspect of mode of knowing, they nevertheless differ in specific aspect, since they contain diverse modes of understanding and manifesting the unknown and rest upon diverse principles. Therefore acts regarding such specifically diverse modes of knowing are specifically dissimilar acts, at least when they regard them precisely as diverse both in themselves and in their principles, as those conclusions certainly do: "A definition is clearer than the thing defined," etc.; "A syllogism consists of three terms." But one habit does not suffice for specifically dissimilar acts; therefore, etc.

6. The subsumed minor is proved 1º because this plainly follows from the doctrine of the Philosopher accepted by all, when he says (*Ethica* II, c. 1): "All habits are made from similar operations; therefore it is necessary to perform operations of such a kind, for the habits themselves follow the differences of the operations." And again (*ibid.*, c. 2): "Acts are the causes that the habits themselves be of a certain kind." Indeed, a habit producing operations specifically dissimilar to those by which it was generated does not produce "such operations" as those were, nor does it follow "their differences," but at most their genera. To this are added the axioms common in the Schools, that "A habit is the seed of acts," and that "it savors of the nature of the acts by which it is acquired." For just as olive seeds do not generate laurels or other specifically dissimilar trees, and always savor of the nature of the olive tree, so an acquired habit behaves in producing acts.

7. 2º Because if generic similarity of acts suffices for them to proceed from the same habit, there will be no reason why a single habit could not produce all scientific acts, which certainly have similarity in the generic aspect of "scientific" and "evident act." Likewise there will be no reason why a single habit of moral virtue should not extend to all "honest" acts by title of generic similarity in "honesty and conformity with right reason." Nor say that similarity in a proximate genus is required and similarity in a remote genus does not suffice. For, first, acts of physics concerning celestial and sublunary body differ by more than a remote genus, and yet are produced by the same habit, according to you. Next, acts of logic concerning demonstrative syllogism and essential definition are not similar in a proximate genus; for the common aspect of mode of knowing under which they tend is a remote genus, containing under itself definition and syllogism

as such, which as subalternate species or proximate genera are further divided into essential and descriptive definition, and demonstrative, probable, categorical, hypothetical syllogism, etc. Therefore those acts will not be able to proceed from the same habit.

8. 3º By parity with habits of the will, in which the same or a greater reason for extension applies. For according to the doctrine of St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 61, a. 1), diverse habits are required for acts of distributive and commutative justice because, although both kinds of act tend under the same common motive of justice as under a generic aspect, nevertheless they differ in specific aspect. Likewise, from the same Angelic Doctor (*ibid.*, q. 146, a. 2; q. 149, a. 2; q. 151, a. [citation incomplete]), sobriety, abstinence, and chastity are habits of virtue diverse in species because their acts, although similar in the common aspect of temperance, are specifically dissimilar. The same St. Thomas (*ibid.*, q. 5, throughout) enumerates various mutually distinct species under the common aspect of prudence. Certainly the aspect of mode of knowing under which logic tends is no more one and no less common than the aspect of moderating pleasures of touch under which the virtue of temperance tends. If therefore the latter leaves room for acts and habits diverse in species, why not the former? Certainly, from the very terms, logic teaching one to define and logic teaching one to syllogize differ no less than temperance concerning food, which is abstinence, and temperance concerning intoxicating drink, which is sobriety.

9. 4º An act concerning definition in no way contains an act concerning syllogism, because it neither infers it nor can otherwise cause it, as is certain. Therefore a habit generated by the first act in no way contains the second; for a habit cannot have greater power than the act by which it is caused. You may say with Bayona and Aguilera that the habit of science is caused not by the act alone, but by the intellect and the habit of principles concurring simultaneously; and consequently the habit can possess greater power than the act. Against this: if the habit does not receive the measure of its power from the act but from the intellect and the habit of first principles, a single habit could extend to the scientific acts of all sciences; for all are contained in those co-causes. Who would not call this consequence absurd? Therefore the intellect and habit of principles, if perhaps they concur in the habit of logic, concur as universal causes and are proportioned to the power of the logical act as to a particular cause, to which the effect is commensurated. Thus the seeds of trees are not produced without the concurrence of universal celestial causes, whose breadth of power they nevertheless do not share, but are limited to the species of the parent tree.

10. Nor is the answer of others any better, namely that the first logical demonstration produces a habit not according to the specific aspect but according to the generic and common aspect of mode of knowing, in which it is similar to the other logical acts, and therefore generates a habit extended to the others. Against this 1º: if an act in producing a habit transcends its specific grade, why does it not produce a habit according to the aspect of "cognition as such," or at least according to the aspect of "scientific act," so that the habit receives power for all cognitions whatsoever, or at least for scientific acts of all sciences? Against this 2º: an act is no less fecund according to its specific perfection than according to its generic perfection, as is clear both from the example of trees in producing seeds and because through habits we commonly become accustomed to these or those specific acts. By what right, then, is the first logical act imagined to be sterile according to its specific perfection? Against this 3º: a genus is less perfect than a species; therefore the first logical act taken according to generic aspect cannot give the habit the power to produce the other acts in their specific character unless it gives power for effects more perfect than itself, which is repugnant.

11. They answer 2º that acts of logic indeed differ specifically from one another materially and in real being, but not formally and in order to the habit, because their objects also do not differ from one another "formally and in the being of a knowable object," but are all contained under the common aspect of mode of knowing, which aspect is formally one and in the being of a knowable object is an "atomic species," that is, incapable of division into several species. Against this: definition and syllogism formally differ in the being of a knowable object; therefore acts concerning such objects differ in formal species and in order to the habit. The antecedent is proved: things formally diverse in the being of the demonstrable are also diverse in the being of the knowable, as is known; but syllogism is formally diverse from definition in the being of the demonstrable; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: those things are formally diverse in the being of the demonstrable which are demonstrated through diverse principles; but syllogism is demonstrated through diverse principles, namely "said of every," "said of none," "things which are the same as one third thing," etc., which in no way apply to definition or have any force as rules of it; therefore, etc.

12. The major is proved because, as St. Thomas teaches with the Philosopher (*Summa Theologiae* I-II^{a}, q. 54, a. 2, ad 2 and 3), diversity of principles in demonstrative matters is related as diversity of ends in virtues and by the same force induces diverse habits. But diversity of end renders an

object formally diverse in moral being or in the being of the lovable; therefore diversity of principles renders an object formally diverse in the being of the demonstrable and knowable. Hence the same Angelic Doctor in *In Posteriora Analytica* I, lect. 41 says: "Material diversity of object does not diversify a habit, but only formal diversity." "Since therefore the knowable is the proper object of science, sciences will not be diversified according to the material diversity of knowable things, but according to their formal diversity." But whence is the formal diversity of knowable things to be taken? "The formal aspect," he says, "of the knowable is taken according to the principles from which something is known." Hence he concludes and proves by examples in the same place that things are or are not diverse insofar as knowable according as they are known through diverse or the same principles.

13. You may say: the principles of logic themselves are not formally diverse from one another, but purely materially. But why? Because, you say, they all tend toward the same formal aspect of the knowable. Yet you are playing in a vicious circle. For the formal diversity of knowable things is taken from diversity of principles, as we have just seen from St. Thomas. If therefore formal diversity of principles is taken from diverse aspect of the knowable, there will be a perpetual circuit without ever reaching the root of the diversity. Moreover, those principles, "An explanation is clearer than what it explains," "Things which are the same as one third thing," etc., neither are from the same principles nor does one proceed from another; therefore they are formally diverse according to the rule laid down from Aristotle in n. 3.

14. The Thomists recur to abstraction from matter as the ultimate root of unity and diversity of knowable things. For this, note that the ancient division of speculative philosophy approved by St. Thomas is into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, from a threefold degree of abstraction of being from matter. For physics or natural philosophy regards being insofar as abstracted or mentally prescinded from singular matter, though not from sensible matter, since it regards "body as sensible" or "mobile." Mathematics regards being as abstracted from sensible matter or matter affected by sensible qualities, though not from intelligible matter, since it regards "being as extended," which is not understood without matter. Metaphysics regards being as abstracted from all matter, even intelligible matter, since it regards "being as common" to corporeal and incorporeal things. Modern Thomists add abstraction from all matter "negatively" and attribute it to logic, because logic, they say, regards a being of reason which abstracts negatively from all matter, that is, by title of an imperfection

incapable of having matter (Froylan, q. 2 prooem., a. 5). From the unity and diversity of these abstractions they therefore derive the formal unity and diversity of knowable things and sciences. Hence they deny that objects are formally diverse in the being of the knowable when they are regarded by science under the same abstraction from matter.

15. But this recourse does not suffice. Against this 1º: under the same abstraction from matter there can be formal diversity of knowable things; therefore under this precise heading the principles and partial objects of logic do not cease to be formally diverse. The antecedent is proved both because under the abstraction assigned to mathematics there are geometry and arithmetic, which no one denies to be mutually distinct sciences regarding formally diverse knowable objects; and because according to St. Thomas, *In Posteriora Analytica* I, lect. 41, "Natural body and mathematical body are different genera of knowable things." "And each of these genera is distinguished into diverse species of knowable things according to diverse modes and aspects of knowability." Thus under the abstraction of natural body corresponding to physics and under mathematical abstraction St. Thomas recognizes "diverse species of knowable things," certainly formally diverse; for beyond doubt that diversity is formal which implies "diverse modes and aspects of knowability," and this is the sole kind of diversity treated by the Angelic Doctor in that place, as will be clear to the reader.

16. Against this 2º: negative abstraction from matter permits definition and syllogism to be specifically diverse modes of knowing and to be demonstrated by logic precisely as diverse from principles which "neither are from the same principles nor proceed one from another," and which consequently ground diverse scientific habits according to Aristotle, *Posteriora Analytica* I, c. 23. Against this 3º: acts tending under the same negative abstraction require really distinct and different intentional species; therefore likewise different habits. The consequence is clear both because most arguments of the Thomists concerning habits can be applied to those species, and because the species of one object does not extend to others for the reason that it is the seed of the object and consequently represents its proper nature, although it is produced by the agent intellect. But the same reason applies to the habit, as is clear from what has been said.

17. Other Thomist answers, since they are easily reduced to those thus far attacked, can be overcome by the same arguments. Hence when they say that the difficulty we experience concerning syllogism after acquiring a habit concerning definition is not "formal and intrinsic" but "material and extrinsic," that is, arises solely from defect of species and not defect of habit, just as the difficulty of the visual potency in seeing an object placed at a

distance arises not from defect of power but of the species, this solution is easily refuted from what has been said above, which sufficiently proves the intrinsic ineptitude of the habit to concur in acts so diverse on the side of object and principles. Add that by the same right it could be defended that the habit of physics of itself facilitates acts of metaphysics and of any science whatsoever, but is impeded until species of the objects arrive; indeed, that the intellect of itself is the facility and habit for all sciences and experiences difficulty from no source other than defect of species.

18. Add further that a disciple already facile concerning definition acquires species of syllogism as soon as he hears the doctrine concerning it, and yet does not immediately experience himself as facile in demonstrating the rules of syllogism. Therefore for the use of the species he needs a new facility and consequently a new habit. Hence the parity with the visual potency is null. For that potency, since it does not use habits, does not so much experience difficulty as impotence from defect of a power simply necessary. But the intellect, after acquiring species concerning syllogism, still experiences difficulty in their use.

19. Indeed, if contention be set aside, who would believe that a beginner, as soon as he elicits his first demonstration in a logical matter, suddenly becomes as much a logician as Aristotle himself or St. Thomas once was? Yet this is the opinion of the Thomists; among whom the habit acquired by the first demonstration is the whole of habitual logic and of itself facilitates reasoning concerning the whole object of logic, without being capable in any way of increase or multiplication in the line of habit. Hence the beginner who begins from the doctrine of defining already knows habitually whatever pertains to syllogism before he even hears the name "syllogism." It is remarkable that one should possess a habit, not infused from heaven but acquired by one's own acts, of knowing and demonstrating things which have not yet entered one's mind. Some Thomists indeed devised certain modes really superadded by which the habit would in the course of time be extensively perfected. But modern Thomists rightly reject these as useless and injurious to their own doctrine. See M. Froylan, q. 2 prooem., a. 6, § 4.

20. But it is still more remarkable that one should have an erroneous act and habit concerning the same properties of syllogism which one habitually knows, as we argued above in n. 4. The Thomists reply that an error arising from defect of application of the object to the habit or of the habit to the object can without absurdity be joined with the habit of science, just as invincible error concerning a mystery not yet promulgated can be joined with the habit of faith. Against this: if anyone dissents from a mystery which through the teaching of the Church he knows to be contained under the

formal motive of faith, namely divine revelation, he will without doubt lose the habit of faith. Therefore if someone errs concerning the doctrine of syllogism which through the teaching of a master he knows to be contained under mode of knowing as such, which according to you is the single formal motive of logic, he will lose the habit of logic. But after a disciple has learned from a master that syllogism is contained under mode of knowing, he can still err concerning the doctrine of distribution of the middle and other rules, especially those proper to each figure, as seems undoubted. Therefore he will then lose the whole habit of logic, even concerning the doctrine of defining, which you deny and which cannot be conceded consistently with experience.

21. Furthermore, tell me in what this "defect of application" consists. For if you speak of application made through actual demonstration, such application necessarily fails whenever error is present, as is evident. Hence if error does not then destroy the habit of science, it never will. The same follows if that defect consists in a disordered use of species. But if it consists in absence of the species themselves, there will then be no error but purely negative ignorance; for no one conceives a false judgment concerning a thing of which he has no species. It will therefore never happen as St. Thomas taught possible (Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 53, a. 1, c. and ad 3), namely that "through a false reason the habit of science is corrupted even as to the very root of the habit." You may say: if God infuses a natural habit of science into a boy not yet imbued with species of objects, he could afterwards err concerning the object of the habit. I answer: he could indeed, but by an error destroying the habit of science, unless God miraculously preserved it contrary to the exigency of the contrary habit.

Corollaries.

22. What has been said thus far proves that in logic, as in any other complete science, there are at minimum as many habits really and specifically distinct as there are species of partial objects individually demonstrated. Hence the habit of reasoning concerning demonstrative syllogism is one, concerning topical syllogism another, concerning sophistical syllogism another, concerning conversion of propositions another, and so with the rest. But beyond this the following must be added. 1º The habits of logic are multiplied according to the number of conclusions disclosing diverse truths concerning the same subject. The Excellent Doctor proves and explains this very well in *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 44, sect. 11, from n. 46.

23. Second: besides habits of conclusions, there are also in logic habits of principles pertaining to its object. For first, "Whatever science considers some genus as its subject must consider the principles of that genus, since science is not perfected except through cognition of first principles," as St. Thomas says in so many words (*Opusc.* 70, q. 5, a. 4, c.). Next, the same Angelic Doctor frequently teaches that the habit of principles, when considered separately, is distinct from the scientific habit of conclusions (e.g. Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2). Hence, since definitions of the subject and of its parts are first and most proper principles which each science uses for demonstrating properties of the subject, it follows that the habit of defining the object of logic is distinguished from the habit of inferring conclusions concerning the properties of that same object.

24. Third, to decide the question which we left undecided above in chapter 3, n. 4, a teaching habit, or one which gives the rules of one mode of knowing, is not a using habit of those same rules concerning the whole matter of logic; consequently there is a really distinct using habit, at least concerning the other species of mode of knowing. The reason is that after a habit of explaining the properties of definition or division has been acquired, if someone uses this doctrine by defining or dividing syllogism, he already elicits an act concerning a diverse formal object. For this use has syllogism as its object, whereas that doctrine regards as its object not syllogism but definition or division. But acts concerning diverse formal objects require distinct habits, as abundantly appears from what has been said. Therefore such use requires a habit distinct from the habit of doctrine. Think the same concerning the habit teaching one to syllogize, which must likewise be distinguished from the habit executing syllogisms concerning definition and division. Whatever can be objected against this corollary remains solved in chapters 3 and 4, or will easily be solved from the doctrine of the following chapter.

25. Fourth: at present the question concerns only the simplicity of a logical habit producing scientific or demonstrative acts. But if we speak of habitual logic insofar as it also produces opinative acts, of which there are very many in logical matter, it is certain, even among the Thomists, that the opinative and scientific habits of logic are really distinct from one another, as M. Palanco admits, tract. I, prooem., last q., n. 1. The other Thomists likewise presuppose or concede this with M. Solo, q. 3 prooem. *Logicae*, "Ad sextum argumentum," except one or another who chose to assign to a scientific habit the power of eliciting probable acts.

CHAPTER VI.
Contrary Objections Are Dissolved.

1. Objection 1º: the authority of St. Thomas, who in Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 54, a. 4, c., not only holds but expressly proves that a habit of science "is a simple quality not constituted from several habits, even though it extends to many things." I admit that the passage is difficult to explain, yet not so clear that we may not doubt the mind of St. Thomas, as Capreolus, the Prince of the Thomists, was permitted to do, who in q. 3 of the Prologue to the *Sententiae*, after bringing forward many testimonies of St. Thomas, says: "It appears to me that he inclines more toward that opinion which posits science as an ordered collection of intelligible species." Many Thomists judged the same, as reported by Cajetan at the cited place, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}. Certainly the Angelic Doctor speaks no less clearly for our opinion elsewhere. For in Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 52, a. 1, at the end of the body, he denies that a habit of science "includes indivisibility in its notion"; and in a. 2, c., treating of increase of a habit by addition, he says: "Science can be increased in itself by addition, as when someone learns more conclusions of geometry, the habit of the same science is increased in him according to species."

2. Again, Summa Theologiae III^{a}, q. 12, a. 2, c.: "There is," he says, "a twofold progress of science: one according to essence, namely insofar as the habit of science itself is increased," which he attributes to acquired science; "another according to effect, as when someone according to the same and equal habit of science first demonstrates lesser things to others and afterwards greater and subtler things," which he attributes to infused science. Nothing could be clearer against the Thomists, with whose principles the first kind of progress is wholly discordant and only the latter consonant. Likewise in *De veritate*, q. 8, a. 16, ad 4, he says: "One whole science comprehends under itself diverse particular sciences by which diverse conclusions are known." Add that the proofs of our opinion rest on the authority of St. Thomas. Hence, when the holy Doctor calls a habit a simple quality, perhaps he speaks of simplicity not physical and entitative, but taken for "unity of order toward the same end." In this way we commonly call logic a habit in the singular even though we recognize several habits in it. "And just as we concede," says Magister Soto for the Thomists (q. 3 prooem. *Logicae*, concl. 3), "that a collection of several species is one habit which is the beginning of science." In the same sense the habit is not

constituted "from several habits," namely by "a plurality of orders toward diverse ends."

3. Objection 2º: logical habits are not distinguished by number alone, since accidents numerically distinct cannot coexist in the same subject. Nor, on the other hand, can they differ in species; therefore they are in no way distinguished. The minor is proved 1º because otherwise logic would not be one but several logics specifically diverse, which could not come together into one science, just as the habits of logic and physics cannot constitute one science. 2º Because if the habits are specifically distinguished, each will have its own specifying object; therefore logic will not have one specifying object or one formal aspect under which, contrary to all. The Thomists are bound to solve this argument: both in the habit of principles, which belongs to logic and is really distinguished from the habit of conclusions, as is clear from n. 23 of the preceding chapter; and in the scientific and opinative habits, which are certainly mutually distinct from the preceding chapter, n. 25, yet constitute one faculty of logic; and in impressed species, which, although specifically different, constitute one habit which at least "inchoatively and secondarily" is the habit of science, as Soto (*loc. cit.*) and Cajetan (*In* Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 54, a. 4) teach from the mind of St. Thomas. Therefore for all:

4. I answer, omitting the major and distinguishing the minor: they cannot be distinguished by complete or total species in the genus of science, I grant; by incomplete or partial species, I deny the minor and consequence. To be distinguished by complete species in the genus of science is to belong to diverse species not ordered toward constituting one total science. To be distinguished by partial species is for habits so to differ that they are nevertheless coordinated toward constituting one complete science. Thus in physical things the body and soul of man are specifically distinguished in the genus of substance, but incompletely, because they are coordinated toward constituting a complete species of substance, namely man.

5. To proof 1º I deny the consequence. For actual logic is called one although constituted from many mutually diverse acts; why could the same not occur in habitual logic? Thus the name "logic" has been imposed to signify the collection of all acts or habits ordered toward one end, that is, conducing to the same object of attribution, whether this be the real or fictitious artifice of the mode of knowing, or the artifice of demonstration, or anything else, concerning which in the following disputation.

6. For the sake of clarity we now admit what the Thomists frequently inculcate in the present question, that the artifice of the mode of knowing is the "of itself, formal, attributive, specifying object" of logic, by which names

they intend to signify the same thing. From the unity of this object logic is therefore called one, not indeed by unity of indivisibility or physical composition, for no physical union can connect habits concerned with diverse partial objects, but by unity of mere order or coordination toward the same formal or attributive object, proximately or remotely. This unity can be called moral composition. In this way we simply speak of one family, one army, one kingdom, or one republic from order, namely, toward one father of a family, one leader, one king, or one senate. Hence several habits are not simply called several logics, but only with the qualification "partially," just as several soldiers or even cohorts are not called several armies except with the same qualification. Hence also logical habits can more readily come together into one science than the habits of logic and physics; for the latter are ordered toward diverse attributive objects and are related like men belonging to different families. Thus, although the same reason applies in both cases as regards real and specific distinction in the being of habit, as is gathered from the preceding chapter, there is nevertheless another reason as regards moral composition of one complete science.

7. To proof 2º I distinguish the consequence: if the discussion concerns partial logic, which is multiple, I grant; if total or complete logic, I deny the consequence. Since complete logic is the collection of all the habits, its specifying object is an aspect embracing all the objects specifying the individual habits, namely the aspect of mode of knowing, which is univocal and generically one, embracing diverse species of artifice from which the individual habits are specified. This aspect so taken is not multiple. But the opponents make many replies against the doctrine of this whole solution.

8. Reply 1º. Logic is one species of science; how therefore can it be constituted from many species? I ask in return: how is one species of army constituted from men, horses, and elephants? Moreover, to use the examples of the Excellent Doctor (*loc. cit.*, n. 57), speaking morally the exterior and interior act are called one human act; one virtue of liberality is said to be composed of a habit of the will and of the sensitive appetite; and one virtue of faith from a habit of the intellect and a habit of pious affection of the will. The examples of n. 3 likewise bear here. Indeed in the physical line health or beauty is considered one quality according to the common manner of speaking and philosophizing, as the same Excellent Doctor says (n. 55), and yet neither is a simple quality, but results from the proportion of several.

9. Reply 2º. If order toward one end suffices for the unity of a science, all sciences will be one science, or all moral virtues one virtue, since all are ordered toward the perfection of the human intellect or toward the moral

honesty of the whole of life. I answer: this difficulty applies equally to actual science and to impressed species, and moreover presses the Thomists more. For why does a simple habit, just as it extends to all acts tending under the aspect of mode of knowing, not likewise extend to all tending under the aspect of truth? Or under the aspect of the knowable? Or under the aspect of good or honesty? Or why does the former rather than the latter similarity of tendency suffice? You may say: because the aspect of mode of knowing is specific, not in real being but in the being of the knowable. Against this: the aspect of truth is also specific in the being of the cognizable, since it is the "specifier of the intellect." You will recur to diverse abstraction from matter. But first, abstraction from matter can be generic in the being of the knowable, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Next, why does similarity in abstraction from matter rather than in the aspect of the demonstrable or of the honest demand a simple habit? Or why is one rather than the other called specific in the being of the knowable or in the being of virtue? By whatever reason, therefore, you distinguish simple habits, by the same we shall distinguish collections of habits.

10. Moreover, whence complete sciences are mutually distinguished is a difficulty which has its place elsewhere. Now I briefly say with the common opinion of Scotists and our authors (see among others Mastrius, disp. 12 *Logicae*, q. 3, a. 3; Fathers Hurtado, disp. 2 *Logicae*, sect. 4, and disp. 1 *Metaphysicae*, sect. 7, subsect. 2; Oviedo, controv. 1 *Logicae*, punct. 3, § 4, concl. 5; Ulloa, disp. 3 *Logicae Minoris*, c. 1, from n. 28), that a distinction of this kind is fundamentally natural, that is, grounded in the very nature and character of knowable things; nevertheless, in most at least purely human sciences, it is formally or completely artificial, constituted by the choice and prudent judgment of the Princes of Philosophy. In the way that nature itself has delineated the boundaries of kingdoms or nations, such as Spain, France, and Italy, by the Pyrenees and Alps, though it did not so fix them that no delimitation fittingly established by geographers, princes, or peoples was needed. The reason for the first part is that there is of itself a greater affinity among the objects of logic than between them and the objects of physics, either because all the former belong to the right manner of conceiving and investigating truth, which manner does not pertain to physical objects, or, if you prefer, because they claim a diverse abstraction from matter. Thus there is commonly a greater agreement in character and temperament among Spaniards themselves than with Italians or Frenchmen. The reason for the second part is that the boundaries of sciences could absolutely have been more enlarged or restricted, although unfittingly or less fittingly. For how from the nature of the thing alone would one refute a person who called the

science concerning soul or concerning the elements a complete science and denied that it was a part of one physics? Or one who called the science of syllogism complete and denied that it was part of one logic? Thus many say that complete Aristotelian logic treats only of syllogism. Thus Italy, which formerly was bounded from Gaul by the river Rubicon, is more fittingly extended today as far as the Alps.

11. Therefore that such and so great a breadth of object exists in complete sciences was determined by the principal philosophers, who, following the guidance of nature, wished to avoid two extremes: one, lest there be an excessive multitude of sciences; the other, lest wholly disparate objects, for example syllogism and angel, be joined into one science. Either would have been sufficiently unfitting and would cause confusion in teaching and learning. Perhaps the same is to be said of acquired moral virtues, although the same reason does not apply in them, as we shall note below. Now to the reply I deny the consequence, because the perfection of the human intellect consisting in cognition of all things is neither the object of science, but science itself multiplied, nor does it have or can it have any moral unity with a sufficiently fitting foundation.

12. Reply 3º. Logic has mode of knowing as its specifying object precisely as an aspect common to all logical objects; but among the particular habits which we posit, none is specified by mode of knowing precisely as common, but precisely as contracted to some species. Therefore logic is not a collection of particular habits; for that which specifies no part of a collection cannot be the specifying object of the collection. First, the argument is turned upon the opponent: both in actual logic, which certainly is a collection of acts specified through mode of knowing; and in the habit itself, which is not specified by an object except through acts. Therefore, if mode of knowing as such specifies no particular act, neither will it specify the habit. Next I answer 1º: when a science is said to be specified by some common aspect of object, the sense is that there is no partial object of such a science which does not participate in and contract to itself that aspect, and thereby be distinguished from the objects of other total sciences. This could stand even if no habit or act attained that whole aspect precisely as common. Thus the visual potency is specified through its acts by the aspect of color as such, even if no act attains or can attain color as such.

13. I answer 2º by denying the minor, because logic defines and discusses mode of knowing in common, as no one is ignorant. Therefore in logic there is a habit of reasoning concerning mode of knowing as such and specified by it. This habit is a simple quality and can be called, as it were, the center or bond of the subjective unity of all the habits of logic, and as it were the head

of the others, not so much from its own intrinsic merits, for intrinsically it is less perfect than the others, as from the merits of its specifying object. For just as mode of knowing as such is an object in a certain way uniting the other objects of logic, because it contains them all under itself as its properties, species, or subordinate parts, proximate or remote, so the habit corresponding to it at least mediately unites all the other habits. Likewise, just as mode of knowing as such, although intensively less perfect than its species, nevertheless because of extension and breadth is called a "whole" and something "superior" to the other logical objects, so the habit which it specifies, because of objective extension, can be called "superior" or the "head" with respect to the remaining habits, especially with the suffrage of the philosophers added. Hence mode of knowing as such becomes the specifying object of the whole of logic, because immediately it specifies that habit to which, as to the head of a family, the other habits are subordinated, and consequently it specifies all of them mediately. This explanation of the unity of logic likewise applies to the other sciences and should be noted as more expedient against opponents who arm themselves with obscurity and ambiguity of terms. It is taken from the Subtle Scotus, *Metaphysica* VI, q. 1, whose mind Mastrius explains (*loc. cit.*, nn. 79-80).

14. Reply 4º. If there is in logic a simple habit regarding the common aspect of mode of knowing, it will contain the other habits eminently; therefore the others are superfluous. The antecedent is proved because such a habit will be able to regard all the species of mode of knowing which the others regard, just as the visual potency regards all particular colors because it regards color as such. I press the point manifestly: then the habit of metaphysics regarding being as such will contain eminently all the habits of the real sciences, which consequently will be superfluous. The consequence is proved because such a habit will be able to regard all particular species of being, just as the intellective potency regards every particular truth because it regards truth as such.

15. Therefore I deny the antecedent together with its proof. For eminent containment requires an excess of intensive perfection such as that habit does not possess in relation to the others, just as neither does its object in relation to particular objects. For a genus does not eminently contain its species, but at most virtually and inadequately. Certainly the properties of syllogism cannot be demonstrated from the common aspect of mode of knowing alone, just as the properties of man cannot be demonstrated from the aspect of animal as such alone. Other principles and consequently other habits are therefore required. That the visual potency regards color as such, if we speak properly, is false; for it does not regard color except through acts,

no one of which has hitherto seen color as such. It is therefore said to tend under the aspect of color in the sense explained in n. 12. Why, however, a simple potency rather than a simple habit can regard various species of objects, we shall say below.

16. Reply 5º. On the side of the objects of logic there is no true and real unity; therefore, since on the side of the habits there is no unity except through order toward the object, there will be no true unity of the whole of logic. This also presses the opponents. For it is certain that really and prior to consideration of the intellect there is no unity in the object of logic except purely fundamental. Therefore, since the opponents wish the unity of the habit to be derived from unity of object, and not conversely, otherwise there will be a vicious circle, the habit cannot derive from it more than fundamental and improper unity. How then does it derive a unity so strict that it becomes physically simple? Therefore I answer from what was said in n. 13: mode of knowing in common, which specifies the whole of logic either immediately or mediately, has whatever unity the Thomists please, grounded namely in negative abstraction from matter or in the generic similarity of its parts, and from this it specifies a simple habit through which it is attained and known in common. The other particular objects, however, have only unity of order toward the common aspect of mode of knowing, to which all are subordinated as parts of a whole or properties of an essence. From this the habits participate in a similar unity of order and are all in some way subordinated to the habit regarding mode of knowing as such.

17. Objection 3º. One habit suffices for acts tending under one formal motive; but all acts of logic tend under one formal motive, namely under the aspect of mode of knowing; therefore, etc. I distinguish the major: under one specific formal motive, I admit; generic, I deny the major. Likewise I distinguish the minor: they tend under one generic formal motive, I grant; specific, I deny the minor and consequence. The aspect of mode of knowing as such is generic and contains under itself various specifically distinct modes of knowing, which logic considers not only insofar as they agree in the common aspect of mode of knowing, but also insofar as they differ among themselves in specific artifice and insofar as they are demonstrable from diverse principles. Therefore logic needs diverse habits.

18. One may object 1º. The aspect of mode of knowing as such is not generic but specific in the being of the knowable; for it is the specifying aspect of logic, and logic is one atomic species. I answer: first, the Scotists with Scotus deny that logic is one atomic species (see Mastrius, *loc. cit.*, nn. 77-78), just as all deny this of mathematics and many of physics. Next I distinguish the first proposition: it is not a generic aspect in the being of

what is knowable by partial logic, I deny; in the being of what is knowable by complete and total logic, I grant. This concept, "partial logic," is generic and contractible through syllogistic, definitive, and divisive logic as through species. But this concept, "total logic," is specific and indeed an atomic species, because it is divided into several total logics not specifically but numerically distinct, namely those which exist consummately in Aristotle, St. Thomas, Scotus, Suárez, and other dialecticians. Thus, although this concept, "part of an army," is a genus with respect to men, horses, and weapons, nevertheless "a complete army" is an atomic species, divisible only into individuals numerically distinct. The same would be seen in the other examples of n. 8. Complete logic indeed contains specifically distinct parts, but as actual parts, as body and soul are in man, not as subjective parts of which it is predicated as a genus.

19. But how, you ask, will the generic aspect of the object be the "specifier" of total logic? Or how will it give unity of an atomic species which it does not itself possess? I ask you in return: how does it give to the habit a unity of physical simplicity which it certainly does not possess? I likewise ask whether the aspect of truth as such or good as such, the former of which is the "specifier" of the intellect and the latter of the will, is an atomic species of object. You will say that it is indeed an atomic species, not in real being but in the being of the cognizable or lovable. But besides the fact that it would follow that acts of intellect or will do not differ specifically from object or motive, I ask again what is meant by "in the being of the cognizable"? Certainly, unless we play in a vicious circle, it can mean nothing other than that truth or good as such is so manifold in real being, indeed also in the being of the cognizable when compared with various cognitions, that nevertheless according to its whole breadth it intrinsically demands to be attained by acts of one potency of an atomic species. Thus the aspect of truth is not formally and in itself an atomic species, but only exigently, inferentially, or radically, when compared with the potency.

20. Likewise, therefore, the aspect of mode of knowing is formally and in itself generic, and also when compared with the partial logics, syllogistic, definitive, etc.; yet because according to its whole breadth and all its parts it intrinsically demands to be attained through acts and habits belonging to one total logic of an atomic species, that aspect is therefore called an atomic species in the being of what is knowable by total logic, namely inferentially or radically. Here note that the intrinsic specifier of any form or thing, even of a potency or habit, is its essential difference; "and it is foolish to call this into doubt," says Cajetan (*In* Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 52, a. 4). Therefore when potencies, habits, and acts are said to be specified by an object, the

sense is that they have their essential differences with order to an object; hence the object is an extrinsic specifier from which, as from a sign or root, we gather the specific diversity of acts, habits, and potencies.

21. You will press 2º: one intellective potency suffices for all acts tending under the aspect of truth; therefore one habit also suffices for all acts tending under the aspect of mode of knowing. The consequence is proved: the antecedent is true because the aspect of truth is the specifying aspect of the intellective potency and all cognitions have truth as such for one motive. But the aspect of mode of knowing is also the specifying aspect of logic, whose demonstrations all have mode of knowing as such for one motive; therefore, etc. You will add the parity of the habit of faith, which alone suffices for all acts tending under the motive of revelation; of the habit of charity, which of itself inclines one to love God and neighbor, whether friend or enemy, and the special difficulty found in love of enemies does not multiply the habit; and finally of the habit of temperance, which as one simple habit suffices for abstaining from food and drink, although there is often greater difficulty in one than the other.

22. I answer by denying the consequence; for if the parity of the intellective potency is valid, one simple habit will suffice for all scientific acts, indeed for all cognitions whatsoever. To the proof, I deny the causal proposition of the major. First, nothing seems to me more false than that all cognitions have truth as such for one motive; otherwise, since cognitions are distinguished in species chiefly according to motive, especially according to the Thomists, it would follow that practical and speculative, certain and uncertain, natural and supernatural cognitions are of the same species, which would be most extraordinary. Next, from the fact that the aspect of truth is the specifying aspect of intellect, it is not sufficiently gathered that this potency is one by unity of simplicity; for that aspect, being most general and admitting under itself innumerable cognitions diverse in species and genus, cannot be the sufficient cause of so strict a unity, but at most grounds on the side of potency a certain vague unity, whether of simplicity, physical composition, order, or affinity. For from the aspect of truth as such alone, how will you prove that the practical intellect is not really distinguished from the speculative?

23. The true reason, therefore, why a simple potency suffices for so many acts is that potency differs from an acquired habit especially in this: it is not produced by acts nor depends on them *a priori*, but is a power of a higher order and, as it were, a universal cause which does not receive limitation from effects in species, as a simple habit does for the contrary reason. The potency has this breadth of power not indeed from truth as such, which

exerts no influence in the production of the potency, but from nature itself or from the substance of the soul. Thus the sun and other celestial causes possess the power of concurring in all sensible sublunary effects, and that power is said to be specified by the common aspect of these effects, although the sun has it from no source other than its own nature produced by God.

24. If you ask why the intellect does not of itself possess power also for acts tending under the aspect of good, so that one really simple potency may be both will and intellect, I answer: the reason for this matter depends upon psychology, in which many deny a real distinction of the potencies both among themselves and from the substance of the soul. Meanwhile it can be said that truth and good as such indeed argumentatively ground the real specific distinction of total potencies because of the excessive diversity of mode of tending which they require on the side of acts, namely by way of representation and affective impulse. Yet with this it coheres that neither truth nor good as such demands the real simplicity of each total potency in its own line. From these points you will easily meet the instances of the Thomists who overemphasize the parity of potencies.

25. The parity of a habit infused of itself, such as the habit of faith, charity, or supernatural temperance, does not press. For an infused habit, just as it is not produced by acts, need not be commensurated to them in species; nor does it give "being able easily," as an acquired habit does, but "being able simply," like a potency, which it consequently imitates more in breadth of power. But if we speak of acquired faith, charity, and temperance, we do not by the same habit believe these and those men, nor by the same habit love friends and enemies, nor by the same habit moderate ourselves concerning food and drink; and the special difficulties of these extremes prove this. Add 1º that the parity of moral virtues rather works against the opponents, as is clear from the preceding chapter, q. 8. Add 2º that the generic motive of a virtue, for example justice, can sufficiently move one to loving any particular species of the object; but in the object of science the generic aspect alone cannot move one to assent to specific truths, and diverse principles are required for demonstrating them. Add 3º that although, for example, the habit of temperance acquired in the will from a common motive is not multiplied according to diversity of matter, it must be said otherwise of the habit in the sensitive appetite (Suárez, *loc. cit.*, n. 42), which immediately experiences the difficulty of one matter rather than another. Hence it remains always true that diverse difficulty of object requires a diverse habit.

26. But you will still object: a habit is a perfection of a potency; but a perfection is commensurated with its perfectible subject; therefore the habit

is commensurated with the potency, at least in this, that one habit suffices for acts tending under the same formal aspect. You will confirm: a habit extends farther on the side of object than the act by which it is first generated, for it is more removed from actuality and exercise. Therefore it can extend to all acts tending under the common aspect of the whole science. But the objection proves that one habit extends to everything cognizable; indeed that one impressed species and one act likewise extend so far, since act and species also are perfections of the potency.

27. Therefore a perfection is commensurated with its perfectible subject, and a habit with its potency, insofar as it can be, namely in this, that it is spiritual and has other predicates not repugnant to it. But it is not commensurated in a function which from its own concept is repugnant to it, such as, with respect to an acquired habit, extension to acts specifically dissimilar to those by which it was generated. To the confirmation I deny the antecedent if the discussion concerns the specific formal object of the act. Nor does the greater distance from actuality matter, which is equally found in an impressed species without greater extension; for at most it proves a greater extension of the habit not on the side of formal object but on the side of active power, which in the habit prior to act extends to other acts of the same species.

28. Objection 4º: the acts of a total science are so connected among themselves that one contains another; for the first demonstrates the first property from the essence of the object, from which the second demonstrates the second property, from which the third the third, and so of the others. But acts connected in this way belong to the same habit; therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º, from Aguilera: whatever is treated in logic is derived from the predicables and contained in their doctrine. For there genus and difference are treated, from which definition consists; genus and species, by which division is constituted; inclusion of the superior in the inferior, upon which that principle, "said of every," rests, by which the syllogistic art is regulated. Therefore the habit of reasoning concerning predicables suffices for reasoning concerning the other objects of logic. Confirmation 2º, from Fr. Quirós: a habit must not be admitted except for a difficulty which cannot be overcome through intentional species; but once the habit of logic has been acquired through the first demonstration, only a difficulty to be overcome through species remains in the others. Therefore no new habit is required for the other demonstrations. The minor is proved because all demonstrations have the same mode of tending; therefore the difficulty of the mode of tending is overcome by the first habit. But once this has been overcome, species alone are needed for demonstrating any object

whatsoever; for one who knows how to infer an animal from motion will with equal facility infer fire from smoke, provided only that he has the species.

29. To the objection I deny the major. For this act, for example, "A definition is clearer than the thing defined," in no way contains this act, "A syllogism consists of three terms," nor the many others which concern various species of logical object. The appended proof at most proves that an act which from the essence of mode of knowing in common, or of syllogism in common, demonstrates its first property also in common contains the demonstration of the second property, and so of the others, always remaining within the common aspect, although even this is not in reality proved, as the Excellent Doctor shows (*loc. cit.*, especially n. 50 sqq.). But if we speak of the proper properties of diverse species of mode of knowing compared with one another, there is no containment of one in another. If you compare specific properties with the generic aspect of mode of knowing, you will find only an inadequate potential and permissive containment, which certainly does not suffice for demonstration unless diverse principles are added from elsewhere, which require a new habit. Thus rationality or risibility of man cannot be demonstrated from animal as such or from its properties. And the objection is pressed: for if specific containment of one thing in another makes them belong to the same habit, with greater reason principles and conclusions, or a subalternating and subalternated science, for example arithmetic and music, or geometry and perspective, will belong to the same habit.

30. To confirmation 1º. First, the same retort just proposed presses. Next, that derivation is inadequate, remote, and insufficient separately from other principles, no differently from the derivation of any building from scattered stones. Hence just as one who knows how to arrange scattered stones does not immediately become an architect or possess the habit of building and constructing diverse species of houses, so must it be said in our matter. Certainly one who knows how to form genera, differences, and species does not therefore know how to distinguish essential from descriptive definition, nor potential from actual division, nor categorical from hypothetical syllogism, etc., nor the properties peculiar to these species. And although he knows the principle "said of every" as self-evident, he is not therefore facile with respect to conclusions of syllogistic art; otherwise the habit of first principles and the habit of conclusions would be the same.

31. To confirmation 2º I deny the minor. To the proof, omitting the antecedent, I distinguish the consequence: the difficulty of the mode of

tending is overcome for any assent whatsoever, I deny; for assents of the same species, I grant. A habit does not give facility toward a mode of tending considered precisely, but toward the assent itself, toward easily penetrating the notions of the terms, and toward the due use of intelligible species by which they can be represented, as the Excellent Doctor says in so many words (*ibid.*, n. 48). Hence by the first habit the difficulty of the mode of tending has not been overcome except insofar as contracted to such a species of demonstrative assent, which species is taken from the formal object. Since, therefore, other demonstrations concerning diverse formal objects contract the mode of tending diversely, they cannot be produced by the same habit. Certainly, if habits were not varied from formal objects but from the mode of tending alone, the habits of the other sciences would be superfluous or indistinct from species, contrary to what is now presupposed. Hence that equal facility of arguing from motion and from smoke must be denied with the habit of one demonstration alone. Add that in logic, besides demonstrations, there are also definitions and divisions, which have a diverse mode of tending.

32. Finally it is objected: science is placed in the predicament of quality; therefore it is not composed of many habits, for a quality composed of many qualities is not placed in a predicament. It is confirmed: because if science is one by unity of order among many habits, it will belong to the predicament of relation. These are easy. Science is placed in the predicament of quality insofar as it signifies a simple habit acquired through demonstration, and therefore insofar as it signifies in general a partial science. But if you wish total science also to be located in a predicament, composition from many qualities is no obstacle, for health and beauty also are composed of many things and yet are placed in the predicament. To the confirmation I deny the consequence, both because that order is perhaps not a predicamental relation but purely transcendental, and because the name "science" is not taken directly for the order of habits, but for the habits themselves morally conjoined, like the name "army"; or also for the principal habit containing the others under itself according to n. 13.

CHAPTER VII.

Is Logic Necessary for Acquiring the Other Sciences?

1. For attaining some end, something can be necessary either absolutely or in a qualified respect. Absolutely necessary is that without which, at least by the powers of nature, the end cannot be attained. Thus breathing is necessary for a man to preserve his life. Necessary in a qualified respect is

that without which the end can absolutely be attained, but not without labor and difficulty. Thus for making a long journey a horse, or some other means of conveyance, is necessary. The question, therefore, is by what kind of necessity the direction of artificial Logic is required for acquiring the other sciences; for there is no doubt that natural Logic, wholly indistinct from the acuteness of the intellect, is required. The sciences may be considered either in an imperfect and incomplete state, namely when one or another demonstration concerning their object is acquired, or in a perfect and complete state, namely when all the demonstrations concerning the object of each science that are ordinarily acquired by men fully accomplished in philosophy are acquired.

2. The first opinion holds Logic to be absolutely necessary for the other sciences in both states, perfect and imperfect. Thus several Thomists, with Soto, Araujo, Lerna, Parra, and Navarrete, to whom more recently MM. Manso and Gabriel a Concept. have been added. The second says that Logic is absolutely necessary for the sciences in the perfect state, but not in the imperfect state. Thus several other Thomists, whom both Lyncaeus, the Dominican and our own, report and follow. The third asserts that the sciences in either state can absolutely be had without Logic. This opinion is very common in our School, and also among the Scotists according to Pontius; among the Thomists the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá and MM. Palanco, Froyl., and Aguilera subscribe to it. With these we agree.

§ 1. Our Conclusion.

3. Logic is not absolutely necessary for acquiring the other sciences, either in the imperfect state or, consequently, in the perfect state. The first part is proved: without artificial Logic the intellect can elicit those demonstrations which proceed immediately from first self-evident principles, such as this: “Every whole is greater than its part; but the world is a whole of which the earth is a part; therefore the world is greater than the earth.” But by demonstrations of this sort science is had in an imperfect state. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proved: the intellect can, first of all, by natural power alone know certainly and evidently the truth of those premises, and furthermore evidently infer the conclusion from them. Therefore it can have that demonstration without the direction of Logic. The consequence is legitimate, and the major premise is beyond doubt. For the premise “Every whole is greater than its part” is one of the self-evident principles for whose evident cognition no one requires artificial Logic. Likewise, “The world is a whole” is evidently perceived by the eyes no less

than "The sun shines," without need of a directing art, unless one wishes to say that those ignorant of Logic can judge nothing evidently, not even their own existence.

4. The minor premise is therefore proved: by its native light alone the intellect knows those principles, "What is predicated of all, etc.; things which are the same as one third thing, etc." For they are self-evident. It can therefore know evidently without Logic that whatever is truly said of every whole, namely "to be greater than its part," must be said of this whole, namely the world; and that things certainly known in the premises to be identified with one third thing must necessarily be identified with each other. But this is to know that the conclusion is evidently inferred from the premises. Indeed, although one does not know how to reduce the validity of the consequence to those principles, it can be made manifest through the clarity of the object of the premises. Thus we commonly see persons ignorant of Logic, and not thinking about those principles, "Things which are the same as one third thing, etc.," not only reason very well by natural ingenuity but also be entirely certain of the validity of their inferences. Suppose an uneducated creditor who presses his debtor with this reasoning: "He who owed one hundred and paid fifty still owes fifty; you, when you owed one hundred, paid only fifty; therefore you still owe fifty." Then ask the man, I beg you, whether he is certain of the validity of the inference. He will doubtless say that he is entirely certain, and no captious argument or sophism will induce him to abandon it, although he knows no other reason to give than the connection of the objects themselves, clearer to him than the noonday light.

5. Confirmation 1º: because we commonly see persons ignorant of Logic devote themselves to the mathematical disciplines and acquire very many demonstrations in Geometry and Arithmetic, to which they adhere with complete firmness. I myself saw a man ignorant of Logic, trained in mathematics and presenting mathematical demonstrations, who, remarkably secure about the correctness of his consequences and conclusions, received with laughter whatever was objected, although he did not know how to solve sophisms. Confirmation 2º: before Aristotle some sages of Greece attained the sciences at least in an imperfect state, as is entirely certain and is evident from the Platonic books and others. But the syllogistic art, which the adversaries especially, or even uniquely, require in the present matter, had not been invented before Aristotle, as he himself testifies in 2 Elench. c. ult. in these words: "Concerning rhetoric, indeed, many ancient things had been said; but concerning syllogisms we had absolutely nothing beforehand that we could say, until we had labored for a

long time at this proposed exercise." Nor does it matter that the whole art of Logic was implanted in Adam; for in the course of the ages it was buried in oblivion, at least among the Gentiles, and therefore the precepts of syllogistic form do not appear in authors older than Aristotle.

6. This proof is strengthened by the express authority of St. Thomas, I p., q. 117, a. c.: "There is in every man a certain principle of science, namely the light of the agent intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally known immediately from the beginning. When, however, someone applies universal principles of this sort to certain particulars of which he receives memory and experience through sense, he acquires by his own discovery the science of things he did not know, proceeding from known things to unknown." See how the Angelic Doctor, remaining entirely silent about the direction of Logic, approves the same way of discovering sciences which we said to be naturally possible, namely that the innate light of the intellect, aided by memory and experience of things, proceeds from universal principles to particular conclusions.

7. Now the second part of our conclusion is proved: without the aid of Logic the intellect can acquire scientific conclusions immediately deduced from first principles, as is clear from the proof of the first part. Therefore it can also acquire others more remote from first principles until at last it acquires them all. The consequence is proved: conclusions proved through first principles are now no less known than the principles themselves. Therefore the intellect can use them as premises for inferring still further conclusions. The consequence is evident: for it was able to deduce conclusions from first principles precisely because those principles are evident to it without Logic. But the first conclusions are likewise now evident to it without Logic. Therefore it will be able by its own resources to deduce new ones from them; and since the same reasoning applies to these, it will be able by successive inference to deduce them all.

8. Confirmation: the intellect is not wearied by producing demonstrations, nor is it rendered weaker for producing others; rather, through the acquisition of one truth it becomes more capable and ready to investigate new truths, as experience testifies. It is no otherwise than the acquisition of wealth, which does not impede but rather prepares the way for one who is rich to become richer day by day. The same is evident also in moral virtues and in mechanical works, whence arose the Spanish proverb: "He who makes one basket will make a hundred." Therefore, once the first demonstrations have been completed, since by that very fact the intellect is already more ready and robust, it will more easily be able to acquire new ones; and because through these a new strength is added to it, it will still

more easily advance to others until it obtains them all. The point is pressed against the Thomists on their own principles: through the first demonstration the intellect acquires the habit of the whole science, so that thereafter it needs only species in order easily to elicit all the remaining demonstrations. Therefore, 1º, the remaining demonstrations are easier, since they already presuppose the habit of the intellect. Therefore, 2º, Logic is not required for the remaining demonstrations, since it certainly does not belong to Logic to supply species. But once the habit and the species are posited, what prevents the demonstration from being elicited?

§ 2. The Doctrine of the Adversaries Is Rejected.

9. The authors of the first opinion concede that evident reasoning can be elicited without Logic, nor can this be denied except against manifest experience. They nevertheless deny that it is "scientific" or "demonstrative" so long as the validity of the consequence is not reflexively known as consisting in the correct disposition of the formal terms; and since this reflexive cognition is a logical act, it is not had without artificial Logic. Hence some say that such reasoning is certain "as to its substance," but not "as to its artificial mode"; others, that it is demonstrative "materially," but not "formally" and "with respect to the knower"; and others speak in other ways. But all intend this one thing: that no reasoning deserves the name "demonstration" and "science" unless it is joined with reflexive cognition of artificial Logic. Therefore this whole doctrine

10. is rejected, 1º: does the reflexive cognition presuppose that the direct reasoning is formally a demonstration and a scientific act, or does it not presuppose this, but constitute or formally complete it in the being of such an act? If the first, then the reasoning is formally a demonstration and a scientific act before the reflection, and indeed with respect to the knower, to whom it will necessarily communicate the formal effect of one "knowing," just as other formal forms communicate their effects to a capable subject. Therefore, even if that reflection did not result, the intellect would truly be demonstrating and knowing. If the second, then every reasoning, insofar as it is demonstrative and scientific, formally includes an act of artificial Logic. Therefore no physical demonstration, under the aspect of demonstration and science, is purely physical, but is something mixed from a physical and a logical act. Therefore the habit of Physics by itself is not scientific, since from it there arises only the direct demonstration, which by itself is not formally a scientific act until it is constituted in the being of such an act by logical reflection. But this consequence is absurd and contrary to common

sense. Otherwise: the habit of Physics is of itself fully scientific, as no one doubts. Therefore of itself it produces a fully scientific act. But it produces only the substance of the evident assent, or direct demonstration; for if it also produced the reflexive logical act, the physical habit would at once be logical. Therefore the substance of the direct demonstration is a fully scientific act.

11. It is rejected, 2º: this demonstration, "Every rational thing is capable of laughter; every man is rational; therefore every man is capable of laughter," insofar as it is evident reasoning with respect to all its assents, can be had without regard to the alleged reflection. First, because that reflection knows the assents to be evident, and therefore does not cause but presupposes their evidence. Second, because the evidence of the premises in no way depends upon Logic, since it is purely physical and pertains to the evidence of principles; and neither, furthermore, does the evidence of the consequence depend upon Logic. This is proved: first, those premises show the necessity of the consequence so clearly that they necessitate the intellect, with respect either to exercise or at least to specification, to infer the conclusion, of which we shall treat in tract 6. Next, the necessity of the consequence consists in this, that the object of the premises is so connected with the object of the conclusion that the former cannot stand without the latter. But this connection is something purely physical and can be evidently known without Logic, just as it is known in this hypothetical judgment: "If every man," or "Because every man is rational, every man is capable of laughter." If this is denied, one will also be bound to deny that any causal or conditional proposition can be evident without Logic, for example: "Because the sun shines, it is day; if a man runs, he moves," since in these too there is found a connection and a certain consequence of one thing from another. Finally, without Logic the intellect evidently knows that it judges what is true. Therefore it also knows that it correctly infers what is true, for it is no less naturally discursive than judicative. And he who holds this judgment evidently, "Every rational thing is capable of laughter," if this enthymeme is proposed to him, "Every man is rational; therefore every man is capable of laughter," how will he doubt the consequence?

12. Then thus: therefore that reasoning, without regard to logical reflection, is formally and fully a demonstration. The consequence is proved: because the definition of demonstration taken from Aristotle (1 Poster. c. 2) and approved by all applies to such reasoning, namely: "Reasoning consisting of true and first premises, lacking a middle, prior and better known, and causes of the conclusion." Consider each part of the definition as all customarily explain them and as we shall explain them in tract 6, and

all will be found plainly verified in the aforesaid reasoning once the evidence of the premises and consequence is posited. But every demonstration "causes knowledge," or "generates science," as no one is ignorant. There is also the definition of actual science, approved by all from Aristotle (ibid.), namely: "Cognition of a thing through its cause, and that it is the cause of it, and that the thing cannot be otherwise." For he who elicits the aforesaid reasoning knows that man is capable of laughter "through the cause," namely through being rational. He likewise knows "that it is its cause," and indeed independently of Logic; for it is not Logic but Physics alone which teaches that rationality is the cause, or necessary root, of the capacity for laughter. Finally, he knows that this thing "cannot be otherwise," since he evidently knows the necessary connection of both objects, antecedent and consequent. What, then, remains for that reasoning to be called, and to be, a scientific act?

13. It is further added that the conclusion, insofar as it is deduced by such reasoning, if it is evident, is neither opinion nor faith, as is clear, nor again is it cognition of principles. It is therefore science, or a scientific act. Someone denies this and judges that such an act should be numbered among experiential cognitions. But against this stands, 1º, that experiential cognition concerns the singular, and in this differs from scientific cognition, whose function it is to concern universals, as St. Thomas expressly teaches with Aristotle (In I Metaph., lect. 1). Against it stands, 2º, that the experienced person knows only "that it is so," whereas one possessing science knows "why it is so," that is, the cause why it is so, as the Angelic Doctor likewise teaches with the Philosopher (ibid.). But that conclusion, "Therefore every man is capable of laughter," concerns a universal object; and he who deduces it knows the cause why man is capable of laughter, namely because he is rational. Therefore such cognition has no right to be called experiential or non-scientific.

14. It will be said: for reasoning to be scientific, evidence concerning the object does not suffice, but evidence concerning the correctness of the syllogistic form is required, and this evidence is not had without Logic. Against this, 1º: the definitions adduced in n. 12 are verified of the reasoning posited in n. 11 independently of reflexive evidence concerning the syllogistic form, as will be evident to one who considers them. In particular, the clause "that the thing cannot be otherwise," which perhaps will be doubtful, speaks not of the form but of the object; for according to St. Thomas it signifies "that what is known cannot be otherwise" (In I Poster., lect. 4). And indeed the form of a demonstration concerning man, and man himself, are distinct objects under the aspect of knowability, as everyone

sees. Therefore man's capacity for laughter can be scientifically known without the form of the demonstration being reflexively known, or at least without one science being constituted through the other. Against this, 2º: even if reflexive evidence concerning the correctness of the form were required, artificial Logic would not therefore be necessary, for natural Logic would suffice, as will appear below in the solution of the first argument.

15. It is rejected, 3º, by a common argument, which is an old and thus far valid proof of our opinion. The first demonstration by which Logic is acquired is elicited by the native light of the intellect without the direction of Logic. For if this direction preceded it, Logic would preexist its own first production, which is wholly repugnant. Therefore any other demonstration of any science can likewise be acquired without direction, and consequently without reflection made according to the rules of artificial Logic. The consequence is proved: first, because all the arguments of the adversaries militate equally against the first demonstration of Logic as against any other. Second, because the other sciences no less than Logic possess self-evident principles which the intellect can by its own light apply to particular conclusions.

16. They answer that the first demonstration of Logic does not need prior direction, because it must necessarily concern the mode of inferring a scientific conclusion in a demonstration, and by that very fact it is virtually its own direction, for it executes the very thing that it teaches; and its conclusion is virtually foreknown in the premises, which are truly logical acts. Against this, 1º: it is asserted wholly without proof that the first demonstration of Logic necessarily concerns that object. For why could Logic not begin from the properties of Definition? Indeed, this is what happens in every School, since what a Definition ought to be is demonstrated before what a Demonstration ought to be. Against this, 2º: whatever may be said of that virtual direction, which is sufficiently improper and obscure, a demonstration and science properly so called are now admitted without express and reflexive cognition of the validity of the inference obtained through the rules of art; yet the adversaries strive with all their strength for the opposite. Against this, 3º: Logic is said to be especially necessary for a scientific act so that the intellect may know how to dissolve contrary sophisms. But one who elicits the first demonstration of Logic does not yet know how to dissolve sophisms, as experience makes clear; and yet he has a truly scientific act.

§ 3. The Contrary Arguments Are Disarmed.

17. Argument 1º: science is not had unless it is reflexively known that the conclusion has been correctly deduced from correctly disposed premises. But this reflexive cognition pertains to Logic. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proved: unless that cognition is present, the intellect does not know whether it infers well or badly and can doubt the validity of the inference, which doubt conflicts with science. I answer, 1º: granted the necessity of reflexive cognition of the validity of the inference here and now, such cognition will by no means belong to artificial Logic, but to natural Logic, arising from the native light of the intellect. For although one ignorant of Logic does not know how to say whether a demonstration is made according to the rules of the Figures and Moods, or what in general the disposition of terms must be for a good consequence to result, he can nevertheless say that this form of reasoning here and now does not deceive at all, but is excellent for convincing the intellect, and that the consequence is most clearly deduced from the truth of the premises. Thus one who does not know Rhetoric can often know that a discourse is excellently composed for the end of persuading; and one who is ignorant of Architecture or Music can evidently know that a house here and now is excellently disposed for the end of habitation, and sounds for the end of delighting. Add St. Augustine the Great, expressly confirming this matter in the words we quoted above, c. 1, n. 10.

18. It will be said: that reflexive cognition will already belong to artificial Logic, for it regards the proper object of Logic, namely the validity of the Consequence. I deny the assumption: because such cognition, as resulting from the evidence and clarity of the demonstration here and now present, is purely experiential cognition, just like vision which results in open eyes from the presence of light. But to be a cognition proper to the art of Logic, it would have to know the validity of the Consequence universally, or at least to be gathered from universal cognition. For as Aristotle teaches, 1 Metaph. c. 1, experience differs from art in this, "that experience is cognition of singulars, but art of universals." St. Thomas confirms this at length there, lect. 1. Art does indeed descend to singulars, but by applying and contracting universal rules. Therefore every cognition pertaining to art is always at least presuppositively universal. Hence the object of art differs from the object of experience by universality alone. "Art has more than experience in this respect: because experience concerns singulars alone, whereas art concerns

universals," as St. Thomas says there in as many words. There also Aristotle proves the old saying, "Experience produces art," because from many experiences of singulars the mind proceeds to the universal apprehension of their species or genus.

19. Yet we do not say that the demonstration concerning man's capacity for laughter had without Logic is experiential cognition, for we rejected this in n. 13. We call experiential only the reflexive cognition concerning the form of the demonstration insofar as it is here and now apt to convince. Nothing prevents an act from being constituted as scientific, as it were obliquely, by a purely experiential reflexive cognition, provided that directly it imports a direct and evident cognition of a universal thing through its cause. Moreover, this reflexive cognition can be attributed to the habit of Physics, or of that science to which the direct evidence belongs, and can be contained in it, at least mediately, since it is a certain effect naturally resulting from any evident reasoning. Therefore, although in the first physical demonstration that reflection is an act elicited by natural Logic alone, afterward, once the habit of Physics has been acquired, it can be produced by it as an adjunct of the principal act.

20. But it will still be objected: the validity of the consequence must be known evidently. But it cannot be so known except through demonstration, for validity is a property of the Consequence, and no property is evidently known except through demonstration. But a demonstration concerning the validity of the Consequence already belongs to artificial Logic. Some labor excessively to remove this obstacle and insist that "validity" is not a "property" but the very "essence" itself of the "Consequence." For my part, I allow that it is a property; and I deny that a property in an individual can be known evidently only through demonstration. Do I need a demonstrative syllogism in order evidently to know that this sun is luminous or this fire hot? Or even to perceive evidently that you and I are capable of laughter when we are actually laughing? Yet the light of the sun, the heat of fire, and man's capacity for laughter are properties.

21. At most, therefore, demonstration is needed in order that a property be known formally in the being of a property flowing from an essence; but by no means in order that it be known by experiential evidence as a certain thing existing absolutely. Indeed, experiential evidence either needs no reasoning or certainly not syllogistic reasoning, but is content with a brief enthymeme *a posteriori*, such as: "This man laughs; therefore he can laugh"; or even with an improperly causal judgment, such as: "This man is capable of laughter because he laughs." Thus in our matter this act will suffice: "This reasoning plainly convinces me; therefore it is well disposed for convincing";

or even this: "This reasoning is well disposed for convincing because it plainly convinces me." Neither pertains to artificial Logic, because neither is properly and formally a demonstration, nor a general rule approving the form in abstraction from this singular matter, or discerning within it Figure, Mood, etc.

22. I answer, 2º, to the principal argument by denying the major premise: for in order that someone have science it is enough that he know the validity of the formal consequence in exercise, although not explicitly and reflexively. "Knowledge in exercise" is the direct demonstration itself, so knowing the identity of the extremes that it simultaneously notices and attends to the objective inference, that is, the necessary connection of the object of the conclusion with the object of the premises, which attention is indicated by the word "therefore." "Explicit knowledge" is called reflexive cognition of the correct disposition of the formal terms for concluding. Accordingly, a direct demonstration, while evidently knowing the objective inference, also knows the formal inference in exercise, that is, by the very exercise of evidently knowing the connection of the objects it renders the intellect entirely secure concerning the correctness of the formal consequence. This security is imbibed in the formal effect of evident cognition, and consists in this, that although the intellect does not actually reflect, it is nevertheless so affected that whenever it is asked whether its reasoning here and now has a form apt to convince, it immediately reflects evidently and asserts without doubt. Hence, to the proof of the major premise, I deny the consequence: because for the intellect to be unable to doubt, evident cognition of the objective connection suffices, which is also, in the manner explained, security in exercise concerning the formal consequence. What M. Manso objects against this solution remains forestalled both here and in the first response.

23. Argument 2º: one ignorant of Logic does not know how and from what a demonstration is to be made. Therefore he cannot have it except purely materially, without advertence and by chance, which does not suffice for science. The consequence is proved: he who does not know such things is ignorant whether the demonstration he elicits is a demonstration. Therefore he demonstrates purely materially and without advertence. Thus one who speaks what is true without knowing that he is saying what is true, and without knowing what it is to say what is true, speaks truth purely materially; likewise one who speaks falsely without knowing that he is lying or what a lie is neither formally lies nor is culpable before God. Confirmation: science is not had unless the intellect knows the thing through its cause, that is, unless it can give a reason why it assents firmly to

such an object and why it is convinced by such reasoning; likewise, unless it can resolve the conclusion into first principles. But that reason cannot be given, nor that resolution made, unless there is reflexive cognition comparing the demonstration with logical rules. Therefore, etc. But this objection, like all the others, is plainly broken by the first demonstration of Logic discussed in n. 16. Furthermore:

24. I answer the argument by distinguishing the antecedent: one does not know how and from what demonstration is to be made in general, I grant; in particular, or here and now, I subdistinguish: one does not know it explicitly, or by reflexive comparison with the rules of Logic, I grant; one does not know it in exercise, or even reflexively by knowing that he is now reasoning evidently and infallibly, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. One ignorant of Logic indeed does not know how to hand down rules in general for constructing a Demonstration, nor to compare this particular demonstration with the rules. This proves that he lacks reflexive science concerning logical artifice as such. But, aided by evident principles and species, he can construct a reasoning by which he is evidently convinced of the truth and connection of the object; and this reasoning of itself, in exercise, renders the intellect secure that it ought here and now to reason in this way and that it reasons well. If some explicit and express reflection is required, an experiential one will suffice, attaining the present demonstration, if not under the name "demonstration," then under the name "reasoning that plainly convinces."

25. Hence one ignorant of Logic does not have the demonstration "without advertence," because he notices that he is convinced and that the object of the conclusion cannot be otherwise; nor properly "by chance," because he sought it guided by first principles and by the native propensity toward truth; nor finally "purely materially," because he penetrates its force and efficacy for convincing, both in exercise and through the reflection of natural Logic, and therefore knows how to prefer such reasoning to other inept reasonings. Hence the examples are turned back. For one who without advertence, that is, while intending to say something else or without penetrating the force of the words, says something true or false, says it purely materially. But if in the very exercise of speaking he has the intention of deceiving or of explaining what he thinks, then he certainly formally lies or speaks truth, even if he does not know the definition of truth or falsehood nor scientifically understand their nature; just as someone can formally have Contrition although he does not know its definition.

26. To the confirmation, granting the major premise understood in its proper sense, I deny the minor premise: because one ignorant of Logic,

when he demonstrates that man is capable of laughter because he is rational, certainly knows the thing through its cause, as we showed above, and can give the reason why he assents firmly and is convinced, namely because he evidently knows that every man is rational and that rationality is necessarily connected with the capacity for laughter. And this very giving of the reason is the "resolution" into first principles which science requires. Moreover, when a conclusion is immediately deduced from first principles, it is resolved into them when it is resolved into its premises. If, however, it is deduced mediately, then if the conclusion is resolved into its premises, those premises into theirs, and so on until first principles, the conclusion will at last be resolved into these; yet Logic is not thereby proved absolutely necessary for resolutions of this kind. The adversaries indeed contend that a reason must also be given for the syllogistic form, and that this must be resolved into first logical principles. But this resolution and giving of a reason do not pertain to direct science, for example concerning man, but to reflexive science concerning logical artifice, which is very different from and separable from direct science, since it regards a different object knowable in a different way. At most, therefore, a certain reason *a posteriori*, or from experience, must be given for the syllogistic form, such as that found in n. 21.

27. Argument 3º: a scientific demonstration is formally a product of art. But a product of art, as is clear from the terms, necessarily depends upon art and is made under its direction. Therefore scientific demonstration necessarily depends upon the art of Logic. Confirmation 1º: in order perfectly to elicit a product of art, one must know the reason for its structure. But to know the reason for the structure of a demonstrative product pertains to Logic, just as giving the reason for the structure of a house pertains to Architecture. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 2º: science cannot be acquired without a mode of knowing; but according to Aristotle Logic is the general mode of knowing for all the sciences. Therefore science cannot be had without Logic. Confirmation 3º: to demonstrate is a property of Logic in the fourth mode. Therefore it cannot be found without Logic. Confirmation 4º: whenever the intellect demonstrates, it in fact acts logically. Therefore it exercises Logic.

28. I answer: a scientific demonstration is not necessarily a product of art "in second act," that is, something actually made under the direction of art. Yet it is necessarily and formally a product of art "in first act," that is, a work of itself capable of being made by art and possessing the intrinsic correctness and perfection which art could intend. A product of art in first act does not necessarily depend upon art, but can be made by the intellect

alone, though with greater difficulty and with a prior danger of error. The adversaries must acknowledge this in the first logical demonstration and in assent to first principles, which is certainly an enunciative product of art although it is not made by art. Indeed, all art arose from the experience of many preceding products of art, as Aristotle teaches in the passage cited above. To confirmation 1º: in order perfectly to elicit a product of art in first act, one need not necessarily know the reason for its structure taken from conformity with the universal precepts of the art, as is evident both from the immediately preceding examples and from the example of ornate speech, which is commonly achieved through natural eloquence without Rhetoric. This indeed pertains to the perfection of the craftsman, or intellect, which doubtless is more perfected by the two sciences, direct and reflexive; but it does not pertain to the intrinsic perfection of direct science itself, to which the direction and approval of the art are accidental and extrinsic. It therefore suffices that the intellect know the reason for the structure in particular through experiential cognition which evidently shows that the structure here and now is excellent for convincing; and of this the demonstration itself also gives assurance in exercise.

29. To confirmation 2º: science cannot be acquired without a passive and direct mode of knowing, that is, without demonstration, which is a species of Mode of Knowing; but it can indeed be acquired without an active, or directive and reflexive, mode of knowing. Only in this latter sense is Logic called the general mode of knowing. To confirmation 3º, I deny the antecedent: because "to demonstrate" belongs properly to every science. What belongs properly to Logic alone is "to teach" the mode of demonstrating. Likewise, every science is a "facility for demonstrating" its own object, but Logic alone is the "facility for providing rules" for demonstrating. To confirmation 4º, I distinguish the antecedent: it acts logically in a directive way, that is, from attention to rules, I deny; it acts logically purely effectually, namely by producing without attention to rules such an effect as Logic would prescribe if it were present, I grant the antecedent; but I deny the consequence, because no one properly exercises Logic which is not present. In the same sense, one who speaks ornately through natural eloquence in fact speaks rhetorically without therefore exercising Rhetoric as an art.

30. Argument 4º: scientific demonstration is not had unless it is known as infallible and in no way defective either on the part of the matter or on the part of the form; for if it admits fear concerning its truth and correctness, it no longer differs from a probable syllogism, which is useless for generating science. That this cannot be obtained without Logic is proved,

1º: because once Logic is excluded, fear of falsity remains with any reasoning. First, on the part of the matter concerned; for although the latter may be proposed under every aspect of truth, nevertheless a paralogism also is often proposed under every appearance of truth, as we commonly experience. Nor is any reasoning more plausible than this: "This Divine essence is the Father; the Son is this Divine essence; therefore the Son is the Father"; yet this reasoning certainly fails. Secondly, also on the part of the form, which without Logic the intellect does not know how to examine and reduce to immutable principles. Certainly one ignorant of Logic discerns nothing between these propositions, "Man is an animal. An animal is a man," although by the variation between them syllogistic form will often be vitiated.

31. It is proved, 2º: because for a demonstration to possess the firmness proper to science it must be such "that no one ought either to err in it or, when pressed by whatever contrary arguments, to waver," as St. Augustine the Great teaches, l. I Contra Academ., c. 7. But one ignorant of Logic easily wavers before any contrary sophism, as experience testifies. Indeed, he who does not know how to discern a demonstrative syllogism from a sophistical one does not hold the former as infallible; but this discernment belongs to Logic alone. It is proved, 3º: because many read the demonstrations of the Philosopher and St. Thomas and yet do not assent firmly but only by opinion, for no other reason than that, through lack of Logic, they do not know of what a demonstration must consist. Aristotle also testifies that the ancient philosophers fell into very many errors through ignorance of Dialectic. Add that one ignorant of Logic does not know that he knows; and according to Aristotle, "he who does not know that he knows knows nothing."

32. I answer: everything assumed in the argument can be obtained without Logic, notwithstanding the contrary proofs. The first proof is pressed back against the logical rules themselves, concerning whose firmness someone can also doubt; indeed, even concerning the first principles by which Logic regulates syllogistic form. For how does he know whether he himself rightly understands these first principles, or whether they need explanation or limitation, as does the principle "Things which are the same as one third thing, etc.," in order to hold in Divine matters? Therefore the whole firmness of scientific assent rests upon the nature of true "evidence," which of itself formally excludes every fear and does not permit the intellect in any way to doubt, however much it reflects and looks about, not precisely because it proposes the object under every aspect of truth, but because it proposes it with such clarity that it entirely carries away

the assent even of the most circumspect intellect. This evidence resides in the direct demonstration just as in assent to first principles, without the aid of Logic. A paralogism, on the contrary, never proposes the object under such and so great an appearance of truth that an attentive and circumspect intellect cannot detect the falsity, just as in fact those detected it who through their own experiences discovered the art of solving fallacies.

33. That syllogism concerning the Divine Trinity, although similar to an expository syllogism about created things, does not equally firmly convince the intellect even without Logic. For by its native light the intellect can notice some difference and fear falsity. For although it cannot naturally know the Trinity, it nevertheless knows confusedly that the truths of the Divine nature, as infinite and incomprehensible, may perhaps not all be subject to the same laws of argumentation as created truths. But in created things there is no place for such fear. And the point is openly pressed: for, faith being excluded, not even the greatest logician would detect the fallacy of that syllogism unless he had recourse to this reason. Nor again is doubt on the part of the form compatible with reasoning that is in fact evident, at least insofar as the form is known under the expression "useful for convincing." One ignorant of Logic will indeed not know whether his reasoning has all that perfection of form which logicians prescribe; nevertheless he cannot doubt that the form here and now has whatever suffices fully to convince the intellect. This is sufficient for direct science and for excluding fear that bears upon the object. Finally, the distinction between the propositions in n. 30 at the end is easy for any moderately acute mind, and it is asserted without proof that it needs the light of artificial Dialectic.

34. To the second proof, I deny the subsumption. For experience rather teaches that those ignorant of Logic remain firmly in things which they have once known evidently, and laugh at sophisms which they do not know how to solve. Try, I beg you, to persuade an uneducated man that he is not a man by this sophism: "What I am, you are not; but I am a man; therefore you are not a man." You will provoke laughter, not doubt. Indeed, even if he were deceived by the sophism and yielded, this would happen accidentally from weakness of intellect, without proving thereby that there was room for fear while the prior assent remained in the composite sense. Certainly the words of St. Augustine also apply to supernatural Faith; and yet Faith, although it is an entirely firm assent and incompatible with fear or doubt, is not rarely abandoned because of the fallacies of heretics. Here note that this example of Faith proves that complete certainty of assent does not require that someone be able to solve sophisms and whatever is objected to the contrary.

Otherwise most Catholics would lack true Faith. I deny further that one ignorant of Logic does not discern in particular an evident reasoning from a fallacious syllogism; for he experiences himself to be evidently convinced by one rather than by the other. But to discern Demonstration from Sophism in general, or through general rules, does indeed pertain to Logic, yet is not necessary for direct science concerning the object.

35. To the third proof: many who are highly skilled in Logic do not recognize those demonstrations as such. Therefore this by no means arises from a lack of Logic, but from the fact that the direct principles on which they rest, and the objective connection with the object of the conclusion, are not sufficiently penetrated. Many indeed erred from ignorance of Dialectic, but not with an absolutely unavoidable error. Thus "through poverty many have sinned" (Sir. 27); and yet riches are not absolutely necessary for avoiding sins. One ignorant of Logic knows that he knows, both in exercise and insofar as he knows that he is now evidently cognizing the object. But to know in general what Science is and in what it consists is by no means required.

36. Argument 5º, from authority. First, St. Augustine the Great, l. III Contra Acad., c. 13, says: "Dialectic remains, which the wise man certainly knows well, and no one can know what is false. But if he does not know it, knowledge of it does not pertain to his wisdom." He adds that through Dialectic he learned that this proposition is true, "It is not both the case that the sun shines here and that it is night," and other similar ones which he enumerates there. Then in c. 17 he calls Dialectic the "formative principle" and "judge" of the parts of Philosophy, "which either would itself be Wisdom, or without which Wisdom could not exist at all." The same author, l. II De ordine, c. 13, speaks thus of Logic: "This teaches how to teach, this teaches how to learn... It knows that it knows; it alone not only wishes to make men knowing, but also can do so." Next, the Angelic Doctor, I Poster., lect. 1, says that the art of Logic is necessary so that "man in the very act of reason may proceed in an orderly manner, easily, and without error." But "to proceed without error" is absolutely necessary for the sciences. Finally, the Excellent Doctor, disp. 1 Metaph., sect. 4, n. 26, seems openly opposed to us, as will be manifest to the reader.

37. I answer: the first testimony of St. Augustine the Great presents no difficulty if it is read in full. It reads thus: "But if he does not know it, knowledge of it does not pertain to his wisdom, without which he could have been wise, and we inquire superfluously whether it is true or can be perceived." Here it is plainly seen that "of it" refers not to the man ignorant of Dialectic but to Dialectic itself. The Academics taught that nothing can be

perceived, and that it belongs to the wise man not to find the True but the Probable. To refute them, Augustine proves that Wisdom itself at least is perceived by the wise man, for otherwise he could not be wise, and therefore all that pertains to Wisdom is also perceived, among which, besides the other sciences, is Dialectic. But if perhaps the Academic denies that Dialectic is perceived, Augustine infers: then the knowledge of Dialectic does not pertain to Wisdom, since someone can be wise without it. Hence, whatever may be the case concerning whether Dialectic can be perceived, that assumption remains unshaken, namely that the wise man perceives wisdom. Augustine then adds obvious and self-evident propositions whose truth he admits he learned from Dialectic; but he does not deny that the same propositions can be perceived certainly and evidently without Dialectic, although through Dialectic they are perceived more easily and with greater extrinsic firmness.

38. The sense of the second testimony is that Wisdom, by which name Augustine there understands "the science of divine and human things," that is, the collection of all the sciences, cannot be full and perfect without Dialectic, since Dialectic is one of the parts of Wisdom. Hence "at all" qualifies "to exist" and has the same force as "fully" or "perfectly." The reason Augustine leaves it somewhat doubtful whether Dialectic alone is Wisdom is its universal directive concurrence in all the sciences, by virtue of which one who knows Dialectic already in a certain way virtually possesses every science. But from this it will be objected: therefore Logic is a universal cause with respect to all the sciences; therefore its concurrence is absolutely necessary, just as the concurrence of heavenly causes with all sublunary effects, and the concurrence or direction of Prudence with all virtues of the Will. I answer: Logic is a universal cause that is purely directive, instrumental, artificial, and eminently contained in another, more principal natural cause, namely the intellect, which by itself can supply its influence. A universal cause of this kind is not absolutely necessary, although heavenly causes are necessary for the contrary reason. And even if the same is conceded concerning acquired Prudence, which many deny, this is because the Will, as a blind potency, cannot operate with complete circumspection without the prior light of Prudence. Finally, in the third testimony Augustine intends only that Logic alone can make men knowing as regards scientific cognition of the Mode of Knowing, which is an extrinsic and accidental perfection of any science. As for the rest, that St. Augustine recognizes the usefulness of Logic short of necessity is sufficiently clear from his words cited above, c. 1, nn. 9, 10, and 11.

39. As regards the passage of St. Thomas, in order to acquire science it is indeed absolutely necessary "to proceed without error" that is irremediable or uncorrected; but not "without error" that is soon noticed and corrected. And St. Thomas is speaking of the latter, as the words "in an orderly manner and easily" sufficiently indicate a qualified necessity, or a necessity "for better being." An error occurring to those ignorant of Logic in the progress of the sciences can be noticed and corrected by natural perspicacity, just as one who sets out for Rome without an itinerary, although he frequently strays, can notice the error and, returning again and again to the road, finally arrive at his destination. Finally, the Excellent Doctor does not deny that true science can be acquired without Logic. For when he says, "True science is never acquired unless someone knows that he knows," he adds, "for science must be a perfect intellectual light which manifests itself; otherwise it will not be entirely evident." Here he does not require the reflexive light of Logic in order that someone know that he knows, but the light of direct science which manifests itself, namely in exercise, as we said above. Therefore his intention in that passage is not to establish the necessity but the sufficiency of Logic for acquiring the sciences; and he proves that Logic would not thus suffice unless it demonstrated the instruments of knowing. But he nowhere denies that, apart from Logic, what suffices can be obtained from elsewhere.

40. Final argument: although the intellect can acquire one or another demonstration without Logic, it cannot acquire all those required for the perfect state of science. This is proved by examples. 1º: a dice-player can indeed sometimes throw dice under the same configuration, but not a thousand times in a continuous series. 2º: the Will can avoid several venial sins, but not all, without special grace; likewise it can resist several helps, but not all collectively. 3º: nature without the medical art can overcome several diseases, but not all. Confirmation: there is some natural act, namely the love of God as Author of nature, for which the Will does not suffice without supernatural grace, although it suffices for other acts. Therefore similarly there can be some demonstration so difficult that it cannot be obtained by the intellect without Logic, especially since there are several demonstrations which, in order to convince, must be aided by Conversion of propositions and Reduction of the form to the perfect Moods of the first Figure.

41. To the argument, I deny the assumption, which is not suitably proved by those examples. For we do not claim that from the terms alone an argument is valid from one or another part to the entire collection, since we know that a special reason is often found in the collection which is not

present in the individual parts. We argue, therefore, from the fact that the ordinary collection of demonstrations in the sciences does not add a special difficulty beyond the first demonstrations; rather, the vigor of the intellect increases as it proceeds and it becomes more capable of new advances. Hence, to example 1º, the disparity is clear: in the throwing of dice there is no principle inclining to this configuration rather than another; but in the intellect, besides the innate propensity toward truth, there are first principles and the first conclusions gathered from them, which lead it by the hand to new demonstrations. Furthermore, the example is turned back. For although the same configuration cannot appear a thousand times in a continuous series, it certainly can if other configurations are intermingled, provided someone perseveres in playing for a long time. Therefore likewise the intellect, persevering in the search for truth, can acquire all demonstrations, although meanwhile it falls into very many errors. This alone is what we intend. For we do not claim that the intellect avoids all errors, which it does not accomplish even with Logic, but that by frequently erring and correcting itself it finally arrives at all demonstrations.

42. To example 2º: there is likewise no principle in the Will preponderating toward the exclusion of all venial sins. Rather, the very changeableness of a free potency, and one prone to evil after the first fall, in a certain way repugns to so great a uniformity in acting. The opposite occurs in the intellect, as we have just seen. Add that venial sins are innumerable, whereas scientific demonstrations are finite in number and in most sciences very few. Likewise, in order that all venial sins be avoided, it is necessary that no lapse ever occur. But we by no means claim that the intellect never errs, nor is this necessary in order that all demonstrations at last be acquired. Likewise, the will can very well avoid at least some individual of every species of venial sin; and this very thing is what we intend in our matter, not that all individuals, but that all species of demonstrations, be acquired. What is added concerning helps is true because of the infinity found in the collection of helps. But in demonstrations there is no such infinity.

43. To example 3º: first, perhaps there is no disease which some robust nature cannot physically overcome, provided that it is capable of being overcome by medical art. Indeed, we commonly see nature accomplish what Medicine has despaired of accomplishing. Next, the disparity is obvious. First, because the physical strength of nature does not contain the medical art eminently, whereas the intellect contains Logic. Second, because the forces of nature diminish through repeated diseases; but vigor increases in the intellect through repeated demonstrations.

44. To the confirmation: the antecedent can be true only because either some special difficulty in that act beyond the others is proved, or some defect of power in the Will. But neither will a defect of power in the intellect for any demonstration ever be proved, nor a difficulty insuperable by natural ingenuity. Furthermore, the power of supernatural grace is not contained in the Will, whereas Logic is eminently contained in the intellect. Conversion and Reduction, just as they were discovered by natural acuteness and reduced to the form of an art, can likewise without art be known as here and now useful for giving new light to the reasoning. Here observe that throughout we speak of a human intellect that is acute and ingenious. What happens otherwise to a rude or slow intellect will be accidental. "A specimen of nature should be taken from every nature at its best," as Cicero says, Tuscul. l. I. We likewise speak of the natural potency, or physical sufficiency, of the intellect; nor shall we greatly oppose someone who asserts a moral necessity of Logic, namely that without the aid of Logic it is extremely difficult to acquire the sciences in a perfect state, and perhaps this has hitherto happened to no one.

CHAPTER VIII.
Is Logic an Art and a Science?

1. The Philosopher distinguished five kinds of habits, 6 Ethic. from c. 3 to c. 7, which he calls intellectual virtues, namely Understanding, Prudence, Wisdom, Science, and Art. By the name "Understanding" there is meant here, not as elsewhere the intellective potency, but "the habit of knowing first and indemonstrable principles," such as "Anything either is or is not; the whole is greater than its part, etc." This habit is also called the "light of principles." Prudence is called by the Philosopher "a habit of acting with true reason concerning those things which are good for man," that is, concerning moral rectitude. Wisdom is often taken for excellence in any art or science; it is also often taken, especially among the ancients with Cicero (4 Tuscul. and 2 Offic.), for "the science of divine and human things and of the causes by which these are contained," in which sense it comprehends the habits of all sciences. Here, however, it is taken for "the most perfect cognition of the most universal and difficult things through the highest causes." Science is "a habit acquired through demonstration," and Art, "a productive habit with true reason," all of which St. Thomas explains there, lect. 3, 4, and 5.

2. Given these things, Logic first of all contains "Understanding" within itself; for it includes the habit of its own principles, for example, "The same

proposition cannot be simultaneously true and false." See what was said in c. 5, n. 23. Next, Logic is not "Prudence" strictly taken, as is clear from the definition given, although in a broad sense it can be called prudence, as St. Thomas explains (II-II, q. 47, a. 2 ad 2, and q. 48, a. unic.). Nor again is it "Wisdom" according to the definition just given, which belongs only to Metaphysics and Theology. But there is a question whether Logic is properly "Art and Science." A few dissent, but all the rest affirm it without hesitation. With these we agree.

3. I assert, 1º: Logic is properly an Art. Before the proof, note this: besides the Aristotelian definition given in n. 1, Art is defined by St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 3 c., as "right reason concerning works to be made." But these definitions properly comprehend only arts of external work. For according to the Philosopher and St. Thomas (In VI Ethic., lect. 3), "making and production" belong only to external acts from which some work remains, such as the acts of building, whereas "acting" and "action" belong to internal actions, or also to those external actions from which nothing remains, such as musical actions (cf. Aristotle, l. I Magn. Moral., c. ult.). Nevertheless, besides arts of external work there are many others, and nobler ones. For the celebrated division of the Arts is into "Active and Productive," or into "Liberal and Mechanical," according to the verses:

"Language, trope, reason, number, tone, angle, stars.
Field, forest, arms, ships, wounds, wool, craftsman."

The first verse indicates the Liberal Arts: Grammar, Rhetoric, Dialectic, Arithmetic, Music, Geometry, Astrology. The second indicates the mechanical arts, which are also called servile and illiberal, namely Agriculture, Hunting, Warfare, Navigation, Surgery, Weaving, and Smithcraft. See the Conimbricenses, qq. 1, 2, 3 prooem. Therefore, although by the name "Art" the ancients more frequently understood productive and mechanical art, the name is also extended to liberal and active arts, as is clear from the usage of ancient and recent sages and is approved by St. Thomas, I-II, q. cit., a. 3 ad 3.

4. Art in common, insofar as it comprehends Active and Productive arts, can be defined either as "a collection of many apprehensions concerning one thing directed to some end useful for life," a definition very celebrated among philosophers, as the Conimbricenses testify (q. 1 prooem., a. 2); or as "a certain ordering of reason whereby human acts arrive through determinate means at their due end," a definition handed down by St. Thomas, In I Poster., lect. 1; or finally, with Fr. Reynaud, as "a habit directing by means of true judgment the free agent in whom it is toward a work not

pertaining to good morals." The final words of this definition mark the distinction of Art from Prudence; the rest explain the nature of Art in common, which must both always prescribe what is true and concern works that are not wholly necessary but subject to the command and choice of the Will, according to Aristotle's doctrine, 6 Ethic., c. 4.

5. Given these things, the assertion is proved. 1º, from the common judgment of philosophers, especially St. Thomas, both often elsewhere and in I Poster., lect. 1, where he proves not only that Logic is an Art but also an Art of arts. 2º, because whatever belongs to the nature of Art belongs to Logic. For it is a faculty directing a free agent by means of wholly true rules toward the construction of some excellent work, namely a Syllogism, Definition, etc.; and this work is not so necessary that it cannot be done well or badly by the command and choice of the Will, as we shall explain in the following Disputation. It will be said: according to St. Thomas (I-II, q. 57, a. 3 ad 3), Logic and every liberal Art is called an Art only "by a certain likeness." Therefore not properly. I distinguish the consequence: by the propriety of the first imposition, I grant; by propriety of usage, I deny the consequence. The name Art was first imposed upon the mechanical arts, but afterward through the usage of the sages was extended to the liberal arts "by a certain likeness," yet in such a way that although this likeness was the occasion of the extension, the name Art thereafter properly signifies a concept common to liberal and mechanical arts, such as is exhibited by the definitions in n. 4. See St. Thomas, I p., q. 67, a. 1 c., where he explains this doctrine excellently concerning the name "Light" and confirms it with examples. Other objections we shall resolve in the following Assertion.

6. I assert, 2º: Logic is properly a Science. For the proof I first note that Science is used in three ways. 1º, for any true cognition, for whatever is not unknown is said to be known. 2º, for evident knowledge desired for its own sake and not ordered of itself to something else; and this usage, which frequently occurs in Aristotle, belongs only to purely speculative sciences. 3º, more generally, for evident knowledge of a thing through its cause, or for a habit acquired through demonstration. This usage is proper and customary and is handed down by Aristotle, 1 Poster., c. 2; hence St. Thomas, 6 Ethic., lect. 3, says: "It is manifest that science is a demonstrative habit, that is, one caused by demonstration." In the first sense Logic is a science, as is self-evident. In the second it is not, because it is desired for the sake of the other sciences and is ordered to acquiring them. That it is so in the third sense was denied by some of the ancients mentioned by the Conimbricenses, to whom a few of the more modern authors have joined themselves. But all the rest commonly affirm it. With these we agree.

7. Our assertion is briefly proved. From evident principles Logic demonstrates the truth of its rules. For it shows that a Definition must be clearer than the thing defined because an explanation must be clearer than what it explains; that one dividing member must not equal the Divided because a whole is greater than its part; that a Syllogism must consist of three terms from the principle, "Things which are the same as one third thing, etc." It likewise gives an evident reason for Conversion, Opposition, etc., so that, if Mathematics is excepted, there is no other Science abounding in so many demonstrations. Therefore Logic is a demonstrative habit, or one acquired through demonstration, and consequently is truly and properly a science. Confirmation 1º: the habit whereby we know what is true is either opinion, faith, science, or even experience. But the habit whereby we know the aforesaid logical truths from certain principles is not opinion or faith, as is clear, nor mere experience, as is plainly gathered from what was said in the preceding chapter. It remains, therefore, that it is truly a science. Confirmation 2º: Logic teaches the form by which the other sciences must proceed concerning their object. Therefore it must itself certainly demonstrate the correctness of that form; otherwise the other sciences would dangerously entrust themselves to the rules of Logic.

8. Against this assertion several sufficiently intricate arguments are taken from the object of Logic, which, if it is said to consist in a purely objective being of reason, does not seem properly knowable scientifically. But these do not concern us, since we shall reject this Thomist opinion in the following Disputation. From other grounds, however, it is objected, 1º: Logic is an art. Therefore it is not a science. The consequence is proved, 1º, because science concerns necessary things, but art contingent things, or things capable of being done well or badly. 2º, because science concerns universals, but art singulars. 3º, because science is for its own sake, but art for the sake of the work. 4º, because science pertains to the speculative intellect, but art to the practical intellect. 5º, because if once an art can be a science, all arts, even mechanical ones, will be sciences, since their rules, like those of Logic, can be demonstrated. 6º, because Aristotle distinguishes Science and Art as members dividing intellectual Virtue in common; but members dividing a Whole exclude each other.

9. I answer by denying the consequence; nor do the proofs stand against this. To 1º: Science is said to concern necessary things, not indeed "in existing," for then only cognition concerning God would be science, but "in verification," insofar as science must regard the object in such a way that, whether it exists or not, the conclusion by which it is demonstratively known is always necessarily verified. Hence this conclusion, "A Definition

must be clearer than the thing defined," is of eternal truth and concerns a thing necessary in verification, because it gives this sense: "Whenever a Definition exists, it will not be correct unless the Definition is clearer," which sense is necessarily true even if a definition either does not exist at all or exists contingently. Art, however, concerns contingent things, not as regards the verification of its rules, which can be necessarily true, but as regards the execution of the object itself, which must be contingent in existing and dependent upon the craftsman's choice; otherwise art would be superfluous. Hence the concepts of Art and Science are not opposed, for the contingency required by Art is perfectly compatible with the necessity required by Science. How an act of the intellect, which is the object of Logic, can be done well or badly will be explained in the following Disputation.

10. To 2º: Science concerns universals because it considers an aspect common to many things. But Art has this same characteristic, since it prescribes rules common to many products of art. Hence Aristotle, 1 Metaph., c. 1, and St. Thomas there, lect. 1, expressly teach and insist that Art also concerns universals, and in this differs from Experience. Art therefore concerns singulars not "in knowing" but "in acting," insofar as, when one comes to action or execution, the product of art must be made in the singular by the craftsman, who very easily applies the general rule of Art. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas in the cited passage. And in the same sense every practical science concerns singulars.

11. To 3º: speculative science alone is for its own sake; practical science, although it is a science, is for the sake of the work. To 4º: practical science, such as Logic, pertains to the practical intellect, just as Moral Philosophy, Medicine, and others do. To 5º: mechanical Arts, insofar as they are commonly handed down and learned, are not sciences. For although most of them possess judgments or rules demonstrable of themselves, craftsmen in fact do not labor to demonstrate them, but are content with experience, induction, or authority. But if some craftsman were to prove by demonstration, as he could, the rules of the art of Navigation or Warfare, for example, that art would then also be a science. Thus Rhetoric, insofar as it is commonly handed down, is not a science; and yet it is judged a science insofar as it was handed down by Aristotle.

12. To 6º: in 6 Ethic. Aristotle distinguished Science only from mechanical Art, as we noted in n. 3. But such Art, as commonly handed down, is not science. Furthermore, Science and Art in common are distinguished at least by reason, and although they do not exclude real identity, neither do they require it. This suffices for them to be dividing members according to what was said in the *Summulae*. Art therefore from its

own concept requires only a certainly true judgment, but not that certainty rest upon demonstration rather than induction or authority. But when that certainty is acquired through demonstration, then the same habit is both Art and Science.

13. It is objected, 2º: according to Aristotle, 2 Metaph., c. 3, "It is absurd simultaneously to seek science and the mode of knowing." But Logic is the mode of knowing. Therefore, while Logic itself is sought, science is not sought. Confirmation 1º: Logic is an instrument and disposition for the Sciences. Therefore Logic is not a science, for neither an instrument nor a disposition can be of the same nature as the thing for which it disposes. Confirmation 2º: Logic directs every science in demonstrating; but it does not direct itself, otherwise it would preexist itself. Therefore it does not itself demonstrate. Confirmation 3º: according to Aristotle, 1 Rhetor., c. 4, if someone attempts to hand down Rhetoric and Dialectic not as faculties but as sciences, he will destroy their nature. In the same book and often elsewhere the Philosopher teaches that Dialectic has no determinate subject; but every science has a definite subject.

14. I answer the argument: by "mode of knowing" Aristotle there understands the method proper and peculiar to each science, which must be known beforehand before someone undertakes the science. And even if he means Logic, he signifies only that it would be absurd and inconvenient if someone wished to learn Logic and the other sciences simultaneously, "because it is not easy for a man to grasp two things at once; rather, while attending to two things, he can grasp neither," as St. Thomas says there, lect. 5. In that passage the Philosopher takes the name "Science" according to the second sense of n. 6. To confirmation 1º, I deny the consequence: for Logic is a disposition and instrument only insofar as it hands down rules of reasoning correctly. But since it hands these down demonstratively, what prevents it from being a science? The added proof is no proof at all, for a hammer is made with a hammer and forceps with forceps. And at least in a generic nature or a subordinate specific nature, there is no doubt that an instrument or disposition can agree with the thing it serves. Thus Prudence, a certain general instrument of the virtues, is itself a true virtue; thus Grammar, which disposes toward the art of Rhetoric, is itself an art; and innumerable other examples easily occur to anyone.

15. To 2º: in the same sense in which "the heavens cover all things," Logic directs every science, namely every science except itself. For as regards its first demonstration it does not direct itself, as we saw in the preceding chapter, where we also showed that the direction of Logic is not absolutely necessary for demonstrating. To 3º: Aristotle in those passages

plainly speaks of accessory Dialectic as using its rules, which concludes outside its proper matter. See above, c. 2 from n. 23, and c. 3, n. 10.

16. It is objected, 3º: Logic knows its object not certainly but only probably. Therefore it is not a science. The antecedent is clear, or will become clear from the controversy concerning the formal object of Logic which we shall treat in the following Disputation. I distinguish the antecedent: Logic does not certainly know its object under the aspect of real being or being of reason, I grant; under the aspect of the Mode of Knowing, both in common and in particular, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. It is certain to all that Logic treats of the Mode of Knowing and its species. Likewise all in reality agree in the definitions of these species, whatever may be said of one or another verbal question. From these definitions the properties of the Mode of Knowing conducive to the end of Logic are demonstrated; for example, that a Definition is clearer than the thing defined is demonstrated from the fact that a Definition is "discourse explaining the essence of the thing." Therefore Logic certainly knows its object to the extent sufficient for demonstrating what is required. Accordingly, the doubt "whether the object of Logic formally denotes real being or being of reason" does not impede the firmness of logical demonstrations, and consequently does not impede the nature of Science.

17. It is objected, 4º: Logic, according to its Topical and Sophistical parts, does not proceed demonstratively. Therefore in this respect it is not Science. I answer with St. Thomas, 4 Metaph., lect. 4. If the Topical part of Logic is considered insofar as it teaches the mode of concluding probably, "it does this demonstratively, and in this respect it is science." But if it is considered insofar as it uses this probable mode, "thus it departs from the mode of science." And the same must be said of Sophistic: for insofar as it teaches, it hands down by necessary and demonstrative arguments the mode of arguing apparently. But "insofar as it uses this mode, it falls short of the process of true argumentation."

18. It is objected, 5º: Logic has many opinative or merely probable acts, for it abounds in questions uncertain on either side. Therefore, although it also possesses demonstrative acts, it ought absolutely to be called not Science but Opinion, for, as they say, denomination follows the weaker part. The objection proves that no Faculty can be called simply Science, since there is none which does not have many doubtful questions concerning its object. Furthermore, it concedes what we intend, namely that Logic in a good part of itself is science. Whence it ought to take its absolute denomination will be a verbal question. More correctly, the whole Faculty of Logic will be called Science, because its scientific part is nobler and the

remaining parts in a certain way serve and are subordinated to it. Therefore it ought to prevail in giving the denomination, just as the soul denominates the whole man rational. The alleged maxim fails here, as often elsewhere, especially since there is no physical composition between opinative and scientific acts or habits.

19. It may be asked whether Logic is a science insofar as it teaches or insofar as it uses. I answer: Logic is a science insofar as it teaches, even in its Topical and Sophistical part, from n. 17. It is not, however, a science insofar as it uses topically or sophistically, either within or outside its proper matter, as is self-evident. A doubt remains concerning Logic insofar as it uses the rules of demonstrating within its proper matter. In this sense, although all acknowledge that the logical act is scientific really or identically, many nevertheless deny this of such an act formally taken under the office of "using" or "use." But I judge that it must be affirmed even in the formal sense. For although the use of rules in general, or from the terms alone, is not scientific, the use of the rules of demonstrating cannot be separated from science. It is proved: the use of rules of this kind is formally a Syllogism selecting premises which are evident, first, better known, and causes of the conclusion, and legitimately inferring the latter from them, for all this is expressly prescribed by the rules of demonstrating. But a Syllogism, insofar as it selects such premises and legitimately concludes from them, is most formally a demonstration, as is clear from the definition of demonstration (Aristotle, 1 Poster., c. 2); and every demonstration is most formally actual science or a scientific act. Therefore, etc.

20. But M. Baiona objects, 1º: Logic, insofar as it uses, demonstrates nothing concerning its object. Therefore it is not a science. The antecedent is proved: because insofar as Logic demonstrates something concerning its object, it teaches; but insofar as it uses, it does not teach. Therefore insofar as it uses it demonstrates nothing. He objects, 2º: Logic as using proceeds by a compositive mode concerning singular and contingent things, namely by composing according to rules a determinate syllogism; but insofar as it is science, it proceeds by a resolutive mode concerning universal and necessary things. Therefore insofar as it uses it is not science. And indeed by this reason the office of Art and the office of Science are formally distinguished in Logic.

21. I answer to 1º by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the minor premise: it does not teach the doctrine which it uses, I grant; it does not teach something distinct from such doctrine, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. When Logic demonstrates the properties of Definition, it does not teach the rules of demonstrating which it uses; but it

does teach the mode of defining, which it is not then using. Although there are here, as it were, two respects, one formally includes the other, namely use includes teaching; for the use of rules of demonstrating cannot be conceived without being conceived as evidently teaching or manifesting some object. Thus the use of the law of charity formally imbibes the love of God, and the use of the intellective power the cognition of the object. By these examples whatever is replied to the contrary can easily be solved.

22. To 2º, granting the premises, I deny the consequence: for the compositive mode itself, when it is such as is prescribed by the rules of demonstrating, formally involves the resolutive mode, that is, the mode of tending which proves the conclusion through universal and necessary principles. For this mode of tending, which is called resolutive explicitly, is formally imbibed in any determinate Syllogism insofar as it is in exercise composed according to the rules of demonstrating. Nor are the concepts of Art and Science in Logic distinguished precisely by reason of composition and resolution, but rather for the reason which we indicated above in n. 12.

CHAPTER IX.
Is Logic a Practical or Speculative Science?

1. The proposed question, celebrated in the School, consists almost entirely in words. Therefore at this point especially we must proceed by the authority of the sages, which has very great force in settling verbal disputes. For the sake of clarity, however, some things must first be noted.

§ 1. Certain Preliminary Remarks Concerning Praxis and the Practical.

2. Note, 1º: the name "Praxis" means the same as "Work," and "Practical" the same as "Operative"; while "Speculation" means the same as "Contemplation," and "Speculative" the same as "Contemplative." Note, 2º: from the bare force of the words every cognition is practical, since every cognition operates or physically produces a habit; likewise every cognition is speculation, since there is none which does not represent some object and consequently constitute an inspection and contemplation of it. Hence the whole intellect, insofar as it is cognitive, would in the same sense be speculative, and wholly practical. But by the usage of the sages it has come about that cognition which represents an object without regulating its execution is alone called speculation or speculative cognition, whereas cognition which serves as a rule for putting its object into execution is called

practical cognition. For example, both a craftsman and a non-craftsman contemplate the idea of a house drawn on paper, the former in order to build the house, the latter merely for the sake of contemplation. Thus the craftsman's contemplation is practical, whereas that of the non-craftsman is speculative. Hence the intellect is divided by all with Aristotle (3 De anima, St. Thomas, lect. 15), by a formal and not a real division, into practical and speculative, insofar as it produces either cognitions purely contemplating or cognitions directing toward the execution of their object. Hence intellectual habits also are divided into practical and speculative. For although they are all productive of their own acts, nevertheless, since they receive their name from the nature of those acts, those which produce speculations are called speculative and those which elicit practical cognitions are called practical.

3. Note, 3º: the principal difference between practical and speculative cognition or faculty is taken from the end of each. "For the end of the speculative is truth, but of the practical, work," as Aristotle says, 2 Metaph., c. 1, with whom all the rest agree. That is, the speculative Faculty rests in the contemplation of its object and seeks nothing else than to know the truth; but the practical Faculty further directs and inclines toward the execution of its object, which execution is therefore called its end, just as the center toward which the heaviness of a stone inclines is called the end of that heaviness. Hence, as is commonly said, speculative Science "is for its own sake and seeks to know for the sake of knowing itself," whereas practical Science is "for the sake of the work and seeks to know for the utility of the work" (from Aristotle, 1 Metaph., cc. 1, 2, and St. Thomas there, lect. 1).

4. Note, 4º: from the difference of end follows a twofold further difference. The first is that practical knowledge must concern an object or matter operable by the knower himself; hence your cognition concerning the structure of the World is not practical. I say operable either physically or morally, or effectually or directively; hence the cognition whereby a man directs the actions of brute animals so that they may be done artfully is practical. It suffices, however, that the thing be operable "of itself," although accidentally it becomes impossible for the knower, as if a harpist loses his hand or a painter his eyes. Conversely, speculative knowledge as such does not require that it concern a thing operable by the knower, although it not rarely does so, as when the science of the soul discusses the acts of our intellect and Will.

5. The other difference is that practical knowledge tends toward an operable object "in an operable mode," that is, in a mode useful for operating; but speculative knowledge, although it sometimes regards an operable object, nevertheless does not do so "in an operable mode," but

rather in a mode useless for operation. For example, this act, "One ought to love one's neighbor," tends in an operable mode, because it manifests the fittingness of love and entices one to love. But this act, "Love consists in an absolute quality," indeed regards an operable thing, but in a mode neither conducive nor enticing to operation. To almost the same point comes what is commonly said, that practical knowledge tends toward an operable thing as operable, whereas speculative knowledge does not, but regards it under another aspect or formal motive. Likewise it is proper to practical cognition to tend "in a compositive mode," that is, in a mode useful for actual operation, which consists in a composition either of parts, if it has parts, or at least of essence with existence.

6. Note, 5º: one kind of practical is moral, another artificial (Suárez, disp. 44 Metaph., sect. 13, n. 27). The morally practical directs rectitude of morals, and thus Prudence is called practical. The artificially practical regulates the rectitude of products of art, and thus Architecture, Painting, and the other Arts are practical. Each kind of practical, in order to arrive in second act at a work or praxis, requires an act of the Will, but in different ways. For the morally practical requires an act of the Will either as the sole praxis, or as the form of the praxis insofar as it is morally right or upright. For when Prudence dictates an external utterance, this utterance, insofar as it is morally right praxis, is constituted by the act of the Will as by a form. And in this sense Scotus taught that praxis formally and primarily consists in a work immediately free or voluntary. But the artificially practical requires an act of the Will only as a mere condition or application of the executive potency; for a house, for example, insofar as it is an artistic praxis, is not constituted by an act of the Will.

7. Note, 6º: the Subtle Doctor Scotus, q. 4 Prolog., defined praxis thus: "An act of a potency other than the intellect, naturally capable of being elicited in conformity with right reason." This definition is commonly approved by Scotists and Thomists. But our School constantly maintains with the Nominalists and several others that even an act of the intellect can be praxis, because no distinction relevant to the thing itself is offered between acts of the intellect and acts of another potency. It is evident in reality, says the Excellent Doctor (loc. cit., n. 26), that an act of the intellect can be subject to the direction and rules of art and can voluntarily be done in this way rather than another. These conditions suffice in acts of other potencies for them to be praxis. Why, then, can such an act not be called praxis? But this will be shown more fully below.

8. Accordingly, nothing else is required for the true nature of human praxis than that it be "an act placed within our power insofar as it can be

directed or regulated by human reason." Hence practical knowledge can be defined as "cognition directing toward the execution of its object." Since, however, no act properly directs itself, practical knowledge is necessarily distinguished from the praxis which it directs, although the same cognition can simultaneously be praxis with respect to one thing and practical with respect to another, as is seen in an act of Logic using its rules within its own proper matter. By contrast, speculation does not differ from speculative knowledge and can be defined as "cognition so manifesting the object that it does not direct toward positing it." I omit the other conditions of the practical and of praxis disputed by authors, both because they contribute little or nothing to the present undertaking, and because, if any are relevant, they will be explained below.

9. Thus far concerning the practical in the proper and philosophical sense. In ordinary usage, however, a twofold further sense remains. First, in any Art or Faculty destined for use, as in jurisprudence and Medicine, someone is commonly called "practical" only if he has experience from repeated use of the rules. Hence "practical" is taken for "experienced," and "practice" for "experience." Yet this does not prevent those Faculties, before they are reduced to use, from being practical in the philosophical sense. Secondly, we commonly call those cognitions practical which excite an affection of the Will toward their object even when it is not operable, whereas sterile cognitions we call speculative. Thus this contemplation, "God is supremely good," is practical in holy men, whom it moves to the love of God, but speculative in scholastics little devoted to Mysticism. But this usage is improper, and certainly not philosophical. For if it suffices for practical cognition merely to move or excite an affection of the Will in any way, no cognition will be speculative, since delight follows upon every cognition, as is clear from Aristotle, 10 Ethic., cc. 7 and 8. Every truly practical cognition must therefore have praxis as its object or matter concerned, as the Excellent Doctor proves with the Angelic Doctor (q. 14 De veritate, a. 4 c.; Suárez, loc. cit., n. 52).

§ 2. The Opinions of the Authors Having Been Reported, Our Principal Assertion Is Established.

10. The first opinion judges Logic to be absolutely and adequately speculative. Thus think all the Scotists and Thomists who concede only that Logic is practical "in a qualified respect," that is, as they themselves explain, improperly, metaphorically, or by a certain likeness. The second asserts that Logic is absolutely practical. This belongs to almost all authors of our

School, most of whom at the same time acknowledge that Logic is speculative "in a qualified respect," that is, with respect to certain acts; while others, such as the Conimbricenses, Arriaga, and Oviedo, say that it is purely practical. Let our first and principal Assertion be: Logic, insofar as it hands down the rules of the Mode of Knowing, is truly practical.

11. It is proved, 1º: in the rules of defining, for example, there is found the threefold characteristic by which, according to all, practical knowledge is distinguished from speculative, namely an operable object, an end situated in operation, and an operable or compositive mode. Therefore in those rules there is found the true nature of practical knowledge. The antecedent is proved by parts. First, those rules regard as their object Definition, which is truly operable by our intellect, since it is an act and operation of the intellect itself. Next, their end is the operation and execution of that object, as no one denies. For it is certain that the rules of Logic are handed down so that the intellect in the other sciences may correctly define, divide, and syllogize. Finally, their mode is undoubtedly useful for directing and regulating toward operation, since from their direction we commonly construct definitions. But this is to tend in an operable or compositive mode. Therefore that threefold characteristic is found in the rules of defining. Add that Logic concerns the acts of the intellect and directs them in the same mode and by the same reason as the smith's art directs external acts, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, I Poster., lect. 1.

12. Confirmation 1º, from St. Thomas, In I Poster., lect. 41, who says: "In speculative sciences nothing else is sought than cognition of the subject-genus; but in practical sciences the construction of the subject itself is intended as an end. Thus in Geometry cognition of magnitude, which is the subject of Geometry, is intended as an end; but in the science of building, the construction of the house, which is the subject of that art, is intended as an end." I subsume: but in Logic the construction of the subject itself, namely the Mode of Knowing, is intended as an end, as no one is ignorant. Therefore Logic is a practical science. Likewise: but Logic is not a science in which nothing else is sought than cognition of the subject-genus, as is also known to all. Therefore Logic is not a speculative science. Again: but in Logic there is intended not mere cognition of the Mode of Knowing, as magnitude is intended in Geometry, but rather the construction of the Syllogism, as the construction of a house in the art of building. Therefore Logic is not speculative like Geometry but practical like Architecture.

13. Confirmation 2º, from Aristotle, 1 Metaph., cc. 1 and 2, where, "comparing active art with speculative art," as St. Thomas interprets him, he places the distinction between them in this, that active or practical art was

invented for use, that is, either "for the necessities of life, as the mechanical arts," or "as an introduction to the other sciences, as the Logical sciences," as St. Thomas explains there, lect. 1; whereas speculative art was invented "not for use" but "for its own sake." From this it is plainly concluded that Logic is not speculative but practical, since no one denies that it was invented not for its own sake but for use, namely so that we may use its rules in constructing the instruments of knowing. To the same point belongs that celebrated rule, "The end of the speculative is truth, but of the practical, work," from Aristotle, 2 Metaph., c. 1, which St. Thomas explains there for our purpose, lect. 2. Likewise the distinction of the practical intellect from the speculative "according to the end," handed down by Aristotle, 3 De anima, text 49, and St. Thomas there, lect. 15.

14. Confirmation 3º, from the same Angelic Doctor, Opusc. 70, q. 5, a. 1 ad 2: "Speculative sciences, as is clear at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, concern those things whose cognition is sought for their own sake. But the things of which Logic treats are not sought in order to be known for their own sake, but as a certain aid to the other sciences." These words are entirely clear in our favor. But the Angelic Doctor immediately adds: "And therefore Logic is not contained under speculative Philosophy as a principal part, but as something reduced to it, insofar as it supplies to speculation its instruments, namely Syllogisms, definitions, and other things of this kind, which we need in the speculative sciences." From this the Thomists infer that Logic is truly and properly a speculative science, although not a "principal" but a "ministerial" one; and they wish everything we have thus far said concerning the distinction of speculative Science from practical to be understood of principal speculative Science, not ministerial.

15. But how unjustly they infer this is clear, 1º: because to pertain to speculative Philosophy "as something reduced to it," and by no other title than that of supplying instruments, is by no means to pertain to it "properly." Otherwise, for precisely the same reasons Grammar would properly pertain to Rhetoric and Poetry, and the art of making bridle and sword would properly be Military art; and since every natural science serves and ministers to Sacred Theology, it too would properly be Theology, although ministerial. 2º: because Logic ministers in the same way to practical and speculative sciences. Therefore by equal right it will be called ministerially practical. They say that Logic ministers to practical sciences not insofar as they are practical, but insofar as they are cognitive of their object. Granted. But in this same way it ministers to speculative sciences, not insofar as they are speculative, or insofar as they rest in contemplation of their object, but precisely insofar as they cognize it artfully, since it hands

down the same rules for all sciences and itself does not care whether the other sciences rest, or do not rest, in contemplation of their object.

16. Our assertion is proved, 2º: the reason Logic would not be truly practical is that it regards as operable matter acts of the intellect, none of which can be praxis, since praxis must be an act of a potency other than the intellect. This is the principal and almost sole foundation of the contrary opinion. But an act of the intellect can be praxis. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved, 1º: an act of the Will is praxis because it can be elicited under the direction of a cognition representing its operability; but an act of the intellect can also be elicited under the direction of a cognition prescribing the mode in which, for example, a Syllogism in Barbara is to be constructed. Therefore it too can be praxis. There is no disparity except that one rather than the other is the work of a potency other than the intellect. But this is a mere begging of the question. I ask the reason why the name "praxis" must be restricted to acts of a potency other than the intellect. Certainly "praxis" properly signifies an "act" or "operation" posited according to a rule; but an act of the intellect is properly an act and operation, and can be elicited by virtue of a rule. Why, then, is it not praxis?

17. It is proved, 2º: an act elicited under the direction of Prudence is praxis even according to the adversaries. Therefore whenever Prudence dictates the study of Metaphysics or an act of believing revealed mysteries, acts of the intellect will be praxes. They say that these acts are praxes insofar as they are commanded by the Will. I grant it. But although the formal aspect of imputability and merit then consists principally or uniquely in the act of the Will, the nature of praxis also consists in the commanded act. First, because this act is expressly dictated by Prudence and expressly falls under the precept of believing or studying, and this precept is not reduced to praxis until the act of the intellect itself is exercised. Second, by parity with an external act, for example the bestowal of alms, which act, although rendered meritorious by the act of the Will, is of itself a praxis of Prudence and of the rule of Charity. Therefore an act of the intellect participates in itself in the nature of praxis.

18. It is proved, 3º: the Science by which God is directed toward producing created effects, and therefore toward producing acts of our intellect, is practical, as theologians teach with St. Thomas. Therefore our cognition is praxis with respect to Divine Science. But, it will be said, our cognition is not an act of the Divine Intellect. I do not doubt it; but this destroys the force of the argument. For according to the adversary our cognition cannot be praxis with respect to Logic precisely because it is speculation and remains within the line of speculation. But it has this very

characteristic when it is directed by Divine Science and nevertheless is praxis. It is proved, 4º: "praxis" is the same as "use of a directing rule," and therefore Aristotle, cited above in n. 13, regards those Arts as practical which are "for use." But an act of the intellect is truly and properly a "use" of the directing logical rule. Therefore it is truly and properly praxis. Confirmation from the division of Logic into teaching and using: all acknowledge here that "to use the rules" is the same as "to reduce the rules to praxis." Hence they call that Logic "using" which reduces to praxis the rules of Logic teaching, certainly through an act of the intellect.

§ 3. Two Further Assertions Are Proposed.

19. Let the second assertion of our opinion be: Direct Logic, contained within its proper limits, is absolutely, simply, indeed almost totally practical. It is explained: although all Logic reflexively considers acts of the intellect, nevertheless within its own order that Logic is called "direct" which concerns those acts insofar as they can be artfully posited or disposed for reasoning correctly; whereas that Logic is called "reflexive" which by a new reflection examines its own nature and properties, as in this introductory Tract. Given these things, the Assertion is proved: direct Logic regards operation as its end, for its end, or object of attribution, is something operable as such, namely the Mode of Knowing, either every such Mode or some one of them according to the various opinions to be discussed in the following Disputation. It was likewise invented for this end, that the intellect might reduce its rules to praxis. But a science "which is ordered to the end of operation is simply practical," as St. Thomas says (I p., q. 14, a. 16 c.), and as is plainly gathered from Aristotle cited above. Therefore Logic is "simply" practical.

20. And from this it is also proved to be "totally," or almost totally, practical. For Logic through all its acts tends toward operations of the intellect as capable of being directed; hence the directability of acts of the intellect is commonly called by our authors the most formal aspect "under which" Logic tends toward its object. Therefore through all its acts it tends toward the object as operable under the direction of a rule; for this is what "capable of being directed" means. Therefore all its acts are practical, since a speculative act, when it sometimes tends toward an operable thing, does not regard it as operable, from n. 5. I said "totally, or almost," lest I oppose excessively those who except certain secondary acts by which the logician reflexively considers an artifice already actually posited, although it could

easily be said that acts of this kind either are not properly logical but reductively so, or are even in a certain way practical.

21. The third assertion: Reflexive Logic, and likewise Logic insofar as by usage it leaves its proper limits and adopts extraneous questions, is speculative. Once the terms are explained, this needs no other proof. For first, reflexive or introductory Logic treats almost nothing that properly pertains to praxis or directly assists it, as anyone will see from what has thus far been discussed and what is to be discussed in the following Disputation. Next, Logic, insofar as it is handed down by the method customary in the Schools, takes over very many questions from Metaphysics, especially in the Tracts on Universals and Predicaments, as no one is ignorant, and also some from the science of the soul. Since all these pertain to speculation and occupy by far the greater part of the customary volume of Logic, it follows that Logic, insofar as it is ordinarily taught in the Schools, is for the greater part speculative. And in this sense I think our Excellent Doctor must be understood, disp. 44 Metaph., sect. 13, n. 53, when he calls Logic simply speculative and partly practical: "For it directs the operations of the intellect so that they may be performed artfully in the way in which they can be performed, whence it is also called a liberal art; nevertheless, for this direction it contemplates many things, and almost the greater part, purely speculatively."

CHAPTER X.
Objections Are Answered.

1. Against the first and principal Assertion, it is objected 1º: Every act of the intellect is speculation; but no speculation can be praxis; therefore no act of the intellect can be praxis; therefore neither can Logic, which directs acts of the intellect, be practical. I answer: Both premises are false. The major is false because speculation is the same as speculative cognition; but nothing is more false than that every act of the intellect is speculative cognition, as is evident in the acts of Prudence, Medicine, and every Art. The minor is also false because praxis and speculation are in no respect opposed, especially with respect to diverse things. For if speculation concerning man, for example, is an artifact truly operable under the direction of another cognition, what prevents it from being praxis? The practical and the speculative are indeed opposed in the same act or habit with respect to the same object, because it is contradictory simultaneously to rest and not to rest in the contemplation of that same object. But praxis is not the same as practical cognition, as we noted above; nor does it conflict with speculation

any more than does the character of an artifact. Add that the objection is clearly met by the examples in the preceding chapter, nn. 17 and 18.

2. It is replied 1º: When Logic directs acts of Metaphysics, it has speculation as its end; therefore it does not have praxis as its end. The antecedent is proved: for the very construction and work of a demonstrative syllogism concerning the object of Metaphysics is speculation; therefore, when Logic regards that work as its end, it regards speculation. Hence the rules of Logic are rules of speculating, and whoever puts them into use speculates; and whatever work is intended through them always remains within the line of speculation. The very construction and rectitude directed by Logic is also a right mode of speculating. Logic therefore is wholly occupied with speculation and is never drawn outside it.

3. I answer 1º by denying the antecedent. For, as we saw in the preceding chapter, n. 15, Logic directs Metaphysics no otherwise than it directs the practical sciences, since it gives the same rules for all of them. Therefore, just as according to the Adversaries it does not have praxis as its end when directing Ethics and Medicine, so neither does it have speculation as its end when directing Metaphysics. In both cases, therefore, the end of Logic is artful cognition of truth, prescinding from whether such cognition rests or does not rest there, that is, whether or not it further directs toward the execution of its object. But an act of Metaphysics under this precise aspect is not speculation, but prescinds from speculative and practical until it is understood positively as resting in contemplation; Logic is not concerned with this. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: the very construction and work, etc., is speculation really, I grant; formally insofar as it is directed by Logic, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. Hence the propositions appended to it are false in the formal sense.

4. I answer 2º by distinguishing the antecedent: it has as its end the speculation of another's object, I admit; the speculation of its own object, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. When a science is said to be speculative because it regards speculation as its end, the discussion concerns the speculation of its own proper object, which such a science does not intend to construct or execute, but purely to know. This is evident both from common understanding, from St. Thomas cited in the preceding chapter, n. 12, and by induction through all the sciences known to be speculative. Physics, for example, or Metaphysics is speculative because it purely speculates upon its object; conversely, Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, is practical because it does not merely speculate but further directs toward the execution of its object. Hence similarly, to the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: it is speculation of the object of Metaphysics, I grant; of the

object of Logic, I deny the antecedent; and with the same distinction I distinguish the consequence. In what the objection further adds, one must likewise distinguish speculation of one's proper object from speculation of another's object; and one must deny that Logic becomes speculative because it is occupied with the speculation of another's object, for Prudence does the same when it regulates the study of Metaphysics, as was established above.

5. It is replied 2º: If the habit of Logic is practical because it directs acts of Metaphysics, the habit of Metaphysics itself will also be practical, since it is more properly operative of the praxis, namely, of its own act, which through us is praxis. For Logic produces this act only by directing it, whereas the habit of Metaphysics produces it efficiently. But the consequence is manifestly false. I answer by denying the consequence. For a habit is such as are the acts which it immediately produces: if the acts are practical, it is practical; if speculative, speculative. Therefore, since acts of Metaphysics, although they are praxes with respect to Logic, are not practical but speculative, the habit productive of them cannot be practical.

6. The Adversaries press the point: if once an act of Metaphysics is praxis, that habit will be more practical which more fully produces such praxis; for the practical is taken from operation, and according to the old maxim, "That on account of which each thing is such is itself more such." Hence even the hand more practically produces a painting than does the art in the intellect which directs it. Since, therefore, the habit of Metaphysics produces its own act more than Logic does, it will be more practical. Hence also, from our opinion it follows, as the Thomists think, that the intellect is practical with respect to all its acts, since it properly produces them all. I answer: The practical in philosophy is not taken for anything whatever that is physically operative, but for what is operative intentionally, or by directing; and it is taken insofar as it is a property of cognition, to which the denomination "practical" first belongs and from which it is derived to the intellect and the habit.

7. This is established 1º because, as St. Thomas says, q. 14, *De Veritate*, a. 4, "the practical intellect" (and the same reasoning applies to the habit) "must be the proximate rule of the work, insofar as the operable itself is considered through it, etc." Therefore the intellect or habit is not called practical except from a consideration which is a rule of the work. The Angelic Doctor supposes the same in q. 3, *De Veritate*, a. 3, and *De anima* X, lect. 15, with the Philosopher, and more clearly in Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 79, a. 11, ad 1, where he says: "The practical intellect is motive, not as executing motion, but as directing toward motion; and this belongs to it according to the mode of its apprehension." Hence the intellect is not

practical insofar as it executes the praxis of Logic, but insofar as it elicits an act by which it directs toward motion either within or outside itself. This is established 2º because no faculty is called practical unless it intends the construction of its object, as St. Thomas taught us in the preceding chapter. But the habit has the same object as the act. Therefore, unless through a practical act it intends that construction, it is not practical, however much it physically produces its own acts, which it certainly does not regard as its object. It is established 3º because it is perfectly consistent that a habit physically produce praxis and nevertheless have as its end the pure speculation of its object, which is the mark of a speculative habit.

8. The habits of all the sciences, therefore, make use of the rules of Logic and consequently put them into praxis, so that they efficiently produce their praxis. Yet they are not practical habits on that account, because they do not have such praxis as their object, nor do they regulate or direct it, but merely produce it physically. Hence the philosophical practical is not taken from operation in any manner whatever, but from operation insofar as it can be directed by prior cognition. Therefore neither is that maxim, "That on account of which each thing," etc., to the point; nor is the executive power of painting practical in the philosophical sense; nor is an act of the intellect praxis with respect to every principle of which it is an operation, but only with respect to that principle in view of which it is an "operation capable of being directed." Finally, the intellect is not practical except insofar as it is fecund of acts directing toward the execution of its object.

9. It is objected 2º from that saying, "The intellect becomes practical by extension," which is alleged by Scotus and commonly attributed to Aristotle, although it nowhere appears in Aristotle himself. St. Thomas agrees with it in q. 14, *De Veritate*, a. 4, c.: "Extension toward a work alone makes an intellect practical." Hence the argument is as follows: with respect to a Logical work there is no "extension" of the intellect; therefore there is no character of the practical. The antecedent is proved: because "to be extended" is "to tend outside oneself"; but the intellect does not tend outside itself when it tends toward a Logical work, since that work remains within the intellect and consists in its acts. I answer: We reject neither the saying nor the authority of St. Thomas, but I deny the antecedent, whose proof is feeble, no otherwise than if someone were to prove that the intellect cannot intend external things because "to intend" is "to tend within oneself." According to Calepino, the verb "to extend" means the same as "to draw out, stretch forth, unfold." But the intellect is truly drawn out or unfolded further within itself when it advances from an act directing and regulating to a regulated act. Therefore it is truly extended within itself.

10. It is replied: according to St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 57, a. 1, ad 4), "The practical or operative, which is divided against the speculative, is taken from an exterior work." Likewise: "A speculative habit... is ordered to the interior work of the intellect, which is to speculate upon truth, and in this respect it is an operative habit." I answer 1º: By "exterior work" St. Thomas understands any work capable of being done from an election of the will, as Capreolus, Prince of the Thomists, explains, q. 2, Prologue, concl. 4; and this is evident in the act of Faith when it is a praxis of Prudence. In this sense an act of the intellect regulated by Logic is also an exterior work. I answer 2º: St. Thomas is speaking not of everything truly practical, but only of the mechanically practical, or active, as the Dominican M. Sanchez interprets, q. 16 proemial, concerning which again below. What is added is beside the point. For that "interior work of the intellect" is not a work which is the object of a speculative habit, as it is the object of Logic, but is the proper act itself which the speculative habit physically produces. Although such a habit is operative in this sense, it is not therefore practical, for the reasons given in nn. 7 and 8. That this is the mind of St. Thomas will be evident to the reader.

11. It is objected 3º: Every practical faculty is either productive or active, as is gathered from Aristotle (Metaphysics VI, c. 1); but Logic is not productive, since it is not concerned with external actions; nor is it active, because an active science, as Aristotle says there, concerns those things "whose principle is election, and what can be acted and what can be chosen are the same." But election is an act of the will, which is regarded not by Logic but by the moral sciences, which are therefore "called active," as St. Thomas notes (ibid., lect. 1). Therefore Logic is not practical. I answer: Logic is an active science and is concerned with those things whose principle is election, not indeed their elicitive or formal meritorious principle, as in works of the virtues, but their imperative or applicative principle. For, as Fr. Vazquez says (*In Primam Partem*, disp. 8, n. 19), no operation of reason, such as the construction of a syllogism, is directed or produced by another operation of the intellect except through the mediation of election; for by election a man applies the intellect to making this or that syllogism.

12. Nor should one be moved by what the angry Discalced Carmelites of Complutum reply, namely that this argument of Vazquez "is unworthy of a response by a philosopher." Very modestly indeed. But what evil does the unfortunate argument contain? They say that it proves there is no speculative science, since every act of any science whatsoever is freely produced by our intellect through the motion or command of the will. They add, so that, with their accustomed kindness, they may deign to answer the

argument despite its unworthiness, that Aristotle's dictum must be understood of works which proceed essentially and formally from election, which are clearly works of virtue to which morality and liberty are intrinsic.

13. But imagine, Reader, that I wished to maintain this paradox, "The art of playing the cithara is not practical," and to prove it as follows: this art is not productive, as will be evident from Aristotle in the following number; neither is it active, since it is not concerned with those things whose principle is election; therefore it is not practical. With Vazquez you will say that this art is active because playing the cithara is not directed by the intellect except through the mediation of election. Then, if I were to rise against you with all the indignation of the Discalced, would you not go away stripped of your shoes by laughter? But stop, I beg you, for your argument proves that no science is speculative. By no means, you will say: for although dependence upon election is a condition required for the object of a practical art, and is found in the act of playing the cithara, it is not therefore a condition sufficient by itself. Every man must have a head, yet not everything that has a head is a man. Therefore this condition proves a faculty practical when it otherwise regards an operable object in an operable mode, such as Logic or the art of playing the cithara; and such is not just any other science, for example Metaphysics, whose habit is not operative of its object, even though it physically produces its own acts from an election of the will. This is not to the point.

14. Aristotle indeed understands by the name "active" art or science chiefly the moral sciences and Prudence, but not them alone, nor does St. Thomas. First, because the Philosopher calls all immanent operations "actions," for example willing, understanding, seeing, as St. Thomas noted in Ethics I, lect. 1, and frequently elsewhere. Hence it follows that there can be an "active" science not only concerning acts of the will but also concerning acts of the intellect. Second, because he extends this name also to transient actions from which no work produced remains. "The producible and the actionable are not the same for those who produce and those who act," he says in *Magna Moralia* I, last chapter. "For among producible things there remains another end besides production itself; thus in house-building... besides the production, the house is the end... But in those things which fall under action, which the Greeks call practical, there is no other end besides the action: thus beyond the playing of the cithara there is no other end, but that itself is the end, the exercise and the action." Here one plainly sees an "active" faculty which does not concern the "choosable" in the sense of the Carmelites, namely the art of playing the cithara, whose work certainly does not proceed from election in such a way that morality and liberty are

intrinsic to it. See Fr. Vazquez, loc. cit., nn. 15, 16, 17, where he suitably reconciles various texts of the Philosopher on this matter.

15. It is objected 4º: Logic does not properly direct demonstration; therefore it is not practical with respect to it, and consequently neither with respect to other acts. The antecedent is proved: first, it does not direct the premises, both because these are usually about foreign matter belonging to other sciences and not to Logic, and because they are evident propositions to which the intellect necessarily assents; but no art directs necessary operations which are not subject to the command of the will. Next, neither does it direct the conclusion, since once the premises are posited the conclusion necessarily results, and cannot be commanded by the will unless it is previously known. But if it is previously known, it already exists before it is commanded. I answer: This argument does not assist the Thomists, who not only acknowledge the direction of Logic but call it simply necessary for demonstrating; and no Thomist or Scotist denies that it is at least very useful.

16. Therefore I deny the antecedent. To the proof I answer: Logic directs the premises of every demonstration, not as to their matter but as to their artful form in Figure and Mood. Likewise it directs that, given various matter, propositions be chosen which are first, immediate, better known, etc., according to the doctrine of demonstration. Nor does their evidence obstruct this. For, once the terms are evidently apprehended, the intellect is at least indifferent as to whether it predicates A of B rather than conversely, whether it removes or adds some syncategorematic term, etc.; and this indifference is determined by the will under the guidance of the rules. The conclusion also depends upon the will, either because according to many it does not arise necessarily from the premises as regards exercise, or because it is often indifferent whether it emerges directly or indirectly. Nor, in order that it be commanded, must it be previously known judicatively, but apprehensively; and from this it does not follow that it preexists before the command. Indeed, even if it results altogether necessarily from the premises, nevertheless, since these depend upon the will, the conclusion will become voluntary mediately and in its cause; and this suffices for the character of praxis. Thus health is a praxis of Medicine, although once the power of medicines has been applied it results necessarily. Yet the conclusion, to note this in passing, is praxis with respect to the rules of Logic, not with respect to the premises; for these move toward the formal conclusion but do not direct toward it, since they cognize not the conclusion itself but its object implicitly.

17. It is objected 5º: A science whose end is truth is speculative, as is evident from the above-cited dictum of the Philosopher, "The end of the speculative is truth"; but the end of Logic is truth; therefore, etc. The minor is proved 1º from St. Augustine, *De Principiis Dialecticae*, c. 7, where he indicates that Dialectic is "for judging truth"; and in *De Civitate Dei* VIII, c. 4, he divides Philosophy into three parts: "one moral, which is chiefly concerned with action; another natural, which is assigned to contemplation; the third rational," namely Logic, "which distinguishes truth from falsity; and although it is necessary to both, that is, to action and contemplation, nevertheless contemplation especially claims for itself the pursuit of truth." It is proved 2º from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 51, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: "Even in speculative matters one rational science is Dialectic, which is ordered to inventive inquiry, and another is demonstrative science, which determines truth." See how he teaches that Logic is both speculative and ordered to truth.

18. It is proved 3º because Logic intends as its end the flight from ignorance, the avoidance of errors, and the discrimination of truth from falsity; which in sum is to intend truth. 4º because Logic perfects the intellect as speculative. First, because the intellect as speculative is an investigator of truth, in which office it is assisted by the rules of Logic. Second, because the intellect is practical only insofar as it implies an order to appetite and regards the true as good and actionable. But in this sense it is not perfected by Logic, but insofar as it regards the true as true, in which sense it is speculative. Confirmation: Logic seeks to know for the sake of demonstrating; but to demonstrate is to know; therefore it seeks to know for the sake of knowing, which is proper to speculative science. Hence it is no help to our position that Logic intends a mental work, since this work is knowing itself. Therefore St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 57, a. 3, ad 5, says: "Even among speculative things there is something after the manner of a certain work, such as the construction of a syllogism or of congruous speech, or the work of numbering or measuring. And therefore whatever speculative habits are ordered to such works of reason are called arts by a certain likeness, namely liberal arts." He repeats nearly the same in Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3, where he supposes Logic to be a speculative art and attributes the construction of the syllogism to speculative reason.

19. To the argument I distinguish the major: whose end is truth concerning its proper object, I grant; concerning another's object, I subdistinguish: truth as purely speculable, I omit; truth as artfully operable, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the minor: the end of Logic is truth

concerning its own object, I deny; truth concerning other objects, not as purely speculable but as artfully operable, I grant the minor and deny the consequence. When "truth," that is, "true cognition," for thus it is now taken, is said to be the end of speculative science, the discussion is not about truth of any kind whatever, but about the truth of cognition concerning the proper object of such a science. The meaning is that "in speculative sciences nothing else is sought than cognition of the subject genus, as in Geometry cognition of magnitude, which is the subject of Geometry, is intended as the end"; conversely, "in practical sciences the construction of the subject itself is intended as the end, as in the science of building, the construction of the house, etc." These are the very words of St. Thomas (cf. preceding chapter, n. 12), lest the Thomists dissent. See what was said in n. 4. Therefore, although the end of Logic is truth situated in the cognitions of other sciences, nevertheless, since these cognitions neither regard the object of Logic nor are regarded by Logic as purely speculable, but rather as artfully operable and constructible into the form of a syllogism, etc., the end of Logic is not truth situated in the "cognition of the subject genus," but rather the "construction of the subject itself."

20. To proof 1º of the minor: St. Augustine advances nothing against us. Dialectic is "for judging truth," that is, for a judgment of truth, not whereby it itself judges its own object, but which it regards as an object artfully operable. It also "distinguishes truth from falsity," both concerning its proper object, as does every other science, and concerning all objects, insofar as it teaches one to avoid fallacies and to discover truth through artfully constructed reasonings, which it regards as an operable object. Likewise it is in a qualified sense necessary to action and contemplation, that is, to practical and speculative sciences; among these, "contemplation," that is, speculative science, has greater need of the rules of Logic because it more fully "claims for itself the perception of truth." Yet this perception does not belong to Logic except insofar as it is an artfully operable object. To 2º: Logic, like every science, whether speculative or practical, "determines truth" concerning its object (cf. Aristotle, Ethics VI, c. 2; St. Thomas, lect. 2), with this difference, that the speculative science rests in such truth, whereas the practical orders it toward the construction of its object, an order which St. Thomas does not deny to Logic. In what sense he numbers Logic "among speculative things" we shall say below.

21. To 3º: that entire flight, avoidance, and discrimination consisting in acts of other sciences is intended by Logic as an object to be artfully constructed under the direction of rules; and this is not to intend truth in the sense harmful to us. To 4º: Logic through its proper acts, or rules,

perfects the intellect insofar as it is "directing toward motion," in which sense St. Thomas said above, n. 7, that the intellect is practical. But through the acts of others which it directs, it perfects both the speculative and the practical intellect, since it directs all speculative and practical sciences, whose acts, even speculative ones, are praxes of Logic, as was explained above. The appended proofs do not press us. For the practical intellect also investigates truth; nor does it become speculative except with respect to that object whose truth it investigates so as to rest in it as in an end. But it does not in this way investigate the truth of the Logical object through Logical acts. Through these it regards the artifice of the Mode of Knowing not precisely as true, or as knowable, but also as actionable and as good with a goodness, not moral, but artificial, and thus as appetible or commandable by the will no less than the artifice of Music or Painting. See St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 57, a. 4, where it is shown that no art implies an order to "right appetite" morally.

22. To the Confirmation I distinguish the major: for the sake of its own demonstrating, I deny; for the sake of another's demonstrating, I grant the major and minor; and I distinguish the consequence: for the sake of its own knowing, I deny; for the sake of another's knowing, I grant the consequence. Logic knows and demonstrates its object, but it does not seek this proper demonstrating and knowing for its own sake so as to rest in it, as speculative sciences do. For it orders it toward the construction of its object, which consists in another's demonstrating, that is, in the demonstrations of other sciences. Recall the solution in n. 19, for the sense of this objection and of that one is the same. The passage of St. Thomas scarcely favors the Thomists, whatever they may say. For first, it proves no more that Logic is not practical than that it is not properly an art but only "by a certain likeness"; yet according to many Thomists it does not prove the latter. See Collegium S. Thomae Complutense, q. 1 proem., a. 4, § 3, n. 240, from which we explained this passage in chapter 8, n. 5.

23. Next, not only Logic but all the liberal arts are there called speculative; and yet among mathematicians it is well known that Geometry and Arithmetic are divided into speculative and practical; and at least Music, Rhetoric, and Grammar, whose work, namely "the construction of congruous speech," is there enumerated, who would deny to be truly practical? Therefore St. Thomas in that place opposes speculative, not to everything truly and properly practical, but only to the mechanically practical, productive, and servile. This is evident both from what has just been said and because he immediately adds, "Unlike those arts which are ordered to works exercised through the body, which are in a certain manner

servile." It is also evident because in a. 1 of the same question, ad 1, he had said in the same sense that the practical is taken "from exterior work," that is, work exercised through the body, as M. Sanchez cited above understood it; and this is everywhere manifest from St. Thomas himself, Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 179, a. 2, c., together with q. 180, a. 1, ad 3, and q. 182, a. 3. Yet it is established that there can be praxis which is not an exterior work in this sense, for example an act of the will. One may say: St. Thomas nowhere else explained more clearly the character of the practical and of praxis. I answer: Soncinas, a distinguished Thomist, *Metaphysics* VI, q. 2, judges thus: "What praxis truly and properly is is not found to have been expressly determined by St. Thomas." Moreover, from the words of St. Thomas cited in the preceding chapter, n. 12, it is sufficiently gathered that praxis in common is any object whatever of a cognition intending its construction. See Fr. Lynce, *Dialectica* II, tract. 3, c. 6, where he learnedly demonstrates how manifold the acceptation of practical and speculative is in Aristotle and St. Thomas.

24. To forestall other minor objections, observe the following. 1º To proceed in a resolutive mode is not proper only to speculative science; for it belongs to all sciences, even practical ones, for example Moral Philosophy and Medicine, since all demonstrate conclusions through first principles, which is to proceed resolutively. Therefore speculative science alone is said to proceed in a "purely resolutive" mode, whereas the practical adds the compositive mode, because the conclusions which it proves resolutively have a useful tendency toward the composition or construction of the object. 2º Whenever cognitions of objects in universal are called speculative by St. Thomas and others, the discussion concerns the improperly speculative, insofar as it is opposed to the ordinary and experiential practical, which consists in cognition of singular things to be done here and now. For the rest, there is no art, even mechanical, which does not hand down universal practical rules; even practical dictates of morals are universal, such as "Vice is to be avoided" and "Do not do to another what you do not wish done to yourself." See what was said in chapter 8, n. 10. One may say: an object in universal is not operable. I answer: It is operable by an operation to be exercised, not in the state of abstraction but in the state of contraction, just as man in universal is discursive by a discourse to be exercised in the state of contraction. Even the Adversaries agree on these points.

25. 3º Even if Logic is referred, not to acts of the intellect, but to the Thomistic being of reason, it will not therefore cease to be practical, since it intends to introduce that being of reason into objects as an artful form into

matter, as the Thomists hold. One may say: a being of reason, since it is nothing, is not operable. Against this: although it is nothing, according to the Thomists it is truly knowable; therefore it can also be operable. Again against this: although it is nothing, it can in its own manner be posited, and Logic with all its effort seeks its positing after the manner of an artful form, as the Thomists contend. They therefore call cognition which feigns beings of reason "in a certain manner practical and effective" after the likeness of building (cf. Collegium S. Thomae Complutense, q. 1, a. 2, § 5, n. 123). But this suffices for Logic to be practical, just as the institution of signs by convention is practical, although their form according to the Thomists is a being of reason; and just as cognition directing toward a purely free omission can be practical. 4º Although some first principles used by Logic, such as "To be said of all," etc., and "Things which are the same as one third," etc., are formally speculative, nevertheless they can be called virtually or radically practical, insofar as practical conclusions can be deduced from them; just as from this speculation, "God is supremely good," the practical conclusion follows, "Therefore He is to be loved," and from the speculations of Arithmetic arises practical Music.

Difficulties Against the Remaining Assertions Are Resolved.

26. Against the second Assertion it is objected: In direct Logic, definitions, divisions, and demonstrations of the properties of the Mode of Knowing are not practical acts; therefore most acts of direct Logic are speculative. The antecedent is proved 1º: a practical act is the proximate rule of the work, according to St. Thomas, q. 14, *De Veritate*, a. 4; but none of those acts is the proximate rule of the work. First, because none shows the mode of operating but only the nature of the work; yet no craftsman is directed toward operating from the definition of the work if he is ignorant of the mode. Second, because those acts do not have a preceptive tendency by means of a gerund or the verb "ought," for example, "A syllogism is to be constructed thus," or "It ought to be constructed thus." Therefore none of them is practical. 2º Concerning an operable thing there can be cognition which is not practical "either actually or habitually, but only speculative, as if a craftsman were to consider a house by investigating its properties, genus, differences, and the like.... But then a thing is considered as operable when in it all things required for its being are considered together." These are the very words of St. Thomas, q. 3, *De Veritate*, a. 3. Hence it is plainly gathered that the aforesaid acts of Logic are in no way practical. Confirmation: if such

acts are practical, there will be no reason why Mathematics, which discusses numbers and figures, which are certainly operable, should not be practical; for what difference relevant to the matter is there between these acts: "A triangle consists of three angles," "A syllogism consists of three terms"?

27. I answer by denying the antecedent. To proof 1º: St. Thomas, as will be clear to readers, opposes the "proximate rule of the work" to a "remote cause" or "remote occasion," such as is often taken from cognition of a non-operable object, for example the immortality of the soul. Further, he does not place such a rule adequately in one practical act, but in the intellect insofar as it considers "the operable itself, the reasons for operating, and the causes of the work." But this consideration includes several acts, each of which can be called an incomplete proximate rule of the work. Therefore in this sense I deny the minor, and the appended reasons do not obstruct us. For first, some definitions sufficiently show the mode of operating, as when Division is said to be "Speech distributing a whole into its parts." Next, if they do not show the mode itself, they at least show the reason for the mode. For if a Logician is asked why he observes such a mode of operating, he must necessarily recur to the definitions and demonstrations of properties of the Mode of Knowing, lest he be convicted of being guided by experience rather than by intelligence and science.

28. Likewise every craftsman through the definition of the work to be constructed already begins to be directed toward operating, though not completely and adequately until he knows the mode of operating. In sum, the character of practical cognition indeed shines forth more in an act cognizing the mode of operating; for this reason such an act is customarily called practical almost antonomastically, and indeed alone "proximately" practical, whereas the others concerned with the nature of the work are called "mediately" or "remotely" practical. But since this act can be had both through experience and through science, it follows that, although it can be practically "experiential" without a scientific examination of the work, nevertheless insofar as it is "a proximate rule had intelligently" or "scientifically," it is constituted through all the acts by which a practical science accurately discusses its work. Otherwise there would be no practical science which did not have many speculative acts, contrary to what nearly everyone teaches concerning Moral Philosophy and Medicine, in which the objection is plainly met.

29. An expressly preceptive tendency by a gerund or something similar is by no means necessary for a practical act (cf. PP. Hurtado, *Logica*, disp. 2, sect. 2; Maurus, q. proemial, c. 4, § 1). First, because many acts of Ethics and Medicine do not tend in this way. Second, because otherwise anyone could

at will render all mechanical arts speculative merely by expressing their acts in an indicative mode, and similarly make all Mathematics practical by adding a preceptive tendency. One may say: therefore practical and speculative acts do not differ by their mode of tending, but only by their object. I deny the consequence: because from the object attained under the aspect of operable there is reflected into the act a practical mode of tending, that is, a tendency essentially orderable toward operating, which can be called "virtually" preceptive insofar as it can easily, but with a reasonable foundation, be reduced to the "formally" preceptive. In the acts of sciences this always arises from the diverse character of the object, as I shall immediately touch upon.

30. To proof 2º: St. Thomas there is not speaking of the practical in general, but only of the ideal practical, which is found in that cognition by which a craftsman forms for himself in the mind an idea or exemplar of the whole work. This is evident first from the context of that article; secondly from the words, "When all things required for its being are considered together," for not every practical cognition, but only ideal cognition, considers all things required for a work, for example a house, together; and chiefly from St. Thomas himself, *Opusculum* 70, q. 5, a. 1, ad 4, where he speaks thus concerning Medicine: "When Medicine is divided into theoretical and practical, the division is not made according to the end; for in this way all Medicine is contained under the practical, as being ordered to operation. But the aforesaid division is made according as the things treated in Medicine are proximate or remote from operation. For that part of Medicine is called practical which teaches modes of operation for cures, as that other remedies must be applied to such abscesses. But that part is called theoretical which teaches principles from which a man is directed in operation, but not proximately; as that the powers are three, and that there are so many kinds of fevers. Hence it is not necessary that, if some part of an active science is called theoretical, that part should therefore be placed under speculative science." These are the words of St. Thomas, which I have transcribed at length because, when applied to Logic, they contain the solution to the whole argument with its proofs. For others see Fr. Oviedo, *Logica*, controversia 2, punct. 5.

31. To the Confirmation: I omit that among mathematicians Computational Arithmetic and the part of Geometry called Geodesy are practical. Likewise, serious Philosophers judge that several further acts of Mathematics in general are practical, and also some acts of Physics, Psychology, and Metaphysics. Nor am I concerned with the manifold distinction others devise between Mathematical and Logical acts. I press the

point first in the acts of Ethics and Medicine according to their theoretical part, which is the greater; for in these the same difficulty applies. Next I answer with our Lynce, *Metaphysics* VII, tract. 5, c. 2, that Mathematical acts, although they regard an operable object and perhaps also have some mode or tendency useful in some manner for operating, are not practical because of defect of the end, since they neither are ordered nor are suitably orderable to the end of operation. The reason is that in human sciences whenever an operable object is such that the truths discovered about it are more worthy and appetible for their own sake than by reason of executing the object, then those truths are not essentially orderable to execution as their end, nor are they rightly appetible on account of operation as principally sought; as is evident from the very nature of means and end. The cited Author proves Mathematical truths to be of this kind, as those who have entered the inner recesses of Mathematics know well.

32. Conversely, whenever an operable object is not greatly worth knowing except for the sake of execution, then the truths discovered about it are practical, as being of themselves appetible for the sake of operation. This occurs with the object of Logic, which certainly would not deserve to be known with so much labor and expenditure of time unless because its execution is most useful. For what does it matter to know of how many terms a syllogism consists, or what figures and moods it admits, unless so that in praxis we may reason well and easily acquire the sciences? Nearly the same happens with the object of Ethics, Medicine, and the external arts, which is more useful as placed in praxis than as purely known or cognized. Hence practical science is said to tend toward an object "as operable" or "as capable of being directed," that is, as worthy of being known for the sake of operation, worthy of being known because of the usefulness of direction. Hence also, when such an object is known under a formality not conducive to operating, for example the object of Logic under the aspect of real being, absolute quality, vital act, etc., it is not cognized practically, because such cognition is not suitably appetible for the sake of operation. I see difficulties against these points which deserve explanation. But excessive prolixity now presents a greater obstacle. See Lynce, loc. cit.

33. Finally, against the last Assertion it is objected: Logic, insofar as it is handed down by the customary method and insofar as it comprehends reflexive and direct Logic, is one science; therefore it cannot be partly practical and partly speculative. The consequence is proved because practical and speculative are essentially opposed differences which cannot be united in one species of faculty, just as rational and irrational cannot be joined in the same species of animal. The Thomists press this argument

against our Authors who assert that Logic is practical simply and speculative in a qualified sense. But they are easily repelled. First, by the example of Sacred Theology, which according to St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 1, a. 4, embraces both differences. Second, because for us Logic is not a simple habit but multiple, and consequently can easily reconcile those differences according to diverse habits and acts, not indeed disconnectedly or without order, but rather suitably, since speculative acts in some manner prepare the way for practical ones. Third, because although the purely practical is opposed to the speculative as the purely vegetative is to the sensitive, the practical in common is not so opposed. Therefore it can be joined with the speculative in some species of science, just as in man the vegetative coheres with the sensitive. See [Our Holiest] Fathers Peynado and Quiros.

34. As for our Assertion, Logic insofar as it embraces reflexive and direct Logic, as well as proper and foreign disputations, is not properly one science, especially among the Thomists, who intermingle almost all Metaphysics with Logic. It is therefore one science by a unity of a certain kinship, which can admit diverse ends with respect to diverse acts and habits, especially when one end prevails, namely the end of operation, which in Logic is natural, whereas the end of speculation is as though adventitious. These points can be illustrated by the clear authority of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 179, a. 2, c. and ad 2, where, although he says that the contemplative and active lives differ from each other as the practical and speculative differ, he nevertheless acknowledges a middle composed of both lives, as lukewarm is composed of hot and cold, and pale of white and black.

DISPUTATION II.
ON THE OBJECT OF LOGIC.

The matter of this Disputation, both intricate of itself and obscured by terminology, and rendered lengthy by the sharp disagreement of minds, would almost deserve a full Treatise. But because time and brevity are more precious than such a deserving treatment, I shall be content with this one Disputation and shall attempt, insofar as I can, to draw out only the more select and useful points from the darkness of terms and opinions; of these I shall either omit entirely or touch only lightly upon many that are less significant or almost negligible.

CHAPTER I.
What and How Manifold an Object Is in General, Summarily Premised.

Object, as the term is now taken, if one considers the etymology, is that which is cast before the eyes or placed under one's gaze; for the origin of the name seems to have been drawn from sight, which is better known to us. But if one considers universally the thing signified, an object is "that which an intentional power attains by its acts," whether that power be spiritual, as intellect and will, or material, as any sensitive power of man or brute. Thus color is the object of the visual power, sound of the auditory power, truth of the intellect, goodness of the will. The power alone properly regards or attains an object, just as it alone properly understands, loves, sees, etc.

Nevertheless, under its auspices acts and habits also are said to have an object: acts because they regard the object "as that by which," that is, as actual tendencies by which the power regards the object; habits because they assist the power in eliciting acts. Hence the object of those acts to which habits of arts and sciences concur is said to be known and considered by the habits themselves, by an improper but customary manner of speaking.

2. The object thus sketched is either "actual," or "in second act," or "aptitudinal," or "in first act." The actual is that which is in fact attained; the aptitudinal is that which can be attained or, as they say, is attainable, that is, apt to be attained. But note that an object is constituted "actual" by the act attaining it, as by a form. For it is the same for color to be an "actual object" as for it to be "actually seen," which denomination involves vision as a form. Hence vision bears upon the object taken specifically, not reduplicatively "as actual," as though actuality were posited on the side of the thing seen; for vision neither bears upon itself nor sees itself together with the color. Yet that reduplication is true if it signifies only that the object is rendered actual through vision in exercise. Likewise, the denomination of an "aptitudinal" or objectifiable object will be purely intrinsic if it signifies only the intrinsic capacity of the thing to be attained, connoting a possible act as a mere terminus; but it will be extrinsic if it reduplicates the possible act as a form.

3. Moreover, object is divided into "adequate and inadequate," or, what is the same, into "total and partial." This division can also apply to individual acts, but it is chiefly employed with respect to sciences and powers. Therefore an adequate object is that which is regarded, or can be regarded, by the collection of all acts of some power or science; an inadequate object is that which is regarded only by some one or several acts. One may say: this division seems improper and contrary to the rules of division, since one member is included in the other as a part in the whole. I grant it; but for the sake of clarity it is frequently used. Perhaps it can be vindicated from this fault from *Summulae*, disp. 3, c. 6, n. 3.

4. But the most celebrated division of all is that of Object into "formal and material." This division, together with its attached subdivisions, is explained so variously by Authors of every School that scarcely two can be found who agree in all things. Here I shall summarily give what seems more select, both concerning the thing itself and concerning the mode of speaking. A formal Object, therefore, is "that which is attained for its own sake"; a material Object is "that which is attained for the sake of another," or by reason of another. The common example is supplied by a sick man who loves the cutting of a vein for the sake of health. The material object of this love is the cutting of the vein, which is loved neither by reason of itself nor

because of a goodness intrinsic to itself, but only because it is useful for obtaining health. Health itself, however, is the formal object because it is sought for its own sake and for its proper lovability. Another familiar example is supplied by an act of Faith by which we believe the punishments of Hell because of the authority of God revealing them, and likewise by an act of Charity by which we love our neighbor, even an enemy, because of God supremely loved.

5. But it is doubtful what the word "for" denotes in the definition of a formal Object. The common and true resolution is that it signifies the same as "of itself and by reason of itself," or more clearly, the same as "by its own merits and by reason of an intrinsic sufficiency and proportion" which the object contains in itself for inviting such an act, without begging merit or proportion from another object. One may say: this is to confuse the formal object with the end or with the object of attribution, whose proper character it is that other things be considered for its sake. One may add that we assent to the premises for the sake of the conclusion, which nevertheless is not the formal object of the premises. I answer: The particle "for" does not always signify an end, but generally whatever is given as the reason for an act; and in the present case it signifies whatever can be given as a sufficient objective reason upon which the act directly rests, together with all its security or adherence; or, as is commonly said, a reason taken from the side of the object which directly satisfies one asking why such an act attains the object, by means of "because," as when one says: "By firm Faith I believe the punishments of Hell because God, who cannot be deceived or deceive, has so revealed."

6. Therefore, although the particle "for," contracted to acts of the will, denotes an end, because with respect to the will every formal object has the character of an end, as is commonly asserted, nevertheless, insofar as it prescinds from will and intellect, it signifies only the objective reason explained above. Thus, to turn back the objection, we say not only that the intellect assents to the premises for the sake of the conclusion, but also, and more frequently, that it assents to the conclusion because of the premises. In the first case "for" denotes an end; in the second, a formal object. As regards the object of attribution, which is found not in powers but in sciences, according to many it is not distinct from the formal object of a science. Yet this lack of distinction does not necessarily follow from the definition of formal object as just explained.

7. For when it is said that everything in a science is considered for the sake of the object of attribution, "for" determinately denotes an order to an end. In acts of the intellect this order is not an order to the formal object,

except perhaps in the improper sense in which any object whatsoever is customarily called an "end," that is, a terminus. Or certainly, although every formal object may be called an end, not every end is the formal object of all things ordered to it. Thus assent to principles is ordered to conclusions, the first operation of the intellect to the second, and the second to the third, certainly as to an end which they by no means regard as their object. Indeed, even in the will the moral virtues, especially infused ones, are of themselves referred to God as an end without regarding God as their formal object. It is therefore consistent that something be attained "for its own sake" as a formal object and nevertheless be said by the same act to be attained "for another" as an ultimate end or object of attribution.

8. The formal object is subdivided 1º into "motive and purely terminative." The motive, which is also terminative but not purely so, is that which gives being to the act either in the genus of final cause, as in appetitive powers, or in the genus of efficient cause, as in cognitive powers, with which it flows into the act either through itself or through its species, according to the saying, "Knowledge is born from the object and the power," or at least through real identity, as in the Divine acts treated by Theologians. The purely terminative is that in which the act finds a sufficient reason upon which to rest, although it in no way receives being from it. Such is judged to be the object of this act, "Anything whatever either is or is not"; or at least such would be color if it were seen without its own influx, God supplying the species. Others refuse to call the formal object of things "purely terminative" and reserve this name for the material object. They divide the formal into "physically motive" and "intentionally motive," under the latter member comprehending what we have just called "purely terminative." Common usage favors this manner of speaking, whereby we often take formal object and motive object for the same.

9. They subdivide it 2º into "intrinsic" and "extrinsic." The intrinsic formal object is that which immediately terminates the act; the extrinsic is that which does not terminate the act to which it is compared, but another preceding act from which the latter arises or is determined. Thus the object of the premises will be an extrinsic formal object with respect to the conclusion if the conclusion does not reflect upon it.

10. It is subdivided 3º into formal "which" and formal "by which," or "under which." This division, which is variously explained by different authors, is chiefly taken in relation to total powers, virtues, and sciences. In this sense the formal object "by which" is the "Formality" or "Common Reason by virtue of which every particular object is rendered attainable by acts of some power or science." This same thing is also called the formal

reason "under which," because whatever the power or science regards must in some way be contained under it, and because every act of the power or science as it were serves under its auspices. The formal "which," otherwise the formal reason "which," is "the Object expressly attained by acts which identically participates in, or contracts, the formal reason under which."

11. I add examples. The formal object "by which," or formal reason "under which," of the intellective power is Transcendental Truth, because it renders attainable whatever the intellect attains. But any particular true thing, being, or good which identically participates in or contracts the aspect of the true is the formal object "which" when it is expressly attained on its own merits. For the same reason, Goodness, or the Good as such, is the formal reason "under which" with respect to the will, while whatever is expressly desired for its own sake is the formal Object "which." Likewise, Color in common is the reason "under which" the visual power tends, because sight attains nothing which is not colored; but the formal Object "which" is whiteness, blackness, and the other species of colors. One must reason similarly in total sciences. For the reason "under which" of Moral Philosophy is the character of Virtue or of an honest act in common; its formal Object "which" is Justice, Temperance, and every species of Virtue expressly attained. Likewise, with respect to Logic, the formal reason "under which" is the artifice of the Mode of Knowing or of acts of the intellect as such; Definition, Division, and Syllogism are the formal reason "which," or formal Object "which."

12. To these is customarily added the most formal reason "under which," which adds to the formal reason "under which" only an express relation to the power or science, and is also called the reason "of the object as object," or "in the being of an object as attainable" or "knowable," whereas the formal reason "under which" is called the reason "of the object as thing," or "in the being of a thing." Thus the most formal reason "under which" is called Intelligible with respect to intellect, Lovable with respect to will, Visible with respect to sight, Knowable or Capable of Being Directed in such or such genus with respect to Sciences and Arts. Although such a reason is implicitly contained in every formal object, it is nevertheless never explicitly attained by material powers, since these cannot reflect upon themselves, nor always by spiritual powers, as St. Thomas noted in Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3.

13. But several points must be observed. 1º In the same object there can be found multiple formal or most formal reasons "under which," by virtue of which that thing belongs to diverse powers and sciences. For example, the same act of the intellect belongs to Logic as artful, to Psychology as vital;

and it is the object of the intellect under the aspect of the True, and of the will under the aspect of the Good. 2º The same formality can be a reason "under which" with respect to one power and a reason "which," or formal object "which," with respect to another. Thus color is a formal reason "which" with respect to the common or internal sense. Thus, when we expressly love Truth or know God to be merciful because He is good, truth is a formal reason "which" with respect to the will, and goodness with respect to the intellect.

14. 3º According to many, especially Thomists, only the formal reason "under which" is properly called a formal Object. What we have explained as the formal reason "which" or formal object "which" they call the "proper and essential" material object. This manner of speaking, because it is very common, must be kept in view. Nevertheless, that our division and explanation are preferable is evident from this: not only the reason "under which" is a formal object of the acts of a power; therefore neither is it the only formal object of the power itself, which certainly does not regard an object, whether formal or material, except through acts. The antecedent is established in acts of the will, for example hope, charity, justice, etc. Who could doubt that these are distinguished from one another by formal object? The same is established in acts of the intellect, which commonly differ from one another by formal object. Likewise in acts of the visual power terminated at whiteness and blackness. The same reasoning applies to acts of sciences, for example those by which Logic specifically regards Definition, Syllogism, etc. But acts of one power or total science do not differ from one another by the formal reason "under which," since they all agree in it. Therefore another genus of formal object must be admitted.

15. The reason *a priori* is that when a man, for example, loves his own life, he does not rest upon the formality of transcendental Good alone as the adequate motive or sole objective reason; otherwise he would equally love the life of a mouse. He is therefore moved by the aspect of the Good as contracted to such a species, so that the very suchness or specific difference also has the office of motive and formal object. This specific motive, which certainly cannot be the formal reason "under which," we call the formal Object "which." One may say: whiteness would not be seen unless it were color; therefore it is attained because of the aspect of color. I turn it back: color would not be seen unless it were contracted by some difference; therefore color is attained because of the difference. Hence the aspect of color is necessarily required, indeed it is the sole reason for vision in the genus; nevertheless it is not the adequate reason for vision in species except

insofar as joined with the difference of whiteness, which is also attained for its own sake.

16. 4º The formal Object is customarily called "specificative," that is, an extrinsic index or rule from which we commonly discern the species of acts, habits, and powers from one another, though in different ways. For if acts of one power or total science are compared with acts of another, their sufficient "specificative," or "distinctive," is the formal reason "under which," which nevertheless on the side of the object embraces every specific formal object. But if they are compared with one another, the "specificative" will be each formal object "which." Thus, for all brutes to differ specifically from man, irrationality suffices as an intrinsic "specificative"; but for them to be distinguished from one another they must be specified by the differences of roaring, neighing, etc. Hence also a power and an infused habit are specified by the reason "under which," because they do not have parts which can be compared among themselves in relation to multiple formal Objects "which" corresponding to the acts themselves. Therefore they can be compared only with other powers and habits tending under a diverse formal reason. But the habits constituting one total Science are specified in the same way as the acts, namely from the habits of another science through the reason "under which," but among themselves through the formal Object "which." Recall what was said in disp. 1, c. 6, from n. 3.

17. 5º When speaking of Sciences, the formal Object is customarily called the "Subject of the science," because it is subjected to the consideration of the science and is that about which the science discusses and demonstrates properties. Although, strictly speaking, the subject is that which is subjected in the conclusions of a science, whereas the object further comprehends whatever is predicated of such a subject. If the subject of a science is compared to particular habits or to individual species of acts, it coincides with the formal Object "which"; but if it is compared to the total science, it coincides with the formal reason "under which," or with the common reason of the object in the being of a thing, which is always generic, as in Metaphysics the aspect of Being, in Ethics moral honesty, in Logic rectitude of understanding. Therefore Aristotle and St. Thomas frequently call the formal object of an entire science the "Subject genus." Furthermore, both the object and subject of a science are called either "of Attribution" or "Attributed." The object or subject of attribution is that whose cognition is principally intended as the end of the whole science, to which end the remaining objects are in some manner referred; and this is customarily called antonomastically the "subject" of the science, especially with the addition "principal" or "first intended." Thus God stands in Theology, and

according to many Demonstration in Logic. The attributed object or subject is every other object of the science which is ordered to the aforesaid end. But more will be said below in its proper place concerning this division of object.

18. Now the material Object is subdivided 1º into "intrinsic and extrinsic." The "intrinsic" material object, which others call "proximate," is that which terminates the act in itself, although not for its own sake. Thus stands an enemy when he is loved for God's sake. The "extrinsic" material object, among others "remote," "purely denominative," and an object "accidentally," is that which terminates the act not in itself but in something really distinct to which it is united. Thus a man is said to be seen, although the vision is not terminated at the substance of the man but at the color united to him. It is subdivided 2º into "immediate and mediate." The "immediate" is that which is immediately referred to the formal object; the "mediate" is that which is referred to the formal through another material object. Thus, when one desires a book for the sake of study and study for the sake of a Chair, the Chair is the formal object, study the immediate material object, the book the mediate material object. Others call the immediate material object formal with respect to the mediate.

19. It is subdivided 3º into "explicit and implicit." The "explicit" material object is that which is expressly attained, as a mystery of Faith believed. The "implicit" material object is any formality really identified with either the formal or material object which nevertheless is not attained under its own expression. Thus when whiteness is seen, the aspect of "quality" is also seen, but materially and implicitly. Thus when Logic regards acts of the intellect as artful, it materially and implicitly regards "vitality" or "spirituality," which those acts identify with themselves. Yet others, not without reason, reject a material implicit object of this sort.

20. For 1º it follows that the most formal reason "under which" is a material object, since it is not explicitly attained, as we noted above with St. Thomas; indeed even the formal reason "under which" is not always attained under its proper expression, since whenever the intellect understands it need not elicit this expression, "True," or "Being." 2º The intellect is commonly said to attain, not "materially" but "formally implicitly," all higher predicates which belong to the definition of the object expressly attained. For example, when you cognize man, you formally implicitly attain "Living, Body, Substance, Being," without nevertheless attaining them under their proper expressions. Therefore only those formalities which, together with others, are identified with the object but are neither expressly attained nor belong to the formal concept of the object as expressly attained can and

commonly are said to be attained "materially." Thus, when we love God in view of mercy, the attributes of justice, immensity, etc., are said to be attained only materially. Understand this concerning acts of a spiritual power. But if the discussion concerns a material power, for example the visual, even higher predicates which belong to the formal concept of color can be said to be attained "materially"; for since such a power neither elicits a definitive expression nor is concerned to resolve into those predicates, they stand as though "on the side of the material" with respect to the power. Yet it is not necessary to call them material objects.

21. One may ask whether there can be a formal object without an explicit material object. I answer that there can, for example when the intellect cognizes only the aspect of the "True" as such, or the will loves only the aspect of the "Good" in common. One may say: formal and material Objects are so called by analogy with physical form and matter; but every form implies an order to matter; therefore every formal object implies an order to a material object. I answer: this analogy chiefly consists in the office of specifying. For just as form intrinsically specifies the composite and determines the indifference of matter, so the formal object extrinsically specifies acts and, in the manner stated, powers, and determines the indifference of the material object. But as regards order to the material, the formal does not always imitate physical form.

22. Some hold that a material object is always really distinct from the formal, for what is identified with the formal they call the formal Object "which." Hence, if you love God because He is merciful, God will not be the material object because He identifies with Himself mercy, which is the formal motive. Others quite commonly do not speak in this way. Whatever the case, for the present purpose it suffices if there is called the formal Object "which," not whatever is in any way identified with the formal, but what contracts to itself the formal reason "under which," as a specific reason contracts a generic or an inferior a superior; in which manner Syllogism, for example, contracts the Mode of Knowing as such. But here it must be noted that not only the material object is called "the proper matter and matter concerning which"; for the formal object also is commonly called by that name. Therefore, if the "matter concerning which" is attained by reason of itself, it will be the formal object; but material if attained by reason of another or for the sake of another.

23. It must further be noted that the Thomists almost agree with us in the explanation of formal and material objects, although many of them take these terms, "formal reason which, formal reason under which, formal Object by which and which," differently, especially when treating the unity,

distinction, and specification of sciences. But in the course of discussion we shall note this disagreement as occasion requires. Now let us proceed to investigate the object of Logic. And because spoken words, things signified, second objective intentions, and according to many fictive beings of reason, and chiefly acts of the intellect, commonly intervene in Logical artifacts, we shall call all these in order to examination.

CHAPTER II.
Whether Spoken Words Are an Object Directly and Essentially Considered by Logic.

1. Some of the ancients thought spoken words to be the adequate object of Logic. But this opinion now lies rejected and obsolete; indeed an old verse, sung against a certain Rucelinus who was a patron of that opinion, testifies that it was already ridiculed long ago: "The words you teach, Rucelinus, Dialectic does not want." Yet it is doubtful whether spoken words are at least a partial object of Logic, so that in this sense they should be called a "formal Object which," or a "proper material" object directly and essentially considered by Logic. Authors use these terms indiscriminately in the present doubt. For those who hold the negative position deny to spoken words not only the office of formal object but also that of a proper material object essentially and directly attained, attributing to them only the office of an accidental object belonging to Logic indirectly and reductively. Those who defend the affirmative commonly think that the common character of Logical artifice is properly participated by spoken words almost as by acts of the intellect. Hence some call spoken words the formal Object "which," others the "proper and essential" material object because by the name formal object they understand only the common reason. I except the Thomists. For although they call spoken words a material object properly and essentially belonging to Logic, they nevertheless refuse to call them a "denominable" object, that is, one receiving in itself the formal character of Logical artifice, but only an object "purely capable of being directed" toward signifying the objective Mode of Knowing. These points must be kept in view lest diversity of terminology among Authors produce obscurity.

2. Furthermore it must be noted that human spoken words are not now taken merely as sound, for thus they belong to Psychology. Hence M. Augustine says in *De Principiis Dialecticae*, c. 5: "A word sounds, but what sounds has nothing to do with Dialectic." Nor again are they taken according to signification endowed with any artifice whatever; for the texture of spoken words, insofar as it is congruous speech committing no solecism,

belongs to Grammar; insofar as adorned with tropes and figures, to Rhetoric; insofar as bound to meter, to Poetry. Spoken words are therefore taken insofar as disposed according to the artifice of Definition, Argumentation, etc., according to the rules and precepts of the *Summulae*.

3. In this sense Spinula, Echalez, Caramuel, and several of our own authors with Fonseca and Lynce, who cites not a few ancients, affirm that spoken words are a proper object of Logic directly and essentially considered. The Thomists also join them, especially the more recent, such as Aguirre, Palanco, Baiona. The negative opinion, however, is much more common in our School with the Excellent Doctor, *Metaphysics*, disp. 1, sect. 4, n. 27, and also seems common among the Scotists. This seems more probable to me, and:

4. It is proved 1º: spoken words would be a proper object of Logic because Logical artifice is truly and properly found in spoken words; but this reason is false; therefore, etc. The major contains the foundation upon which most of the adversaries rely. The minor is proved: the artifice of the Mode of Knowing is not truly and properly found in spoken words; therefore properly Logical artifice is not found in them. The consequence is evident, because the whole Logical artifice is situated in the Mode of Knowing or its parts. The antecedent is proved 1º universally, because no vocal speech by its own power manifests the unknown without the assistance of another manifestation by disclosing to the mind the essence, parts, or properties of a thing; but the artifice of the Mode of Knowing consists in this manifestation; therefore, etc. The minor first seems evident, for since the Mode of Knowing is defined as "Speech manifestative of the unknown," everyone understands a manifestation by which, once it is posited, the object necessarily ceases to be unknown, or becomes known from unknown. For if, in the composite sense of the manifestation, the thing still remains unknown, who would say that a truly Logical Mode of Knowing exists? Its essence therefore requires a manifestation which, without the assistance of another manifestation, discloses by itself to the intellect the essence, parts, or properties of things. Certainly the manifestation proper to the Mode of Knowing must be a form removing the denomination "unknown" to which it is opposed in the aforesaid definition. But such a form is nothing other than knowledge or cognition, which by itself confers the denomination "known."

5. Next the major is proved from the Great Augustine (*De Magistro*, c. 11), who says: "If I grant the most possible to words, they only admonish us to seek things; they do not present them so that we may know them." Therefore verbal speech by its own power, or of itself, does not disclose to the intellect the essence of things, etc.; for whatever discloses such things of

itself undoubtedly "presents them so that we may know them." The point is urged: purely vocal speech first does not manifest the unknown to the speaker, for he already knows beforehand what he says; neither does it manifest it to the hearer unless the latter perceives the words through ultimate concepts, by which alone he is rendered knowing of what had been unknown to him. Therefore such speech, without the assistance and intervention of an ultimate concept, does not render an object known to the hearer. Therefore of itself and in itself it does not possess the proper power of the Mode of Knowing, but that whole power resides in the accompanying concept. Otherwise, if a vocal definition were uttered with no hearer perceiving it, a true Mode of Knowing would exist by virtue of which no one knew or cognized anything and no essence ceased to be unknown; which from the terms appears absurd.

6. The reason *a priori* is that spoken words, as also any sign by convention, do not manifest the inner nature of things except by arousing the hearer's mind to seek the species of objects or to use those already possessed, eliciting cognitions by which it knows the inner nature of things. For once spoken words and their signification alone are posited, the mind is not said to know or understand what and how manifold a thing is, or what properties it has, unless it directly considers the thing itself and penetrates it through species possessed from elsewhere. But this is for the intellect to be aroused or admonished by words so that it may manifest to itself through its own acts the essence or properties of a thing, as Augustine said; it is not for objects to be disclosed to the mind by the proper power of words, but rather by another's power. Similarly, one who arouses or warns soldiers of the approach of enemies so that they may fight does not therefore fight or conquer by his own power or by himself. Hence no vocal speech is a Mode of Knowing except improperly, remotely, occasionally, or presuppositively, and after the manner of a certain image, just as it is not otherwise a mode of cognizing or understanding. Therefore it is properly only a mode of speaking, a mode of admonishing, a mode of arousing toward cognizing and knowing.

7. It is proved 2º specifically from the same antecedent: the artifice of Demonstration or Syllogism is not properly found in spoken words; therefore neither is the artifice of any Mode of Knowing. The consequence is established by parity of reasoning. The antecedent is expressly taught by Aristotle, the inventor of this artifice (*Posterior Analytics* I, c. 8, before the middle), in these words: "Demonstration consists not in speech which is external, but in speech which is in the mind, since neither does Ratiocination appear to consist in the former." Nothing could be more

express. The Philosopher adds: "For since opposition by denial can always be made against external speech, it cannot always be made against that which is in the mind." These words contain the following reason: a true Demonstration must so convince the intellect that the latter cannot oppose it by denial, that is, elicit a denying or contradictory act against it. This arises both from the certitude and evidence of the premises and from the illative force of the conclusion. Indeed every good Syllogism, even a probable one, once the premises are posited, necessitates the conclusion at least as regards species, so that the intellect cannot elicit the opposite conclusion. But there is no vocal syllogism against whose premises and conclusion opposition by denial cannot be made in the same line, both by the hearer and the speaker, namely by immediately eliciting the opposite vocal speech, as experience makes clear. Therefore, etc.

8. More universally our position is proved 2º from the Excellent Doctor, loc. cit., where he speaks thus: "Dialectic is not directly and by design concerned with these things," spoken words and writings, "as with its proper object and matter, but it does this consequently and as though by a certain concomitance. For since spoken words arise from concepts, while Dialectic directs and orders concepts it consequently teaches by what words or by what form of words they are to be expressed." Under these words lies a proof of this kind: Logic does not directly and by design direct spoken words; therefore spoken words are not matter capable by design of being directed by Logic, and consequently are not its proper object. The antecedent is proved: Logic directly and by design directs concepts as matter principally capable of being directed, as all the Adversaries grant; therefore it does not directly and by design direct spoken words. The consequence is proved: once the rules of Logic concerning concepts are posited, spoken words consequently, or by a certain concomitance, remain sufficiently directed and regulated insofar as anything beyond Grammar is needed. For the whole vocal artifice follows the norm of the intellectual. Hence one who has learned from Logic to form such a norm, and in fact forms it, will by that very fact, without again consulting Logic, very easily consequently form the vocal artifice, provided Grammar promptly supplies spoken words apt to express concepts and their syntax, as it should. Hence, as we commonly say, one who conceives rightly and speaks badly either does not know Grammar or sins against prudence voluntarily. Therefore, if Logic by design directs concepts, it does not by design additionally hand down new rules concerning spoken words, and thus neither does it direct them by design. The consequence is evident because no art by design hands down rules for matter already presupposed to be sufficiently regulated by rules tending

elsewhere, insofar as it needs regulation and the difficulty of the artifice requires.

9. Confirmation 1º: Logic does not by design regulate writing, or the artifice of a written Syllogism, for example, as most Adversaries admit, because once the vocal artifice is regulated and skill in writing presupposed, no one can thereafter err in the written artifice except voluntarily. But once the mental artifice is regulated and skill in Grammar presupposed, no one can thereafter err in the artifice of spoken words except voluntarily. Therefore, etc. The same is evident in Grammar and Rhetoric, which formally or directly do not treat the congruity and ornament of writing, for no other reason than that they directly regulate the congruity and ornament of spoken words; once these are posited, no difficulty remains in writing except that overcome by the art of writing. Confirmation 2º: Architecture does not essentially, directly, or formally regard an exemplar of a building drawn ichnographically on paper, nor Astronomy a wooden sphere, nor Medicine an anatomical body, nor Music written notes of sounds, although all these stand to their respective arts as spoken words stand to Logic, namely as signs of an object directly considered, in whose likeness they are expressed or whose imitation they exhibit. Therefore Logic likewise does not directly and essentially regard spoken words. Some Adversaries, conquered by parity, deny the examples in the antecedent.

10. But they can be pressed 1º because the formal reason or artifice essentially intended by those faculties is not properly participated by those objects. For true stars and their positions and motions are not found in a wooden sphere; nor is the true character of sonorous number found in written notes of sounds; and so with the rest. 2º Because otherwise by the same reasoning it would follow that absolutely all arts, even bridle-making, shoemaking, tailoring, formally or directly and essentially regarded the artifice of their works expressed in a picture, which is unheard of. The consequence is proved because a picture of a bridle or shoe is also a sign and expression of the true bridle or shoe no less than a wooden sphere with respect to the celestial sphere. When placed before the eyes, it can also assist beginners in those arts so that they may better understand and learn whatever is prescribed to them concerning the true artifice. But there is no other reason why the wooden sphere should be essentially considered by Astronomy or the anatomical body by Medicine. Hence our position is effectively strengthened: for one who knows the art of Painting well, if from elsewhere he has a true bridle before his eyes or knows the rules of making it, needs no other direction to paint a bridle. Therefore likewise one who

knows Grammar well, if he attends to a mental definition or knows its rules from Logic, will need no other direction to make a vocal definition.

11. Finally, our position is proved: if spoken words were excluded and rules terminated precisely at concepts were possessed, Logic would perfectly obtain the end for which it was instituted; therefore Logic does not by design treat spoken words. The antecedent is proved: Logic, by everyone's confession, was instituted for acquiring other sciences through artfully composed acts; but one who knew well the rules of Logic terminated precisely at concepts, for example one who possessed them infused from heaven, would be perfectly instructed for obtaining this end. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved: sciences are perfectly acquired through acts of the intellect; therefore one who knew well the rules of those acts would be fully instructed for perfectly acquiring the sciences.

12. From what has been said you will infer 1º that spoken words are regulated by Logic not immediately in themselves, but mediately and in presupposed concepts, insofar as from attention either to the rules of concepts or to the concepts themselves formed according to the rules, a vocal definition, syllogism, etc., can very easily be constructed through the assistance of Grammar. And this is for spoken words to be regulated "indirectly, consequently, and as though by a certain concomitance," as the Excellent Doctor said. You will infer 2º that the rules of the *Summulae*, insofar as they are directly or expressly terminated at spoken words, belong partly to Grammar, partly to Logic: to Grammar as their essential cause; to Logic as their indirect cause or condition without which they would not exist. This is evident because it essentially belongs to Grammar perfectly to imitate concepts and their texture through spoken words and syntax. But in order that it may imitate the Logical texture of concepts above others, it requires as a condition either previously to have in the mind concepts already formed Logically, to which it attends, or previously to know the rules concerning the concepts themselves. Once this condition is posited, the Grammarian himself by his own effort collects rules concerning spoken words to be disposed according to the Logical norm. Hence Grammar in these rules is as though a disciple of Logic, from which, although directed elsewhere, it learns what form of words it must observe.

13. Long ago Apelles, prince of painters, used to expose his works in an open gallery to passersby, while he himself, hidden behind the panel, listened to faults that might be noted. They say that a passing shoemaker reproved him for omitting something in the sandal of one of the figures. Apelles immediately corrected the sandal according to the shoemaker's judgment. But when the shoemaker, made proud by the correction, on the

following day also found fault with the leg, Apelles indignantly sprang from hiding and said, "Let the shoemaker not go beyond the sandal," which thereafter passed into a proverb. In this little story you see how Apelles in painting sandals in some manner acknowledged himself the disciple of the shoemaker, although he rejected his admonitions in other matters; because the art of Painting cannot provide itself with rules for representing sandals except by attention to the rules of the shoemaker's art or to its artifice. Hence a painting of a sandal, and the determinate and expressed rules for it, can reductively be said to belong to Shoemaking as to an indirect cause. Thus therefore one must reason in our case.

14. You will infer 3º that the aforesaid rules of the *Summulae* concerning spoken words are instituted not from a requirement of Logic but from the need or convenience of the Logician. For Logic does not need rules of vocal artifice in order perfectly to attain its end, from n. 10; neither are they needed for Logic itself to be acquired, since it can be acquired simply by one's own discovery, as it was largely acquired by Aristotle, or even through rules expressed by the teacher's voice which speak not about spoken words but only about concepts. Besides, means required merely from the weakness of the human mind for acquiring a science need not precisely on that account be the proper object of the same science; otherwise attendance at School, or even the reading of books, would be a proper object of Theology, for example. Therefore the aforesaid rules were instituted only from the need or convenience of Logicians, that is, of beginners studying Logic, who much more conveniently and easily grasp the truly Logical rules of mental artifice if they are first exercised in vocal artifice and learn its rules. But this slowness or convenience of beginners is accidental with respect to Logic. Therefore spoken words are customarily called by Authors of our position an "accidental Object of Logic"; certainly they must be called an object, not "formal," not "directly and essentially considered," but "indirectly and reductively" and "consequently regulated."

Objections Are Solved.

15. It is objected 1º: that which Logic treats expressly is its formal or proper object; but Logic directly and expressly treats spoken words; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: the books *Perihermeneias*, which are truly Logical, directly treat spoken words and demonstrate their properties. This is proved because these books expressly discuss Name, Verb, and Speech, whose definitions expressly speak of spoken words, and indeed as of a properly Logical object; for, as Aristotle warns there (*Perihermeneias* I, c. 4),

enunciative vocal speech "properly belongs to the present consideration," whereas optative, interrogative, and other speech "belongs to Rhetoric or Poetry." Accession 1º: the very title *Perihermeneias*, which means the same as "On Vocal Interpretation." Accession 2º: the manifold division, supposition, ampliation, restriction, etc., of Terms belongs either uniquely or chiefly to spoken words. Accession 3º: according to St. Thomas (*In Perihermeneias* I, lect. 2), "The signification of spoken words, which is immediate to the conceptions of the intellect, belongs to the principal consideration of Logic." Accession 4º: the treatise on Predicables is entitled among the ancients "On the Five Words."

16. I answer by denying the minor. To the proof: the books *Perihermeneias* treat spoken words not as a properly Logical object but as a sign through which the rules concerning concepts may be better understood. Hence in the appended proof I grant that these books expressly discuss spoken words, but I deny that the books *Perihermeneias*, insofar as they treat such things, are Logical except indirectly and reductively. Likewise I deny that they were written by the Philosopher as concerning the proper object of Logic. For because Aristotle saw that the object of Logic, being hidden in the mind, would not easily be perceived in itself by beginners unless first viewed in an exterior and sensible sign, he therefore, consulting the convenience of learners, wrote the books *Perihermeneias* and their rules expressly terminated at vocal artifice as at a sign and external exemplar of intellectual artifice. It is no otherwise than when an Astronomer shows beginners an eclipse of the Sun, and its increase and decrease, in the water of a basin, where the gaze can endure it more easily than in the Sun itself. The examples in nn. 9 and 10, by which the objection is met, are relevant here; likewise the doctrine of the second and third inferences in nn. 12, 13, and 14.

17. Hence Logic can be taken in two ways. 1º Insofar as it "regards its own proper object," and thus it contains only rules for concepts, whose artifice it considers essentially and from its own requirement. 2º Insofar as it was "methodically disposed by Aristotle and afterward by other Dialecticians so as to be learned conveniently by beginners," and thus it also contains several rules concerning spoken words. Yet these rules are as though accidental with respect to Logic, from n. 14; they arise from Logic as from an indirect cause, from n. 12; and belong more to Grammar, from which Aristotle introduced them into Logic for the aforesaid end, just as he introduced many Mathematical examples, and as many rules and principles of Logic are commonly taken up into Metaphysics and Theology. Allied to this is a third acceptation, namely insofar as Logic is taken "as applied to the use of external disputation." This application is not from the institution of

the art but from the will of the craftsman, who from the rules of concepts consequently gathers in what verbal form he ought to dispute; just as if someone should apply Military art to Tournaments and Jousts, or Architecture to paper houses.

18. Therefore, if Logic is taken in the second mode, it is true that the books *Perihermeneias* "properly" belong to Logic, even insofar as they contain definitions of vocal Name, Verb, and Speech, and that the enunciative "properly belongs to the present consideration," and likewise that "the signification of spoken words belongs to the principal consideration of Logic." But if Logic is taken in the first mode, as it is taken in the present question, none of these belongs to Logic "properly," but only "indirectly and reductively." Hence the Accessions of the argument are solved. For the last must either be explained in the same sense or understood metonymically of the "five words" according to the object corresponding to them, namely "Genus, Species, Difference," etc. Thus "that which is signified by a word is figuratively called a word," as St. Thomas noted, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 34, a. 1, c.

19. It is replied: Logic is named from the Greek "Logos," in Latin "Speech"; likewise Plato calls it "Talkative," and both ancients and moderns commonly call it the "Art of disputing"; but no one disputes except by spoken words. Hence St. Augustine adds to the words cited in n. 2: "And yet when there is disputation concerning spoken words, it does not belong to anything except Dialectic, for this is the science of disputing." Confirmation: a true Logical Term is divided into mental, vocal, and written; and other Logical artifacts are similarly divided. I answer: Logic received its name from the Greek word "Logos" insofar as it means the same as "Reason," as St. Isidore testifies (*Etymologiae* II, c. 24), and others commonly. Hence Logic is called "Rational Philosophy." Likewise "Logos" and "Speech" are said in Sacred Scripture of the Divine Word, certainly intellectual (Jn. c. 1; cf. Maldonatus there; likewise Heb. 4, v. 12; cf. Cornelius there); and according to St. Thomas the name "Word" is said more properly of concepts than of spoken words (Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 34, a. 1). Add that etymology does not always agree with the signification of a name. For, as the same Angelic Doctor notes (Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2), "The etymology of a name is one thing, and the signification of the name another. Etymology is considered according to that from which the name is imposed for signifying; the signification of the name according to that which the name is imposed to signify; and these are sometimes diverse." He immediately confirms this with examples.

20. That Plato called Logic "Talkative" proves nothing, for he himself divided Logic into Dialectic and Rhetoric (apud St. Isidore, loc. cit.); indeed Aristotle also called Rhetoric "as though an offshoot of Dialectic" (*Rhetoric* I, ad Theodecten, c. 2). Will Rhetoric therefore be a true part of Dialectic? Whenever these things are said, therefore, Logic is taken not insofar as it is intent upon its proper object, but insofar as applied to the use of external disputation according to the third acceptation in n. 17. In this sense Logic is called the "Art of disputing," and not only to dispute concerning spoken words, which alone St. Augustine says, but also to dispute by spoken words belongs to nothing except Dialectic. Yet this Art, insofar as it is thus applied to disputation, is not properly and directly Logic, but a certain indirect offshoot of Logic which differs from Rhetoric only as a clenched fist differs from an open palm in the hand of a man, as Zeno the Stoic and Varro used to say. But if we speak of Logic properly so called, Aristotle's well-known dictum holds: "The Logician is for himself, the Rhetorician for others." I omit that "disputation" is preserved even in concepts of the intellect, just as is "ratiocination"; for as St. Isidore says, *Differentiae* I, n. 490, "Ratiocination is rational and subtle disputation, and thought proceeding from certainties toward investigation of uncertainties." Now to the Confirmation: that division of Term is not univocal but improper and analogical, like the division of the star-bearing sphere into Celestial and Wooden.

21. It is objected 2º: Logical artifice is truly and properly found in spoken words; therefore also the character of a truly Logical object. The antecedent is proved, for example, in the artifice of Definition: this vocal complex, "Rational animal," is truly and properly "Speech explaining the essence of a thing"; therefore it truly contains the artifice of Definition. The antecedent is proved: first, that complex is truly "Speech," since this is defined by Aristotle through a vocal sign significant by convention, or more generally through a sign. Next, it truly "explains" the essence of a thing, because an instrumental sign truly explains or manifests its object, otherwise it would not truly be a sign. Confirmation 1º: Logic directly regards the artifice of a mental definition not because it is an act of the intellect, for this aspect belongs to Psychology, but precisely because it is an artifice conformable to the rules of defining; but this aspect also applies to the artifice of a vocal definition. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 2º: the art of statuary directly regards its artifice in whatever matter it is found, whether marble, jasper, etc.; therefore the Logical art also will directly regard its own artifice whether found in spoken word or concept. Confirmation 3º: Logic not only teaches knowing but also "teaches teaching and teaches learning," according

to M. Augustine (*De Ordine* II, c. 13); but through vocal artifacts we teach and learn, although through mental ones alone we know. Therefore, etc.

22. I answer by denying the first antecedent and distinguishing the second: it is speech explaining, etc., grammatically, I grant; logically, I deny the antecedent and consequence. To the proof: the definition of Speech as it stands in the *Summulae* is not proper to Logic but to Grammar, insofar as Grammar is inserted into Logic for the sake of beginners or insofar as it is indirectly regulated by Logic, as is established from what has been said. Nor likewise is that definition purely Logical when it is handed down through sign prescinded from formal and instrumental. Therefore, in order to yield a purely Logical sense, it must suppose "sign" for an internal and formal sign, which is proper to the Mode of Knowing. Furthermore, the vocal speech "Rational animal" explains the essence of a thing by admonishing us to seek, not by bringing it about that we know, as is required for the Mode of Knowing and therefore for a truly Logical definition. See above, n. 5. Hence, whatever may be the case as to whether a sign by convention truly and properly "explains" or "manifests," or whether a univocal character of "sign" can be abstracted from formal and instrumental sign, it must be held that no genus of explanation or manifestation belongs to the Mode of Knowing unless, in its composite sense, its object necessarily ceases to be unknown; which a sign by convention certainly does not accomplish.

23. To Confirmation 1º: Logic regards artifice insofar as it is in concepts, not under the aspect of vitality as Psychology does, but under the aspect of a formal sign manifesting the unknown in an ordered manner; this aspect is not found in a vocal definition. To 2º: the artifice of statuary is truly and properly preserved in any kind of stone; but Logical artifice, transferred to spoken words, does not formally manifest the unknown as Logic intends, and therefore falls short of the property of Logical artifice. To 3º: Logic teaches teaching and learning, insofar as these are done by spoken words, only indirectly; for when it directs rules to concepts, Logicians easily gather from them what method and form of words they must use in handing down and learning disciplines.

24. It is objected 3º: Spoken words, insofar as capable of being directed into the artifice of Definition or Syllogism, must belong to some art as its proper object, just as they belong to Rhetoric and Poetry insofar as capable of being directed into the artifice of ornate and metrical speech. But under that aspect they do not belong to Grammar as its proper object; therefore they belong to Logic. The consequence is correct, since no other art remains to which such directability pertains. The minor is proved 1º because in Grammar there is no treatise, no rule concerning the artifice of Definition or

Syllogism, just as neither concerning Genus, Difference, Subject, Predicate, Middle, and major and minor Extremes, insofar as these are considered in spoken words by writers of *Summulae*. 2º Because if a Grammarian is asked whether this speech, "Rational animal," is a definition of man and consists of genus and difference, he will say that these things do not belong to him; whereas the Dialectician will immediately answer as though from his proper office. 3º One who expressed the mental definition of man by these spoken words, "Rational animals," would posit the artifice of a vocal definition, and yet would not posit grammatical artifice; therefore one artifice differs from the other. The converse is also evident, for one who defined man thus, "A certain living thing whose property it is to sense and reason," would sin against Logic but not Grammar. 4º Aristotle, when for the use of Dialectic he defines Name, Verb, and Speech, does not use grammatical definitions but others very different.

25. I answer: Grammar can be considered in two ways. 1º Insofar as it is in the pure Grammarian, in which sense it is general Grammar and detached from things, and hands down only general rules of congruous speech without solecism and barbarism. 2º Insofar as it is in the Logician, in which sense it is particular Grammar, or Grammar particularly contracted to Logical matter and applied to explaining Logical objects; and thus it hands down particular rules for vocally imitating a mental syllogism, definition, etc. Moreover, Grammar insofar as it exists in the Theologian, Physicist, Geometer, indeed in the mechanical craftsman, uses words uncommon in ordinary speech and unknown to the pure Grammarian. Cicero gives a fine passage on this matter in *De Finibus* III, shortly after the beginning, where among other things he adds: "Even Agriculture, which is remote from every more polished elegance, has nevertheless designated by new names those things with which it is concerned." If, I say, Grammar insofar as it serves these sciences and arts speaks differently from the pure Grammarian, at least by diversity of names, what wonder if the same Grammar, insofar as it is in the Logician, prescribes something special beyond the general rules? Therefore:

26. To the objection I deny the minor. To proof 1º: I grant all this concerning general Grammar, but deny it concerning Grammar particularly applied to Logical matter; for thus it uses names unknown to the pure Grammarian and adds rules suited for vocally imitating Logical artifacts, which it learns from Logic dictating indirectly, according to nn. 12 and 13. To 2º: the pure Grammarian will indeed hesitate at questions of this kind and will not answer aptly unless imbued with Logic. But this proves only that such an artifice of spoken words belongs to Grammar insofar as it exists in

the Logician; this reduplication denotes that the teaching of Logic is required, not directly but indirectly, in order that Grammar may hand down rules for vocal definition. And the objection is met 1º because if the pure Logician is asked whether this vocal speech, "A being through itself," is an apt definition of Substance, he will remain mute or refer the matter to the Metaphysician; does Metaphysics therefore regard spoken words or the artifice of definition as its object? 2º Because if a pure Grammarian is presented with a verbal description of a building, for example Solomon's Temple, and is asked whether it is expressed in geometric terms or with architectural propriety, he will say that it is indeed expressed without solecism but that the rest does not belong to him, whereas a Geometer or Architect would immediately answer as though from his proper office. Will the vocal description therefore be a proper object of Geometry or Architecture?

27. And chiefly: if you show to a painter completely ignorant of military matters a painting of a drawn-up Army and ask him whether the legions, squadrons, cohorts, tribunes, centurions, etc., are rightly represented and placed in the panel, he will say that he does not know and will not even understand the terms. But if you ask this of a soldier, or a painter skilled in military affairs, he will immediately answer as though from his proper office. Would you therefore say that a painting of this kind is a proper object not of Painting but of Military art? Rather one must say that general Painting determines nothing concerning a painting of an army in particular, but insofar as particularly applied to military matter it hands down particular rules for that artifice, which it learns in some manner from Military art. For this art, while teaching how to draw up a true battle line, indirectly and consequently also teaches how a battle line is to be painted, if general Painting is presupposed from elsewhere. Behold, therefore, our doctrine expressed, as it were, in its own colors. See also n. 13.

28. To 3º: the same example presses. For one who painted an ordered battle line with crude figures would similarly posit military artifice and yet commit a solecism against the art of Painting; likewise one who arranged a battle line with excellent figures but without observing military order would sin against Military art and not against Painting. Therefore that concordance, "Rational animals," in fact does not possess Logical artifice, because it possesses neither the artifice directly intended by Logic, which alone is mental, nor the artifice indirectly regulated by Logic. For the latter is the very grammatical artifice insofar as applied to congruously expressing the mental artifacts of Logic; and this kind of artifice is then absent. One who speaks in this way is nevertheless customarily called a bad Grammarian

and a good Logician, namely mentally, because although in reality he speaks neither grammatically nor logically, he gives indications that he conceives the objects themselves well Logically. The other definition, "A certain living thing," etc., although it does not sin against general Grammar, nevertheless sins against particular Grammar, or Grammar particularly applied to Logical matter; for this must follow the direction of Logic and employ no other spoken words except those which perfectly imitate, in clarity, brevity, etc., the Logically disposed concepts as their archetype, as is again evident in the example of painting. To 4º: Perhaps definitions of this sort were in use among Grammarians in Aristotle's time. Moreover, even if they do not belong to general Grammar, they belong to it insofar as it serves the Logician.

29. It is objected 4º: a mental definition is of itself indifferent to being explained by merely grammatical, rhetorical, metrical, or dialectical spoken words. Therefore, for this indifference to be contracted and determined toward dialectical spoken words rather than others, a new direction of Logic is required beyond that which is bestowed upon concepts. Confirmation: Rhetoric or Poetry directly and formally orders spoken words because it determines the indifference of the intellect toward rhetorical or poetic spoken words rather than others. But Logic also determines the indifference of the intellect so that it may use spoken words disposed by a dialectical method, for Logic alone dictates rules in the *Summulae* so that spoken words be disposed according to the manner of Syllogism, Definition, etc., and exhibit dialectical form rather than rhetorical or poetic. I answer 1º by an example: for a drawn-up battle line is likewise indifferent to being expressed by a painter or historian with or without military order, position, and proportion of words or images. Therefore a new proper direction of military art, beyond the direction of the true army, will be concerned with the painting or history.

30. I answer 2º to the objection by denying the consequence. For that indifference is determined through particular Grammar insofar as it imitates Logic and is its disciple, without another direction of Logic intervening besides that bestowed upon concepts. Once this direction is posited, Grammar forms for itself, according to its norm as an archetype, the rules of the vocal artifice which is called dialectical, and selects spoken words suited to it. Hence two Faculties concur in determining such indifference: Logic indirectly, Grammar directly, as is abundantly evident from the foregoing. To the Confirmation: that causal proposition is true, not because Rhetoric or Poetry determines indifference in any manner whatever, but because it determines it alone and by design; for it has no other object which it first or

more principally directs, nor does Logic contribute anything to ornament or meter. But Logic does not by design determine toward spoken words formed in dialectical fashion, but only consequently and indirectly, almost as Military art determines that a battle line be rightly painted. Logic, insofar as it is intent upon its object, dictates rules of the *Summulae* as terminated at spoken words only indirectly, although from n. 17 and following it also dictates them directly insofar as disposed for the convenience of beginners, in which sense it has Grammar intermixed with it.

31. It is replied: even metrical or rhetorical artifice is formed in spoken words according to the norm of a similar mental artifice, and nevertheless is regarded formally by Rhetoric or Poetry; therefore likewise the dialectical artifice of spoken words, although formed according to the mental exemplar, is formally regarded by Logic. I answer 1º by denying the major, for in concepts of things there is no meter at all, nor do at least most of the forms which Rhetoricians call tropes and figures of words have a place there. Only the substance of the thought is therefore pre-conceived, which is afterward clothed with the ornament of spoken words or the harmony of verse. But if the discussion concerns concepts terminated at spoken words, they indeed precontain rhetorical and poetic ornament, but not in being, rather in representing and as pure signs of vocal ornament, in which way the mental idea of a building contains the artifice of the house. In this sense a concept also belongs to Rhetoric and every external art, not as an object first and essentially intended but as a way and prior disposition toward the true artifice. But all things stand differently in Logic, as will be clear to anyone who considers the matter. I answer 2º, granting the major and minor, and deny the consequence: because, as we noted above from Aristotle, the Logician is for himself, whereas the Rhetorician, as also the Poet, is for others. Hence it is no wonder if one rather than the other formally considers vocal artifice.

32. It is objected 5º: Moral Philosophy, besides acts of the will, directly regards external actions and even spoken words insofar as they constitute honest speech conformable to right reason; therefore similarly Logic, etc. Confirmation 1º: Medicine directly considers the pulse and other external signs of health or disease; likewise Theology directly considers the Sacraments, which are signs of grace, and the sacrifice of the Mass, by which the bloody sacrifice of Christ the Lord is signified. Therefore Logic also will directly regard vocal artifice, which is a sign of mental artifice. Confirmation 2º: Spoken words are truly parts of the subject of Logic; but Logic, like every science, directly treats all parts of its subject; therefore, etc. The major is proved from St. Thomas (*Opusculum* 70, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3), who says: "The parts

of the subject are all those things whose cognition is required for cognition of the subject, since all such things are treated in the science only insofar as they have an order to the subject." But cognition of spoken words insofar as they signify or delimit instruments of knowing is required for cognition of the subject of Logic, which is the intellectual Mode of Knowing. Therefore, etc.

33. I answer the objection by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. The disparity lies in this, that Ethics essentially regards human actions insofar as they are morally conformable to right Reason, which conformity is properly found even in external acts. But Logic regards its object under the aspect of formally manifesting the unknown, which manifestation does not properly belong to spoken words. Add that the Logician is for himself, whereas the Moral Philosopher is for himself and for others; therefore Ethics is divided into Monastic, Economic, and Political. To Confirmation 1º, let the same answer stand with respect to Theology. For Theology considers such objects not precisely because they are signs of another object, but because in themselves they properly participate in the character of the revelable object, or of what can be known from principles of Faith, under which Theology tends. This does not occur in our case.

34. But the pulse and other things indicating disease and health are not the formal object of Medicine, since they participate only analogically in the character of healthy or healable under which it tends. Nevertheless they are a material object directly and by design considered by Medicine, not precisely because they are signs of the formal object, for otherwise Medicine and every art or science would directly consider every sign whatever of its formal object, namely concepts, spoken words, writings, pictures, etc., but from two other causes. 1º Because they are signs which, from the proper need of the Medical art already acquired, must necessarily be previously known in order that it may accomplish its work of healing a man here and now without error. 2º Because consideration of such signs requires new rules beyond those which immediately regard internal health, and there is no other instrumental Faculty which gathers these new rules from the indirect teaching of Medicine. It is not so in our case. For once Logic is acquired, in order to direct its mental work without error it does not need knowledge of spoken words. Even if the Logician forgot every language, he could still reason without error concerning objects which he sees with his eyes. Likewise, dialectical vocal artifice either does not need new rules beyond those immediately concerned with the mental, once Grammar is presupposed, or, if it still needs rules, Grammar itself, as an instrumental

Faculty, by its own effort gathers and forms them for itself from the indirect teaching of Logic.

35. To Confirmation 2º I deny the major. To the proof I answer: St. Thomas speaks of those things whose cognition is required by the necessity of the science itself, as cognition of the pulse is required in Medicine, not of those whose cognition is required solely from the necessity or convenience of learners so that they may acquire the science more easily and briefly. Knowledge of spoken words in Logic is required only in this latter manner. Indeed, unless you explain St. Thomas's words in this way, you will have to number spoken words and writings among the parts of the subject of all sciences and arts. For in order that beginners reach perfect cognition of the subject of any science or art, cognition of the words by which a teacher instructs, or of the characters by which books teach, is undoubtedly required.

CHAPTER III.
Whether, and to What Extent, Things According to Physical Being Are the Object of Logic.

1. The "physical or natural being" of things is that which belongs to things independently of the consideration of the intellect, as being Heaven, Earth, Man, Stone, etc. To this is opposed intentional being, which consists in those denominations which flow from acts of the intellect into objects, as in man to be a species, in animal to be a genus. Therefore it is confessed by all that things, which are now taken as distinct from spoken words and concepts, according to physical being do not belong to Logic as its adequate formal object. Nevertheless some, with the support of our Lynce, *Lib.* 2, tract. 1, c. 4, maintain that they are an inadequate or partial formal object of Logic, against the common opinion in every School, which is also held by St. Thomas, or whoever is the Author of *Opusculum* 56, where he says: "When Logic considers the universal, it does not consider it according to the subject nature through itself; for it does not consider man insofar as man, but insofar as species, and likewise with other animals." And shortly afterward: "It is evident that the Logician does not consider the subject thing through itself."

2. I know that this Opusculum is numbered among the doubtful works of St. Thomas. But, to note this once, both it and the other opuscula which are marked as doubtful in smaller characters in Tome 17 of the Roman Edition composed by order of Pius V (cf. the short Preface before *Opusculum* 41) I shall nevertheless cite under the name of St. Thomas, because I see

them commonly cited thus both by our Authors and by Thomists. As regards the present matter, St. Thomas can also certainly be cited in *Posterior Analytics* I, lect. 20, where he says: "Logic concerns intentions of reason which extend to all things, but not in such a way that Logic itself concerns common things themselves as subjects." We therefore embrace this common opinion as true.

3. It is proved 1º: what does not identically participate in the formal reason under which a science tends is not its inadequate formal object, as is established from chapter 1; but things according to physical being do not identically participate in the formal reason under which Logic tends. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved because the formal reason under which Logic tends is some genus of artifice constructible by the intellect and pertaining to the Mode of Knowing. For this reason Logic is commonly called by all a "Rational Science, Art directive of reason, and Mode of Knowing." But it is beyond doubt that things according to physical being do not identically participate in artifice of this kind. The point is urged: Logic regards as its formal object the artifice of the Mode of Knowing, as no one denies. Therefore, if it is also to regard the physical being of things as a formal object, this must agree with that artifice in some common reason corresponding to Logic as the formal reason "under which"; for a reason of this sort abstracted from all inadequate formal objects corresponds to every science, lest it regard its objects as a bundle without unity, as induction establishes. But no common reason can be abstracted from the artifice of the Mode of Knowing and from things according to physical being except the most general reason of Being, which corresponds not to Logic but to Metaphysics. The point is urged again: direct Logic, for we always speak of this, is wholly practical, or as the Thomists hold, after the manner of practical. Therefore it formally regards only an object operable by the intellect as operable; and the physical being of things certainly is not such.

4. It is proved 2º: if Logic formally treated things sparingly and soberly, or under their chief headings, as the Adversaries say, it would also have to treat all things formally and abundantly, and investigate expressly all predicates of things; for the same reason applies to abundance and sobriety, namely that knowledge of things is necessary in order that the intellect avoid errors, which is said to be the end of Logic, or that such knowledge is useful for defining, dividing, and arguing readily. For why should the intellect through the benefit of Logic avoid errors concerning the nature of things in common more than in particular? Or why should it be more ready to reason concerning substance as such than concerning God, the Heavens, Man, and all other things? Then it follows 1º that no one will ever become a perfect

Logician unless he becomes omniscient; 2º that once Logic has been perfectly acquired all other Sciences will be superfluous; 3º that Logic will not be a special science but a crude and undigested mass of all sciences. These consequences are undoubtedly absurd, yet they seem to flow of themselves.

5. Confirmation: just as Logic is said to be exercised concerning all beings, so the Oratorical art is said to be concerned with all things, and nothing is more frequently said than that a good Orator ought to be imbued with knowledge of all sciences, arts, and human affairs. Yet Oratory does not regard the universe of things as its formal object, but only verbal ornament. Therefore Logic likewise will regard only the artifice of acts of the intellect. The same reasoning applies in both cases. For it belongs to Logic, as to Oratory, only to instruct the intellect by rules and precepts, or also by some practice concerning its proper matter, so that by reason of doctrine it may be facile and prompt in reasoning artfully or speaking ornately in any matter whatever. But to supply this matter belongs to other arts and sciences. Thus also it does not belong to the same art to provide a smoothed panel and to paint artfully upon it.

6. It is objected 1º: in the treatise on the Predicaments, which is truly Logical, things are directly and formally treated according to physical being, namely Substance, Quantity, Quality, etc. I answer 1º: in the judgment of many that treatise is not Logical but Metaphysical, although many insert it into Logic, both so that Metaphysics may have less labor and so that some matter may be proposed as a specimen for the exercise of Dialectic; no otherwise than problems from various matters not belonging to Rhetoric are customarily proposed to candidates of Rhetoric for the sake of exercise.

7. I answer 2º from the Excellent Doctor (*Metaphysics*, disp. 39, at the beginning). The treatise on the Predicaments is Logical in such a way that at the same time, according to a higher and more exact reason, it is Metaphysical. For Metaphysics directly and from its proper institution divides the Predicaments in order to inquire into the proper reasons and essences of things. Logic, however, treats things in that division of places, not in order to declare their natures, but only in order to coordinate concepts of the mind; nor does it there formally seek anything other than how under some supreme genus the intellect can descend step by step to the individual through more and less universal concepts, which alone it consequently regards as its formal object. Knowledge of things is indeed required for this coordination of concepts, but Metaphysics supplies it and claims the principal role in that treatise. Read the Excellent Doctor (loc. cit.; and disp. 1, sect. 4, nn. 28, 29).

8. It is objected 2º: Logic tends toward the instruction of the intellect; but not only rules conduce to this end, but also the exposition of things and their distribution into various classes, so that the intellect may reason artfully upon them. Confirmation 1º: some, at least general, knowledge of things according to themselves is necessary in order that Logic may explain and execute its rules; therefore Logic cannot fail in virtue of its proper office to consider things at least in genus. Confirmation 2º: Logic formally considers the truth of concepts, which partially consists in the physical being of things to which acts of the intellect are conformed. Likewise, this proposition, "This man is living," with Peter designated, is an object of Logic insofar as signifying Peter; but insofar as it thus signifies him it includes Peter on the side of the subject. For the term "This man," of itself indifferent to signifying any man, is completed and determined by Peter's presence so as to signify him rather than another. Confirmation 3º: Some precepts of Logic are verified of things according to physical being, for example, "The Divided Whole must contain more than each single dividing Member."

9. I answer: Logic tends toward the instruction of the intellect through rules for ordering concepts, not through the showing of things. Logic either presupposes this showing or begs it from other sciences, just as Grammar and Rhetoric do. Therefore Aristotle in the *Analytics*, in order to explain the precepts of Logic, uses the letters A, B, C in place of things, from which he commonly constructs syllogisms; by which he sufficiently indicates that the showing of things does not belong to Logic. Certainly the intellect would be better instructed by an exact investigation of all things than by a general and sober knowledge; and nevertheless according to the Adversaries Logic does not investigate the natures of all things.

10. To Confirmation 1º: Not everything which conduces or is necessary for understanding and explaining an art must be a proper object of that same art; otherwise all sciences and arts would be confused, since all, as Philo said, "require service from one another and stand by mutual assistance." It is necessary, I grant, in order that the precepts of Logic be understood, to understand at least as to "what the name means," as they say, what "essence, identity, being," and other things are. But Logic does not hand down knowledge of these terms; it presupposes it as obvious and commonly known, or as to be sought from Dictionaries, or even borrowed from other Faculties. Thus, in order that a Grammarian know how to distinguish a masculine noun from a feminine, he must know what a male is and what a female is; yet Grammar does not teach this. Nor does Architecture, but presupposes as otherwise known, what a stone is and what wood is.

11. To 2º: Logic at most directly considers the formal truth of concepts, that is, their conformity with things, insofar as it can be directed by art. But this conformity is not capable of being directed according to all its constituents, but only according to what is rectifiable, namely the concept. For Logic does not direct that a lion be an animal; but, presupposing from elsewhere that it is, or that it is apprehended to be so, it directs that a judgment conformable to this object rather than a deformable one be elicited. Thus, to meet the objection, Painting intends the likeness of images with things without therefore regarding the things themselves as its formal object, although that likeness is also constituted from the things themselves. For Painting does not direct that Caesar, for example, have an elongated nose; but, on the supposition that he does, it directs that his image also be long-nosed. Add that perhaps Logic does not regard the truth of concepts as its proximate and intrinsic end, but artifice, which can also be found in false matter. Therefore according to St. Thomas (*Posterior Analytics* I, lect. 22), a syllogism which errs not in form but in matter is truly a syllogism. The subtlety concerning the term "This man" does not apply to concepts, which of themselves signify one thing rather than another, nor is their representation completed by the object. That it applies to a vocal term, what is that to us?

12. To 3º: The Logical sense of that precept and similar ones is that the dividing concept should assume a Whole containing more than the individual things represented as Members. Therefore such a precept does not formally regard the physical Whole but its mental division. This is plainly evident, for that rule formally regards what it commands to be done and toward which it directs. But it neither commands nor directs that the Whole in its physical being be greater than the individual parts, for this direction would undoubtedly be vain and ridiculous. Rather, it directs that the mental division designate as parts those which truly are smaller than the Whole. Therefore, etc. Nor does it obstruct this that the precept as stated is verified of a physical thing. For an act of Faith also is verified of the punishments of Hell, which nevertheless it does not regard as its formal object. But we shall again treat this objection below in chapter 6, where we shall also dissolve other arguments which could be brought here.

13. It is objected 3º: according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, c. 2, and St. Thomas there, lect., as also *Posterior Analytics* I, lect. 20, Dialectic is concerned with all beings and disputes about all things. I answer: This is true of accessory Dialectic in use, which we explained in disp. 1, c. 2, from n. 23; not of teaching Logic, which is truly Logic. Although even the latter can be said to be concerned with all beings remotely, mediately, and in potency,

insofar as it hands down rules of mental artifice indifferently applicable to cognizing all beings. See St. Thomas in the places cited in the objection.

14. It is objected 4º: Logic must by design consider the causes and principles of its object, for every science must cognize a thing through its cause, as Aristotle often teaches. But things according to physical being are true causes of concepts, which Logic regards as its object. Therefore, etc. The minor is established because things taken in this manner are motive objects of cognitions, and, as they say, "Knowledge is born from the object and the power." The objection proves that Logic by design treats the Soul, the Intellect, Habits, and impressed Species, which no one has said. Furthermore I answer: when it is said that it is proper to a science to cognize a thing through its cause, the discussion does not concern extrinsic efficient causes, at least in practical sciences; otherwise Ethics and Medicine would by design treat the Divine and human nature. The discussion therefore concerns causes, that is, *a priori* reasons through which a science must demonstrate conclusions concerning its object as such. These reasons are partly general self-evident principles, as in Logic, "To be said of all," etc.; partly definitions of the Subject and its parts, which are taken in demonstration as principles. "In demonstrations," St. Thomas says, "one always proceeds from definitions" (ibid.). In this sense Logic considers the causes of mental artifice without therefore having to consider the physical being of things.

15. But one may ask whether things according to physical being are at least a material object of Logic. I answer: They are. The reason is that the material object of a science is that which is attained by its acts for the sake of the formal object. But things according to physical being are indeed attained through acts of Logic for the sake of prescribing intellectual artifice. For this act, for example, "Definition is Speech explaining the essence of a thing," so teaches the artifice of Definition that for its sake it attains the "thing" and its "essence," of which it makes mention. The Thomists add that every being artfully cognizable according to its physical or intrinsic being is a proper and primary material object of Logic, which they call "denominable," because it receives in itself the Logical form of reason by which it is denominated artfully disposed; no otherwise than for the same reason stones and wood are the proper and primary material object of Architecture, or denominable. Whether or to what extent this is true depends upon matters to be disputed below. Meanwhile we grant only that things according to physical being can be called a material object of Logic, attained under a certain general reason remotely or mediately, or even indirectly or

obliquely; which is the doctrine of the Excellent Doctor, *Metaphysics*, disp. 1, sect. 4, n. 29.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether the Formal Object of Logic Is a Being of Reason?

We approach a controversy than which none is more difficult in the prolegomena, or more famous for the contention of minds. To settle it briefly and clearly is exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, I shall attempt this to the best of my ability.

§ 1. Terms Explained, the Opinions of Authors Are Set Forth.

1. In order that the ancient novelty of the terms of this controversy may become clear to beginners, I note several things beforehand. 1º An act of the human intellect is customarily called an "intention of reason," but in such a way that direct cognition representing an object according to physical being is called a "first intention," whereas reflexive cognition representing an object as already previously known, or according to being derived from the intellect, is called a "second intention." Hence names signifying things as they are first and directly conceived are called "names of first intention," such as "man, animal, sun, etc." Those, however, which signify things as they are known secondly and reflexively, are called "names of second intention," that is, corresponding to a second intention of the intellect, such as "universal, genus, species, subject, predicate, etc." But because the objects of cognitions are also customarily called by the names of those cognitions, both first and second intention are therefore divided into "formal" and "objective." For just as a mental judgment is called a formal proposition, and the object which it represents an objective proposition, so cognition itself is called formal intention, and the object of cognition objective intention. First objective intention, therefore, is that object which terminates the first formal intention; what is attained by the second formal intention is second objective intention.

2. For example, this cognition, "animal," is first formal intention, because it is borne directly toward the physical entity of animal in itself; whereas this physical entity of animal is first objective intention, or a thing taken first intentionally, or according to physical being. But if the intellect reflects upon the nature of animal as thus known, it will find that, by force of the prior cognition, it has been prescinded and abstracted from rational and irrational, that is, known and expressed without mention of those

differences, for this is what it is "to be prescinded and abstracted." Then, if it considers more attentively, it will find that the nature thus abstracted remains in a certain way one and can be uniformly predicated of man and of any brute; this unity and predicability constitute the logical universal and genus. The mind, therefore, when reflecting in this way, forms these concepts: "abstract animal, one, predicable of many, universal, genus"; all of which are reflexive cognitions and second formal intentions. The object corresponding to these concepts is that being which the mind finds to have been bestowed upon animal by the first cognition, namely, abstract being, universal being, being a genus; and this being is called second objective intention, and also a thing according to intentional being, a thing taken secondly intentionally, or "secondly intended." The whole doctrine of this observation is taken from St. Thomas, Opusc. 56, at the beginning; likewise Opusc. 48, c. 1, and Opusc. 42, c. 18.

3. 2º Second objective intention, taken concretely, involves two things, a subject and a form. As subject or material element it involves the thing which is first known, for example the physical nature of animal itself. As form or formal element it signifies second objective intention taken abstractly, such as is signified by these names: "universality, genericity, subjection, predication, definition, etc." This form, at least in the sense in which Logic intends it, is nothing other, according to our Authors, than direct cognition, which is called first formal intention. For according to the variety of its manner of tending, this cognition formally bestows upon the object the denominations of genus, predicate, thing defined, etc. Now a denomination is called "extrinsic" when it proceeds from a form which does not inhere in the subject but exists elsewhere, as when, from vision, cognition, or love existing in you, another is denominated "seen, known, loved." It is called "intrinsic," however, when it proceeds from a form inhering in the subject, as when you yourself are denominated "seeing, knowing," or also "white" or "hot." Second objective intention in the concrete, therefore, is an extrinsic denomination whose matter is the external object and whose form is a cognition inhering not in the object but in the intellect; that cognition, I say, which in relation to its object is first formal intention. For this same cognition, in relation to reflexive cognition, is second objective intention in the abstract, or the form of second intention in the concrete. The Thomists think very differently; to understand them, the following must be noted beforehand.

4. 3º Being is either real or a being of reason. Real being is said to be that which truly and really exists or can exist. A being of reason is said to be that which receives being from the intellect and cannot exist elsewhere. This is

taken in three ways. 1º For a being which is truly effected by reason and received in it as in a subject; such are all acts of the intellect, which are therefore called "effective and subjective beings of reason." 2º For denominations derived from an act of reason upon an object, such as being "known, defined," etc.; these are called "denominative beings of reason." 3º For a purely objective or fictitious being. This is commonly defined as "that which has objective being only in the intellect," that is, which has no real being, either possible or existing, positive or negative, but is a mere fiction which the intellect sets before itself as though it were a being. The present controversy concerns this being of reason, for a being of reason in the first and second acceptions is truly a real being and is made, not feigned, by reason, although it is customarily opposed to real being taken for a being of nature which exists outside the soul.

5. Moreover, this specter of being, when feigned without foundation, is called a "being of reasoning reason," such as is expressed in these concepts: "goat-stag, chimera, rational horse." It is called a "being of reason reasoned," however, when it is feigned with some foundation, either from an occasion furnished by things or rather, as others maintain, from the very weakness of the human intellect, into which fictions often creep while things are being investigated, as when animal in man is conceived as intrinsically distinct from rational on an occasion taken from the diversity of the operations of sensing and reasoning. A being of reason reasoned is customarily divided into privation, negation, and relation, because it is either uniquely or more frequently feigned by conceiving lacks as though they were positive affections of a subject or signified some little entity, or by thinking relations or dispositions where none exist. These things having been premised, we may now report the views of authors concerning the object of Logic.

6. All Thomists establish a being of reason as the adequate formal object of Logic. But it is doubtful whether all speak of a purely objective being of reason or of a subjective or denominative one whose form is cognition itself. For Fr. Hurtado, disp. 1, sect. 4, proves quite effectively that Soto and Masius, and also our authors Toledo and Rubio, whom the Thomists cite for themselves, spoke of this latter. Whatever the case, "the authors of that opinion," these are the words of the Most Illustrious Dominican Araujo (l. 3, Metaph. q. 1, art. 1, dub. appendix, de Objecto Logic.), "are divided into five modes of speaking. For some of them say that the object of Logic is a being of reason in its whole breadth, as it abstracts from privation, negation, and relation. Others, however, say that it is relation of reason alone, as it abstracts from first and second intention, etc." But we omit these and other modes, since they have now been abandoned by more recent Thomists.

There remains the celebrated Thomistic opinion which places the whole formal object of Logic in a being of reason which is produced in the matter of Logic and from its rules as a certain artificial form, which they call second intention. Yet even in the explanation of this opinion the Thomists are divided into two classes.

7. The first consists of those who comprehend acts of the intellect, insofar as they are artificial in themselves and directed by Logic, under the formal object of Logic, but in such a way that their artifice as formal is a certain being of reason resulting in them. Thus, with others, Lerma, Sanchez, and Martinez de Prado. The second consists of those who refuse to make acts of the intellect matter denominable by logical artifice, but make them matter purely directible, after the manner of the actions of an artisan by which an artifice is introduced into external matter. Hence they say that the entire artifice formally considered by Logic is a form of reason feigned in the objects themselves by acts of the intellect; this form of reason is adequately distinct from cognition and is the form constituting these concrete things: "genus, predicate, thing defined, antecedent, consequent, etc.," in which the external object is also included as denominable matter. And this form of reason they themselves call second logical intention in the abstract. Thus the more recent Thomists commonly hold, such as Dominic Lince, the College of St. Thomas of Alcalá, the Most Illustrious Palanco, Froyllan, Cardinal Aguirre, Gabriel a Conceptione, and Aguilera, although this last does not acknowledge fictitious beings of reason. Among the Scotists Merinerus follows the Thomists, and Mastrius does so in part.

8. On the contrary, almost all the Authors of the Society, with the Eximious Doctor, last disp. Metaph., at the beginning, deny that a purely objective or fictitious being of reason is the formal object of Logic. For whether Logic considers acts of the intellect as artificial, their artifice is true and real; or whether it regards second objective intentions concretely, these are extrinsic denominations whose form is real cognition, from n. 3. And although beings of reason may perhaps be mingled in the formation of logical artifacts or result from it, they are wholly disregarded by Logic, which cares for nothing except what is real in mental artifacts. Several authors outside the Society are of the same opinion, such as Aversa, Spinula, Bonae Spei, Murcia, Servera, Pontius with other Scotists, and also Mastrius insofar as he teaches that Logic considered in itself and from the nature of the thing regards real being as its formal object.

§ 2. First Conclusion.

The Artifice Intended by Logic in Acts of the Intellect Does Not Consist in a Being of Reason.

We undertake to oppose the two Thomistic opinions proposed in n. 7, since the others have fallen into disuse. Against the first stands the stated conclusion. We shall dwell on it only briefly, both because this opinion now displeases modern Thomists and because we shall treat below of the artifice of acts of the intellect. The conclusion is therefore proved: the cognition, "rational animal," prescinding by itself from every fiction, supplies everything that the rules of Logic prescribe concerning a mental definition; therefore, prescinding from a being of reason, it contains the artifice of definition intended by Logic; therefore the same must be held concerning other acts. The antecedent is proved: that cognition explains the essence of man through that in which he proximately agrees and that in which he ultimately differs from other things; and this is to explain through genus and difference, insofar as these names can be verified of acts of the intellect. It is likewise convertible with the thing defined, in the sense in which such conversion falls within an act of the intellect, namely, by representing the very same thing which the concept "man" represents. Moreover, this representation is neither prolix, deficient, nor improper. But the rules of defining prescribe nothing else, as will appear to anyone who reviews the Summulae, even those of the Thomists. Therefore, etc.

10. The point is urged 1º: that to which the definition of definition properly belongs is truly and formally a definition. But the definition of definition properly belongs to the aforesaid cognition, attending precisely to its real representation, namely, "a discourse explaining the essence of a thing." The point is urged 2º: that act has a real representation by which it is distinguished from every bad and disordered definition of man, for example from these: "rational living thing," "risible animal," which, even if one loads them with fictions, can never be made into ordered definitions. Therefore a good and ordered definition is constituted by such representation, just as an ordered painting is constituted by that order of colors by which it is distinguished from every badly painted image. The point is urged 3º: the being or relation of reason which the Adversaries call the form of the mental artifact is, first, not feigned by direct cognition. For although the latter might perhaps feign a being of reason in the object, from which we now prescind, it

certainly does not feign one in itself, otherwise it would know itself. Next, neither is it feigned by reflexive cognition; nor, if it were feigned, would it pertain to the constitution of the artifact. For reflection considering a work directly made does not make but finds the rectitude and conformity of the work with the rules, as is seen in a painting, a house, and every artificial work. There is therefore no source from which a being of reason can enter into the constitution of logical artifacts.

11. It may be said 1º: definition insofar as artificial is definition insofar as directed by Logic. But insofar as directed it implies a relation to the rules, which is not a real relation but a relation of reason. Yet this proves equally that the artifice of painting, a house, a ship, etc., consists in a relation of reason to rules, which is unheard of. Definition, therefore, is not regarded by Logic reduplicatively as "directed by rules," for this is an extrinsic denomination constituted by active direction or rule. It is therefore regarded as intrinsically artificial in itself, just as a house insofar as artificial is regarded by the art of building. It is insisted: a definition is not known as artificial unless it is compared with rules; but from this comparison there results a relation of reason. First, there is no reason why comparative cognition tending thus, "This work is such as the art prescribes," must feign anything. Next, let it feign as much as it pleases: comparison does not make, but presupposes, a work rightly made, as the art intends.

12. It may be said 2º, with Araujo and Prado: from the active direction of Logic there necessarily springs or arises in the directed acts a form of reason which is second intention and the ultimate form of the logical artifact. But whence is this proved? Or why does not a similar shadow spring from the active direction of painting, architecture, and every art? If it is said that otherwise an artificial act cannot depend upon or proceed from the direction of Logic, nothing is said. For that procession and dependence will be given solely by the will, attending to the rules, applying the intellect so that in defining man it elicits rather this act, "rational animal," than this one, "biped animal." In this no fiction intervenes, just as none intervenes in the wholly similar dependence of external artifacts upon the rules of art.

13. It may be said 3º: acts of the intellect according to their real tendency are actions of the artisan by which Logic constructs its artifact. But the artifice or artificial form cannot consist in actions of the artisan or of the art, but is always something distinct from them and springing from them. I press 1º: therefore, just as the actions of a painter are not denominable matter, or matter receiving in itself the artifice of painting, neither will acts of the intellect be matter denominable by logical artifice, contrary to what is now supposed. I press 2º: therefore acts of the intellect will reflect upon

themselves so as to introduce or feign an artificial form in themselves; otherwise they will not be actions of the artisan with respect to the form to which they are subject. But this consequence is extraordinary and will find no example in any other art. The doctrine of the objection, therefore, is true in productive arts, but otherwise in sciences and active arts. For in these the object formally intended is indistinct from the actions themselves really ordered, as is seen in Ethics and the art of dancing. But concerning this again below.

14. It may be said 4º from Araujo: the form of a syllogism in Barbara is its disposition in figure and mood; but this disposition is something of reason, because it places nothing in the concepts, since from the same concepts unchanged another syllogism can be constructed in another mood and figure. I press the parallel of an army arranged according to military art, whose form is an order placing nothing in the soldiers, since from the same soldiers unchanged a battle line may be arranged differently; therefore such order will be a being of reason. In our case the matter is easier. For syllogistic disposition in figure and mood consists in a certain quantity and essential quality of propositions, with the sign of inference added, as is clear from the Summulae. But this in the concepts is without doubt something real; and nothing is more false than that, with the quantity of the three propositions and the quality of affirmation or negation unchanged, a different syllogism can be constructed. Other arguments which might be brought here will be solved in what follows.

§ 3. Second Conclusion.

Second Objective Intentions, at Least Insofar as They Pertain to Logic, Do Not Consist in a Being of Reason.

15. This conclusion stands against the second and principal opinion of the Thomists, concerning which see n. 7. It is proved 1º: the denomination "known" does not consist in a being of reason; therefore neither do the denominations "genus, thing defined, enunciated, etc.," which are second objective intentions. The more recent Thomists, conceding the antecedent, deny the consequence for a reason to be rejected below. But the antecedent was denied by the older Thomists, with Araujo and Sanchez subscribing, to whom most recently M. Aguilera has joined himself. These authors formally constitute all extrinsic denominations, especially those taken from acts of the soul, by a being of reason, so that the denomination "seen," for example, with only vision and color posited, does not yet exist except "fundamentally,

causally," or "in process," until a certain being of reason supervenes as the form of that denomination, or at least as the union and application of vision to the object, which is then rendered "formally seen." Against these authors, therefore:

16. The antecedent is proved 1º: the denomination "knowing" or "seeing" does not formally consist in a being of reason, as all admit; therefore neither does the denomination "known" or "seen." The consequence is clear, because from the terms themselves, with fiction excluded, or prior to it, the denomination of the passive voice follows upon that of the active and is constituted by the same form; nor can one exist without the other, as is seen in the denominations "creating and created, conquering and conquered, offending and offended." 2º Creatures are "known" to God from eternity; but from eternity there is no being of reason, since from eternity no intellect existed except the Divine, which does not make beings of reason, even according to the Adversaries. Therefore, etc. If it is said that creatures from eternity were known fundamentally, not formally, I argue thus: either "fundamentally" denies that creatures are truly, properly, and simply known by God, or it does not.

17. If the first, then Christ as man was not truly "foreknown" by God "before the foundation of the world," contrary to the testimony of Sacred Scripture (1 Pet., c. 1). Indeed, no man or Angel will be truly "predestined" by God until this most fortunate denomination is completed in time by the shadowy form of reason; which is extraordinary. Add that in Heaven, from which fictions are absent, neither will God properly be "seen" by the Blessed, nor will they properly be "known" or "loved" by God through eternity. If the second, this alone is what we intend: the denomination "known," and other extrinsic denominations, truly, properly, and simply exist prior to beings of reason, no less than denominations proceeding from an intrinsic form. And this is for denominations to exist "formally," to be truly constituted by their proper form. What does it matter that they further provide a foundation for a being of reason? Such a fiction does not therefore constitute the denomination "truly known," but at most "fictitiously known." For it implies a contradiction that an object be rendered truly known by a fictitious cognition or one fictitiously united, just as it would be contradictory for it to be rendered truly luminous by fictitious light or by light fictitiously applied. Hence:

18. It is proved 3º: the being of reason which you feign is neither vision nor cognition, as is clear; therefore it cannot be the form of the denomination "seen" or "known," just as "luminous" or "hot" cannot be constituted by a form which is neither light nor heat, for "seen" implies

vision just as much as "luminous" implies light. Indeed, such a form of reason differs from vision as fictitious being from true being, and therefore differs more from vision than hearing does; but hearing cannot be the form constituting "seen"; therefore neither can a form of reason, a fortiori. Nor can a being of reason be an intrinsic union or application of true vision to the object: both because there is no foundation for feigning vision as torn from the eyes and transferred to the object, for example the heavens, and because the object would then be denominated not "seen" but "seeing"; for this is the formal effect of true vision intrinsically united. It is proved 4º: the being of reason itself is denominated "formally known and feigned," without a new fiction, by the feigning cognition as by a form which is indeed extrinsic and does not intrinsically inhere in the being of reason. Why, therefore, cannot real objects be similarly denominated?

19. It is proved 5º from the denomination "proximately fundamentally known," which is certainly extrinsic and yet is constituted by real cognition without fiction. Finally, it is proved by the clear testimony of St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2: "When one says 'actually understood,' two things are implied, namely, the thing which is understood, and the very fact of being understood... Therefore the nature itself, to which being understood happens, exists only in singulars; but the very fact of being understood exists in the intellect." Behold the extrinsic denomination "actually understood," that is, "formally"; for what is understood or known purely "fundamentally, causally," or "in process" is not yet understood "in act," but as it were "in potency." Behold likewise that it is constituted not by a form of reason intrinsic to the denominated thing, as the Opponents maintain, but by the form which is "the very fact of being understood," existing "in the intellect." What is said for the contrary opinion we shall touch upon below.

20. Now the consequence in n. 15 is proved against the modern Thomists, because the denominations "genus, thing defined, enunciated," and similar ones are no less formally constituted by real cognition than the denomination "known." Therefore, if the latter does not need a fictitious being of reason, neither will the former. The antecedent is proved. First, because there is no reason why an act of the intellect should denominate an object really insofar as it is cognition and not insofar as it is such a cognition, namely prescissive, definitive, enunciative; just as whiteness denominates the subject not only as color but also as such a color, namely whiteness, and an election of the will renders the object not merely willed but chosen. Indeed an act of the intellect, according to its various differences, denominates the object believed, scientifically known, opined,

apprehended, judged. Therefore, as M. Soto wisely said (q. 3, de Universal. art. 1, dub. 2), "Just as a thing is said to be known because it is objected to cognition, so it is denominated genus or species in act because it is objected to this or that cognition."

21. Secondly, because the intellect is formally denominated "defining and enunciating" by a real act, just as it is denominated "knowing" by cognition. Therefore by the same act the object will be formally denominated "defined and enunciated," just as it is denominated "known." For here the connection between denominations of the active and passive voice, discussed in n. 16, presses equally. The Thomists distinguish a twofold genus of actions of the soul. Some, they say, are purely speculative, which place nothing in the object, such as vision, absolute cognition, and love; these formally denominate both object and potency without the intervention of a being of reason. Others, however, are quasi-practical and effective, which cause some artifice in the object, such as every artificial cognition. For by such cognition Logic forms in objects the artifice of genus, definition, enunciation, and syllogism, not a real but a fictitious artifice, just as the builder's art by actions of the hands produces the real artifice of a house in external matter. In these, however, the form of the active denomination and of the passive denomination is not the same. For the intellect is indeed denominated "formally defining" by real cognition, but the object is only rendered "defined in process and in becoming," because only by a being of reason resulting from cognition is it rendered "formally defined"; and so of the other logical denominations. This is no different from the artisan, who from the action of the hand is denominated formally "building," whereas the house is not rendered formally "built" except by the artifice induced through the action. Thus also the form of "heating" and "heated" is not the same; for the one is the action of the agent, the other the heat resulting from the action. This is the entire doctrine of the more recent Thomists. They add that the names of logical artifacts, such as "genus, definition, enunciation, syllogism, etc.," truly and properly belong to objects insofar as adorned with beings of reason, but to acts of the intellect only "improperly, representatively, causally," or "in process."

22. But against this doctrine our conclusion is advanced 1º, because it is falsely said that a practical action is not the form of the passive denomination as well as of the active. First, because "built" and "heated" are constituted by the same form as "building" and "heating," namely by the action. For from the artifice is formally constituted not "built" but "building," and from heat not "heated" but "hot." Yet "building" and "hot" are not denominations of the passive voice in comparison with "building"

and "heating," as grammarians know. Secondly, because God's practical knowledge denominates creatures "practically known"; likewise the dictate of prudence, although wholly practical, denominates acts of the will "reasonable, regulated, directed." Thirdly, because the same physical production denominates the cause "producing" and the effect "produced"; and the same feigning cognition, however practical, renders the intellect "feigning" and a being of reason formally "feigned."

23. It is advanced 2º: the intellect is formally denominated "defining and enunciating" by real cognition, as you concede; therefore cognition is truly and properly definition and enunciation, and not purely representatively or in process. Thus it is contradictory for a potency to be denominated "knowing, seeing, building" except by a form which truly and properly is cognition, vision, building. 3º This act, "rational animal," at least renders the essence of man "known and represented," since it is not practical but speculative with respect to man. Therefore it renders manifest that in which man proximately agrees and that in which he differs from everything that is not man. But this is for man to be rendered "defined"; nor do the sciences seek anything else in defining.

24. It is advanced 4º: this cognition, "Man is an animal," feigns no being of reason in the object; therefore by itself it formally constitutes subject, predicate, and enunciation; therefore the same must be held of other artificial acts. The antecedent, which alone is doubtful, is proved: if it feigned anything, it would especially be an intrinsic relation and distinction between man and animal; but it does not feign this. Therefore, etc. The major premise is that of the Thomists, who think that whenever the intellect affirms, subject and predicate are necessarily objected to it as one and another, or as two extremes intrinsically and on the part of the object distinct. The minor premise is proved: that act conceives on the part of the object the identity of animal and man, for it expressly affirms it, as does every affirmative proposition according to St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 12, C.). Therefore it does not conceive on the part of the object an intrinsic distinction between animal and man. The consequence is proved, because otherwise it would conceive on the part of the object a notable chimera, namely simultaneous intrinsic identity and distinction, or intrinsic distinction and indistinction; no differently than one who conceived silver as spiritual and at the same time intrinsically corporeal.

25. Nor does the familiar doctrine of the Thomists help, namely that this act directly, signately, and speculatively conceives only the real predicates of man, whereas it conceives the being of reason exercitively, practically, and indirectly. For these words do not deny that the intrinsic distinction of the

proper object is known by that act; otherwise the act would not feign or make a being of reason, which certainly does not exist except while it is actually known (Colleg. S. Thom. q. 2, Logic, n. 92). Therefore at the same time the distinction and indistinction of animal and man are actually known and objected to the intellect. But this is always a chimerical object, no less even if the same cognition speculatively conceives an Angel as spiritual and at the same time practically as corporeal, or man signately as rational and exercitively as irrational.

26. The point is urged: that act, if it feigns what the Thomists maintain, is necessarily false. The absurd consequence is proved. First from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1: "When it is said that the intellect is false because it understands a thing otherwise than it is, this is true if 'otherwise' is referred to the thing understood; for then the intellect is false when it understands the thing to be otherwise than it is." But an act feigning man as distinct from animal understands the thing otherwise than it is, in such a way that "otherwise" is referred to the thing understood, since that distinction and every logical being of reason, according to the Thomists, stands on the part of the object and of the thing understood. Therefore such an act necessarily becomes false. Secondly, because an animal intrinsically distinct from man is falsely affirmed of man. It may be said, with Palanco and the College of St. Thomas (q. 1, n. 130, in Edition 5), that the mental enunciation is not false because, although it conceives the thing otherwise than it is by feigning a being of reason, it does not feign it "indicatively and assertively," but "purely apprehensively." Yet this escape is effectively opposed.

27. 1º Because according to St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 17, a. 3, C., falsity can occur not only in judgment but also in apprehension, when objects are joined which cannot be joined, as if one were to conceive thus, "rational quadruped animal." Therefore, even if distinction is joined to identity purely apprehensively, the act will become false. 2º If someone affirms animal of a man whom he apprehends as identified with a horse, he will judge falsely; likewise if he affirms that God, whom he apprehends as finite, is infinite, because he affirms a real predicate of a chimerical God or man. But man is likewise apprehended as chimerical when apprehended as intrinsically distinct from animal, since this distinction is no less repugnant to him than identity with a horse. Therefore animal is not truly affirmed of man thus apprehended.

28. 3º A mental enunciation, if it knows a being of reason, must know it judicatively. This is proved: an enunciation knows a being of reason insofar as it is formally a judgment and the second operation of the intellect

contradistinguished from pure apprehension. But an enunciation taken thus tends judicatively and not purely apprehensively. Therefore, etc. The minor premise seems evident, for a purely apprehensive tendency does not formally distinguish the second operation from the first, or judgment from apprehension. The major premise is proved: according to you an enunciation knows a being of reason insofar as it forms a subject and predicate by distinguishing and relating them, or insofar as it "says one of another." But an enunciation insofar as it does this is most formally a judgment and the second operation of the mind as such. Therefore insofar as it is such, insofar as it is distinguished by its proper character from pure apprehension, it knows a being of reason.

29. Otherwise: a mental enunciation either knows a being of reason according to its judicative tendency or it does not. If the first, then the being of reason is known judicatively, just as that is known apprehensively which is known according to an apprehensive tendency. If the second, then, since the judicative tendency is the formation of subject and predicate, as is evident, this formation feigns nothing, and therefore subject and predicate in the being of such things are constituted by no fiction. Again otherwise: according to you judgment, insofar as judicatively knowing, feigns nothing; but insofar as judicatively knowing, it is formally judgment and the second operation of the mind. Therefore insofar as it is judgment and the second operation it feigns nothing. But judgment and the second operation of the mind as such are directible by Logic, as you concede. Therefore insofar as feigning nothing they are directible by Logic, which is what we maintain and what you strenuously deny. Add that judgment as posited by the Thomists renders this sense: "Man distinct from animal is animal indistinct from man," where beyond doubt the distinction of animal from man, which is a being of reason, is judicatively known.

30. Finally, according to the doctrine of the Thomists (Colleg. S. Thom. q. 1, § n. 5, 126 and 129), no possible mental proposition exists which does not practically feign and know in the object a being of reason. Hence it follows that this act of Faith, "God is holy," feigns a distinction and intrinsic relation between God and His holiness. But that this is false is clear: 1º because otherwise God would be the special Author of that fiction, since it results from and essentially depends upon the habit of Faith, of which God is the special Author. 2º Because an act of Faith attains nothing except as revealed by the First Truth, which that fiction certainly is not. 3º Because for a similar reason it would absurdly be said that some malice necessarily results from an act of Charity; for fiction is as opposed to truth as malice is to goodness. St. Thomas plainly confirms these things (*Summa Theologiae* II-

II, q. 1, n. 3) in these words: "The formal aspect of the object of Faith is the First Truth; hence nothing can fall under Faith except insofar as it stands under the First Truth, under which no falsehood can stand, just as non-being cannot stand under being, nor evil under goodness." Add that all propositions of Sacred Scripture and all those formed by Christ the Lord which are attributed to the Word would have to be defiled with fictions.

§ 4. Third Conclusion.

A Being of Reason Must Be Absolutely Rejected from the Formal Object of Logic.

31. It is proved 1º by the authority of St. Thomas in Proem. Ethic., or lect. 1, where, distinguishing the diverse orders of objects, he teaches that there corresponds to Logic as object "the order which reason by considering makes in its own act, for example when it orders its concepts to one another"; just as there corresponds to moral philosophy "the order which reason by considering makes in the operations of the will"; and to the mechanical arts "the order which reason by considering makes in external things of which it is itself the cause, as in a chest and a house"; and to natural philosophy "the order of natural things which reason does not make but only considers." He adds that "according to these diverse orders there are diverse sciences." Hence he plainly speaks of the order which is the formal and specifying object, for this alone diversifies sciences; which is also clear in the order assigned to Physics, Ethics, and mechanical art.

32. Now thus: therefore, according to St. Thomas, the formal object of Logic is the order which reason makes in its "own act," namely "when it orders its concepts to one another." But modern Thomists posit as the formal object of Logic an order, not which reason makes in its own act, but which it feigns in the object; not by which it orders its concepts, but by which it orders its objects to one another. Again: therefore the order regarded by Logic is not fictitious but real. First, because reason "makes" it, not "feigns" it. Secondly, because modern Thomists do not acknowledge in acts of the intellect themselves a being of reason by which they are ordered to one another, but only in the objects. Most of all, because St. Thomas says that the order of Logic is of the same character as the order of Ethics and mechanical art, as is clear from those words, "which reason by considering makes." But the order of the parts of a chest or house is certainly not fictitious but real. Hence one may rightly wonder that the Thomists cite this passage of St. Thomas for themselves because of the words "by considering

makes," as though St. Thomas did not use the same phrase concerning the order of a chest or house, or as though reason could not "by considering make" a true and real order whenever it considers a work of art as makeable and preconceives its idea, through which it afterwards makes the ordered work, not by physically influencing but "by considering," that is, directively, ideatively, or exemplarily.

33. It is proved 2º: the intention of universality which Logic regards as formal is not a purely objective being of reason; therefore neither are the other parts of the object of Logic. The consequence is legitimate among Thomists, who nowhere see beings of reason more clearly than in universals. The antecedent is proved by the express testimonies of St. Thomas. For in Opusc. 55 he distinguishes "a twofold being of the universal: one according as it is in things, another according as it is in the soul. And with respect to that being which is of reason, it has the character of predicable; but with respect to the other being, it is a certain nature and is not a universal in act but in potency." Ask now of St. Thomas what "that being" is which "is of reason" and "is in the soul," for in it, according to all, universality or the intention of universality is situated. The universal, says the Angelic Doctor, "is in the soul according to its likeness and species." He adds: "Universality itself is in the soul and in no way in things." Below: "Whether the universal is substance or accident, it must be said that in comparison with the soul it is an accident and a certain disposition in the soul, and is one of the individuals of sciences or formations." I subsume: but a being of reason is not the likeness and species of the object; nor is it in the soul in such a way that it is "in no way" in things, since rather it is feigned to *inesse* in things as an artifice in its proper matter; nor again is it an accident, or a certain disposition in the soul, or one of the individuals of sciences. For these are proper lineaments of real cognition. Therefore, etc.

34. Hear things clearer still, if possible. In Opusc. 56 St. Thomas teaches that prescissive "cognition makes the universal to be a universal in act and is something formal in the universal." Therefore the form of the universal in act is not a mere being of reason. He continues: "Speaking of the universal insofar as universal, it is only in the soul and is an accident." Therefore it is not a fiction standing on the part of the object and distinct from every real being. He adds: "One thing must be noted, that when it is said that a thing subject to a second intention is predicated, it is not to be understood that the thing is so subject to the intention that the intention is in it as an accident in a subject, just as the subject of a science is not called subject in this way, so that the science is in it as in a subject; rather it is in it as in an object. For science is not in the knowable thing but in the knower. Hence,

properly speaking, it is not called the subject but the object of science. And similarly the thing subject to that intention is not properly called subject but object."

35. Apply, if you can, this doctrine to a purely objective being of reason which you feign to be in the thing as the artifice of a statue is in stone. Is not this second intention described by St. Thomas rather evidently a real cognition, which is not in the object but in the knower as in its proper subject? If one still doubts, hear St. Thomas in the same place: "An intention of this kind is in the soul and is something singular; this is because everything is received in another according to the mode of the receiver... Since, therefore, the soul is singular, it follows that whatever is received in the soul is received singularly and is singular with respect to it." Below: "The intention which is in the soul is immaterial, and it must be in it according to its mode, as was said above." Therefore the intention of universality is a being of reason in such a way that it is received in the soul as in a subject and therefore is a spiritual and singular being. Why, then, are the Thomists so indignant that we say the being of reason posited by St. Thomas as the object of Logic is not "purely objective" but "subjective"? See other things in both Opuscula; for each is entirely opposed to the Thomists, as also Opusc. 49, and 48, cc. 1, 2, and others.

36. But lest someone perhaps distrust these Opuscula as uncertain, I note that very consonant doctrine is handed down by the Angelic Doctor in *De ente et essentia*, c. 4; likewise q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 6, C., where among other things he teaches that the intellect does not otherwise know genus, species, and similar intentions except insofar as "it reflects upon itself" and "understands things to be understood," and there corresponds to it as object "only the thing understood insofar as such." See also *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2; and In I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3, C., where 2º "with respect to the first," after teaching that the "formal aspect" of a thing is "the very definition of the thing," which certainly includes the intention of genus and difference, he notes that the "formal aspect," or "intention signified by the name of formal aspect," is not "in the thing outside the soul," but is in the soul "as in a subject." See to the end of the article, from which many things can be noted against the doctrine of the Thomists.

37. It is proved 3º: Logic was invented so that the intellect "may proceed in the very act of reason in an ordered manner and without error" (St. Thomas, I Poster. lect. 1); and therefore "it belongs to logical consideration that through correct reasoning one arrive at true cognition of the thing, and by avoiding false reasoning avoid the error of falsity" (Opusc. 39, de fallac., at the beginning). Therefore Logic does not formally intend that the intellect

feign beings of reason. The consequence is proved, because to feign is not to proceed in the very act of reason in an ordered manner and without error, but rather to conceive inordinately, to be deceived, to err, and to be contrary to truth. This is clear, for to feign is to understand the thing otherwise than it is, as you admit. But according to St. Augustine (l. 83, qq. q. 32), "Whoever understands any thing otherwise than that thing is, is deceived, and all who are deceived do not understand that in which they are deceived." St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 7, C.) explains this passage of the otherness which is conceived "on the part of the thing understood." "If anyone," he says, "were to understand it otherwise than it is, he would be deceived and would not understand, as Augustine argues." The Angelic Doctor adds (ibid., ad 2): "The truth of the intellect consists in this, that the thing be understood to be as it is." If, therefore, Logic teaches one to conceive a thing not as it is but otherwise than it is, with otherness standing on the part of the object, as the Thomists maintain, will it not be more the teacher of error than of truth?

38. They say: to feign with a foundation is not to err; rather, to err is to feign gratuitously and without foundation. Against this 1º: to feign with a foundation is to understand the thing otherwise than it is, as you concede; but "whoever understands any thing otherwise than that thing is, is deceived," as Augustine just said. Therefore to feign with a foundation is to be deceived and to err. Against this 2º: a fiction is said to be with a foundation when the object invites or furnishes an occasion for feigning. But this occasion does not remove error. Thus assertively or judicatively to know the thing otherwise than it is, even with great foundation or occasion, is truly to be deceived and to err. Thus he truly errs who, going to Rome, leaves the right road on the testimony of a grave man. Thus likewise one who sins under vehement temptation truly sins. Hence, just as moral philosophy neither intends nor approves sin mingled with acts of the will, although committed with great occasion, so neither does Logic intend or approve fiction, however well founded. For Logic regards the rectitude of acts of reason just as Ethics regards the rectitude of acts of the will, as St. Thomas teaches in Proem. Ethic. and often elsewhere.

39. The point is urged: Logic formally intends instruments of knowing and attaining truth; but fictions by which a thing is conceived otherwise than it is cannot be instruments of science or truth, which consists in conceiving the thing as it is, just as darkness cannot be an instrument of light, nor vices of virtue, nor diseases of health. Therefore, etc. They say that fictions, because of the imperfection of the human mind, are useful and necessary for knowing rightly, just as glass spectacles, which represent letters and other

objects as larger than they are in themselves, help weak sight to see better. Against this: spectacles which represent as double what is one, or as one what is double, or invert the figure by representing the letter A as B, or the artifice of a house where none exists, are beyond doubt instruments of error, not of seeing better. But such are your beings of reason, when in a genus they present as intrinsically one what is in itself multiple; in an enunciation subject and predicate as intrinsically two although in reality they are one and the same; and in other objects the artifice of definition, syllogism, etc., which in reality is not there. Therefore they are not instruments of right cognition but of deception and error.

40. Indeed, that a man through glass spectacles see an object as large and apprehend it thus cannot be a necessary or useful condition for the man to see that the object is small and judge it so. Therefore, that the mind through fictitious spectacles apprehend man as distinct from animal cannot be a useful condition for the mind to judge that man is animal, or is indistinct from animal; for distinction is no less opposed to indistinction than smallness to largeness. How glass spectacles represent an object to sight otherwise than it is may be explained by the Thomists, who deny that beings of reason are made by the senses; and certainly no one will say that they are made by spectacles. As far as we are concerned, that otherness causes no difficulty. For glass which magnifies objects does not conduce to a correct judgment about magnitude, but only about figure, in which no otherness is represented.

41. It is proved 4º: the artifice of demonstration is not a being of reason; therefore neither is the artifice of other logical artifacts. The antecedent is proved: the artifice of demonstration causes science, as all teach with Aristotle; but a being of reason does not cause science, otherwise a true and real effect would depend upon a cause which neither is nor can be in the nature of things. Therefore, etc. Thomists who acknowledge the artifice of demonstration in acts of the intellect themselves say that a being of reason causes science not by way of a power, for thus only real assents cause it, but by way of condition and application. The same is said by more recent Thomists, who place demonstration properly so called only in objects adorned with a being of reason. From these, they say, science is caused not effectively but objectively, yet in such a way that in the being of reason there is no power and formal aspect of causing, even objectively, but only a required condition; no differently than in an ordered army the soldiers conquer, and in a house the stones protect from sun and cold, without the order of the battle line or the artifice of the house being the power of

conquering or protecting, but merely a condition without which the effect does not occur.

42. But, to begin with these examples, who does not see that the difficulty remains unsolved? We contend that a real effect cannot be caused by a fictitious artifice; and against us are objected victory and protection, which depend upon military and building artifice. Is the order of soldiers or the arrangement of stones a being of reason? No one doubts that any real effects can depend upon a real condition, for example upon the local application of causes. Will one infer from this that any effects whatsoever can also depend upon a fictitious application? The Carmelite Complutenses come to the rescue (disp. 1, proem. q. 2, § 4, n. 25) and suggest more suitable examples, namely, conventional signification, which, since it is a being of reason, is a necessary condition for a spoken word to cause a species and cognition of the object; indeed, Grace itself depends upon the signification of the Sacraments as upon a condition which is a being of reason. Bravo, illustrious being of reason, since you are raised to such dignity that sacramental Grace, which is our life and the pledge of eternal salvation, depends upon you. But I fear that this dignity is not sufficiently secure. For those examples are denied by our Authors, and rightly. Baptism causes Grace, and the word "bread" excites cognition of its object, even if no one then thinks of a being of reason; but this being does not exist unless it is thought.

43. Moreover, the doctrine of the solution is opposed. First, because under no title can a being of reason be a condition required for real assents to cause science. For a scientific conclusion requires nothing except that the intellect be convinced of the identity of the extremes with the middle; but it is convinced by the very evidence of the premises, which by itself is applied to the intellect and supplies its formal effect. Therefore no being of reason is required either as power or as application of power. Next, neither can a being of reason posited on the part of the object be a condition required for science, for example Physics. First, from what has been said above: science is acquired by knowing the thing as it is. How, then, will a condition which figures the thing otherwise than it is be necessary for this? Or how will an objective distinction of subject and predicate render knowable the indistinction or identity of each? Secondly, because it would follow that the object of Physics and of every science is constituted in the being of proximately knowable by a being of reason, just as a battle line is constituted by the order of soldiers in the being of proximately capable of conquering. Hence, just as the order of soldiers stands formally in relation to victory, and victory essentially depends upon it and is truly attributed to it, so a being of

reason will stand in relation to every science. Will theologians or mathematicians agree? I omit that the heavens, for example, just as they do not need a being of reason in order to be, neither need one in order to be truly known or scientifically known. For, as St. Thomas says with Aristotle (II Metaph., c. 1; St. Thomas, ibid., lect. 2, lit. a), "Each thing, as it stands with respect to being, so also stands with respect to having truth. And this is because the being of the thing is the cause of the true estimation which the mind has of the thing."

44. I knowingly pass over other proofs found among our Authors, so that I may finally come to an end. From what has been said one will infer that, even if beings of reason necessarily creep into the objects or artifacts of Logic, they are not cared for by Logic but disregarded, not prescribed but permitted or tolerated, because these shadowy flies cannot be completely driven away. Thus other sciences, although they commonly encounter many beings of reason in their objects, as when Theology distinguishes by reason the Attributes of God, which distinction is an objective being of reason among Thomists, disregard them and intend only the real object. Thus also, if you carry a torch before your lame father so that he may return home, although he continually limps and stumbles as he walks, and although you can neither correct his legs nor remove the stones in his way, you are not therefore said to intend or will the limping and fall, which you rather regret; you intend only that your father finally reach home. Logic behaves similarly, as the faithful offspring of the intellect, when it carries a torch before it so that it may arrive at Truth. Indeed the Thomists (Colleg. S. Thom. q. 1, nn. 103 and 129), in acts of the intellect, for example in this one, "rational animal," acknowledge a twofold representation: one primary and signate, which terminates in the real predicates of man; another secondary and exercitive, which terminates in a being of reason. They distinguish these to such a degree that only the second is an action directible by Logic, whereas the first is the mediate and remote end of Logic. Why, then, may we not say on the contrary that only the first is procured by Logic and the second wholly disregarded?

CHAPTER V.
Contrary Arguments Are Disarmed.

1. It is objected 1º for the opinion constituting extrinsic denominations through a being of reason. The denomination "knowing" requires an intrinsic form; therefore also the denomination "known." But the form intrinsic to the known object is not real cognition; therefore it is a fictitious

form. I press: therefore the denomination "known" requires a form not fictitiously but truly intrinsic, just as does the denomination "knowing." Therefore I deny the first consequence. The disparity lies in this, that "to know" is a perfection of the subject, whereas "to be known," or "being known," is not a perfection of the object. It is replied 1º: cognition is neither applied nor united to the object; therefore it cannot denominate it. I answer: it is not applied by contact or penetration, but certainly by termination or tendency regarding that object as terminus. This tendency can be called intentional union; nor is anything greater necessary for this genus of denominations. And I press the denomination "fundamentally known."

2. It is replied 2º: if cognition is in some way applied to the object, why does it not bestow upon it, as upon the intellect, the denomination "knowing"? I ask in return, why does it not denominate it "proximately fundamentally knowing," just as "known"? Or why does cognition not denominate a being of reason "feigning," just as "feigned"? Cognition, therefore, has this by its own nature, that it denominates as "knowing" only that in which it vitally remains, and as "known" only that which it represents. But it remains only in the intellect and represents only the object. Here two things should be noted. One is that the subject of this denomination, namely the thing which is known, is not a "subject of inherence" but a "subject of pure denomination," and therefore is not properly a "subject" but an "object," as St. Thomas taught us in a similar case in the preceding chapter, n. 34. The other is that "denomination" is not here taken for the imposition of a name, but for the thing signified by the name, namely the effect or quasi-formal effect poured forth by the form upon the subject or object.

3. It is replied 3º from M. Aguilera (l. 2, Logic. q. 2, § 1): the denomination "knowable" or "scientifically knowable" is a relation of reason; therefore also the denomination "known," and every other extrinsic denomination. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas (q. 21, *De veritate*, a. 1, C.), who says: "The relation by which science is referred to the knowable thing is real; but the relation by which the knowable thing is referred to science is one of reason only." Nor may it be said that the knowable thing can be understood without relation to science, although science is understood as related to the knowable thing; for, as the same St. Thomas says (q. 1, *De potentia*, a. 1, ad 10), "Our intellect cannot understand something related to another without understanding in return the relation from the opposite." It is confirmed: "being known" is not some real being; therefore it is a being of reason. The antecedent is proved: by that "being" the subject is not constituted in any Predicament, or in any genus of real

being. First, because otherwise, when cognition ceased, the known object would lose some real being, which is absurd. Secondly, because that "being" is neither quality, action or passion, nor a real relation in the subject, otherwise it would be something intrinsic to it; and it cannot pertain to another Predicament.

4. I answer to the reply by denying the antecedent. For the denomination "knowable" can be considered either as intrinsic, and thus formally consists in the real capacity of the object to be known; or as extrinsic, and thus is constituted as by a single form either by the possible act of science or by the cognitive power of the intellect. To the proof: lest we linger untimely over the intricate questions concerning relation, I grant that the relation of the knowable thing to science is distinct from the comparative act of the intellect and from every real being, and likewise that the knowable as such cannot be understood by us without a mutual relation to science. I deny, however, that the denomination "knowable" is constituted by that relation. For this denomination consists in something absolute, although it cannot be conceived by us except relatively, or after the manner of a relative denomination; just as in the present state we cannot conceive an Angel except connotatively with respect to body, or after the manner of a body, without body or the connotation of body therefore being the form constituting "Angel" in the being of such. This especially has place in the principles of Aguilera (q. 7, nn. 14, 21, and following), who does not admit a relation of reason attributed or applied to the object, or apprehended as though it were in the object, but separately conceived indirectly, or "as that by which." For corporeity is apprehended in plainly the same manner when an Angel is known.

5. To the confirmation I deny the antecedent. To the proof: that "being," taken concretely, does not pertain to one Predicament, since it does not have the unity required for a thing to be placed in a Predicament, but is an aggregate of cognition, which is an accident, and of the object, which is a substance or something else. Hence the subject is not constituted in any Predicament by that "being." Yet "being known" itself, taken abstractly or according to the form, pertains to the Predicament of Quality, or, if preferred, of Action, without therefore having to be something intrinsic to the object, or the object, when cognition ceases, losing some intrinsic real being, but only an extrinsic one. It may be said: "being known" does not supposit for some "being" which is in the intellect, otherwise the latter would be denominated known. I deny the assertion, for already in n. 2 we gave the reason why this "being" does not bestow upon the intellect the denomination "known." Finally, the whole objection with its confirmation is

plainly broken by the denomination "proximately fundamentally" or "causally known," which according to the Adversary is constituted by real cognition, although it is an extrinsic denomination and everything objected against us applies to it.

6. Here note in passing that, according to the same M. Aguilera (l. 2, q. 2, n. 19), the object is "really seen" even if no intellect exists or thinks, and therefore before a being of reason exists, because the foundation of this denomination, namely vision, really exists independently of the operation of the intellect. Hence I argue thus: it is contradictory for a denomination truly to exist prior to the form by which it is constituted, even if there be a proximate foundation or proximate cause of such a form. If, therefore, the denomination "seen" truly exists before the being of reason, the latter is not its proper form. The antecedent is clear, because otherwise man would truly exist prior to the soul by force of the ultimate disposition of matter for animation; likewise the denomination "knowing" or "seeing" would truly exist prior to cognition or vision merely from the species of the object being applied to a disposed potency. Certainly these foundations are much more strongly and proximately connected with soul, cognition, and vision than vision itself is with a being of reason, as is evident. And yet when those forms are absent, as if by miracle they were prevented, the subject is rather inanimate than animate, and the potency rather not seeing than seeing. Therefore, when a being of reason is absent, the object is rather not seen than seen; whence it also absurdly follows that St. Paul from eternity will be rather "not predestined" than "predestined."

7. It is objected 2º for the principal Thomistic opinion: real being cannot be the formal object of a science except under some abstraction from matter. But insofar as it abstracts from singular matter, it is the object of Physics; insofar as it abstracts from sensible matter, of Mathematics; insofar as it abstracts from intelligible matter, of Metaphysics; nor is another genus of abstraction possible according to St. Thomas. Since, therefore, Logic is a science distinct from these three, its object is not real being but a being of reason, which is regarded by Logic under abstraction from all matter "negatively," that is, by title of imperfection. This argument, highly regarded by other Thomists, is considered weak by the great defender of the being of reason, Cardinal Aguirre. For from it follows that there are no more than those three species of sciences concerning real being; and that this is plainly false is shown by Ethics and Medicine.

8. Moreover, just as within the common abstraction from sensible matter there are several wholly diverse species of sciences, such as Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and others, because they exercise

specifically diverse modes of abstracting from sensible matter, why cannot the same happen within the common abstraction from all matter, even intelligible matter? Therefore the object of Logic can agree with the object of Metaphysics in abstraction from all matter and at the same time differ in a special mode or title of abstracting, namely under the title of a formal sign artificially manifesting what is unknown. Such, in sum, is the view of the praised Aguirre. Add that abstraction from all matter "negatively" comprehends every being of reason in its full breadth; and yet according to the Thomists Logic does not concern itself with every being of reason, but only with that which pertains to the artifice of the Mode of Knowing. Therefore already within that same common abstraction, which also pertains at least secondarily to Metaphysics, Logic finds a way of selecting certain beings for itself while leaving others. Why, then, could it not do the same concerning real beings within the common abstraction from all matter?

9. It is objected 3º: Dialectic according to Aristotle (I Poster., c. 8; IV Metaph., c. 2) extends to all beings, or to all things concerning which Metaphysics treats. Therefore it must tend under some formal aspect which can be found in all things. But this aspect cannot be something real, otherwise it would be real being as such or some transcendental predicate, which no one says. Therefore it remains that it be a being of reason, which can be feigned or conceived in every thing. I answer: first, Aristotle is speaking of accessory using Dialectic, which is neither a science nor has a determinate Subject or formal aspect. See above, disp. 1, c. 2, from n. 23, and c. 3, n. 10. Next, granted that he speaks of Logic truly so called, I distinguish the antecedent: it extends mediately, I concede; immediately, I deny. Then I distinguish the consequence: an aspect which can be found in all things insofar as they fall under the consideration of reason, I concede; in things otherwise taken, I deny the consequence and the subsumed minor premise. Nor does it therefore follow that the aspect under which Logic tends is something transcendental, but rather that it is artificial cognition, which can belong to all things and extrinsically denominate them by constituting second intentions in the concrete. Because, therefore, artificial cognition can be concerned with all things, Logic, which immediately directs such cognition, is said mediately to be concerned with all things.

10. St. Thomas in fact explains Aristotle thus, I Post. lect. 20, in these words: "Because reason has to deal with all things that are, and Logic concerns the operations of reason, Logic too will concern those things which are common to all, that is, the intentions of reason which are related to all things." Then, as examples of intentions of reason, he names "syllogism,

enunciation," etc. The same in IV Metaph. lect. 4: "Intelligible intentions are equated with beings of nature because all beings of nature fall under the consideration of reason; and therefore the subject of Logic extends to all those things of which being of nature is predicated." I know that Thomistic ears are pricked up at the phrase "intention of reason," as though at the proper name of a fictitious being. But we plainly saw in the preceding chapter, nn. 33 and the two following, that according to the mind of St. Thomas an intention of reason is an act of the intellect and is said to be in things outside the soul in no other way than science is said to be in the knowable thing. The same is proved by those reasons: "Because Logic concerns the operations of reason"; "because all beings fall under the consideration of reason"; also, "because reason has to deal with all things that are." A splendid trade indeed the diligent merchant would conduct if she wandered through all genera of things as though to the markets of beings of reason. Will she not rather trade in truth and science, more precious than all gold?

11. But from this one will rise up and object 3º: St. Thomas in the cited lect. 4 on IV Metaph. opened his mind in favor of a being of reason in these words: "Being is twofold, namely being of reason and being of nature. Being of reason is properly said of those intentions which reason discovers in things considered, such as the intention of genus, species, and the like, which indeed are not found in the nature of things but follow upon the consideration of reason. And this sort of being of reason is properly the Subject of Logic." Nothing is more evident, say the Thomists. And because our Doctors interpret this of a being of reason not purely objective but subjective and denominative, they are said to be blind. 1º Because they do not see that St. Thomas divides being in its whole breadth, as it abstracts from real and non-real, as is clear from the words, "Being is twofold." 2º Because they do not penetrate the expression "which reason discovers," which sounds the same as "devises, imagines." 3º Because they do not notice that only of a purely objective being of reason can it be said that it "is not found in the nature of things"; likewise that it "follows the consideration of reason," for a subjective being of reason, since it is the very consideration of reason, does not follow upon it, otherwise it would follow upon itself.

12. Nevertheless, the interpretation of Our Authors is most true. For St. Thomas does not divide being abstracted from real and fictitious, but real being as such into two members: one which does not depend upon an act of reason, and this he calls "being of nature" and elsewhere commonly "being outside the soul"; the other, which is a work of reason and is really made by reason according to a relation to objects, and this he calls "being of reason,"

and denies that it is found in the nature of things, that is, in things outside the soul. This genus of being, according to St. Thomas, is properly said of the intentions of genus, species, etc.; and these reason through reflexive cognition "discovers," that is, finds or detects, for "to discover" does not always mean "to devise," nor does "to devise" always mean "to feign," in things taken not specifically but as "considered," that is, as already known through direct cognition. It discovers them, I say, not as feigned but as made or constituted by the direct act, just as one reflexively considering a recently made statue discovers the head, chest, arms, etc.

13. These intentions "follow upon the consideration of reason," not by physical but by logical consequence. For, taken concretely, they are extrinsic denominations and formal effects of direct cognition; but a formal effect is said logically to follow or result from a form without fiction, as the Thomists now admit in the denominations "seen, known, loved," which follow vision, cognition, and love. Taken abstractly, however, they are as it were logical properties of cognitions; but a logical or metaphysical property, although wholly real and really indistinct from the essence, is nevertheless said to follow the essence and result from it. Hence one has solved whatever moves the Thomists. If it is said: then it could equally be denied that intellect and will are found "in the nature of things," because they are not found "outside the soul" but are subjectively in the soul. I deny the consequence, because in St. Thomas's phrase being of nature or being outside the soul is not opposed to every being existing in the soul, but only to that which has the surname "of reason," because it is the Work of Reason as such, under the function proper to it and not common to other potencies, or insofar as it transforms itself representatively into any object whatsoever, according to the saying: "The intellect by understanding becomes all things."

14. The Angelic Doctor himself proves the truth of the interpretation given. First, in the Opuscula cited in the preceding chapter under Conclusion 3, which need no interpreter. Secondly, q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 6, C., where among other things he teaches that the "formal aspects" of the attributes of God, in which consists the formal plurality or distinction of reason among the attributes which according to the Thomists is a being of reason, "follow upon the conceptions of the intellect." And yet, notwithstanding the expression "follow," he says below: "And thus all the formal aspects are indeed in our intellect as in a subject, but in God they are as in a root verifying these conceptions." In the same place: "There is nothing," he says, "in things which are outside the soul whose likeness is the formal aspect of genus or species; nevertheless the intellect is not false, because it does not attribute to things the things of which these are formal

aspects, namely genus and species, according as they are outside the soul, but only according as they are in the intellect. For from the fact that the intellect reflects upon itself, just as it understands things existing outside the soul, so it understands them to be understood. And thus, just as there is a certain conception of the intellect, or formal aspect, to which the thing itself outside the soul corresponds, so there is a certain conception or formal aspect to which there corresponds the thing understood insofar as such; just as to the formal aspect of man or conception of man there corresponds the thing outside the soul, whereas to the formal aspect or conception of genus or species there corresponds only the thing understood." These, unless I am greatly mistaken, are our doctrine in the very terms which, as they say, terminate the matter.

15. It is replied: that is formal in the object of Logic from which it arises that Logic is less noble than other sciences. But that this arises from a being of reason is clear from St. Thomas, Opusc. 56, toward the end, where he says: Logic "is more uncertain than all the other sciences, because the certitude of a science depends upon the certitude of its Subject. Among all Subjects of sciences the Subject of Logic is the weakest and most uncertain, because each thing has as much truth and certitude as it has entity, as Aristotle says in II Metaph.; but second intentions have being only in the soul, from which it follows that they have the weakest being." One may wonder that this Opusculum is cited against us, since the whole is for us, even in the testimony objected. I therefore turn it back thus: each thing has as much truth and certitude as it has entity; but the Thomistic being of reason has nothing of entity except apparently or fictitiously. Therefore it has nothing of truth and certitude except apparently or fictitiously. Therefore it is scientifically knowable only fictitiously or apparently. Therefore Logic is a science only fictitiously and apparently. Behold a consequence absurd to the Thomists and yet legitimately deduced. Again: a being of reason is neither weak nor robust, but in reality nothing. Therefore it grounds no science. Again still: a being of reason is weaker and has less entity than the object of the shoemaker's or blacksmith's art. Therefore the art of Logic will be less noble than those arts.

16. I answer, therefore, that the subject of Logic is called the weakest and most uncertain for two reasons indicated there by St. Thomas. The first: because beings which are in the soul are very fluid and mutable in being, although certain in verifying scientific propositions. Therefore Logic is called "uncertain," not intrinsically and subjectively, but extrinsically and objectively, the denomination being taken from the uncertainty of the object in being. The Thomists say the same of their being of reason, which they

wish to be simply scientifically knowable although in being it is something shadowy and merely apparent. The other reason: because logical intentions cannot be fully known unless one already possesses some knowledge of things pertaining to other sciences; for it cannot be known that man, prescissively known, is a "species" unless it is known from elsewhere that several men differ only numerically. "Therefore," adds the Angelic Doctor, "it is impossible to know Logic unless one is learned and experienced in the other sciences, especially Metaphysics." Therefore the object of Logic, at least with respect to us, is weaker and more uncertain than others in the being of knowable, insofar as it in some manner borrows certitude and knowability from other objects.

17. One will object: if the object of Logic is real cognition, it abstracts more and more perfectly from matter than the object of Physics and Mathematics. Therefore it will render Logic nobler than those sciences; therefore Logic will not be less noble than the other sciences. I answer: lest we be forced here untimely to discuss the question concerning the order of dignity among the sciences, about which opinions vary, I deny the antecedent, because the greater nobility of a science is not taken from greater abstraction from matter unless other things are equal. Therefore Physics, although abstracting less from matter, is quite commonly said to be nobler than Mathematics. Since Logic, therefore, is a ministerial science whose object is sought for knowledge not for its own sake but as a certain aid to other sciences, as St. Thomas says (Opusc. 70, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2), it is for this reason thought less noble than others, especially speculative sciences, which the same St. Thomas (In I Metaph., lect. 1, lit. m), with Aristotle, prefers to practical sciences and those invented for utility, among which he numbers Logic.

18. It is objected 4°: Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric are distinguished from "real" sciences and are called "rational." But this is not because they regard acts of the intellect as object, for Animastics also regards these and is a real science; nor because they direct the intellect to scientific cognition, for this belongs to the habits of all sciences; nor again because they direct an act of reason in an artificial manner, since Mathematics also does this and is therefore called a liberal art. It remains, therefore, that they are called "rational" because they are concerned with beings of reason. This argument, used by the Carmelites, Merinero, and Aguirre, plainly militates against St. Thomas in I Poster. lect. 1, where he says: "Logic, that is, rational science, is called rational not only because it is according to reason, which is common to all arts, but also because it concerns the very act of reason as its proper matter; and therefore it seems to be the Art of arts, because it directs us in

the act of reason from which all arts proceed." And Opusc. 39, at the beginning, takes as equivalent that Logic is a "rational science" and that it was "invented for reasoning."

19. I answer, therefore, that Logic is called "rational" because it regulates the use of reason so that it may artificially investigate the truth of things, and that it is distinguished from real sciences not because an act of reason is not also a certain thing, but because "things" are commonly taken as contradistinguished from concepts and spoken words. Thus a concept itself is commonly divided into a concept of a "thing" and a concept of a "word." Will a word therefore cease to be a thing? Thus also Dialecticians dispute whether words signify "things" or concepts. Will concepts therefore be beings of reason? Animastics is not called a "rational" science, first because for the greater part it treats of things which are not acts of reason; secondly because it considers those acts themselves under a formal aspect in which they agree with other things, namely under the aspect of vitality, whereas Logic tends under an aspect of artifice proper to the intellect alone. That the habits of all sciences direct toward scientific cognition is most false. Every habit indeed produces such cognition, but to direct is not physically to produce; rather, it is to hand down rules for scientific cognitions, which only the habit of Logic does. For the same reason it is false that Mathematics directs the act of reason in an artificial manner as its proper object. For whether it speculates or regulates, it is not concerned with an act of reason as matter or object. It is concerned, therefore, with numbers or figures in quantity. Mathematics is called arts because in part practical, or even in a broad sense, as are all sciences; and liberal because of the excellence of the object.

20. Grammar, Rhetoric, and Poetics are scarcely called "rational" except by Thomists. Among the ancients they are commonly called "discursive" arts, because they treat external speech. Let whoever wishes believe that they regard a being of reason as object. I have no doubt that Quintilian and Priscian, the one prince and master of rhetoricians, the other of grammarians, to whom a being of reason was wholly unknown by name and appearance, would have feared it like a specter if they encountered it. And indeed who will believe that the formal object of an art is that whose very name is not heard in the whole art? Even modern Thomists now seem to banish beings of reason from these arts (Colleg. S. Thom., Edition 5; Gabr. a Concept., l. 4, dub. 1, nn. 143 and following), I believe because they rightly think it incredible that the artifice of the *Aeneid*, or of the Orations of Demosthenes or Cicero, should have no being except fictitious. This does not, however, prevent those arts from being called "rational" in some

manner, insofar as they were invented to express concepts of the mind by the artifice of words.

21. It is objected 5º: the formal object of Logic is the form constitutive of the logical artifact, namely genus, subject, predicate, definition, syllogism, etc. But this form is not something real but of reason. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved in many ways. 1º In the artifice of genus: genus formally is one nature, universal and superior to inferiors. But on the part of the thing there is no such unity, universality, or superiority. Therefore it is a being of reason. Nor can it be said that real cognition is the form of these denominations. First, because the intellect does not apprehend the generic nature as multiple. Therefore it apprehends it as one. Therefore unity is not the apprehension itself but the apprehended object, conceived on the part of the nature. Secondly, because the intellect knows the generic nature as such. Therefore cognition represents all the constituents of genus as such, and therefore universality and superiority, which stand on the part of the object; for whatever is representatively in cognition is objectively in the thing known.

22. 2º In the artifice of definition: the form constituting this definition, "rational animal," consists in the composition of animal with rational, for an artificial form is the composition of parts, as is seen in every art. But this composition is a being of reason. This is clear because the composition is of the same character as the distinction of the parts, since composition is the union of things distinct. But the distinction of animal from rational belongs to reason alone, for really those extremes are one and the same. Therefore the composition too is a being of reason. 3º In the artifice of enunciation: in this proposition, "Man is rational," subject and predicate are distinguished and related to one another. But neither the distinction nor the relation can be real. Therefore it is of reason. The minor premise is clear because there cannot be real distinction where there is real identity, nor a real relation between extremes really indistinct. It is confirmed 1º from the College of St. Thomas: this act, "Rational is animal," not only conceives the extremes by distinct concepts but also as distinct. First, because otherwise it would not differ from an identical proposition. Secondly, because it conceives animal as distinct from everything that is not metaphysically animal, and therefore as distinct from rational. Thirdly, because by such an act the intellect conceives that it affirms of rational something new, namely something which in its judgment is not rational. But that distinction conceived in the object is a being of reason. Therefore, etc.

23. It is confirmed 2º from Palanco: that act is representatively disconformed to the object. Therefore it represents what does not belong to

the object and consequently feigns. The antecedent is proved. First, because such an act, "I subsume," represents the object otherwise than it is in itself, for it distinguishes being rational and being animal, and conceives one as subject and the other as predicate, which functions are not in reality. Secondly, because the Divine Intellect is incapable of knowing by distinguishing predicates really identified, or of comparing them as subject and predicate, superior and inferior, etc., precisely because it knows things as they are in themselves and because a mode of knowing disconformed to the object is repugnant to it, not precisely on the part of the act, for thus Divine cognition, as spiritual and infinite, is disconformed to a material and finite object, but on the part of the object. Therefore the comparative and distinctive mode of representing which our intellect observes in judging does not display the object as it is in itself but necessarily imports disconformity with things.

24. The same minor premise is proved 4º in the artifice of syllogism: the syllogistic form consists in relations of the major and minor Extremes to one another and to the Middle; and therefore according to St. Thomas (Proem. Ethic.) it belongs to rational philosophy "to consider the order of the parts of discourse to one another and the order of principles to one another and to conclusions." But this order and these relations are not real relations, since they are not concerned with really distinct extremes, as is seen in this syllogism: "Every rational animal is risible; every man is a rational animal; therefore every man is risible." Therefore the syllogistic form is a mere relation of reason. It is confirmed 1º: the aforesaid relation is not transcendental, for a transcendental relation consists in the very essence of a thing, which is never varied; but the relation of the Middle and Extremes is continually varied when the terms are changed at the will of the intellect. Nor again is it predicamental, since it belongs to none of the genera of relations assigned by Aristotle. Therefore it is not a real relation. It is confirmed 2º from the Carmelites: Aristotelian Logic, since it is wholly occupied with preparing and handing down the syllogistic form, has no treatise concerning acts of the intellect. Therefore that form does not consist in these acts but in a being of reason. Behold almost the entire mass of arguments upon which the more recent Thomists rely.

25. I answer to the objection by denying the minor premise, if the discussion concerns a purely objective or fictitious being of reason. To proof 1º I distinguish the minor: on the part of the thing, that is, outside the soul or before the operation of the intellect, I concede; if real being which is in and from the soul is also included, I deny the minor and the consequence. For the unity and universality of genus, and of every universal, is the real

prescissive cognition itself, which confusedly represents the nature of animal, for example, without thinking of the plurality which it has on the part of the thing. From this it arises that this nature, as expressed by the concept "animal," is called "one," that is, not expressed as multiple. And because, as thus expressed, it remains indifferent and apt to be predicated by the intellect of many, namely man, horse, lion, etc., which aptitude toward many is called universality, predicability, and superiority, it is therefore called "universal nature, superior, and genus." Hence one sees that all these denominations are extrinsic to the object and that their form is real cognition. This will be explained more broadly in the following treatise.

26. St. Thomas says to the point (Opusc. 56): "The universal is one in cognition, because although many, according as they are many, do not constitute one thing understood, nevertheless many, according as they are similar, constitute one thing understood, such that the intellect cannot distinguish among similars insofar as they are similar. And therefore the intellect apprehends man and ass insofar as they agree in one operation," namely sensing. He adds: "And because a thing is being and one by the same, and conversely, the universal must be universal by the aforesaid unity, such that the cognition of such a nature makes the universal to be a universal in act and is something formal in the universal." See how genus, insofar as "universal" and insofar as "one," signifies cognition as the "formal" element. Below: "Therefore the universal is one by the unity of cognition, such that nothing is required for the formal aspect of the universal except that rational unity; and for this reason Aristotle says that it is One in many, namely, one thing known."

27. Nor does what the proof adds stand in the way. For it is false that direct cognition, for example "animal," conceives the nature as one or as generic. It conceives nothing except the pure power of sensing, prescinding from whether in reality it is one or multiple. Yet by thus prescissively conceiving it, cognition exercitively constitutes and formally denominates it "one and generic," or "genus." The intellect indeed knows unity and the other constituents of genus as such, but not by direct cognition; rather by reflexive cognition, not by the concept "animal," which is the very form of genus, but by the concept "genus," which, as St. Thomas taught us in n. 14, is reflexive and is borne toward the thing as understood, or as already known by the concept "animal" or a similar one. Therefore whenever the Thomists cry out that unity, aptitude, and relation to many stand on the part of the object and are representatively in cognition, concede this if they speak of reflexive cognition and its object, which is a concrete whole composed of the thing outside the soul and direct cognition as form; but deny it if the

discussion concerns direct cognition and its object. If it is said: therefore there is a universal on the part of the thing, since it truly is something real both according to matter and according to form. I deny the consequence in the sense in which the Peripatetics, against the Platonists, deny that the universal is on the part of the thing, namely, that outside the soul and before the operation of the intellect there is one thing apt to be in many. If, however, the phrase "on the part of the thing" also comprehends the works of reason and excludes only fictitious beings, I most willingly concede the consequence.

28. To proof 2º I deny the minor premise, notwithstanding the appended proof. For the distinction of animal from rational is indeed of reason alone, but not of feigning reason; rather of reason prescissively knowing or abstracting. For the intellect by the first operation "distinguishes one thing from another when it understands what this is while understanding nothing of the other, neither that it is with it nor that it is separated from it. Hence this distinction does not properly have the name of separation... But this distinction is rightly called abstraction, yet only when those things of which one is understood without the other are together in reality," as St. Thomas says in so many words (Opusc. 70, q. 5, a. 3, C.). Hence it follows that for one thing to be distinguished by reason from another is not for one to be understood as separated from the other on the part of the object; likewise, that a distinction of reason is abstraction itself, or prescissive cognition. But abstraction is not fiction, as St. Thomas proves in a thousand places, nor do the Thomists seem to disagree. Hence a distinction of reason is purely extrinsic to the object and does not conflict with intrinsic identity, which alone is understood by the name "real identity." Palanco therefore cries in vain that extrinsic distinction is repugnant just as extrinsic identity is. In vain indeed, for the contrary, both concerning distinction and identity or unity, is clear from what has been said according to the mind of St. Thomas and will be still clearer in the following treatise.

29. Moreover, the composition of the definition "rational animal," if considered on the part of the act, is the real conjunction itself of two apprehensions. If, however, it is considered on the part of the object, there is no composition in the object as contradistinguished from the concepts, but only insofar as the object is known through that complex apprehension. Since on one side this apprehension expresses animal by abstracting from rational, and on the other rational by prescinding from animal, by this very fact it denominates one as formally or intentionally distinct from the other; and while each part of the apprehension is joined, it also denominates the whole object as though composed of parts. Hence one will gather against the

Thomists that the order of definition does not stand intrinsically on the part of the object corresponding to the mental definition, but formally resides in the mental definition itself, whereas in the object it is present only by extrinsic denomination. What the Thomists may reply against this I shall touch upon a little below.

30. To proof 3º: by mental affirmation the subject and predicate are distinguished and related, not signately but exercitively; that is, mental affirmation does not signify or represent an intrinsic distinction and relation of subject and predicate, since it rather represents the identity of both. But by the exercise of its manner of tending it denominates each extreme extrinsically as intentionally distinct, composed, and related. For since it tends in a compositive and distinctive manner, insofar as it uses distinct expressions which it binds and composes with one another so that one as it were completes and determines the other, by this very fact it is the form constituting man as subject and rational as predicate, and both as intentionally connected with one another. In these denominations there is involved a certain relation after the manner of that by which matter and form are related in a composite, for subject is compared to matter and predicate to form. But an extrinsic and merely intentional relation requires only a similar distinction of extremes. All these things therefore formally consist in the mental enunciation itself.

31. To confirmation 1º I deny the assumption, which is not well proved. For first a proposition is not called identical because it does not conceive an objective distinction between subject and predicate, but because it uses synonymous concepts or repeats the same concept twice, as is clear from the Summulae. But this is not the case in the proposition "rational is animal," as is clear from the terms. Next, a direct proposition does not conceive animal as distinct from rational as though the distinction stood on the part of the object; for this belongs only to reflexive cognition by which the mind knows itself to enunciate. Hence the direct proposition does not conceive animal as distinct, but exercitively distinguishes on the part of the formal predicate, just as it does not conceive it as known but exercitively knows or renders it known. Nor again does it conceive itself to enunciate of rational something new which in its judgment is not rational; for all this novelty and distinction consists in the direct cognition itself and is known only reflexively. And indeed, who will believe that I judge that rational is something which according to me is not rational, so that I conceive this being and non-being in the same act?

32. To confirmation 2º: if that act "without doubt" represents the object otherwise than it is in itself and is not conformed to the object, "without

doubt" it will be false, since according to all truth is the conformity of an act with the object insofar as the object is represented as it is. See what was said in the preceding chapter, n. 37. Therefore all this difformity and otherness standing on the part of the object must be denied. Likewise it must be denied that the direct proposition signately distinguishes this twofold being or knows one as subject and the other as predicate. For these functions are the object only of reflexive cognition insofar as they have already been exercitively made or constituted through direct enunciation. Likewise that causal claim concerning the Divine Intellect must be denied. For a mode of knowing similar to ours is not repugnant to it because otherwise Divine cognition would be disconformed to the object or would conceive in it what is not there, but because our mode, as inadequate, prescissive, and compositive on the part of the act, implies an imperfection of cognition foreign to the Divine Intellect, which comprehends the whole thing from every side in a simple intuition. Moreover, otherness on the part of the act, when it arises from perfection, such as infinity and spirituality, is not repugnant to Divine cognition; but it is repugnant when it implies imperfection, such as defect of clarity, precision, composition.

33. It should be noted in passing that if mental judgment is a quality composed of at least three concepts, as the old and sufficiently common opinion holds, the judicative force proper to the second operation of the intellect consists in that concept which corresponds to the word "is" in vocal enunciation and is called the mental copula and composition. But this concept distinguishes subject and predicate neither signately nor exercitively. Not signately, because rather, as St. Thomas says (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 5, C.), "The composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the things which are composed." Not exercitively, because it rather joins and binds those concepts which are called formal subject and predicate and through which the objective subject and predicate are denominated intentionally distinct. Its function, therefore, is to bind the other two concepts together by attributing the object of one to the object of the other, or also by signately removing it; and this attribution or removal is the form denominating one "subject" and the other "predicate." Hence it is clear that the object of mental judgment is not denominated "distinct" by the same simple form by which it is denominated "predicate" or "subject."

34. To proof 4º I concede the major premise and also the minor if it speaks of a real relation outside the soul and distinct from an act of reason. I deny it, however, if it speaks also of a real relation situated in the act of reason denominating the object. For to be a syllogistic Middle is to be joined in the Premises, after the manner of subject or predicate, with those terms

which are found in the Conclusion; and to be the major or minor Extreme is to be the term of the Conclusion which is predicated more or less widely in the whole syllogism. But all these denominations belong to terms, both formal and objective, from the threefold mental copula as from a form. From this form also proceeds formally that the Principles, that is, Premises or Antecedents, are ordered to one another and to the Conclusions. Therefore Middle, Extremes, Principles, and Conclusions are formally constituted and coordinated by a real form indistinct from an act of reason. And in this very form consists whatever relation, order, or relation Logic considers in the parts of the syllogism, in which there is always distinction, at least intentional, and therefore proportioned to a non-fictitious relation of reason.

35. To confirmation 1º: of the relations of the logical object, some are quasi-transcendental, others quasi-predicamental. To the first class belongs the relation of Genus and of every Universal to its inferiors, since it consists in aptitude toward many; likewise the relation of Principles to Conclusions, since it is situated in the power of inferring. These relations consist in the essence not merely of the thing outside the soul but of the whole intentional concrete or second intention in the concrete; and it is false that they vary at will while the same essence of the concrete remains. To the second class belongs the relation of Subject to Predicate, of the syllogistic Middle to the Extremes, and of Genus to Difference within a Definition. For these relations imitate those which are found between actual parts of an external artifact, as between the head, chest, and feet of a statue, or between the front and the rearmost rank of an army, or between the right and left wings, or between other parts and the center. Therefore they can be reduced to the first genus of relations designated by Aristotle, or even to the second, since those founded in union and conjunction are reduced to either, as the Eximious Doctor proves (disp. 47, Metaph. sect. 15, nn. 9 and 10).

36. I said "quasi," because these relations, although they are properly such in the acts of the mind themselves compared with one another when a logical artifact is made from several really distinct acts, nevertheless insofar as they extrinsically denominate objects they are not proper predicamental relations, as will be explained in its place. Add that logical denominations can be called relative, not "according to being" but "according to being said," insofar as they cannot be defined and explained by us except by comparison with certain things as termini. They can also be called "relations of feigning reason," but "fundamental" ones, insofar as they provide some occasion for feigning, yet in such a way that Logic regards as formal only the foundation, which is real; just as Theology does not regard as formal the relations of

reason themselves which are feigned by us when conceiving God's Omnipotence and Dominion, but only their real foundation.

37. The other confirmation is plainly retorted. In the whole Logic of Aristotle not even a word is said of a being of reason. Therefore it is not the formal object of Logic. It may be said that there is treatment there of proposition, syllogism, etc., which names signify beings of reason. But, I believe, one knows that the very same can be said by me, with much greater credibility, of acts of the intellect and certainly much more according to the mind of St. Thomas. First because in Opusc. 47, at the beginning, he says: "Therefore the efficient cause of the syllogism is the rational soul forming it; hence syllogism is an act of reason." Secondly because "syllogism" means the same as "reasoning," and therefore Aristotle and St. Thomas commonly use this name in the Analytics. "Reasoning, however, is a certain movement of the intellect passing from one thing to another," as St. Thomas says, I *Contra Gentiles*, c. 57, n. 6. Most of all because the same Angelic Doctor, at the beginning of Book I of *Perihermeneias* and Book II Poster., is wholly occupied in explaining how the whole Logic of Aristotle corresponds to the three operations of the intellect. Read these places, and one will plainly see that Aristotelian Logic is occupied in regulating acts of the mind, not under the aspect of quality, vitality, etc., which pertain to Animastics, but under the aspect of artifice signified by the names "proposition, syllogism, demonstration, etc."

38. But against the sequence of the entire solution the more recent Thomists rise up with various forms of argument. It is replied 1º: definitive cognition is "ordinative" of the object; therefore it attains the object under the order of definition; therefore it attains on the part of the object the order of definition, which certainly is not real. I answer: a mental definition, properly speaking, is not ordinative but ordered, not defining but a definition. It is called ordinative only in the sense in which it is called representative and cognitive, or in which vision is called intuitive, or sanctifying Grace sanctifying; not because some representation, intuition, or sanctification distinct from these forms is effected or attained in the object, but because "as that by which," or in the genus of formal cause, through them the object is rendered ordered, represented, seen, holy.

39. One will object, with Gabriel a Conceptione: it is contradictory in terms to attain objects definitively and not to know in the objects the order of definition, just as it is contradictory in terms to dispose stones artificially and for no artifice to result in them; especially since St. Thomas, at the beginning of I Poster., teaches that acts of the intellect are so directed by Logic as an action of the hand is directed by the builder's art. But one is

struck in return by the same example. Therefore it will likewise be contradictory in terms to attain an object "intuitively" or "comprehensively" and not to know in it some intuition or comprehension. One will deny the consequence because these adverbs denote a purely speculative mode of cognition to which no mode of the same character corresponds in the object. Let the same be said to you concerning the adverb "definitively." For that definitions of man, and others which Logic directs, are practical cognitions, as the Thomists maintain in the present matter with little consistency with what was said in the preceding disputation, is wholly false. They are indeed practices of logical art, but they are not therefore practical cognitions. Hence the example of the disposition of stones is irrelevant, for that is a practical action to which there corresponds a terminus produced in external matter. But, to use the words of St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 87, a. 3, C.), an operation of the intellect is not an action tending into another in such a way as to be the perfection of what is operated, as building is of what is built; rather, it remains in the agent as its perfection and act. Indeed the same Angelic Doctor (Proem. Ethic., lit. c) notes the difference between operations of the intellect and those by which an artisan acts upon external matter, namely that the former do not have a work besides themselves but are themselves ends, whereas the latter effect another work which is the end of the agent. From this it is clear what sense the objected comparison of Logic with builder's art has, namely, that direction is according to the character of the acts, of which some are the work intended while others are a way to another work.

40. One will again object: a mental definition orders objects representatively. Therefore the order or relation of objects is representatively in cognition. But what is representatively in cognition is objectively in the thing known. I press similarly: Divine cognition comprehends objects representatively. Therefore comprehension is representatively in cognition. Therefore it is objectively in the thing known. What could be more inept? A definition therefore orders objects only "as that by which," or in the genus of extrinsic formal cause. Order and relation, however, are representatively in cognition not as something represented but as a mode of representing, just as comprehension, clarity, obscurity. Still one will object: if order is only a mode entitatively found in cognition, the object cannot be denominated from it, just as for the same reason the object is not denominated spiritual and infinite from God's cognition representing spiritually and infinitely. The quibble is vain. Are not representation, intuition, and comprehension perfections entitatively found in cognition no less than spirituality and infinity? How, then, is the object denominated from the former rather than

the latter? There are therefore modes of cognition which denominate the object only adverbially, namely, "known vitally, spiritually, finitely," or "infinitely," because denominations nominally taken from these modes are understood in common speech as intrinsic. But other modes or perfections of cognition, especially those which expressly imply a relation to the object, for the contrary reason denominate it nominally as "represented, comprehended, etc." Add that an object is not so properly denominated "ordered" from a definition as "known in an ordered manner."

41. It is replied 2º from Aguirre, Gabriel a Conceptione, and others: the form of the logical artifact is attained by Logic "signately and as that which"; but definitive cognition attaining objects does not attain itself "signately and as that which." Therefore that form does not consist in such cognition but is its object. This is a mere equivocation. Granting the premises, I deny the consequence. For Logic attains that form through its own acts, which are the rules of defining, syllogizing, etc.; not through definitive cognitions attaining other objects, for example man, since these are not rules but objects of rules. It may be said: every definitive cognition is a logical act. I distinguish: logical objectively, I concede; subjectively, I deny. A definitive cognition of man or tree is subjectively an act of Physics, by whose habit it is physically produced and whose object it regards; but it is an act of Logic purely objectively, insofar as it is the object of its rules. Here note the inconsistency of the Adversaries, who, lest artificial cognition become false, say that a being of reason is known by it "practically and as that by which," not "signately and as that which"; yet here they intend the opposite. Note further that modern Thomists maintain that logical forms or intentions are known through direct cognitions, although St. Thomas (for example q. 7, *De potentia*, aa. 6 and 9; IV *Contra Gentiles*, c. 11) continually teaches that intentions of this kind are known only through reflexive cognition.

42. It is replied 3º: this cognition, "Man is an animal," affirms one thing of another, for this is proper to every affirmative proposition. Therefore it knows one and another. Therefore it knows duality and distinction in the object, which nevertheless is not in reality. It is confirmed 1º: a negative judgment is called "division," just as an affirmative is called "composition." But the negative is not so called because it is divided on the part of the act, but because it signifies objective division. Therefore likewise the affirmative is not so called because it is composed on the part of the act, but because it signifies objective composition, which, since it cannot be real, will be a being of reason. It is confirmed 2º: if judgment is a simple quality, on the part of the act there is no distinction or composition of subject and predicate; and yet there is an affirmation of one concerning another and an attribution of

predicate to subject, which necessarily supposes distinction. Therefore this distinction is known as standing on the part of the object. The point is urged: with the simplicity of judgment posited, still in the aforesaid proposition "man" is subject and "animal" is predicate, and not conversely. But really there is no stronger reason why one rather than the other should be subject or predicate, since there is only one indivisible entity, whether one considers the act or the real object. Therefore that man and animal stand thus depends solely upon a being of reason.

43. This objection, which I have not seen proposed and confirmed in this way in any Thomist, is intricate and difficult, not so much because of a being of reason as because of the obscure character and constitution of mental judgment, which belongs not here but to Animastics. To the reply it could easily be said that through mental judgment one thing is affirmed of another, not in such a way that duality is signately known, but in such a way that it is exercitively constituted in the object through extrinsic denomination from two concepts which are the formal predicate and subject. But I answer further from what was said in n. 33. The properly judicative concept presupposes simple apprehensions, for example "man, animal," and through them the object already intentionally distinguished, or already one and another. Then that concept, supervening, attributes the object of one apprehension to the object of the other, directly and assertively signifying the real identity of each; and in this sense it is said to affirm one thing of another. Hence all the duality and distinction is extrinsic to the object and not contrary to intrinsic identity; and it consists in the presupposed duality of apprehensions, which is known through the judicative concept by at least a certain implicit reflection. For, as the learned Ferrariensis, Most Illustrious Master General of the Order of Preachers says (In I *Contra Gentiles*, c. 59), "Cognition pertaining to the second operation of the intellect, which is absolutely direct cognition of a complex, can be called reflexive cognition in comparison with the simple apprehension of the thing, because the intellect cannot form a proposition unless it reflects upon simple cognition; and this is what St. Thomas intends, etc."

44. To confirmation 1º, conceding the major premise, I distinguish the minor: it signifies division properly taken, I deny; taken for distinction, I concede the minor. Then I distinguish the consequence: because it signifies composition properly so called, I deny; taken for identity, I concede the consequence. A negative judgment therefore signifies division of the object taken not for real separation but for distinction of the subject from the predicate. For it is truly said in the Trinity, "The Father is not the Son," without signifying separation of the Persons, but distinction alone. But since

identity is immediately opposed to distinction, an affirmative judgment signifies identity. Therefore the composition signified in the object outside the soul is not taken for a junction of distinct things but for identity, which every affirmative proposition signifies, as St. Thomas taught us above. This does not, however, prevent there being on the part of the act, in both affirmative and negative judgment, a composition truly so called from distinct concepts, concerning which St. Thomas speaks (I *Contra Gentiles*, c. 58) when he says: "The formal composition of a proposition through the intellect composing and dividing exists in the intellect itself, not in the thing which is outside the soul." Below he calls this "composition of reason." Here note the commentary of Ferrariensis: "By composition of reason St. Thomas does not understand a composition which is a being of reason as being of reason is distinguished from real being, but a composition and complex concept formed by intellect and reason, which is a real being, though distinguished from natural being which is represented outside the intellect." See how ancient is the exposition according to which we interpreted above St. Thomas distinguishing "being of reason" from "being of nature."

45. To confirmation 2º: distinction and composition, insofar as composition is a conjunction of things distinct, always stands on the part of the act, either formally, equivalently, or presuppositively. Formally, indeed, if judgment is a composite quality, as Aristotle and St. Thomas seem to suppose. Equivalently, if judgment is a simple quality; for even then it is equivalent to the three apprehensions "man, is, animal," and can be distinguished into as many parts by a new reflexive cognition. Then also presuppositively, insofar as the simple judgment presupposes those apprehensions and in them an extrinsic distinction of the object, from n. 43. Therefore affirmation and attribution consist in the judgment; but that the object be extrinsically "one and another" is not made by the simple judicative act, but presupposed. Hence no distinction is known on the part of the object outside the soul. What is added presses the Opponents equally. For why, I ask, does the simple judgment feign the intention of predicate rather in animal than in man? All therefore are bound to reduce this to the special mode of tending of that act, which, when it regards the prior apprehension "man" as a basis, denominates the object as known through it "subject," and when by identity it attributes to it the object as expressed through the apprehension "animal," denominates this latter "predicate." The opposite occurs in the judgment "Animal is man," from a diverse mode of tending, without any need for fiction.

46. It is objected 6º: this act, "Animal is a genus," does not predicate something real, but predicates "genus." Therefore genus is not something

real but of reason. The major premise is proved: first, that act does not predicate something essential to the subject, otherwise the predicate would also belong to the inferiors; next, neither does it predicate something accidental, for accidental predicates are said first of singulars rather than of the common nature, as is clear in the predicates "white, hot, etc." The objection is pressed by the denomination "prescissively known," or even "loved," when Good as such is loved. Likewise this act, "Animal is a genus causally" or "proximately fundamentally," suffers the same difficulty, and yet it predicates something constituted through cognition, as M. Aguilera, whose argument this is, admits. Therefore I deny the major premise. To the proof: that predicate is accidental, not physical but intentional. Intentional accidents need not first belong to singulars, but can immediately affect the common nature, as is clear from the examples adduced. Certainly St. Thomas, Opusc. 56, expressly teaches that "the universal, insofar as universal, is an accident," and that "it aggregates in itself an accident, namely second intention."

47. Finally, lest anything cause a scruple, I shall briefly touch upon other slight objections. 1º The artifice of every art is intrinsic to the matter about which it is concerned; therefore the artifice of Logic too will be intrinsic to its objects. 2º An extrinsic denomination is not something artificial, since it results naturally from cognition; therefore the logical artifact does not consist in such a denomination. 3º Logic regards a being of reason at least as a partial object. First, because "of contraries there is the same formal aspect and discipline," as Aristotle says. Therefore if Logic treats of real artifice, it must also treat of fictitious artifice. Secondly, because Logic teaches one to argue from an impossible hypothesis and to lead an adversary to absurd and impossible consequences; there chimerical beings must be feigned. Thirdly, because one of the treatises of Logic concerns a being of reason; and at least the present question directs the whole acuity of the mind toward a being of reason.

48. I answer to 1º: logical artifice is intrinsic to its proximate matter, namely the acts of reason themselves; nor need it be intrinsic to its remote matter, namely objects. Thus the artifice of painting is intrinsic to the colors, not to the represented objects. Or say that the antecedent is true of an artifice which perfects and changes matter, but not of one which purely denominates, as is clear from the same example of painting. To 2º: according to the Adversaries, a being of reason also naturally and necessarily results from enunciative cognition, for example. How, then, is it artificial? If they say that it indeed results from cognition, but from artificial cognition, let them regard the same as said to themselves. Whether in reality the logical

artifact consists in an extrinsic denomination we shall see in the following chapter. To 3º: we do not even concede this much to a being of reason if the discussion concerns the formal object. For first, for Logic to be said to concern contraries, it is sufficient that it treat of vicious and fallacious artifice as something to be avoided, in the sense in which Ethics treats of vices and Medicine of diseases. It need not treat of fictitious artifice, just as Theology does not treat of a fictitious God, nor Medicine of fictitious health. Next, the treatise on a Being of Reason, although inserted into Logic by many, is not logical but metaphysical; otherwise a being of reason in its whole breadth would pertain to Logic. The present question indeed regards a being of reason, but, as far as we are concerned, as alien to logical artifice or as an enemy of Logic. Therefore, if one wishes it to be an object of Logic, not as something Logic procures but as something it abhors, so be it. When one argues from an impossible hypothesis or to an impossibility, Logic regards formally only the artifice of argumentation consisting in acts; but chimerical objects it regards only materially and remotely.

CHAPTER VI.
Whether Objective Second Intentions in the Concrete Are the Formal Object of Logic?

1. Having dismissed fictitious being of reason, it is still asked whether Logic regards as its formal object objective concepts, that is, things according to intentional being, or, what comes to the same thing, objective second intentions in the concrete, constituted, namely, from the physical object and real cognition as form, as explained by us in Chapter 4, no. 3. Some of our Authors, following Fr. Hurtado, affirm this, if the question concerns a partial object. Some outsiders agree. But both speak rather perplexedly and do not sufficiently explain whether they intend both parts of the concrete to be regarded formally by Logic. The negative position, which I embrace, is common in our School with the Excellent Doctor, who acknowledges no formal object of Logic besides acts of the Intellect.

2. It is proved, 1º, by the authority of St. Thomas, Opusc. 56, about the middle, where, after premising that a Universal, for example a Genus, is composed as it were of two parts, namely, the nature subjected and cognition as form, which he calls the intention of universality, he adds: "It is impossible for one and the same science to determine of the Universal of itself with respect to those two natures which it includes, but rather of one of itself and of the other accidentally. Therefore Logic, when it considers the Universal, does not consider it of itself with respect to the nature subjected;

for it does not consider man insofar as he is man, but insofar as he is a Species, and likewise with the other animals. And therefore Logic is principally concerned with second intentions.... The other sciences, however, consider the Universal with respect to the thing subjected... and do not consider that which formally makes the Universal." You see that Logic does not so regard this concrete "Universal" (and the same reasoning applies to the other intentions in the concrete) as to consider it "of itself" with respect to the subject, but only with respect to the form, which is the objective second intention in the abstract, or direct cognition itself; whereas the other sciences proceed in the contrary manner.

3. It is proved, 2º: Logic does not formally regard a second intention in the concrete, for example a Genus, unless besides the form it also formally regards the subject; for the form alone is not the concrete. But Logic does not formally regard the subject of the intention of Genus, for example the nature of animal. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved: the nature of animal is not attained by Logic for its own sake; therefore it is not formally regarded. The antecedent is proved: that nature, insofar as it is distinguished from cognition, has no intrinsic sufficiency or formality which is the motive of logical consideration. This is clear: for if it had any, it would be an intrinsic capacity to be known artfully; the Adversaries assign no other. But a capacity of this sort cannot be the sufficiency or formal motive for its being attained by Logic: both because, since this capacity is found in each and every formality of all possible things, indeed even of impossible things, it would follow that Logic ought to treat of each and every one of them and be omniscient; and because such a capacity is a transcendent, necessary predicate, not producible, not directible, and in no way dependent upon the rules of art. All of these attributes are incompatible with the formal object of Logic, since according to the Adversaries Logic is truly practical, or similar to the practical in its manner of proceeding.

4. You will say: although Logic does not regard the nature of animal and other things when taken separately or in isolation, it nevertheless does regard them as clothed with cognition, so that by one stroke it is borne immediately toward cognition and the thing known, insofar as they are parts of the one concrete "known thing." Although the Intellect by the same stroke is borne immediately toward the whole concrete "known thing," or "Genus," nevertheless, since the whole formal and motive reason of that stroke or act is not in the entity of the things but in cognition alone, which is really distinct from the things, the things themselves are at most the proximate and intrinsic material object. For it does not exceed the limits of a material object that it is attained because of a formal reason really distinct

from itself, however proximately it is attained by the same act. Thus, when the Will loves medicine because of health, when Faith assents to a mystery because of revelation, when Charity loves men because of God, health alone, revelation alone, and the goodness of God alone are the formal object; medicine, the mystery, and men, although proximately attained by the same act, are only material objects.

5. When you say that the thing known is regarded "insofar as it is part of the concrete," either you reduplicate something extrinsic to the entity of the thing, namely, the tendency of cognition by which the thing is constituted in the being of an actual part of the concrete "known thing"; or you reduplicate only the intrinsic capacity of the thing. If you choose the first, then the thing is attained because of something extrinsic to itself, and the objection of no. 4 returns. If the second, the argument of no. 3 presses again. By the same dilemma you will press the Adversaries whenever they say that physical things are considered by Logic not according to themselves but with respect to cognition, whether as capable of being objectified, capable of being defined, capable of being enunciated, etc. For either that respect, that capacity for objectification, or that capacity for definition which they propose as the motive of logical consideration is something intrinsic to the things themselves, or it is something extrinsic consisting in possible or existing cognition. Whatever they choose, the objection returns.

6. It is proved, 3º: the art of painting, although it regards man as painted, regards him solely because of the painting or image, and in this concrete "painted man" formally regards nothing except the form. Therefore Logic proceeds likewise when it considers things as artfully known. The reasoning is the same in both arts. For just as in one there are an object expressed by colors, a panel receiving the image, and the image itself, so in the other there are an object represented by cognition, the Intellect as a panel receiving formal concepts, and the concepts themselves as images, expressions, and intentional pictures of things. Hence, just as painting formally considers the image alone and for its own sake, while the object and the panel materially and for the sake of another, so Logic conducts its business with due proportion. The examples of Rhetoric and Grammar also support this. For with equal right Grammar could be said formally to consider things signified or capable of being signified, as Logic considers things defined or capable of being defined. For just as Logic is the art of defining, so Grammar is the art of speaking correctly about all things. Nevertheless Grammar formally regards only speech as grammatically correct.

Solution of the Objections.

7. It is objected, 1º: that is a partial formal object of Logic of which some acts of Logic are verified. But not a few acts of Logic are verified only of objective concepts, or of objects invested with cognition. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved: these acts, "A Genus is Predicable of many things differing in species. The Predicate of an affirmative proposition must be identified with the Subject. The Definition must be convertible with the Defined. In a Syllogism the Extremes must be identified with the Middle," and other similar acts, are truly logical; and yet they are verified only of objects underlying cognition, as will be clear to one who considers the matter. Hence almost the whole of Logic concerns not so much the acts of the Intellect in themselves as second intentions in the concrete, or things insofar as denominated by cognition; for it is almost entirely occupied in explaining "Genus, Species, Difference, Subject, Predicate, Middle, Extremes, etc.," which names properly belong to objective concepts and are only improperly applied to formal ones. This argument, first of all, does not help the Thomists, who admit nothing real among the formal objects of Logic; for those acts are by no means verified of a being of reason, as is evident of itself.

8. Next, neither does it favor objective concepts of second intention, that is, concretes or denominations constituted from an object and direct cognition. For neither is the denomination of Genus predicable of inferiors, nor is the denomination of Subject identified with the denomination of Predicate, and so with the rest. Those acts, therefore, are verified of the object alone outside the soul, taken specifically, with a form of reason at most connoted as a mere condition. Indeed, the second and fourth, as they sound, regard a thing entirely independent of a form of reason, namely, real identity. If, therefore, the function of a formal object is to verify an act, there will be several truly logical acts that formally regard things alone according to physical being, so that the form of reason is at most an objective condition. Yet the Authors with whom we are now dealing seem to reject this.

9. Finally, it is customarily answered in two ways. 1º, by denying the major: for that which verifies an act is not always its formal object, namely, whenever it is attained because of a motive or formal reason really distinct from it. Thus, when by divine or human faith we assent to objects otherwise unknown, these assents are verified of the things believed, although the

authority of the speaker alone is their formal object. The same occurs in acts of a mechanical art, for example this one: "A house ought to be suitable for habitation," which is principally verified of the matter of the house, which is only the material object. Hence it is no obstacle that in the concrete "Genus," for example, not the form but the subject is imported and defined directly; for it must be denied that acts or definitions dealing with accidental concretes must formally regard what is directly imported by the name of the concrete, as is clear in these cases: "revealed mystery, habitable house, thing correctly signified." Add that it is falsely said that almost the whole of Logic concerns such concretes; for the principal precepts of Logic are properly verified of acts of the Intellect, as will be clear in the following chapter.

10. 2º, I distinguish the minor: acts of Logic are verified, etc., if they are taken as they sound, I grant; if they are explained according to the intention of Logic, I deny the minor and the consequence. To the proof I answer: if those acts are explained according to the intention of Logic, they yield a sense of this kind: "The concept of genus must be such that it renders a nature predicable; the formal Definition and formal Defined must be verified of the same object; the formal Subject and Predicate must represent objects really identified; in a Syllogism the real identity of the Extremes with a third thing and with each other must be expressed." Think the same of the rest. Thus explained, however, they are undoubtedly properly verified of formal concepts and directly regard them. The same comes to what others say, namely, that the aforesaid acts of Logic, as they stand, are verified of formal concepts, not "as that which" but "as that by which," not "in being" but "in representing." For although the formal subject and predicate are not what is identified, they nevertheless represent objects really identified; and although the concept "animal" is not what is predicated, it is that by which the object is rendered predicable.

11. Nor is this interpretation, as the Adversaries object against us, forced or gratuitously invented. First, because the intention of Logic, as will appear from what has been said and from what will be said, is to teach the Intellect the manner of rightly conceiving, so that from a crowd of concepts it may reject the unsuitable and select the orderly. Therefore the sense of all the precepts of Logic must concern the selection of cognitions. Second, because, as we argued elsewhere, those acts, insofar as they are truly logical, are prescriptive and directive, which the Adversaries do not deny and which is clear from the word "ought" or a similar formula in which they are commonly delivered. Therefore they intend the production of that object which they principally regard, or of which they are verified in the logical sense. But the objective identity of subject with predicate, or of the extremes

with the middle, cannot be produced by the direction of art, nor could it be prescribed by Logic except foolishly. Therefore it is not such identity, but its mental representation, which verifies those acts in the logical sense. Almost the same occurs in every art. Thus Poetics, when dictating that Neptune be taken for the sea, Vulcan for fire, Ceres for grain, speaks about words, not things. Thus also, if an experienced Painter, asked by a novice how an Elephant should be painted, replies, "This beast must have an ugly appearance, limbs of such and such a size, a long trunk, two teeth projecting from its mouth, etc.," these are precepts which in their mere sound speak of the Elephant in being, yet a novice who is not stupid will understand them of the Elephant in representing, namely, of the painting.

12. If you infer: therefore this act, "A Genus is that which can be predicated of several things differing in species," and other acts of similar tendency, which are given, and as they are given, in the Treatise on Predicables, will not be formally logical in the sense which they present. I answer: according to the response of no. 10, I deny the consequence. But according to the solution just given, those acts as they sound are partly logical and partly metaphysical. They pertain to Logic insofar as they regard the formal and expressed signification, namely, predicability, which is a form of reason; but to Metaphysics insofar as they regard the material signification, namely, the subjected nature, which, although imported directly and serving to verify the act, is nevertheless signified confusedly. Nor is this inconvenient, for it is established that logical doctrine can scarcely be delivered without an admixture of Metaphysics and indeed of Psychology. Add that a subalternated science is not distinguished from the subalternating science according to absolutely all its acts.

13. It is objected, 2º: the concretes "Genus," "Subject," "Predicate," and the like pertain to some science according to all the parts they involve. But they pertain to no other than Logic. Therefore, etc. I answer: first, not every concrete or extrinsic denomination must be assigned to some science, as is evident in "loved, seen, touched, mocked." Next, for these concretes to pertain to Logic, it is not necessary that each part have the function of a formal object. It is enough that one be attained formally and the other materially by logical acts, as occurs with these concretes: "correctly signified, ornately expressed, vividly portrayed," with the parallel of Grammar, Rhetoric, and Painting. You will say: because a natural composite pertains to Physics, Physics regards as its formal object not only form but also matter; Architecture does the same when it regards and constructs a house. Therefore likewise in our case. I answer: what is said of Physics is true not because the natural composite pertains to it in some manner, but because

each of its parts participates in the notion of "mobile being," which is considered the formal reason under which Physics tends toward its object. But the material part of the concrete "Genus," insofar as distinguished from the formal part, does not participate in the formal reason of the object of Logic, which is a rectitude producible by art. What is assumed of Architecture, however, is false; for no art formally regards the matter of the artifact which it constructs, but only the form.

14. It is objected, 3º: Logic formally treats of the Truth of cognitions. But Truth is something resulting concretely from act and object. Therefore Logic formally considers both. This argument was solved above, Chapter 3, no. 11. It is objected, 4º: Psychology treats not only of acts of the Intellect but also of their objects. Therefore Logic likewise. Confirmation 1º: Logic formally considers the difference between a probable and an evident Syllogism; this difference consists in the things themselves, or at least depends upon them. Confirmation 2º, from Fr. Lynceus: man is so ordered to God clearly seen that not only the vision but God Himself is the end of man. Therefore Logic is so ordered to Genus, Species, and other intentional concretes that not only cognition but also the thing known is its end and formal object. Confirmation 3º, from the same: everything of which a science professedly disputes is its formal object. But Logic professedly disputes about objective concepts, at least in the present question. Therefore, etc.

15. To the objection, I deny the antecedent if the question concerns formal treatment. For although the objects of vital acts are discussed in Psychology, this is done through admixed acts of Physics and Metaphysics. For the treatment of the True and the Good as such, which are the objects of the Intellect and Will, properly pertains to Metaphysics; and the treatment of color and light, sound, taste, and the rest, which are objects of the senses, pertains to Physics. To the first confirmation: that difference consists intrinsically and formally in the entity and representation of the assents; for evidence and probability are properties of cognition, like clarity and obscurity. Although it depends extrinsically and objectively upon the things themselves, Logic does not therefore direct or formally consider them, but presupposes them as supplied from elsewhere, just as it does not consider as a formal object the Intellect or the impressed species upon which probability or evidence depends efficiently.

16. To the second, I deny the consequence: because God Himself, insofar as distinguished from the vision, possesses the reason and motive why He is the end of man; for by His intrinsic beauty He makes man blessed and happy. Hence He is the principal end, while vision is the attainment of the end. But Logic, whose end is the artifice of the Mode of Knowing, finds nothing in

things outside the soul in which it may rest. Hence it considers cognitions alone formally, since the entire reason of the artifice is in them. Indeed, if the proposed parallel held, it would prove that Logic is more principally ordered to things according to physical being than to cognitions, which is contrary to the objector. It would also prove that Logic professedly deals with the intrinsic and specific predicates of all things, so that no one would be fully a Logician unless he were omniscient. Nor should you say that the same absurdity follows if Logic regards the objects of cognitions at least as its material object. For a material object is not professedly examined by sciences, but only incidentally, sparingly, and insofar as the necessity of the formal object requires. But the artifice which is the formal object of Logic, insofar as dictated by its general rules, usually does not require more than a ready and general knowledge of things.

17. The third Confirmation proves that all real beings and beings of reason, even chimerical ones, both in common and in particular and under every formality, can be numbered among the formal objects of Logic, whenever one chooses to dispute whether all these are the formal object of Logic. It also proves that everything about which it is disputed whether it is a formal object actually is one, even though the negative side be shown with evidence. This is remarkable. Therefore the formal object of Logic is that whose nature and properties Logic directly investigates, not that of which it merely asks whether it is an object, so that, after fuller consideration and as though the case were known, it may declare it spurious and reject it. For this is attained only, and, if you wish, formally, through reflexive speculative acts which pertain to Logic not properly but reductively. More briefly, what we said in the preceding chapter in a similar case may be said: objective concepts are the formal object of Logic not insofar as Logic embraces them, but insofar as it rejects them.

An Allied Doubt Is Resolved.

18. Although in concretes of second intention constituted from a thing outside the soul and direct cognition, all of which for brevity we include under the name "rightly known," the formal object of Logic is only the denominating form, namely, artful cognition, while the material object is the thing denominated, it is still doubted whether cognition is formally intended by Logic insofar as it is right in itself, or rather insofar as it derives upon the object the denomination "rightly known," so that the "rightly known," insofar as it is a concrete constituted from subject and form, is that artifact which the art of Logic intends of itself, just as a statue or house, insofar as it

is a work constituted from matter and form, is the artifact intended of itself by Statuary or Architecture. This latter position Fr. Mauri, q. 9, proem., defends and advances with great subtlety, citing many of the older authors. Fr. John Baptist de Benedictis, q. proem. c. 5, § 2, seems to think the same. Such is also the mind of the Thomists, especially the more recent, except that they hold the form of that artifact to be fictitious, while our authors hold it to be real cognition. Both, however, maintain that the material object of Logic, or its proximate, immediate matter attained of itself, is all beings outside the soul which underlie or can underlie a form of reason, just as marble is the proper matter of Statuary.

19. For this position it is argued, 1º: the whole labor of every art is concerned with adapting an artificial form to some matter, so that from both an artifact results. But in the art of Logic there is no other matter to which an artificial form is adapted besides the object of direct cognition. Therefore the whole labor of Logic consists in fitting cognition to the object so that the denomination "rightly known" results as the proper artifact of Logic. The major is clear in Statuary, Architecture, and other arts. The minor is proved: first, cognition itself is not the matter of the artifact, but according to us the artificial form, or according to the Thomists the action of the artisan. Next, neither is the Intellect the proper matter of Logic: both because it is scarcely named in the whole of Aristotle's Logic; because right cognitions are not defined by an order to the Intellect but to objects outside the soul; and because the denomination or concrete "Intellect rightly understanding" is not intended by Logic, but by Ethics, whose end according to Aristotle is the happiness of man insofar as he rightly understands and wills. Since, therefore, no other matter can be devised, that minor is true. Confirmation: no art intends an artificial form in the abstract and as though torn away from matter. Therefore neither does Logic intend right cognition in the abstract, but rather as concreted with an object.

20. Argument 2º: the proper matter of artifacts is that of which an art treats in order to the form, especially if the form also is explained in order to that matter. But in the Books of Predicables and Categories Logic treats of things in order to operations of predicating, while in the Books *Perihermenias* and Analytics it explains the operations themselves of the Intellect in order to things. Therefore things are the proper matter of the artifacts of Logic, just as the operation of the mind is the form. Argument 3º: the whole difficulty of Logic consists in conforming acts of the mind to things; for once this conformity is established, nothing remains for the art to overcome. But this conformity consists in fitting the act to the object as form to matter. Argument 4º: in the Intellect there is no disposition of acts which is artful,

for acts are not disposed there as in a space; nor do they otherwise have an order of time, since the parts of a Syllogism or proposition, if there are such parts, exist simultaneously in time in the mind. Therefore the logically artful disposition is considered as poured back upon the object, which is rendered disposed in a certain manner by the acts, as marble is by the figure of the statue.

21. Argument 5º: Logic intends of itself right cognition as extrinsically united to an object. Therefore it intends of itself the concrete resulting therefrom as its proper artifact. The consequence is clear from the parallel of Statuary, which therefore intends of itself a marble statue because it intends of itself the figure as united to marble. The antecedent is proved: because Logic intends of itself a mental definition as representing the essence of the thing; but this representation is a union by which the definition is rendered extrinsically united to the object. Confirmation: to that which produces the ultimate determinant from which a concrete necessarily results, the whole concrete as such is of itself attributed; nor for any other reason is a physical composite attributed to a generator, and a whole house or statue attributed of itself to an art. But by its rules Logic produces right cognition, from which the concrete or denomination "rightly known" necessarily results. Therefore, etc. Add that Logic frequently uses the names of concretes of this kind, such as "Genus, Species, Difference, Defined, Subject, Predicate, etc.," which are therefore called logical concretes or logical denominations. It uses them, I say, no less than Architecture uses "Wall, Vault, House, Temple, etc.," which signify its artifacts.

22. Because of these considerations this position is quite probable. And at least it can very probably and without inconvenience be granted that Logic intends such concretes of itself as secondary objects, provided that the form of reason is not fictitious but true, namely, artful cognition, as our Authors suppose. Nevertheless, it is more probable and more commonly received in our School that Logic does not of itself, at least primarily, intend cognitions as denominating objects, or as extrinsically concreted with things, but rather insofar as they are artful in themselves. Hence we assert that the artifact intended of itself and primarily by Logic is not this concrete "rightly known," but rather "artful cognition." The first reason is that according to St. Thomas, cited in no. 2, Logic considers the matter of this concrete "Universal" not "of itself" but "accidentally." But no art considers merely accidentally the proper matter of its primarily intended artifact, as is clear in Statuary and other arts.

23. 2º, because, as the same St. Doctor teaches in the Proemium to the *Ethics*, the proper artificial form of Logic is "the Order which Reason by considering makes in its own act," just as the form intended by mechanical arts is "the Order which Reason by considering makes in external things," as "in a chest or house." Therefore the proper form of Logic is related to the act of reason as the form of a house to external matter. Therefore, just as the artifact of Architecture is "external matter ordered," so the artifact of Logic is "an act of Reason ordered." Certainly, on the contrary position, the form of the art of Logic is an order which Reason makes not in its own act but in the object. 3º, because, as the same Angelic Doctor says in II *Posterior Analytics*, lect. 1, Logic concerns "the very act of reason as its proper matter." Therefore the proper matter which Logic forms into an artifact is the act itself of reason. He adds there that Logic "directs us in the act of reason." But every art directs us toward its artifact, for example Architecture toward a house.

24. 4º: that is the artifact intended of itself and primarily by an art which, once possessed, would satisfy the art even if by impossibility the rest were lacking. But once artful cognition, for example Demonstration, is possessed, the art of Logic would be satisfied even if by impossibility the denomination "rightly known" were not derived upon the object, or even if abstraction were made from such derivation. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved: Logic would then obtain that for which it was invented. Therefore it would be satisfied. The antecedent is proved: "the art of Logic was invented so that the Intellect might proceed in an orderly, easy, and error-free manner in the very act of Reason," as St. Thomas testifies (*In II Posterior Analytics*, lect. 1). But once a mental demonstration were possessed, the Intellect would proceed in that manner "in the very act of reason," as is evident, even if we abstract from the denomination passively derived upon the object or by impossibility remove it. Therefore, etc. Confirmation: if the passive denomination were removed, the very rectitude of understanding, or ordered representation of this act, "Rational animal," in preference to this, "Living thing capable of laughter," would still be worthy that the art of Logic be taught for its sake; the Intellect could still err in producing it and other acts; and from them it would still receive the same utility as it now does. Therefore the end and purpose of Logic, and consequently its proper artifact, would still remain. Nor is it an obstacle that the passive denomination necessarily results. For the art of building does not of itself and primarily intend the shadow necessarily resulting from a house, nor the relation of similarity or dissimilarity of the house to other things, however necessarily it follows, for the reasons just stated.

25. 5º, because the parallel of Grammar, Rhetoric, and Painting presses again. For by almost the same arguments it could be proved that the proper artifact of those arts is the object "correctly signified, ornately expressed, vividly painted." Nevertheless, although those concretes and passive denominations necessarily result, they are not the artifacts intended of themselves and primarily by those arts, but rather these: "Correct Speech, Ornate Expression, Vivid Image." Therefore we must philosophize likewise concerning the art of Logic. Add 1º that Logic, according to all, is not a productive but an active art, while active arts intend no work beyond the very operations of the agent: "but the end is the exercise and the action," as Aristotle says, whose excellent passage may be seen above, disp. 1, c. 10, no. 14. Add 2º that there is no other art whose proper artifact consists in a mere extrinsic denomination that changes nothing in the matter. Therefore neither is such the artifact of Logic, if the example of other arts with which the Opponents arm themselves has any force. But what is to be said to their arguments?

26. To the first, I deny the minor. To the proof: the very entity of cognition, according to predicates formally distinct from the artifice, is the matter to which Logic adapts the artful form; nor is a real distinction between matter and form required for this. Thus Prudence adapts moral rectitude to acts of the Will, from which that rectitude is really indistinct. Thus also the Art of dancing adapts to movements of the feet an artifice really indistinct from them. Nor do we hold that the Intellect is the proximate matter of Logic; it is only remote matter, just as the panel is the remote matter of Painting while colors are the proximate matter. Nor again do we hold that this concrete, "Intellect rightly understanding," is the artifact or intrinsic end of Logic. It is only an extrinsic and as it were mediate end, which, if you wish, Ethics may immediately regard. It is therefore related to Logic as these concretes, "Man speaking correctly," "speaking ornately," or "dancing rightly," are related to Grammar, Rhetoric, or the Art of dancing. But the passive denomination in the object is not even in this way an end of Logic, which intends to perfect the Intellect, not the object, as can be explained by the same examples. To the confirmation: although Logic does not regard the artifice as concreted with objects, it does not therefore regard it as torn away from matter, but rather as concreted with the entity of cognition, just as Prudence regards rectitude as concreted with acts of the Will as its proper matter.

27. To the second: the Books of Categories and Predicables, insofar as they pertain to the primary intention of Logic, do not treat of things as the matter of a logical artifact, but as extrinsic terms of mental artifice, just as

Rhetoric or Painting also considers things in order to express them well, yet not as the proper matter of its artifact, but as extrinsic terms of ornate expression or of an image. Hence I grant that the operations of the Intellect are explained by Logic in order to things or objects, but no otherwise than an image is explained by Painting in order to its object, or a cause is defined in order to its effect; namely, not as in order to a subject or denominable matter, but only as in order to a pure term or extrinsic specifying object. To the third: the example of Painting again returns, whose whole difficulty could with greater reason be said to lie in conforming images to objects and consequently in fitting both together as form with matter. Therefore, just as the conformity of an image with an object is not intended of itself and primarily by Painting insofar as it is on the side of the object or passively denominates it, but only insofar as it denotes a right disposition of colors, so the same must be said in our case.

28. To the fourth: what the artful disposition of formal concepts in themselves is will be explained in the following chapter. Meanwhile we say that, for cognition to be called rightly disposed or rightly placed, it is enough that by the prescription of Logic a cognition representing in such a manner be produced rather than another representing otherwise, although the very manner of representing is not really distinct from cognition. This may be explained by the example of the rectitude of acts of the will from no. 26. To the fifth, I deny the antecedent, if the question concerns the primary intention by which an art tends toward its proximate artifact. To the proof: the representation of cognition is indeed an extrinsic and intentional union of the act with the object. Yet it is not formally and explicitly intended insofar as it is a union, but only insofar as it is artful representation in itself. Thus the same representation is vital, yet Logic does not formally and explicitly intend it as vital. Thus also correct speech and an image are extrinsic unions of themselves with their objects, since no other union is needed for the passive denominations "signified" and "painted" immediately to result; and yet they are not formally intended by their arts insofar as they are such unions.

29. To the Confirmation. The major is true only of one producing the ultimate determinant formally as such, or with the intention of determining the existence of the concrete. Such an intention is present in a physical generator, in an art inducing the form of a statue or house, and generally whenever the form of the concrete is intrinsic to the subject and instituted for perfecting it. But if the ultimate determinant is not produced as such and because it is such, but under another reason or function desirable of itself, it does not then ground the attribution, at least the primary attribution, of the

whole concrete. This is again clear in Grammar and Painting, to which the concretes "correctly signified" and "painted" are not attributed in this way, although they produce correct speech and an image, which are the ultimate determinants of the concretes. Since, therefore, Logic produces right cognition under the function of artful representation, which is most desirable of itself, and not under the function of determining or deriving an extrinsic denomination, which is scarcely worth desiring since it in no way perfects the thing denominated, it follows that the whole denomination is not of itself and primarily attributed to Logic. Thus, when right cognition is produced, the denomination "similar" or "dissimilar" to other acts preexisting in the World necessarily results in it, without Logic therefore caring for or intending such a denomination of itself.

30. What is adduced from the use of names proves at most that such concretes are attained of themselves by some secondary acts of Logic, among which may be numbered the definitions of the five Predicables when their signification is preserved as it presents itself at first sight. For I will not obstinately deny that there are some acts of Logic which consider those concretes of themselves and consequently regard things outside the soul as their proximate material object. Yet these acts are secondary and introduced into Logic because the consideration of passive denominations is often useful for better knowing and regulating the artifice of cognition in itself. Thus Architecture often considers how a constructed house is similar or dissimilar to other buildings, certainly by certain secondary acts, without therefore being said absolutely to intend the denomination "similar." Moreover, the proper names of the artifacts of Logic are not those which the objection enumerates, if they are taken objectively, but rather these: "Definition, Division, Syllogism, Demonstration, etc.," which properly signify artful cognitions.

CHAPTER VII.
Is the Formal Object of Logic Directly Established in Acts of the Intellect?

Although it is sufficiently gathered from what has been said in this Disputation that the formal object of Logic consists in the real rectitude of the operations of the Intellect, we shall nevertheless give other arguments by which this same point is immediately and directly proved. But first some things must be premised for clarity.

§ 1. How Many Operations of the Intellect There Are, and How Far They Are Directible by Art.

1. As far as the present matter concerns us, an operation of the human Intellect is a certain image, expression, and representation of an object, produced by the Intellect and received in it, by which a man is rendered formally and actually knowing. This is called cognition, concept or conception, intellection or act of the Intellect, and mental word. Three are commonly assigned. The first is called "pure Apprehension," which so represents an object that it neither denies nor affirms anything of it. If it represents by a certain simple intuition which cannot by reflexive precision be divided into two expressions, it is called "entirely simple Apprehension," such as corresponds to these words, "God, Man, Army," and the like. But if it either consists of expressions really distinct and united together, or is equivalent to them in representing without real composition, it is called "complex Apprehension," or also "simple in a qualified sense," insofar as it is neither entirely simple nor yet has that composition of subject and predicate which is proper to the second operation of the Intellect. We express this kind of apprehension by complex terms or imperfect spoken phrases, for example, "Rational animal, Learned man, Almighty God."

2. The second operation of the mind is called judgment, and also assent or dissent, enunciation, and mental proposition, and it is a representation of an object by affirming or denying. This is called "composition and division," or an operation "composing and dividing," signally and on the part of the object, composition and division being taken for the objective identity and distinction of the extremes, as we explained in Chapter 5. It is also said to "compose the formal subject and predicate" exercitively and on the part of the act, whether it affirms or denies, because either it is an act really composed of as many concepts as there are words in this spoken proposition, for example, "Man is an animal," or at least it presupposes as many apprehensive concepts and contains them virtually or equivalently. Nor should logical doctrine be made dependent upon whether a judgment or complex apprehension is a really indivisible act or is really composite, although the latter is commonly supposed for clarity of speech. Finally, the third operation of the Intellect is called discourse, and is the progress of the mind from one or more judgments to another which arises from them. This is called Argumentation, whose various species you have in the *Summulae*.

3. Now, for an operation to be directible by art, it is required that it be capable of being performed in various ways, well or badly, so that in it a rational Agent can err or deviate from the right end. In this sense it is supposed or proved throughout the School that the operations of the Intellect, at least the second and third, are directible by art, and no one will deny it unless he declares Logic altogether idle. What might stand in the way was solved in disp. 1, c. 10, n. 16. Nor do those differ except verbally who hold that not the act but the mind or man is properly directed; for they take "to be directed" as "to be taught" or "instructed," whereas here it is taken as "to be dictated" or "prescribed by rules," in which sense we say that human acts are directed by Prudence. Some, however, with Fr. Hurtado deny that the first operation of the Intellect is directible by art. Their position rests upon these arguments. 1º, because pure apprehension is incapable of error; therefore also of direction. The antecedent is clear: both because it is incapable of falsity, which can be found only in judgment; because there is no apprehension which cannot serve some true proposition; and because it always turns out to be conformable to the object apprehended, and likewise to some rule of Logic. For if it is useless for forming a Genus, it will form a Difference, Property, or some other logical Predicable. 2º, because once the species of the object is posited, apprehension necessarily results, just as external vision does once the species of color is posited. Therefore, just as vision is incapable of direction, so is apprehension.

4. 3º: what does not fall under the command of the Will cannot be directed by art. But apprehension does not fall under the command of the Will. This is proved: when the Will commands the Intellect to form the Genus "Animal," for example, is "Animal" already conceived, or not? If the first, then the Intellect already possesses the apprehension forming that Genus, and consequently direction and command supervene in vain. If the second, then, since the Will cannot command except what is previously known, that command will be impossible. 4º: Ethics does not direct the simplest complacencies of the Will. Therefore neither does Logic direct the simple apprehensions of the Intellect. 5º: Logic does not direct acts of the imagination and external senses, although the Intellect not rarely takes from them the occasion of error. Therefore the same must be said of apprehension. 6º: simple Apprehension is incapable of artifice, for this requires composition of parts. Therefore it is also incapable of direction.

5. Notwithstanding these arguments, the common and true position holds that apprehension, whether entirely simple or complex, can be directed by the art of Logic. Not every apprehension, indeed, nor with respect to all circumstances; for in this way neither is the second operation

always directible, since a judgment often results necessarily and without deliberation, as when we see the Sun rising. But apprehension is directible in many instances and often, especially in the examination of difficult and abstruse things, by which we acquire sciences. It is proved, 1º, by the authority of St. Thomas in the proemium to II *Posterior Analytics* and I *Perihermenias*, where he distributes the doctrine of the art of Logic among the three operations of the Intellect and assigns to each its own parts of logical consideration. But Logic is occupied with operations of the Intellect as a "directive art," as the same St. Doctor teaches in the cited place of the *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore it finds directibility in all three operations.

6. It is proved, 2º, by reason. First concerning complex apprehension: for according to the common position a Definition is found in it. But in forming a definition the Intellect can proceed not rightly but badly, by employing, for example, a remote Genus in place of the proximate, or an accident in place of a Difference, or by adding something superfluous, or even by joining predicates incompatible with each other. Therefore, in order that it may easily avoid these defects, the direction of Logic is useful, and for this reason Logic supplies so many rules for rightly forming a definition. Nor should you say with Fr. Hurtado that Logic treats of Definition only in order to the judgment in which it is predicated of the Defined, and consequently only insofar as it is a part of a proposition. For it will be answered against you that, although it is true that the first operation is ordered to the second, as the second also to the third, nevertheless each in its own order or line is capable of disorder and defect before it reaches the other. Thus a marble hand, although fashioned in order to a statue, can be defective in itself, as if it had six fingers or only four. Therefore, just as the hand demands direction and rules proper to itself, so does a definition, which certainly before it actually composes a proposition is liable to the defects just enumerated, and the rules of the *Summulae* are concerned with avoiding them.

7. Hence St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q. 17, a. 4, c.) teaches that some falsity can fall upon the first operation of the Intellect, which is definition, not only "insofar as the Intellect attributes the definition of one thing to another, as if it attributed the definition of a circle to man," but also "insofar as it composes together parts of a definition which cannot be associated together. For in this way the definition is not only false with respect to some thing," namely, to which it is attributed through judgment, "but is also false in itself," namely, apart from judgment; "as if it formed such a definition, Rational four-footed animal, the Intellect is false in thus defining." Thus St. Thomas. Understand this of inchoate, radical, or virtual falsity, which can be found even before judgment, as we say elsewhere. This

proof holds even if those apprehensions which are called complex are indivisible acts. For the Intellect is still indifferent whether, in place of an act representing an object according to the norm of Logic, it elicits another discordant with its rules.

8. Next, the same is proved of incomplex or entirely simple apprehension. For by it Genus, Species, and the other Predicables are formed. But the Intellect can err in forming these. This is proved: because the Intellect, when about to form the proximate Genus of man, although it notices the agreement of man with brutes in the operation of sensing, is not necessarily determined to the apprehension "Animal," which alone is suitable for such a Genus, but can elicit one of these: "Animals," "Things sensing," neither of which is useful; the former because it expresses a multitude, the latter because it bears upon an accident. Therefore, in order that the Intellect may omit useless apprehensions and select useful ones, it must first be taught what conditions are required in an apprehension that is to form a Genus or any other Predicable. Therefore it must be directed by doctrine or by rules of art, as it is in fact directed in the Treatises on Universals and Predicables, which pertain to simple apprehensions; the Treatise on Categories also belongs here.

9. Nor do the contrary arguments establish the opposite. To the first: apprehension is incapable of error if error is taken for formal falsity, which is found only in judgment; but not if error is taken for disorder with respect to the logical end or for discordance with rules, as we have just shown. In this sense acts of the Will and external actions are said to be capable of error. How complex apprehension admits falsity we saw in no. 7. Nor is it an obstacle that every apprehension can serve some true proposition. For in order that it be directed by Logic it is enough that it can fail to serve the propositions in order to which Logic teaches the formation of Genus, Species, etc. Grant also that apprehension always conforms to its object; it does not therefore necessarily conform to the rules of Logic which dictate a definite manner of representing. I ask, to what rule does this act conform: "Rational four-footed animal"? Or these: "Animals, Fishes, Men"?

10. But suppose every apprehension to conform to some rule of Logic. It could still be erroneous, at least negatively, by frustrating the rules to which attention is here and now given. For if the Intellect, applied to operating according to the rules for forming a Genus, forms a Species, it will err no less than in the second operation if, when applied to predicating a Genus, it predicates a Species; or no less than a Painter who, intending to paint a man, paints a horse; or a mason who, intending to make a square stone, makes an arched one. It will err, I say, not so much by positive as by negative error,

insofar as it fails to produce the work dictated by the rules actually illuminating it. For Logic does not disapprove the formation of a Species absolutely, but does not prescribe it here and now. Through these rules, however, it disapproves the absence of the Genus or anything incompatible with it in the state of existence. This may be explained by the examples just given. Hence some authors wrongly infer that the artifice of acts of the Intellect depends upon extrinsic circumstances, because in the case given the formation of a Species in place of a Genus is rejected by Logic as inartful because of the circumstance of an improper time. With equal right the same could be inferred of the artifice of a painting or stone, contrary to the mind of all. It follows only that the formation of a Species then lacks the artifice which they call formal and which imports an extrinsic denomination from rules actually directing, as will be said below.

11. To the second: apprehension often indeed precedes the direction of art, which also occurs with judgment. But often the species of objects are not so vivid that they necessarily produce apprehensions, or at least do not determine some rather than others, as in the case of no. 8. The opposite happens in external vision. To the third, I deny the minor. To the proof: the Will does not expressly command the Genus "Animal." It commands only that the Intellect form the proximate Genus of man by such an apprehension as Logic dictates, namely, one indefinitely expressing that in which man proximately agrees with other things. Once this command is given, the Intellect elicits various apprehensions until it comes upon one which it sees conforms to logical doctrine; then it approves and retains it. Thus the apprehension "Animal" truly proceeds from logical direction, since by its light it is sought and, when found, distinguished from others. Therefore the apprehension "Animal" does not precede that command, but this cognition does: "A concept indefinitely expressing the essential predicate in which man proximately agrees with other things." Add that, for an apprehension truly to be called directible, it is enough that its conservation and retention depend upon Logic, even if its first production is altogether necessary.

12. To the fourth: Ethics does not direct complacencies which are called first-first movements because they precede freedom; but it does direct others, even simple ones, which fall under freedom. This very thing we say in our case. To the fifth, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence, because Logic neither ought to guard against every even remote occasion of error, such as arises from imagination and the senses, nor does it direct apprehension precisely because from it some occasion of error is taken, but because error and disorder immediately contrary to logical doctrine properly fall upon apprehension itself. To the sixth: it is false that artifice requires

composition of parts, as will be clear in the following section. And an objection may be raised from judgment, which among the Adversaries is a simple quality.

§ 2. What the Artifice of Acts of the Intellect Is.

13. Since from what has been said it is established, and from what remains to be said it will appear further, that acts of the Intellect can be directed by the art of Logic, not only as the action of the artisan but as artifacts or artful works, we ask what that artifice is, or in what it consists, by reason of which they are directed by Logic. A twofold "direction" is commonly distinguished, "active and passive." Active direction is the very rule of the art; passive direction is the ordering or rectitude which the rule dictates in the work to be made. Each may be considered either "in first act" or "in second act." Active direction in first act is the aptitude of a rule for directing; and this is also commonly called, though improperly, "active directibility." Active direction in second act is the rule itself as actually directing or illuminating the operation. Conversely, passive direction in second act is the rectitude of the work as made with attention to the rules. Passive direction in first act is the aptitude or worthiness of the work to be dictated and approved by the art.

14. This latter direction is also called "passive directibility." But lest this term cause confusion, observe that something can be directible by art in two ways, subjectively and objectively. Something is called subjectively directible when, after it exists, it is an indifferent subject capable of receiving or not receiving an artful form. Such is the directibility of wood and marble by Architecture. By a certain analogy, subjective directibility may also be called the rational indifference possessed by common predicates to be contracted by specific differences that are either defective or right; for example, the indifference of a human act as such to be contracted, by the direction of Prudence, rather to the love of the morally good than to the love of a pleasurable good. Something is called objectively directible, however, when it is essentially right but indifferent as to whether it exists or not, and therefore its existence rather than that of an opposite act is dictated by the art. Hence it is not a subject to which art superadds a perfection, but is itself the perfection pre-conceived by the artisan and presented to the rules as worthy to be actually produced. Thus the love of God above all things is directible by Faith, not because Faith dictates that a love of some other object become a love of God, but because it dictates that the act which it

pre-conceives as the love of God be elicited rather than another love. In this manner we say that acts of the Intellect in species are directible by Logic.

15. This objective directibility, therefore, is entirely the same as passive direction in first act, and it is also commonly called "fundamental artifice." The term "artifice," as also "artifact," taken strictly, connotes the direction of art, and therefore seems to signify the same as a work "actually directed, actually regulated, actually produced with attention to the rules of the art." It therefore formally imports an extrinsic denomination from the illuminating rule as from a form, and this denomination is called "formal and extrinsic artifice." But if precisely the intrinsic rectitude of the work, of itself worthy of being dictated by art, is considered, it is then called "fundamental artifice." For example, this act, "Rational animal," elicited by one ignorant of Logic or without attention to its rules, is not formally and extrinsically artful. Yet it is intrinsically and fundamentally so, because it has all the rectitude which the rules of defining would prescribe if they were present, and nothing is lacking for it to be called formally artful except the extrinsic direction of art. But because "artifice" absolutely stated is commonly taken for intrinsic artifice or for this rectitude, therefore that act, just as it is formally and fully right, is also formally and fully artful, although here and now it does not proceed from art. In this sense artifice is taken in the present question, namely, insofar as it is the same as passive direction or objective directibility, or more clearly, insofar as it is the same as a rectitude of a work that of itself deserves the labor of art and that art prescribes when it is present.

16. With these things established, the common and true position of our Authors holds, against the Thomists contending for a Being of reason, concerning whom see Chapter 4, § 2, and against others who place artifice in a certain mode superadded by art, that the artifice, at least the positive artifice, which Logic prescribes in acts of the Intellect is really indistinct from those acts themselves and from their specific representation. The reason is that this artifice consists in a special and definite manner of representing objects. For example, the artifice of a Definition consists in the brief and clear representation of essential predicates called the proximate genus and ultimate difference; the artifice of a Syllogism consists in a representation of premises and conclusion modified by a definite affirmation or negation, and also by the quantity and disposition of terms. But this definite manner of representing is really indistinct from representation, which is the very entity of the concepts. Therefore, etc. The major seems evident, because once such a manner of representing is posited, the art of Logic is satisfied and its rules are fully fulfilled. The minor is certain, for acts

of the Intellect identify with themselves each one's specific manner of tending toward an object, which they can neither cast off nor alter in any way; just as the same judgment which once is affirmative cannot become negative, or conversely, nor can what once is universal become particular.

17. But it must be noted that some mental artifice is really simple: namely, according to many, the artifice of Judgment and complex apprehension, and according to all, the artifice of the apprehension forming a Genus or another Predicable. Other mental artifice is really composed of many concepts: namely, the artifice of a Syllogism, or also, according to a probable opinion, the artifice of Judgment or a mental proposition. Understand our position, therefore, in this way: a simple artifice is entirely identified with the simple concept of which it is proper; a composite artifice is adequately identified with the parts taken together, for example in a Syllogism with three Judgments, but only inadequately with each taken singly. If you wish to hold that the three judgments of a Syllogism, insofar as they are "taken together," import superadded modes of duration or even of union with the same Intellect, I will not oppose it for present purposes. For the Adversaries are not speaking of these modes, which arise naturally even without art, but of a certain real or rational mode superinduced by art, which is the whole form denominating the concepts artful.

18. But it is objected, 1º: moral Rectitude is distinguished from acts of the Will. Therefore logical rectitude is also distinguished from acts of the Intellect. It is objected, 2º: while the same concepts remain, artifice can be varied or fail. Therefore it is really distinguished from them. The antecedent is proved. First, because the concepts are the same whether one says "Man is an animal" or "Animal is man"; nevertheless the artifice is not the same. It is also varied if to the proposition "Man is an animal" there is added "rational," although those preceding concepts are not varied. Again, because two concepts, "animal" and "rational," are not a definition unless they are joined, certainly by a superadded mode of conjunction. Nor are they a good definition until the absence of redundant or harmful concepts is understood, for example, "biped, quadruped, etc." Again, because in a Syllogism what is the Major premise could have been the Minor and conversely, and from the same unchanged Premises various conclusions may be deduced, now universal, now particular, now direct, now indirect.

19. It is objected, 3º: spoken artifice is distinguished from words. Therefore mental artifice is distinguished from concepts. 4º: artifice is always something superadded to directible matter, as is clear in the artifice of a house, image, and other things. But concepts are the matter directible by Logic. Therefore, etc. 5º: what is natural and belongs to matter by its own

nature is not artificial. But representation is natural to a concept. Therefore, etc. Hence an unlearned man often conceives well as regards the representation of the acts, and yet he is not said to conceive artfully.

20. I answer to the first: moral Rectitude, taken for a tendency toward a morally good motive, is indistinct from acts of the Will. This alone should be compared with logical rectitude, which is a certain representative tendency toward such or such Objects. For moral rectitude insofar as it involves freedom, although it be extrinsic to the acts, which many deny, proves nothing for present purposes, because concepts are not right precisely because they are free or imputable. Moreover there is a disparity, because moral rectitude is conformity with a rule of Prudence or Divine Law, which dictates not only the substance of an act but also certain extrinsic circumstances of place and time. But the rules of Logic are fully satisfied by the specific representation of the act.

21. To the second, I deny the antecedent; it has not been well proved. First, if judgment and the complex apprehension which becomes a definition are indivisible acts, those variations or additions cannot occur unless the whole act changes and perishes, another being substituted for it. Next, even if judgment is a composite act, with every variation made in predicate or subject the mental copula varies, for it is always a concept essentially connected with these extremes rather than others, being their formal union. Hence in these judgments, "man is an animal," "Animal is man," the concept of the copula is different because, although the extremes are the same, one copula regards as its base what the other regards as its crown, and conversely. It is likewise different if "rational" is added to the predicate "animal," because the predicate which was simple becomes complex, and consequently becomes a different extreme. From this you will solve what others object, namely, that three concepts, "man, is, animal," can exist together without a judgment resulting. They can indeed, if "is" is a mere apprehension of identity; but not if it is a concept exercising the function of a mental copula, for such a concept essentially pertains to the second operation and has a judicative tendency essentially bound to the extremes.

22. The same must be said in the definition "Rational animal," if apprehension is held to be really composite. For the concept "rational" will be an apprehension, not just any apprehension, but one identifying with itself a manner of representing contractive of a common predicate and consequently essentially requiring association with the apprehension "animal"; nor does any other mode of union between simple apprehensions seem conceivable. Hence the apprehension "rational" is not the same concept inside and outside the definition. What is added concerning the

absence of redundancy can be granted without inconvenience; for it is common to artifices requiring a determinate measure to import indirectly or connotatively an absence of redundancy, as is seen in painting. For this reason we spoke in no. 16 of "at least positive" artifice. As for the Syllogism, if the three judgments are not varied entitatively, it is false that the Major premise can become the Minor or conversely; for that will always be the Major which contains the major extreme, as was shown in the *Summulae*. When the Conclusion is varied, the Syllogism and its artifice are indeed varied, but not without an entitative variation of one of the three judgments of which it consists. Hence it is never verified that the artifice intended by Logic is really distinguished from such concepts as existing together in the same Intellect.

23. To the third, I deny the consequence, because the artifice of speech consists in signification, which is extrinsic to words, since it depends upon human convention, which requires a definite order of pronunciation and definite pauses and circumstances of time and place. But mental artifice consists in the representation of objects, which according to all is identified with acts of the mind. To the fourth: the major is true only in productive arts, which act upon external and presupposed matter and tend toward a permanent work; it is not true in active arts, whose work consists in the very acts or movements of the Agent. For these do not shape or correct already existing matter, but direct toward the existence of their proper matter. Indeed, their artifice as actually produced is placed in the existence of such matter rather than another and is consequently really indistinct from the directible matter. Examples are the Art of dancing and Music, whose artifice, at least the positive and principal artifice, not to exclude pauses, is indistinct from such movements of the feet and from grave, acute, and other tones. But Logic is an eminently active art.

24. To the fifth: if "natural" is taken for "necessary," such that it always occurs uniformly or does not fall under the choice of the Agent, the major is granted. But it is denied if "natural" signifies that which essentially belongs to certain acts in species, which nevertheless are indifferent as to whether they exist or give place to other unsuitable acts according to the choice of the agent. The matter is clear in leaps, musical sounds, movements of the fingers striking a lyre, and in acts of the Will morally good from their object. Ethics directs these, although it cannot direct merely natural, that is, necessary acts. It is therefore consistent that representation belongs to acts of the mind by their own nature and yet is something artificial, that is, something produced from the direction of art. But when an unlearned man

aptly defines or argues from natural Logic, he conceives artfully by an artifice not extrinsic but intrinsic, of which we are now speaking. See no. 15.

§ 3. The Formal Object of Logic Is Acts of the Intellect According to Their Proper Artifice.

25. The proposed assertion, which our School maintains against the Thomists reported in Chapter 4, is proved, 1º, by the authority of the Angelic Doctor, who in I *Perihermenias*, lect. 1, says: "Since Logic is called rational science, it is necessary that its consideration concern those things which pertain to the three operations of reason." And in II *Posterior Analytics*, lect. 1, he expressly teaches that Logic is an art "directive of the act itself of reason, by which, namely, man may proceed in an orderly, easy, and error-free manner in the very act of reason." He adds that it is called a "rational" science "because it concerns the very act of reason as its proper matter." "And therefore," he says, "it seems to be the art of arts, because it directs us in the act of reason, from which all arts proceed. Therefore the parts of Logic must be taken according to the diversity of the acts of reason. Now there are three acts of reason, etc." Here you have the proper marks of the formal object of a science or art: namely, to be that around which the consideration of a science is intentionally occupied; that in which through art we proceed in an orderly, easy, and error-free manner; that from which a science takes its proper name by which it is distinguished from the rest; that toward which the art itself directs us, especially so as to possess from it a singular prerogative; and that whose diversity of parts diversifies the parts of the science. Certainly this belongs only to a specifying object. But according to St. Thomas all these marks belong to Acts of the Intellect in relation to Logic.

26. The Thomists reply that Logic directs acts of reason not as artifacts but as actions of the Artisan from which artifice results in the object; for Logic concerns the act of reason as the art of building concerns "the act of the hand," as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place. But first, by "act of the hand" St. Thomas there does not signify a mere transitive action, but a manufactured work, namely, the artifice of a house. This is manifestly proved from St. Thomas himself in the Proemium to the *Ethics*, a passage most clear for the present Assertion, which we gave above, Chapter 4, no. 31, where he teaches that the Order made in an act of reason corresponds to Logic as the order made in a chest or house corresponds to external acts. Therefore this order or artifice of the house is that act of the hand to which St. Thomas compares the act of reason in the function of object. Next, even

if he speaks of the action or movement of the hand building, he does not institute the comparison in all respects but only in the need of direction, by which both an act of the mind and the movement of the builder's hand need to be kept from being performed disorderly.

27. Moreover St. Thomas, as we have already answered elsewhere, supposes there what he frequently teaches in other places, that an immanent act differs from one transitive into external matter in this, that the immanent act itself is the end and work intended by the Agent, while the transitive act is intended only as a way toward another work. Let him be heard by way of example in III *Contra Gentiles*, c. 2, where he speaks thus: "An action sometimes terminates in something made, as building terminates in a house and healing in health; sometimes, however, it does not, as understanding and sensing. And if the action terminates in something made, the impulse of the Agent through the action tends toward that thing made; but if it does not terminate in something made, the impulse of the Agent tends toward the action itself. Therefore every Agent in acting must intend an end, sometimes the action itself, sometimes something made through the action." Thus far St. Thomas.

28. The proof adduced is confirmed. According to the Adversaries, Logic does not regard acts of the Intellect as its formal object because it is wholly concerned with intentions of reason, just as the other sciences are concerned with real being. But the intentions of reason with which Logic is concerned are the acts themselves of the Intellect. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved by the words of St. Thomas in IV *Contra Gentiles*, c. 11: "The understood intention in us is neither the thing itself which is understood nor the substance itself of the Intellect, but is a certain likeness conceived by the Intellect of the thing understood, which exterior words signify. Hence the intention itself is also called the interior word, which is signified by the exterior word. And that the aforesaid intention in us is not the thing understood is clear from this, that it is one thing to understand a thing and another to understand the very understood intention, which the Intellect does when it reflects upon its own work. Hence some sciences are of things and others of understood intentions." Thus the Angelic Doctor, graphically describing those intentions with which those sciences are concerned that are not concerned with things, namely, the parts of Logic, which St. Thomas elsewhere calls "Logical sciences" (*In I Metaph.*, lect. 1), and teaching that they are nothing other than the mental word.

29. Our Assertion is proved, 2º: Logic regards the Mode of Knowing as its formal object, as all confess. But the essence of the Mode of Knowing properly belongs to acts of the Intellect. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved:

the Mode of Knowing is commonly defined, even by Thomists, as "Discourse manifesting the unknown." Therefore its essence is manifestation of the unknown. But it is evident that manifestation of the unknown belongs to no kind of signs so properly as to acts of the Intellect. For these are formal signs which of themselves immediately and formally make the object manifest to the mind and render it known from being unknown, manifest from being hidden, while instrumental signs can manifest only through the mediation of a formal sign. "Manifestation," says St. Thomas (*De veritate*, q. 4, a. 3), "is found of itself only in the Intellect; for if something outside the Intellect is said to manifest, this is only insofar as from it something is left in the Intellect which afterwards is a principle of manifestation there. Therefore the proximate manifester is in the Intellect, but a remote manifester can also be outside it." Hence he concludes that the name Word, which imports manifestation, properly belongs to the mental word. By the same reasoning you yourself will conclude that the logical Mode of Knowing is found only in acts of the mind.

30. This is confirmed and pressed: acts of the Intellect properly are "Definition, Division, Syllogism, Demonstration, and Enunciation" or "Proposition." Therefore it properly belongs to them to be the formal object of Logic. The consequence is legitimate, because by these names are signified all the species of the Mode of Knowing, and indeed almost all the artifacts of Logic. The antecedent is proved, because the definitions given in the *Summulae* for each of these names properly belong to acts of the Intellect, as will be clear to one who considers them. For example, the definition of Definition, namely, "Discourse explaining the essence of a thing," properly belongs to this act, "Rational animal," which is first of all discourse, that is, a complex sign explaining and distinctly disclosing the essence of man. Likewise the definition of Proposition given by Aristotle and St. Thomas, namely, "Affirmation or negation of something concerning something," or also "True or false discourse," or "signifying the true or false," is proper to a mental judgment and can only in a most alien sense be adapted to objects.

31. Certainly "affirmation and negation" are the same among Logicians as "composition and division," proper to the second operation, as no one is ignorant. But "composition or division is a certain operation of the Intellect," as St. Thomas says (*Contra Gentiles* I, c. 58, n. 6); and therefore "the composition of a proposition formed by the Intellect composing and dividing exists in the Intellect itself, not in the thing which is outside the soul," as the same St. Doctor says there, n. 5. But elsewhere he explains more clearly what Definition and Proposition are (*De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, c.), saying:

"The Intellect forms within itself a conception of the thing in order to know the thing understood.... It differs from the action of the Intellect, because the aforesaid conception is considered as the term of the action and as something constituted through it. For by its action the Intellect forms the definition of a thing, or also an affirmative or negative proposition." At this the Thomists will imagine that they see their objective Being of reason, constituted and formed by the action of the Intellect as by an Artisan, and will eagerly greet it. But, alas, the mind of the Angelic Doctor is otherwise, for he immediately continues: "This conception of the Intellect in us is properly called a word, for it is that which is signified by the exterior word." He adds: "Such a conception or word... arises from another and represents another: it arises from the Intellect through its act, and it is a likeness of the thing understood."

32. That a Syllogism and Reasoning are acts of the Intellect is expressly taught us by St. Thomas and St. Isidore, whose words see above, Chapter 5, no. 37, and Chapter 2, no. 20. That Demonstration is also an act of reason is clearer than light in Aristotle, II *Posterior Analytics*, especially c. 2, where among other things he says: "By Demonstration I mean that Reasoning which produces science; and I mean that it produces science by which we know in having that very Demonstration." Therefore formally it is the same "to have Demonstration" and "to know." But "to know is to cognize a thing through its cause," as the Philosopher teaches there. St. Thomas explains his words thus in the same place, lect. 4: "Demonstration is a scientific Syllogism, that is, one causing knowledge. A scientific Syllogism is said to be that according to which we know insofar as we possess it, lest perhaps someone should understand a scientific Syllogism as one which some science uses," that is, lest anyone think that Demonstration is a certain instrument really distinct from the very act of knowing. Therefore, just as heat is the very form of the hot thing because we become hot insofar as we possess it, so Demonstration is the very scientific cognition because we know insofar as we possess it.

33. We dwell upon an obvious matter. Yet by the authority of the Princes of Philosophy it was necessary to establish the usage and proper meaning of names which the modern Thomists strive with all their strength to alienate from acts of the Intellect and transfer to beings of reason resulting on the part of the object. For they say that these names, "Definition," "Proposition," "Syllogism," "Demonstration," and the like truly and properly belong to objects insofar as invested with a being of reason, but to acts of reason only "improperly, representatively, causally," or "as by a way," just as an image of a man is called a man only "representatively," and the action of a

builder contains the artifice of a house only "as a way" or "causally." Thus they speak. Nothing is more repugnant to the doctrine of St. Thomas and Aristotle just cited, and to the definitions of the Mode of Knowing and its species. Recall what has been said, and setting aside attachment to parties consider whether, for example, a stone defiled, or if you prefer adorned, by a certain shadow of being is truly and properly a Discourse manifesting the unknown, or explaining the essence of a thing, or an affirmation or negation, or a reasoning according to which we know insofar as we possess it. Certainly you could say this no less absurdly than that in Grammar not words but objects burdened with fictions are Noun, Verb, Participle, Discourse; or that in Poetics they are a Dactylic, Spondaic, or Trochaic foot, or a Sapphic, Iambic, etc., verse.

34. Among the Thomists themselves "formal definition, formal proposition, formal syllogism" are acts of the Intellect, for intentions fictitiously placed in the object are called only "objective syllogism, objective definition," etc. Is the action of a builder similarly to be called a "formal palace"? Or an image of Caesar, "formal Caesar"? Or a cognition which represents God to me, "formal God"? Certainly, in the most familiar usage of the Schools the added term "formal" does not alienate the signification of the noun, but designates its proper acceptance, as when one says "formal" object, "formal" constitutive principle, "formal" heat, etc. Indeed, if the same heat were called both "formal" and purely "as by a way" or "causal," the contradiction in terms would be manifest. Therefore there is an equal contradiction when an act of reason is called a "formal definition," and at the same time the name "Definition" is said to belong to it only "causally" or "as by a way."

35. The same Assertion is proved, 3º, by an old but valid parallel. Acts of the Will according to their proper moral rectitude are the formal object of Ethics or Moral Philosophy. Therefore acts of the Intellect according to their proper artifice are the formal object of Rational Philosophy or Logic. The consequence is clear, both from the similar manner of proceeding and institution of each Philosophy and from St. Thomas in the Proemium to the *Ethics*, where he plainly teaches that Logic considers "the Order which Reason by considering makes in its own act" just as Ethics considers "the Order which Reason by considering makes in operations of the Will." The antecedent, which modern Thomists deny, is established, 1º, from St. Thomas expressly teaching there that the Order of Operations of the Will corresponds to Moral Philosophy just as the order made in a chest or house corresponds to a mechanical art and the Order found in natural things to Natural Philosophy. But this twofold order unquestionably corresponds to

these Faculties as their formal object. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes in this manner: "Therefore, just as the Subject of Natural Philosophy is motion or a mobile thing, so the Subject of Moral Philosophy is human operation ordered to an end, or also man insofar as he acts voluntarily for an end."

36. It is established, 2º, because Moral Philosophy is not speculative but practical, as Aristotle indubitably asserts in II *Ethics*, c. 2, and St. Thomas there, lect. 2. Therefore its formal object is something operable by the knower. Therefore it is placed in acts of the Will. The consequence is clear, because apart from human acts nothing is operable according to the rules of Ethics: first, not a being of reason which results in an object from an act of the Will, for according to the Adversaries the Will does not feign or produce beings of reason; next, not the object of an upright volition according to objective goodness, as though, when Ethics teaches us to love God, parents, and friends, it intended their goodness as something operable by us. Add that the position which constitutes the formal object of Ethics in acts of the Will is that of almost all authors, as Fr. Raynaudus shows in the volume *Disciplina moralis*, Prolog. § 2. The parallel of Painting also supports this, which does not formally regard the object of an image but the image, because it is an art invented for expressing things by an artifice of colors. Likewise Logic was instituted so that right images of objects may be formed in the Intellect, which before acquiring cognitions of things is "like a blank tablet on which nothing has been painted," as Aristotle says.

37. Finally, the *a priori* reason for our Assertion is that the institution of Logic is fully satisfied by the proper rectitude of acts of the Intellect. For although Logic dictates nothing besides that special manner of representing which is proper to formal Definition, formal Syllogism, formal Demonstration, etc., it dictates what fully suffices for the acquisition of sciences and the formation of the use of Reason, and opens a safe way to Truth by removing confusion, ambiguity, and error, which certainly cannot coexist with that manner of representing. But Logic was instituted for no other purpose according to the common sense of Philosophers, nor for any other reason is it called the Art of arts, the Instrument and Organ of sciences, Rational science, and Mistress of the mind. Add that acts of Reason are directible for their own sake, with direction terminating in them as its proximate and intrinsic end, and by reason of themselves they deserve the labor of some art. For it would be remarkable if acts of the mind were worthy of no art of themselves and for their own sake, while entire arts are instituted for the sake of actions of dancing, playing the lyre, managing a horse, and other merely playful activities. But what other art will thus labor upon acts of the Intellect except Logic?

38. From what has been said throughout this Disputation from Chapter 2 onward, you will easily gather that the adequate formal object of Logic is placed in the intrinsic artifice of the operations of the Intellect. For once the artifice of words and objective being of reason have been excluded, and things also excluded both according to physical being and according to intentional being, nothing remains which can exercise the function of a formal object in Logic except acts of the Intellect according to an artifice real and intrinsic to them. I deliberately omit a certain diminished being intermediate between real being and being of reason which is commonly attributed to some Scotists, as though they placed in it logical artifice and the form of the denomination "known," even from eternity. For besides the fact that a being of this kind is commonly rejected as chimerical, it scarcely seems worth bringing into the Schools for the present matter. Read the Excellent Doctor, disp. 31, *Metaph.*, sect. 2, where he discusses this kind of Being and vindicates the Subtle Doctor Scotus from its patronage. I also omit the position of M. Manso, who places the object of Logic in reflexive truth, or in the conformity of acts of the Intellect with logical second intentions, or with the rules of defining, dividing, and arguing. For whatever this Author laboriously gathers for his position in fact proves ours, which he himself does not explain well.

CHAPTER VIII.
Contrary Arguments and Their Solutions.

1. It is objected, 1º: acts of the Intellect, neither as directible nor as directed, are the formal object of Logic. Therefore they are not so in any way. The antecedent is proved. First, acts as directible explain only a capacity to be disposed artfully by Logic. But the capacity of matter to be artfully formed by an art is not the formal but the material object of the art, as may be seen in the capacity of marble, wood, colors, and any matter formable by art. Next, acts as directed add nothing above their natural entity except an extrinsic denomination from a rule or direction of art. But that denomination is not the object of an art, which certainly does not regard its own rules as its object. This objection rests upon a wrong understanding of our doctrine.

2. When the directibility of acts of the Intellect is called by our Authors the formal or most formal reason under which Logic tends toward its object, the discussion is not of subjective directibility, which alone coincides with the intrinsic capacity of matter to be formed by art and which is also found in some manner in the common notion of an operation of the Intellect

according to what was said in Chapter 7, no. 14, and, if you wish, even in particular concepts insofar as they are indifferent to being joined with others suitable or unsuitable for logical artifacts, as in the individual propositions of a Syllogism taken separately. For this directibility cannot be the formal reason under which an art tends toward its object, unless perhaps by the name "formal reason" one understands a condition presupposed on the side of matter. The discussion, therefore, is of objective directibility, which we explained in the cited place and which is nothing other than the intrinsic rectitude of acts of the Intellect presented signally to the rules of the art as producible. In this sense Medicine is said to regard as its formal object the human body "as healable," Ethics acts of the Will "as orderable," and every art or practical faculty its object "as operable." Hence "directible" taken in this way signifies the same as "worthy of the direction of art of itself and for its own sake," in the manner in which something precious, for example Wisdom, is called "estimable, honorable, lovable."

3. To avoid the ambiguity, others among our Authors teach that Logic regards acts of the mind "as directed," not indeed according to an extrinsic denomination from a directing rule, which no one ever dreamed, but according to passive direction, which is the very objective directibility or intrinsic rectitude of the acts and which is signified by the name "intrinsic artifice," or, as others speak, "fundamental artifice." Reread Chapter 7, § 2. Therefore, when we say that acts of the Intellect are formally regarded by Logic "as artful," we reduplicate intrinsic artifice or the rectitude of the manner of representing, by reason of which one about to define man, for example, prefers this act, "Rational animal," to this other, "Living thing capable of laughter." If you ask whether Logic regards this rectitude as possible or as existing, the question is common to every art and practical faculty, in which it seems that the artful form is principally considered by the art "in the signified act," as they say, namely, prescinding from whether it exists or not and teaching as it were conditionally what nature it has and how it ought to be made whenever it is made. And because this doctrine is desirable for the sake of operation, operation is therefore said to be its end.

4. It is objected, 2º: the formal object of every art must be an artificial form really distinct from matter and accidentally accruing to it through art and industry. But in acts of the Intellect there is no such form. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º: the formal object must be distinct from the material. Since, therefore, acts of the Intellect are the material object or "proper matter" of Logic, as St. Thomas speaks, the formal object of Logic must be distinct from them. But the artifice which we posit is not really distinct from the acts. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 2º: Logic does not formally regard the

natural predicates of cognitions, for Psychology considers all these. But a right manner of representing is a natural predicate of cognitions. Therefore, etc.

5. I answer: the major of the argument is true in productive arts, false in active arts, which do not intend an external work left by an action but are precisely ordered to rectifying human actions. In these the artificial form consists in the actions themselves according to specific characteristics by which they differ from other actions unsuitable for the end of the art. This has been shown above more than once by the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas and also by examples, and it is especially evident in Ethics, which observes the manner of an active art; for the form of rectitude which it gives to acts of the Will is indistinct from their tendency toward such objects rather than others. To the first Confirmation, I deny the antecedent if one is to follow the common manner of speaking, concerning which see above, Chapter 1, no. 22. Certainly St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae II-II^{a}, q. 1, a. 1) calls God the material object of Faith, while assigning as its formal object "First Truth," which is certainly really indistinct from God Himself. Likewise nothing is more frequent among Thomists than to call the common reason alone under which a science tends its formal object, while calling the specific differences material objects. Hence above (disp. 1, c. 5) they denied that the acts of Logic concerning Definition and Syllogism differ from one another through the formal object. Does a real distinction intervene here?

6. Accordingly, acts of the Intellect are called the material object of Logic both because besides artifice, or rectitude of representation, which alone is the formal object, they contain other predicates, for example vitality and spirituality, which are materially and implicitly attained by Logic; and because the individual acts are the formal object "which," and this is quite commonly called the material object when related to the formal reason "under which." Above all, they are so called because the common notion of an act of the Intellect as such, insofar as metaphysically indifferent to various species of representation, right or defective, is as it were matter formable by Logic. The Intellect, guided by its rules, contracts that common notion to acts essentially endowed with logical rectitude when it elicits them while omitting others rejected by Logic. In this manner Logic is said to adapt an artificial form to its proper matter, and in the same sense "right cognition" is a logical artifact constituted from matter and form distinguished not really but only formally. To the second Confirmation: Psychology indeed regards the right manner of representing, but under the formal reason of vitality common to all acts, and it does not practically and formally consider the difference of that manner from others. Hence it

attains it materially. By contrast, the whole formal intention of Logic consists in discerning that manner and dictating it in preference to others. Therefore, just as the health of the human body is regarded both by Physics and Medicine, but in different manners, so it happens in our case.

7. It is objected, 3º: no instrumental art regards as its object the acts of that faculty which it serves, as is clear in the art of making bridles, which serves horsemanship. But formal definitions, syllogisms, etc., are acts of other sciences to which Logic ministers instruments of knowing. Therefore Logic does not regard formal definitions, etc., as its object. I press the point: according to the Thomists Logic regards formal definitions as directible matter and as actions by which it constructs its instruments. But no instrumental art regards in this manner the acts of a superior faculty. Therefore Logic is not to be compared with mechanical instrumental arts. Accordingly, instruments of knowing taken passively are not related to the use of Sciences as a bridle is to the use of horsemanship. For they do not actually preexist before use but are the very use and exercise of the Sciences, and they proceed from Logic directively and from the "other sciences effectively." "Because man," says the Excellent Doctor (disp. 1, *Metaph.*, sect. 4, n. 25), "acquires science through discourse, and in order to accomplish discourse he needs other prior operations or conceptions of things, therefore conceptions of the mind disposed and ordered in such a way that they contribute of themselves and directly to acquiring science are called Instruments of knowing. Therefore instruments of this kind are formally in operations of the mind." See above, disp. 1, c. 4, nos. 23 and 24. But if instruments of knowing are taken actively or directively, they are not objects but the rules and acts of Logic teaching.

8. It is objected, 4º: those things which Logic teaches concerning its artifacts or instruments of knowing do not properly belong to acts of the Intellect. Therefore neither does it properly belong to them to be the formal object of Logic. The antecedent is proved, 1º: what concerns Definition cannot belong to cognition. First, because cognition does not "explain" the essence of a thing of itself but through objects. For one who wishes to explain to another the essence of man does not propose his own concept to him but the objective predicates of man. Hence to one asking, "What is man?" the answer is not, "He is a cognition representing rational animal." Again, because a Definition consists of Genus and Difference, which names do not belong to parts of cognition, otherwise those parts would be predicable of many things and would be true predicates of the thing defined. Again, because Definition and Defined "are said with reference to convertibility," that is, they are convertible by mutual consequence, and one

is predicated of the other, and consequently they are really identified. But the cognition defining man is neither convertible nor identified with man.

9. It is proved, 2º: acts of the mind are not Subject and Predicate, for a subject is "that of which something is said," and a Predicate "that which is said of another." But a concept is said neither of an object nor of another concept. Since, therefore, a Proposition consists of Subject and Predicate, it is not properly found in concepts. It is proved, 3º, from the doctrine concerning Argumentation and Syllogism. For concepts are neither Middle nor Extremes, since they are not identified with a third thing or with one another. Neither are they disposed in Figure and Mood, since they are not predicated or subjected. Moreover Consequence, about which Logic teaches so much, is the objective connection of one thing with another. Nor does one truth therefore follow from another because the Intellect rightly infers, but rather conversely. Hence one who in arguing denies the Consequence does not deny that the Intellect of the reasoner infers one thing from another, but that one object is connected with another.

10. Confirmation 1º: the rectitude or depravity of cognitions depends upon and is specified by the requirement of objects, which therefore is the rule and measure of the rectitude of acts. For the Intellect rightly predicates, defines, etc., insofar as objects require themselves to be thus represented. Therefore the requirement of the object is attended to more by Logic than the rectitude of the act. The consequence is clear: both because this rectitude spontaneously results from that requirement, and once the objects are rightly disposed by Logic no difficulty remains in rightly representing them; because Logic does not labor so that the mind may understand somehow by composing, defining, arguing, for it has this naturally, but so that in composing, defining, etc., the mind may observe the order required by objects; and because of the example of Architecture, which attends more to the form of the house, by which manual actions are specified, than to the actions themselves. Confirmation 2º: the formal object of an art is the artifice to which the artisan ought to attend in operating. But in defining, syllogizing, etc., the Intellect ought not to attend to rectitude located on the side of the act. First, because there ought not to be attention to a rectitude which necessarily results, even if not attended to, from attention to another form. But the rectitude of the act results precisely from the mind attending to the right disposition of objects. Again, because attention to acts would be an occasion of error, since it would impede attention to the right order of objects. Thus a craftsman who attended wholly to the movements or actions of his hands would err more often.

11. Confirmation 3º: logical Artifice is in cognition only as in a sign, or purely "representatively," just as the nature of man is in an image. It is proved: because for cognition to be artful is nothing other than to represent objects artfully ordered by Logic. The point is pressed: a name said indifferently of sign and thing signified belongs properly to the latter and only improperly and metaphorically to the former. But the name "Definition" is said of formal and objective definition, of which the former is a sign of the latter. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 4º: Logic teaches the Intellect as a Master teaches a disciple. But a Master does not communicate intellectual light or an act to the disciple; he teaches precisely by proposing objects orderly disposed which he himself previously knows. And just as the specifying object of the Master's cognition is not the disciple's cognition, so the specifying object of Logic is not cognition of the Intellect. Indeed, while Logic directs the mind toward its end, it is already supposed to have an end and specifying object, which must consequently be distinct from acts of the mind. Confirmation 5º: an operation of the mind defining, dividing, etc., is the exercise of the art of Logic, an act of Logic using. But no art regards its exercise or use as its formal object, but some artifact resulting from it. Certainly the mind produces instruments of knowing by no other acts than its operations insofar as they rightly represent. Consequently these are not instruments produced but their productions and causalities. Here is whatever has been ingeniously devised by the more recent Thomists against our position. Nevertheless:

12. To the Argument, I deny the antecedent. To the first proof: first, "to explain is to manifest clearly and distinctly." But St. Thomas clearly and distinctly taught us that this is found "of itself" in acts of the Intellect; and it is evident of itself, since clarity and obscurity are properties of cognition, as no one is unaware. The explanation proper to Definition is not to another but to the Intellect from which it arises, according to the old saying, "The Logician is for himself, the Rhetorician for others." Hence explanation to another is not made by Definition properly such but by words which are signs of an internal Definition. What does it matter that to one asking, "What is man?" one does not answer, "He is a cognition, etc."? Will one perhaps aptly answer, "He is a Being of reason, or a fictitious relation of animal and rational"? Will one aptly answer, "He is a Discourse explaining his essence"? Therefore to one asking what a thing is, the Definition indeed answers, but not as the thing signified; rather as signifying the essence of the thing. For Definition is not the essence of the Defined, but the explanation of the essence. Hence the Definition must be the answer itself, not the object of the answer.

13. Next, defining cognition consists of Genus and Difference taken formally, that is, according to the form by which the object is denominated a Predicable "as that which." The Thomists themselves are bound to say the same of a fictitious Intention, whose parts certainly are Genus and Difference in no other manner, nor are they predicable of many things "as that which," nor true predicates of the thing. Finally, convertibility or conversion of Definition with the Defined, in the strictly logical sense, is not the real identity itself of objects, especially among the Thomists, for whom that conversion is a property which Logic demonstrates of its formal object, that is, of a being of reason. It is therefore the mutual connection of formal truth, so that of whatever object the formal Definition is verified, the formal Defined is also verified, and conversely. Hence St. Augustine (*De quantitate animae*, c. 25), after saying that by conversion it is tested whether a Definition lacks defects, adds an example: "For if you were to ask me what man is, and I defined him in this way, Man is a mortal animal, you ought not immediately to approve the definition merely because it is true, but to convert it and see whether it were also true when converted; that is, whether just as it is true that Every man is a mortal animal, so it were also true that Every mortal animal is a man." Certainly the True and Truth pertain more to acts of the Intellect than to objects (St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 16, throughout).

14. To the second proof: not only objects but acts of the mind also are properly and simply Subject and Predicate. "The Intellect," says St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 16, a. 2, c.), "in every proposition either applies some form signified by the Predicate to some thing signified by the Subject, or removes it from that thing." You see that not the objects signified but their formal signs are called Predicate and Subject. Therefore one concept is said of another with formal supposition, or in the manner of a sign; and this very thing, "to be said in the manner of a sign," properly and formally pertains to Logic, which even among the Thomists cannot formally regard that which "is said of another" in the manner of an object, since it formally regards only the fictitious intentions of Predicate and Subject, of which one is not said of the other. Therefore Logic objectively intends Subject and Predicate not according to the substratum but according to the form, which among the Thomists is fictitious and among us is real cognition.

15. To the third proof: the same difficulty presses the Thomists, for neither beings of reason nor intentions of Middle and of the major and minor Extremes are identified with a third thing or with one another, nor is one predicated of the other. Therefore the doctrine concerning the identity of Extremes and Middle regards the identity of objects not formally,

otherwise the formal object of logical doctrine would be real being, so unwelcome to the Thomists, but materially, insofar as it is an extrinsic foundation for the rectitude of a mental Syllogism, just as Painting considers Caesar's natural face in order to form a right image of him. Hence the logical sense of that doctrine is that the Intellect elicit concepts representing objects which are the same as one third thing and with one another, as we showed above in Chapter 6; and these concepts are the formal Middle and Extremes, to which by force of the rules identity belongs not in the being of a thing but in the being of a sign, that is, not subjectively but objectively. Logic formally attends to objective Middle and Extremes not according to the substratum but according to the form. See the preceding number, where you also have how predication and subjection belong to concepts.

16. What is added concerning Consequence proves against the Thomists that the formal object of Logic is real being. For the objective connection, for example, of the Sun with light, Fire with heat, Rational with capable of laughter, is without doubt real; nor does one truth therefore follow from another because the Intellect attributes a fictitious intention of Antecedent to one object and of Consequent to another, but rather conversely. And one who in arguing denies the Consequence does not deny that such intentions are feigned by the reasoner but denies that one object is in reality connected with the other. Therefore our positions are equal in this matter. Accordingly, the connection of objects is objective Consequence, which Logic does not regulate but presupposes as a foundation of formal, that is, mental Consequence. The latter alone is regulated by Logic because it alone is capable of error, and it consists in the dependence of one judgment upon another or others with respect to truth, so that the consequent judgment cannot be false if the antecedent is true. One who denies the Consequence does not deny that some judgment is inferred by the reasoner, but denies that the judgment which Logic dictates is inferred or expressed, namely, one which in truth depends upon the antecedent. This causal statement, "Therefore the Intellect rightly infers because one truth follows from another," is true in the formal sense if it speaks of the truth of judgments. But if it speaks of purely objective truth, it is to be admitted only insofar as "because" denotes an extrinsic foundation presupposed by Logic, in which sense we say, "Therefore the painter rightly paints Hannibal one-eyed because Hannibal himself was one-eyed."

17. To the first Confirmation: this likewise proves that the formal object of Logic is physical and real being, for the requirement of things that they be rightly known is not fictitious. Indeed, according to the Thomists, the rectitude or depravity of intentions of reason depends upon the requirement

of objects. For an intention will be defective if it is unsuitable to the object, for example if the intention of Genus is attributed to rational or the intention of Difference to animal. Therefore Logic will attend more to the requirement of things than to the rectitude of second intentions, since the latter depends upon and is specified by the former as by a rule and measure. Accordingly, to answer for all, the rectitude of concepts depends upon the requirement of objects as upon an extrinsic measure or specifying principle in the natural order. An art does not formally intend this kind of specifying principle, since it is not producible by rules but is presupposed as supplied from elsewhere. What the art formally attends to is the specifying principle in the artificial order: both the intrinsic one, which is the specific difference of representation by which a right act differs from a defective one; and the extrinsic one, which is the very form of rectitude taken signally, or insofar as pre-conceived in an idea. For in artificial things this is commonly called the measure or extrinsic specifying principle of rectitude as actually exercised, although it differs from it only according to a different mode of existence, now intentional and now physical.

18. Besides the objection from the Thomistic being of reason, you also have the example of the art of Painting, which does not formally regard the natural prototype or object, although this is called the measure and specifying principle of the rectitude of images; for an image is right insofar as it imitates and conforms to the object. Hence what is added to prove the Consequence has no force. For when it is said, "once the objects have been rightly disposed by Logic, etc.," it is falsely supposed that an object receives from Logic an artificial disposition distinct from acts of the Intellect. This was refuted above in Chapters 4 and 5. More falsely still is it supposed that such a disposition of objects precedes the rectitude of the acts so that the latter results from the former. For since acts of the Intellect, as the Thomists hold, are actions of the artisan by means of which a disposition is made or feigned in objects, this disposition rather follows and results from the acts. They say that prior to the act by which man, for example, is actually defined, the artifice of objective definition preexists signally and in idea. Against this: therefore the proper artifice of the definition of man already exists as much as it can before this act, "Rational animal," which consequently is produced too late and in vain. The consequence is proved: that artifice preexists objectively in the Intellect, since it preexists signally and in idea. Therefore, since it is a mere being of reason, as you hold, it already exists as much as it can, for it is capable of no greater existence. Thus the artifice of a house, if it could exist in no other manner than purely objectively in the Intellect, would fully exist by force of the idea alone.

19. Therefore on the part of the object no artificial disposition is presupposed, but only a natural capacity and, if you wish, also a requirement to terminate a right cognition. But from such a requirement a right cognition does not result so necessarily that a defective one cannot be elicited in its place. Hence rules of art are needed so that one rather than the other may be elicited, which also occurs with Thomistic intentions. It is indeed natural to us to understand by composing, arguing, etc., just as according to the Thomists it is natural to feign intentions in objects. But since this can be done rightly or defectively, Logic labors so that it may be done rightly. Manual operations are irrelevantly alleged. For they are specified by the form of the house as by a specifying principle in the artificial order, in which the whole labor of the art shines forth. This does not happen in acts of the Intellect, from no. 17.

20. To the second Confirmation, I deny the minor. For the logical artisan ought to attend to the rectitude of acts insofar as represented in the idea or illuminating rule, just as one who is to act morally well attends to the rectitude of acts of the Will as pre-signified by the rules of Ethics or Prudence. But it is false that the rectitude of acts results from attention to a right disposition of objects, since there is in objects no artificial disposition which could be attended to. It is likewise false that attention to acts of the Intellect is an occasion of error, for it does not impede attention to some other artifice, since in logical matters there is none outside the acts. Hence the disparity with the actions of a craftsman is clear. Attention to acts is indeed laborious for novices, but in those practiced in the use of Logic it becomes so easy that it is scarcely noticed. The same occurs in acts of playing the lyre, dancing to rhythm, and others.

21. To the third, I deny the assumption. For it is one thing that cognition is a sign of an object, and another that it is a sign of artifice, as may also be seen in an image of Caesar. Therefore the artifice both of Logic and of Painting is proper to the sign as such and formally belongs to it. To the proof, I deny the assertion, or rather the supposition, because there is no artificial ordering of objects which is represented by direct cognition. Hence the artifice of cognition is not a representation of artifice but a representation of an object right in itself, as is again clear from the example of a painted image. Nor does what is said concerning names which are said of sign and thing signified press the point. For although it is often true, it is not always so. The name "Word" is said of a concept of the mind and of the thing signified through it, as St. Thomas testifies (Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 34, a. 1, c.); and yet, as the same St. Doctor observes, it is said "properly" of the concept and only "improperly or figuratively" of the thing signified.

Therefore the same must be judged of the name "Definition," which signifies a certain species of mental word, as St. Thomas teaches us in *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, whose words we gave in Chapter 7, § 3.

22. To the fourth: as a Master proposes the object of his doctrine to a disciple, so Logic proposes to the Intellect the object of its rules. Thus far we admit the parallel, although there is a difference in that the Master teaches externally, while Logic teaches internally. But whence do you prove that the object which Logic proposes to the mind is not the rectitude of acts of the Intellect? I grant that the specifying object of the Master's doctrine is not the cognition by which the disciple receives the doctrine, but is the thing which is declared through the doctrine; and this can be either a thing outside the soul, as if the Master teaches Physics or a mechanical art, or acts of the soul, as if he teaches Ethics or Logic. But neither do we say that the formal object of Logic is the cognition by which the mind in some manner receives the rules of the Mode of Knowing, but only those cognitions which contain the rectitude declared through the doctrine and rules of Logic. Moreover, while Logic directs the Intellect, it is already supposed to have an end and specifying object, not actually and really produced but objectively and signally, that is, pre-conceived in an idea, and it directs toward its actual execution. This holds whether Logic is said to intend acts of the mind or a being of reason, and it is common to every practical or directive faculty.

23. To the fifth: it is falsely asserted that no art regards as its formal object its own exercise, that is, the use of its doctrine. For we have often shown above from Aristotle and St. Thomas that the contrary occurs in all active faculties, for example in Ethics and in the art of dancing or playing the lyre, in which "the end is the exercise and the action," as the Philosopher says (disp. 1, c. 10, no. 14). Nor is it true that every operation defining, etc., is an act of Logic using. For in the matter of other sciences such an operation, although it is a use of Logic, is not Logic using; concerning which see above, disp. 1, c. 2. But although within the matter of Logic that operation is an act of Logic using, it can be the object of another rule or act whose doctrine it uses, as was explained there. Finally, it is not inconvenient that the same operations be instruments of knowing and causalities of those same instruments, if acts of the Intellect are really identified with their own production, which position we now suppose or permit. But if the mental word is held to be produced through an action really distinct from it, then the instrument of knowing will be distinguished from its production. Reread the words of St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, which we cited in Chapter 7, § 3.

24. Finally, some more recent authors with Fr. Oviedo object: Logic also regards as its formal object the lack of rectitude or defect of acts of the Intellect. Therefore rectitude at least is not the adequate formal object of Logic. The antecedent is proved: first, because Logic professedly treats of fallacies of Argumentation, and indeed scientifically or demonstratively, and therefore Sophistics as teaching truly is a science, as we saw from St. Thomas, disp. 1, c. 8, no. 17. Again, because it has several rules prohibiting defects of concepts, for example: "Let a definition contain nothing superfluous. Let a syllogism not consist of four terms." But such rules formally regard the defect which they forbid, just as prescriptive rules regard the rectitude which they prescribe, for, as they say, "Opposites have the same account." Because of these things these Authors divide Logic into assenting and dissenting Logic, and establish as its formal object rectitude for assenting Logic and lack of rectitude for dissenting Logic. They say the same, or are bound to say it, of every practical faculty, since there is none which does not flee and forbid defects contrary to the rectitude intended.

25. The dispute seems purely verbal, in which, even if what the objectors intend is granted, there will be no inconvenience. For what throughout the entire Disputation we have investigated with the Authors of all Schools is the formal object of Logic as procuring or assenting, and this we say is solely the rectitude of acts of the Intellect, just as the adequate formal object of Architecture is said to be the right form of a building, of Painting the right disposition of colors, of Medicine the health of the human body, and of Ethics the right moral order. But if all these faculties are considered according to acts of avoidance, prohibition, and dissent, in this manner they will also regard as a formal object the defects and vices which they prohibit and endeavor to avoid. Others say that acts of this kind regard defects contrary to rectitude not for their own sake but because of rectitude, which they simultaneously and implicitly or virtually prescribe, and which consequently alone they attain formally.

CHAPTER IX.
What Is the Object of Attribution in Logic?

1. Among the objects of each science or art, that is called the "object of attribution" which is primarily intended, or which is considered first in itself, and for whose sake all the others are attained, which for this reason are called "attributed objects" and also "objects of community." By many the object of attribution is confused with the adequate formal object, or with the formal ratio of the object as a thing, which by some is called the formal ratio

"which," by others "under which," by others the formal object "which," by others "by which"; and it is that common title belonging to all the particular objects attained in themselves by some science, concerning which above, ch. 1, from n. 10. In fact, both objects, both the object of attribution and the adequate formal object, are commonly called the "subject of the science" and the "specificative object." There are also some sciences, such as Mathematics, Ethics, and Medicine, in which no object of attribution distinct from the formal ratio "under which" is assigned, unless one says with many that the object of attribution is the concrete composed of the material and the formal, as a statue is composed of marble and figure. Yet even then it is taken so generally that it extends as widely as the formal object, or as the formal ratio taken separately.

2. In this sense the object of attribution in Logic will be "the intrinsic rectitude of an act of the Intellect useful for acquiring sciences"; for this is the formal ratio "under which" Logic tends. Or, if one prefers to speak concretely, it will be "right cognition useful for acquiring sciences"; for this is the artifact which Logic intends in itself, composed of matter and form, as is clear from what has been disputed thus far, especially from ch. 6, and is plainly gathered from St. Thomas, frequently cited, especially in the Proemium to the *Ethica* and 2 *Poster.*, lect. 1. This kind of object is a common ratio and is predicable directly of every operation of the Intellect capable of direction, and consequently also of simple apprehension, by which Genus and the other Predicables are formed. For that this apprehension also participates in the ratio of the formal object of Logic is clear from the fact that there are many logical acts which, as their formal object, regard the form of the Predicables; for they attain no other object. But an inadequate formal object of a science is that which is formally attained by some of its acts.

3. Nevertheless, the common manner of speaking, at least in most sciences, distinguishes the object of attribution from the adequate formal object as a part from the whole, or a particular object from a common one, and judges it to be some determinate and special object among the particular formal objects; as God in Theology, complete Substance "as such" in Metaphysics, and the substantial Composite, or complete natural Body, in Physics. And because some call the particular object contracting the common formal ratio the formal object "which," and others the material object "in itself," the object of attribution is commonly designated by the same names. Three conditions are commonly attributed to it. The first is that it be one thing with some unity, whether real or rational, whether univocal or analogical, or merely a unity of order, so that it may suitably be

proposed by a single definition and may have properties demonstrated of it. The second is that from it the diversity of the science from others be taken; for this reason it is called the "specificative object." The third is that the other objects of the science, which are called "attributed" or "of community," be considered in order to it, and come under consideration for no other reason than because they are its parts, principles, accidents, or are ordered to it in some way. This ordering must chiefly be regarded "in the being of the known," as they say; that is, so that consideration of the other objects is introduced into the science because it conduces to a fuller knowledge, whether speculative or practical, of the object of attribution. But how this ordering does not remove from an attributed object the ratio of a formal object, see above, ch. 1, n. 5 sqq.

4. The object of attribution thus explained, so as to be distinguished from the adequate formal object or formal ratio "under which," is called the "subject of attribution," whereas the formal ratio is called the "subject of adequation." It is likewise called the "specificative object by way of end," whereas the formal ratio is called the "specificative object by way of an objective sphere" circumscribing the extent of the whole Science. This difference can be explained by the example of the Will, whose end and, as it were, object of attribution is Beatitude, whereas its formal ratio and, as it were, objective sphere is the Good "as such"; and to each is attributed the function of specifying. Hence the object of attribution is not unsuitably defined by Father Peynado as "an objective end intrinsic to a faculty." It is called an "end" because the other objects are considered for its sake; "intrinsic," lest it be confused with the "end" which belongs not to the "science" but to the "one knowing," namely that to which, by the arbitrary intention of the learner, the science is ordered, as if someone should study Logic or Theology for the sake of a Chair or a Benefice; "objective," because it must be an object attained by the proper and principal acts of the science or art. Therefore it must not be confused with extrinsic ends either, to which a science or art already fully acquired is ordered in itself, and which are distinguished from its whole object. In this sense the extrinsic end of Military Science is said to be the peace and tranquility of the Commonwealth; the end of Painting, the delight of sight; the end of Logic, the acquisition of the habits of the other sciences. When the object of attribution includes several parts or species, that which is nobler or more worthy of being known is called the "object of principality," as God in Metaphysics and Man in Physics.

5. These things being presupposed, concerning the object of attribution in Logic Father Lynceo reports twenty opinions besides his own (l. 2,

Dialect., tract. 2, c. 5), to which others could be added. Four are more celebrated in the Schools. The first extends it to every complete second Intention. Thus several Thomists, whom Gabriel a Conception cites and follows. The second restricts it to Demonstration alone. Thus Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Joan. Bapt. de Benedictis, Peynado, Ulloa, and frequently others. The third assigns the perfect Syllogism, insofar as this includes both probable and demonstrative syllogism. Thus Father Oviedo, Spinula, Bonaspes, Emmanuel a Conception, and others whom Servera cites and follows. The fourth establishes the Mode of Knowing, insofar as this includes Definition, Division, and Argumentation. Thus Fathers Fonseca, Toletus, the Conimbricenses, Rubins, and very many others of ours, to whom the Excellent Doctor gives no little support, disp. 1, *Metaph.*, sect. 4, from n. 26. To these are added Faber, Merinerus, Pontius, Mastrius, and other Scotists, speaking of Logic considered in itself. Among the more recent Thomists, the College of St. Thomas, Illustris, Palanco, Froylan, and others also subscribe to this view, although they speak of an objective and fictive Mode of Knowing.

6. This controversy seems to me of no great importance. First, because almost everyone speaks as he pleases concerning the object of attribution and the various conditions belonging to it. Second, because the unity and specification of a science, for whose sake the object of attribution is so laboriously sought, are sufficiently derived from the formal ratio "under which," just as from it is taken the specification of Powers, to which no object of attribution distinct from the formal ratio is assigned, except perhaps to the will, according to n. 4. Nevertheless, if in this matter a choice is desirable, I assert with the fourth opinion that the object of attribution in Logic is the Mode of Knowing, insofar as it includes Definition, Division, and Argumentation.

7. The Assertion Is Proved. The object of attribution of Logic, first, is not anything broader than the Mode of Knowing; on the other hand, it is not anything narrower. Therefore it is the proposed Mode of Knowing. Both Premises must be proved. The major premise is proved because, apart from the Mode of Knowing, there remain only the Predicables taken individually, such as Genus, Difference, etc., and likewise the Proposition with its species and parts. But none of these can be the end and goal of Logic; for they are not worthy of the labor of an art except insofar as they can serve the Mode of Knowing. For what does it matter to know how a Genus or Difference ought to be formed unless we thereby know how to construct a Definition? What need likewise was there to examine so subtly the nature and properties of a Proposition unless we might know how to argue from one to another

without danger of deception? Certainly, whatever is taught in the Summulae concerning Opposition, Conversion, and Equipollence of propositions, and likewise concerning Hypothetical, Modal, and Exponible propositions, tends to this: that, once the sense of each proposition has been discerned, good Consequences may be distinguished from bad. All these things, therefore, are treated for the sake of another, and accordingly as merely attributed objects.

8. The minor premise, however, which is more difficult and has more Adversaries, is proved. According to all, Logic was invented in order to supply the other Faculties with instruments of knowing by which the innermost features of things and their unknown recesses are artfully penetrated. Therefore the end of Logic, or its object of attribution, includes those instruments which in themselves immediately accomplish such penetration. But no thing is fully known or penetrated until these three things are evident: "what it is, into how many kinds it is divided, and what properties it has." For the first, Definition is in itself immediately necessary; for the second, Division; for the third, Argumentation. Therefore the object of attribution of Logic cannot be anything narrower than the Mode of Knowing insofar as it includes this threefold instrument.

9. The point is urged first against the second and third opinions. Logic does not hand down rules of defining and dividing precisely for the sake of Syllogism or Demonstration. Therefore it does not regard Definition and Division as merely attributed objects, but as partial objects of attribution. The antecedent is proved. First, because those rules, taught expressly, are not necessary for the syllogistic or demonstrative art; for this art was taught most perfectly by Aristotle in the Books now extant, although in those Books he did not expressly teach rules of defining and dividing, as all acknowledge. Second, because Definition and Division contain an artifice in itself highly desirable even prescinding from an ordering to Syllogism. For who would make little of being able by a fixed method to investigate what a thing is and what parts or species it has, even without remembering or knowing any further art? Hence, although Aristotle was the inventor of the syllogistic art, as he himself testifies (2 *Elench.*, last c.), nevertheless the more ancient Philosophers practiced Dialectic, because they had discovered and perfected the art of defining and dividing, especially Socrates and Plato. Hence also nothing is more frequent among the Ancients than to divide Logic, as though into primary parts, into the art of defining, dividing, and arguing.

10. The point is urged second. Instrumental arts do not have as their object of attribution the most perfect instrument, but all complete instruments needed by the higher arts. Thus the art of preparing medicines,

which ministers to Medicine, does not regard the most healthful medicine as its object of attribution. Likewise, if one and the same art fabricated all the weapons needed by Military Art, it would not regard as its end the sword rather than the shield, musket, or engine of war. Since, therefore, Logic supplies the other sciences with instruments for manifesting the unknown, it must regard as its end not some special instrument, but all those endowed with complete artifice and in themselves immediately conducive to the other sciences. The same is seen in every art. Architecture does not regard as its object of attribution a palace rather than a temple or another kind of building. Poetics does not set before itself as its end Comedy rather than Tragedy, an Epic Poem, an Elegiac Poem, etc.; nor does Rhetoric regard an Oration in the Judicial genus rather than in the Deliberative or Demonstrative; and so of the rest. The reason is that each of these artifacts has its own difficulty and value separately, prescinding from the others. The same occurs in our case.

CHAPTER X.
Solutions of Objections and Corollaries.

1. It is objected first. The Mode of Knowing "as such," as a common ratio abstracted from the species, is not the object of attribution of Logic; on the other hand, neither is the Mode of Knowing insofar as it aggregates and actually includes all the species within itself. Therefore it is such in no way. The consequence is clear; and the minor premise seems certain, because a complex composed of all the species has no unity except that of aggregation. But since a science takes its unity from its object of attribution, this must be truly one. The major premise is proved: first, because the intrinsic end of Logic must be an instrument by which sciences are acquired; but no science is acquired through the Mode of Knowing "as such." Second, because Logic, as a practical science, regards as its end something operable; but the precise ratio of the Mode of Knowing is not operable. Third, because cognition of the Genus is ordered more to cognition of the species than conversely. Therefore the object of attribution of Logic ought to be placed in the species rather than in the generic ratio of the Mode of Knowing.

2. This objection, upon which some insist too much, attacks all opinions equally. For whether one prefers the perfect Syllogism, or Demonstration, or the Conclusion of Demonstration, or any other artifact whatsoever, I shall equally ask whether it is taken as an abstract common ratio or as an aggregate of inferiors; and I shall turn the same difficulties against you. Certainly no one, so far as I know, restricts the object of attribution of Logic

to some atomic species of artifact. Indeed, not even thus would the objection be avoided. For such a species, if it aggregated all individuals, would not be truly one; but if it prescinded from individuals, it would not be operable or useful for acquiring sciences, which certainly are acquired only through individual acts. Moreover, the same difficulty applies to every art and practical science, for example, Ethics, Medicine, Architecture, and Painting, as will be clear to anyone who applies it. I know that by the Adversaries Demonstration or Syllogism is established as the end of Logic, abstracted on the side of the mode of conceiving, but on the side of the object including all the particular species. But, first, why may we not say the same? Second, according to the principles of Formal Precision, which please most of the Adversaries, no common ratio is abstracted on the side of the object, but only on the side of the mode or act. Therefore, if this abstraction suffices, why do they attack us, who will reject Objective Precision in the following Treatise?

3. For all these difficulties, therefore, I answer that the object of attribution of Logic is the Mode of Knowing, both in the genus and in the aforesaid threefold species, including also the species of those species. For in all these our proofs hold, as does also the parallel with the other arts. Nor is the objection concerning unity, which science derives from its object of attribution, an obstacle. For, first, the unity of the formal ratio "under which" suffices for the unity of a science, from n. 6 of the preceding chapter, especially when joined with abstraction from matter. Second, the object of attribution which we posit does not have merely the unity of aggregation, like a heap of stones; rather it additionally has the unity of definition under the same Genus belonging to Logic, namely under the common ratio of the Mode of Knowing. That this unity suffices for an object of attribution no one denies, and it is evident by induction through nearly all the sciences and arts.

4. Accordingly, the generic ratio of the Mode of Knowing is considered and defined by Logic in itself with a single definition. Although this definition immediately explains only the Mode of Knowing "as such," it nevertheless includes all the species contained under such a genus as a multiple mediate or remote Definiendum, and accordingly joins all those same species into one even when considered under their proper concepts. Therefore, when Logic considers the individual species as such, as partial objects of attribution, it does not wander outside one Genus, but remains within its latitude, and thus remains one. For, as Aristotle says (1 *Poster.*, c. 23), "One science is that which is of one Genus." See above Disp. 1, ch. 6, n. 13, where we explained how the common ratio of the Mode of Knowing is, as

it were, the center or bond of objective unity. And although there, for the sake of disputation, we allowed the object of attribution of Logic to be situated in the common ratio alone, whereas now we say that it is constituted also from the species as such, nevertheless the explanation of unity there given remains valid.

5. We add that the major premise of the objection can be denied without the proofs being obstacles. For, first, the Mode of Knowing "as such" is an instrument by which sciences are acquired, the acquisition being exercised in the state of contraction, not in the state of abstraction in which it specifies the art. Second, it is also something operable, indeed in the state of abstraction, yet not for that state but for the state of contraction to a species, indeed to an individual. The matter is evident and should be denied by no one. Every art and practical science regards its object universally, and in this differs from experience, as Aristotle and St. Thomas expressly teach (1 *Metaph.*, c. 1, lect. 1). How, then, does Architecture regard a house universally, which, precisely as such, certainly cannot be made or inhabited? Or how does Ethics regard Operation in common, by which one lives honestly, when no one lives thus by an operation in common? The reasoning is the same in speculative sciences. For Metaphysics, for example, regards Being "as such" insofar as possible, or capable of existing; and yet Being "as such" can never exist while abstraction is retained. A practical Faculty, however, as we have observed elsewhere, is said to have operation as its end insofar as this is suitably desirable because of operations to be exercised individually, to which its universal doctrine can be applied.

6. Finally, cognition of the Genus does indeed conduce and is orderable to cognition of the Species, but the same occurs conversely. For just as, with intensive perfection considered, the Genus is a part and the Species a whole, so, with latitude or extensive perfection considered, the Species is a part and the Genus is a whole, which they call "potestative or potential," for the cognition of which cognition of the subject parts is serviceable. Therefore the division of a Genus into Species or Differences is truly called a Mode of Knowing with respect to the Genus, because it manifests it more and renders it better known. But although cognitions of Genus and Species are mutually orderable, nevertheless the object of attribution is reasonably established rather in the common ratio than in the specific ratios, because in this way better provision is made for the unity of the science. Nor is it novel that the choice of an object of attribution should depend to some extent upon the prudent judgment of Philosophers, with a reasonable foundation on the side of things. For the common opinion, especially of the Scotists and of Ours, teaches this generally concerning every object of attribution.

7. One may say: cognition of the specific Difference in no way conduces to a more perfect cognition of the Genus. Therefore the object of attribution is established without foundation in the generic ratio. The antecedent is clear, because specific Differences are outside the ratio of the Genus and manifest not the ratio of agreement but of difference. I answer by denying the antecedent, which is not well proved. For properties also are outside the ratio of essence, which nevertheless is better known from cognition of them. Likewise cognition of one Contrary conduces to cognition of the other, although neither is constituted from the other. Differences, therefore, are outside the ratio of the Genus in such a way that at the same time they terminate its connection. But there is no doubt that a thing is more perfectly penetrated when the terms with which it is connected have been penetrated, as is evident in causes and effects. It is replied: one who knew perfectly all the species of the Mode of Knowing in particular would be a perfect Logician. Therefore Logic does not need cognition of the Mode of Knowing in common. I answer by denying the consequence, for the species cannot be perfectly known while the Genus is unknown, as is evident from the example of Man and Animal.

8. It is objected second, for the first opinion among those enumerated in the preceding chapter. The object of attribution of Logic also includes the Proposition and the five Predicables. Therefore it ought not to be restricted to the Mode of Knowing. The antecedent is proved. 1º From St. Thomas (lect. 4, in 4 *Metaph.*), who calls that "being of reason" which is properly said of the intentions of "Genus, species, and the like" the "proper Subject of Logic." But under the name "Subject" comes the object of attribution. 2º Because, according to the same Angelic Doctor in the Proemium to the *Ethica*, the Specificative Object of Logic is the "Order which Reason, by considering, makes in its proper act." But this Order is also found in the Proposition and in the construction of the Predicables. 3º Because the Proposition is a complete artifact about which Logic expressly treats. Therefore it is included under its object of attribution, if the parallel with the other arts has any force. 4º Because Logic treats the Predicables in a special treatise, with no mention made of another artifact to which they are ordered as parts. Therefore it treats them for their own sake and without attribution to another object.

9. I answer by denying the antecedent. To proofs 1º and 2º: St. Thomas there speaks of the Subject and Specificative Object not "of attribution, but of adequation," namely insofar as it coincides with the formal ratio "under which," or with the adequate formal object. The reason for this interpretation is that "being of reason," which St. Thomas calls the subject

of Logic, is also properly said of the intentions of the "Middle, the major and minor Extremes, Predicate, Subject," and of others that are merely partial or incomplete; and in these also is found the "Order" made by reason. Yet such intentions are merely attributed objects according to the Adversaries. To 3º: a Proposition often contains a definition or division, or even at least a virtual argumentation, such as is contained in causal and conditional propositions. But then it is included under the object of attribution not precisely insofar as it is a Proposition, but insofar as it has the force of a Mode of Knowing. Likewise a Proposition which discloses some essential predicate of an object may without absurdity be numbered among the species of the Mode of Knowing, according to what was said in the Summulae.

10. If, however, we speak generally of the Proposition insofar as it affirms or denies something of something, I answer by denying the consequence of the proof. For the Proposition so considered without respect to Argumentation is something obvious and very easy; or certainly it does not possess an artifice which proximately and by reason of itself is useful for the extrinsic end of the logical art, namely for the use of the other sciences, which use consists in penetrating what a thing is, into how many kinds it is divided, and what properties its essence entails. But an instrumental art regards as its intrinsic end only those instruments which proximately and by reason of themselves are useful for its extrinsic end, namely for the use of the higher faculty. Thus the art of constructing musical instruments does not regard as its intrinsic end the individual harmonic pipes, but an instrument properly constructed from all of them, because the individual pipes separately are not proximately useful for the end of the musical art. Hence it must be denied that a purely enunciative artifact is complete "in the being of an instrument of knowing," although it is complete and perfect "in the being of a Dialectical Expression," just as an artifact complete in the being of a harmonic pipe is not therefore complete in the being of a musical instrument. For these reasons Logic is not called the Art of enunciating, whereas it is commonly called the Art of defining, dividing, and arguing.

11. To proof 4º, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For in order that some object be attributed, it is not required that it be treated everywhere under the function of a part of another artifact. It suffices that the treatise concerning such an object was instituted and inserted into the art or science because cognition of that object is useful for a better cognition or easier construction of another object, so that without this usefulness the treatise would be useless for the goal of the art. And thus stands the treatise on the Predicables, which is inserted into Logic only as a kind of preparation

of terms, or of the proximate matter from which instruments of knowing may be constructed.

12. It is objected third, for the second opinion. The object of attribution of Logic is the Mode of Knowing; but Demonstration alone is properly a Mode of Knowing, since it alone generates science. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º: because Aristotle, 1 *Prior.*, c. 1, establishes Demonstration as his end and testifies that his intention is directed to it. Confirmation 2º: because St. Thomas, at the beginning of Opuscule 48, shows individually that all things treated in Logic are ordered to demonstration. Confirmation 3º: because Definition and Division can be parts of Demonstration. Therefore they are ordered to it as attributed objects, as also are the probable and fallacious syllogisms under the title of contrariety. Confirmation 4º: because Logic, as directive of the Intellect, regards as its end that operation which the Intellect most desires. But since the Intellect naturally desires to know, it most desires Demonstration, which alone causes knowing, since according to Aristotle Science "is a Habit acquired through Demonstration," or also "Cognition of a thing through its cause." Confirmation 5º: because the end of a ministerial art is the instrument which the higher faculty asks of it. But the other sciences, to which Logic ministers, ask chiefly from it Demonstration, as necessary for their end, which is certain knowledge of the object without danger of error.

13. I answer that the minor premise of the objection is true if Mode of Knowing is taken strictly, but false if Mode of Knowing is taken broadly, though not improperly, for a mode or means of artfully manifesting the unknown insofar as this belongs to the integrity of the Sciences. And in this way the Mode of Knowing is understood among Logicians; its division into Definition, Division, and Argumentation is called improper by no one. Hence, although Demonstration alone generates discursive science strictly taken, it does not alone generate science taken in a broader sense. To Confirmation 1º: many Authors of our opinion concede that Demonstration is the intrinsic end of Aristotelian Logic now extant, or as it has come down to us in the Books we possess from Aristotle, since those Books do not expressly treat Definition and Division. They deny this, however, if the discussion concerns Logic considered in itself, or even insofar as Aristotle once treated it in Books which have perished. But this solution is unnecessary. For the passage objected proves indeed that Demonstration is the object of attribution of the books of the Analytics, but it does not prove this of the whole of Aristotelian Logic. For similarly, at the very beginning of Book I of the *Topics*, the Philosopher says that his purpose is to discover a

method of probable Syllogism, which therefore will be the object of attribution of those Books.

14. To Confirmation 2º: among the things which St. Thomas teaches to be ordered to Demonstration he does not mention Definition or Division, and moreover he omits the Topical Syllogism. To 3º, I deny the consequence. For although Definition, for example, can be a part of Demonstration, it is not considered by Logic precisely under the title of a part, nor is its whole usefulness for the goal of Logic situated in the function of a part. For even prescinding from this function, Definition has by reason of itself a reason why it should be treated expressly by Logic, since it proximately serves the use of the sciences, to which it belongs to know the quiddity of the object through Definition. Definition, therefore, is treated by Logic both insofar as it explains the essence of the thing in itself, which is the primary concept of Definition under which it is regarded as an object of attribution, and insofar as it has force for inferring a conclusion concerning properties; and this is the secondary concept under which Definition is regarded as a part of Demonstration and as an attributed object. Thus in the very quiddity of a thing a twofold concept is commonly distinguished, "of essence and of nature": under the first, quiddity is regarded absolutely; under the second, with an order to properties, of which it is the root. Thus also an Element is considered by the Physicist both absolutely and by reason of itself, and with an order to the Mixed Body.

15. It can moreover be denied that Definition is a part of Demonstration; for it would be such insofar as it is the Middle for inferring properties. But the force of inferring is not in the whole Definition, but in the Difference alone. For in order to conclude by demonstration that man is capable of laughter or wonder, "rational" suffices for the Middle, and the complete definition "rational Animal" would be superfluous, since "Animal" in no way entails "capable of laughter." See Father Compton, from whom this whole doctrine is taken. What is added concerning probable syllogism deserves no consideration; for the title of contrariety no more proves that probable syllogism is ordered to demonstrative syllogism than conversely.

16. To 4º: that the Intellect most desires Demonstration is uncertain. Father Compton prefers Definition to Demonstration: first, because it more closely imitates the mode of Angelic cognition; second, because just as objective definition, or the quiddity of the object, is the principal objective concept and first truth, which is the root of all properties, so formal definition is the principal concept and first formal truth, and the origin of the other cognitions. Hence it will be the operation most desirable to the Intellect. But let whatever the objection alleges be granted. From it follows

only that Demonstration is the object "of principality," not at all that it alone is the object "of attribution." For it is nothing new that among the partial objects of attribution some determinate one should be eminent and most worthy of consideration by the science, as God by Metaphysics and Man by Physics. Hence, although Demonstration alone causes knowing according to the Aristotelian definitions of science, which proceed in the strictest sense, it is not therefore alone the object of attribution. Thus, although God alone is Being by antonomasia, and the other beings in comparison with God are as though nothing, nevertheless God alone is not the object of attribution of Metaphysics, but Being in common, or complete substance "as such," is. Hence also the solution to 5º is clear: although the other sciences chiefly ask for Demonstration, they do not ask for it alone. Certain knowledge of the quiddity and parts of an object is acquired by Definition and Division.

17. It is objected fourth, for the third opinion. Logic, as a rational science, follows the natural order of the operations of Reason; but of these operations the first is naturally ordered to the second, and the second to the third, as St. Thomas explains (lect. 1, in 1 *Periherm.*) and all acknowledge. Therefore Logic regards whatever artifice belongs to the first and second operations with an order or attribution to the third, which is syllogism. I answer: Logic does indeed follow the natural order of the operations of the Intellect with respect to method or the arrangement of doctrine, but not entirely with respect to the attribution of one to another. For wherever Logic finds a complete artifice proximately useful for the acquisition of sciences, there it rests as at an intrinsic end, at least an inadequate one. Nor must the order of attribution in the sciences follow in all respects the natural order of objects; otherwise all sciences would regard God as their object of attribution, since the objects of all of them are naturally ordered to God. And this ought especially to be true in those sciences which consider God among their partial objects, such as Physics and Metaphysics. I would not deny, however, that Logic considers the first and second operations in some measure insofar as they are ordered to the third. For thus it regards both those acts which by reason of themselves do not have a complete artifice in the being of an instrument of knowing, and also those which are endowed with the artifice of Definition or Division, provided they are considered under a concept not primary but secondary, according to what was said in n. 14.

18. To forestall other objections, note 1º: Father Compton places the object of attribution of Logic in Definition alone. But whatever he alleges, even if it is conceded, proves at most that Definition is the object of principality, just as we said in n. 16 concerning the arguments alleged for

Demonstration. Note 2º: Father Lynceo sets Truth in common as the object of attribution of Logic because Logic is called the Mistress of truth, and by its proper function distinguishes true from false, guards against errors, and teaches how to know. But such praises prove only that Truth is the mediate and extrinsic end of Logic, which Logic does not regard as its object, since nowhere does it treat the nature of Truth except through certain questions borrowed from Psychology or Metaphysics, concerning which in tract. 5. Rather, it prepares instruments for attaining it. For because Logic teaches the artifice of defining, dividing, and arguing, by which, when reduced to practice, truth is easily attained, error avoided, and science acquired, it is therefore called the Mistress of Truth, etc. In this sense Music is called the art of soothing the ears, and Cooking is called the art of delighting the taste, namely from a mediate and extrinsic end.

19. Note 3º: although the designation of an object of attribution in the sciences and the ordering of attributed objects depend to some extent upon the judgment of Philosophers, and are completely and formally artificial, as is also the division of whole Sciences, according to a sufficiently common opinion (see above Disp. 1, ch. 6, from n. 10), to which the Excellent Doctor favors, disp. 44 *Met.*, sect. 11, n. 68, nevertheless it is not therefore useless to inquire what the object of attribution is in Logic or in another science. For all suppose that such judgment ought to be founded in the very nature of the objects. Therefore it can at least be disputed which of the partial objects of Logic ought more suitably and reasonably to be chosen as the object of attribution.

Corollaries.

20. Now, in order that from the doctrine of the whole Disputation a full conception of the object of Logic may be formed, I add the following observations. 1º Spoken words and writings, insofar as they imitate logical artifacts, are the material object of Logic, not attained in itself but accidentally and indirectly, that is, attained by acts indirectly belonging to Logic, as is clear from ch. 2. 2º Things according to physical being, under which name beings of reason are also included when they are discussed, are the mediate or remote material object insofar as they are the object of the object of Logic, namely of acts of the Intellect. They are also the material object immediately indeed, but incidentally attained under the general headings "Identity, Essence, Quiddity, Whole, Parts," and the like, not as denominable matter, but as extrinsic matter and that "about which," almost

in the same way that Painting considers natural things in order to express them through colors. These things are clear from chs. 3 and 8.

21. 3º Things according to intentional being, or concretes of second intention, are in the first place not constituted from purely objective being of reason, as is clear from ch. 4, nn. 2–3, but from a thing outside the soul and real cognition as form. Next, neither are they the formal object of Logic if they are considered as concretes including subject and form, as we showed in ch. 6. Indeed, neither does the artifact constituted from form and proximate matter, which Logic intends in itself as an art, consist in these concretes, at least through primary acts or principal rules, as we saw in the same ch. from n. 18, whatever may be said of certain secondary acts, concerning which ibid. n. 30, joined with n. 9. Therefore, with the primary acts of Logic considered, such concretes are not considered in the being of such things. Nevertheless, each of their parts is considered under another function: namely, the formal part under the function of right representation, and the material part under the function of matter, not that "from which," but purely that "about which."

22. 4º The whole formal object of Logic is in acts of the Intellect. For the formal ratio "under which" (otherwise the formal ratio "which," otherwise the formal object "by which," otherwise "which," otherwise the formal ratio of the object "as a thing," or "in the being" of a thing, according to various modes of speaking) is "the intrinsic rectitude of operations of the Intellect useful for acquiring sciences," which rectitude also falls within the first operation, from what was said ch. 7, from n. 3, and ch. 9, n. 2. This rectitude is a "being of reason," not purely objective but subjective; and because it is neither known nor dictated except through reflexive acts, which are formal second intentions, it is therefore called an "objective second intention." The most formal ratio "under which" (otherwise the ratio of the object "as object," or "in the being of the knowable," which adds to the formal ratio only an express respect to the science, from ch. 1, n. 12) is the "objective directability of the operations of the Intellect," such as we explained in ch. 7, nn. 14 and 15, and also ch. 8, nn. 2 and 3. Each ratio, both formal and most formal, is the "Specificative Object" of Logic taken as a whole and also the "Subject of adequation." See ch. 9, n. 4. Abstraction from matter is commonly regarded as an "objective condition," that is, a condition rendering the object proportioned to a power or science, not as a motive but as an application. Thus to Logic corresponds "abstraction from all matter insofar as limited by the artifice of the formal sign." See ch. 5, n. 8.

23. 5º The formal object "which" of Logic, taken for the specific and inadequate formal object such as we described ch. 1, n. 10, is "any specific

rectitude," or "any particular artifice of operations of the Intellect." But the proximate material object, or the proper denominable matter "from which" logical artifacts are constructed, is "the entity of acts of the Intellect according to predicates formally distinct from representation," and also "according to representation in common, insofar as it is indifferent to various species, right or defective." See ch. 6, n. 18, and ch. 8, n. 6. Hence the proper artifact of Logic, intended in itself by its rules insofar as constituted from matter and form, is "right cognition."

6º Finally, the object of attribution of Logic, which is also called the "Subject of attribution and the Specificative Object by way of an intrinsic end," is the Mode of Knowing insofar as it includes Definition, Division, and Argumentation. The attributed objects, or objects of community, are apprehensions forming the Predicables, and also Enunciation or Proposition with its species and parts, as well as the actual parts of each Mode of Knowing taken individually, for example the Middle, Extremes, Premises, and Conclusion of a syllogism. All these things are clear from chs. 9 and 10. And thus far concerning the Introductory Treatise.

TREATISE II.

ON UNIVERSALS IN GENERAL.

After Logic, reflecting upon itself in the introductory treatise, examined its own nature and fixed its proper object in the operations of the Intellect, it now undertakes to deliver an exact doctrine of that same object, and therein the direction of the human mind, and consequently of all the Sciences. And since correctness in judging and reasoning depends greatly upon the general ideas of things formed by simple perception, it will therefore devote the three immediately following Treatises to refining the first operation of the Intellect, that is, simple apprehensions, while in the remainder it will briefly supply whatever is lacking in the Dialectical Institutions concerning the second and third operations. Yet Logic will not proceed in these Treatises wholly unmixed: for it is compelled to borrow many things from Metaphysics, both by reason of the cognition of things and by the usage of the Schools; and first of all it must thoroughly examine the various kinds of identity and distinction, lest thereafter its own doctrine be obscured at almost every line.

DISPUTATION I.
ON IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION.

CHAPTER I.
The Terms Explained, Real Distinction Is Set Forth, and Is Denied to Exist Between Metaphysical Grades.

1. Identity, says the Philosopher (*Metaphysics* V, c. 9), "is a certain unity of essence, either of several things, or when one thing is treated as though several, as when one says that a thing is the same as itself, for one then treats it as two." That is, those things are said to be the same which have some unity of essence, whether they are in some respect several, or whether merely by repetition of the name we treat one as several. For in order that a determinate identity may be expressed, we are always compelled to form the extremes as though they were two, at least verbally, as when we say, "Man is man," or "He is the same as himself."

2. "Unity" is here taken by the Philosopher as meaning the same as "agreement" or "conformity." In this sense, the unity of two or more things may be either in substance, or in quality, or in quantity. Unity or conformity in substance, such as that, for example, between the humanities of Peter and Paul, is specially called "identity"; unity or agreement in quality, for example that of snow and milk in whiteness, is called "similarity"; unity or agreement in quantity, that is, in magnitude of mass or of perfection, is called "equality." Unity or identity taken in this sense, however, is broad and improper, since it is compatible with true multiplicity or distinction; and

therefore among more recent authors every agreement or conformity of extremes that are truly several, whether in substance, quality, or quantity, is ordinarily called not so much "unity" or "identity" as, by the general name, "similarity."

3. Unity, therefore, must here be taken for indivisibility, not indeed of parts among themselves, but of the whole thing which is said to be one. Thus, according to the mind of Aristotle (*Metaphysics* V, c. 6), it may be defined or described as "the non-division," or "indivisibility, of a being into several things wholly of the same nature," or "into several such as the thing itself is, together with division from every other thing." Hence you gather that not only a wholly simple being, such as an Angel, is truly called one, but also a being composed of parts joined by some bond; because, although it can be dissolved into parts, it cannot be divided into several composites wholly of the same nature. Thus Peter is one because, although divisible into body and soul, he cannot be divided into several Peters. Thus also the water of the sea is called one because, although it can be divided into several portions of water, it cannot be divided into portions each having the same measure as the sea that was divided.

4. For the present matter, three species of Unity are ordinarily assigned. The first is "individual" Unity, which is also called "numerical, material, and characteristic": it is the ultimate indivisibility of a thing, founded upon individual predicates, such as Peter has by reason of Peterhood, and every other individual as such. The second is "essential" Unity, which is also called "formal": it is the non-division, or indivisibility, of a thing into several essences. Thus Peter both is one Peter and is one man, because he cannot be divided either into several Peters or into several men. Whether this unity is distinguished on the part of the thing from individual unity will be decided below. The third is "universal" Unity, which is also called "unity of precision and formal intentional unity": it is that by virtue of which several individuals become one species, or several species one genus. This will be explained expressly below. In another and shorter way Unity, like Identity, is divided into real and rational, concerning which division later. Opposed to Unity is Multitude, which consequently consists in the division or divisibility of beings, and is taken in as many ways as Unity is taken contrariwise.

5. Unity thus explained now coincides with Identity and is not distinguished from it except perhaps by the manner of signifying, or also because unity imports the distinction of a being from everything that is not itself, which distinction identity indeed grounds but does not include. Therefore Identity, according to the mind of the Philosopher cited in n. 1, will rightly be defined as "unity in entity." For this concept seems both

sufficiently clear and, moreover, belongs to every identity and to identity alone, as will be evident by induction. For example, because in the Divine Triad the Father and the Son have unity in absolute entity, but not in relative entities, they are the same God, but are not the same Person. Even in privations and beings of reason, identity will in its own way be found if there is unity in negative or fictive entity.

6. Yet I do not contend that this is a strict definition. For Identity can scarcely be expressed in clearer terms than the common and customary ones, "the same," "the very same." Hence the great Augustine said (In Psalm. 121): "How shall I say the very same, except 'the very same'?... Whatever else I say, I do not say the very same." Certainly innumerable persons, without reflection or explanation, evidently know their own identity with themselves; and therefore, if you propose to anyone that something which he remembers having done himself was done only by another, he will immediately dissent, as from a proposition evidently false. Moreover, there are certain first principles known through themselves and with every rational evidence, for example: "Everything either is or is not"; "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be"; "Things which are the same as one third thing," etc. But since Identity is expressed in these principles, it cannot fail to be known through itself and evident to everyone. Hence more recent authors commonly conclude, and rightly, that Identity is strictly indefinable because no explanation clearer than the thing defined can be given.

7. Nevertheless Identity may somehow be described by terms accidentally better known, such as those contained in the definition given in n. 5; or also if Identity is said to consist in this, "that this and that are not truly two, that they are not distinguished from one another, that this is that." Hence I now find somewhat displeasing the description of Identity which I formerly approved, namely, "the capacity to verify an affirmative proposition of one thing concerning another, at least if the predicate is taken directly and substantively." Man is therefore identified with animal because it can truly be said, "Man is an animal"; and so in other cases. It will be said: "Man is an animal" is therefore truly said because identity of the extremes is given; therefore identity is not given because that proposition is true, otherwise there will be a vicious circle. I answer: we do not give as the reason of Identity that the proposition is true, but that in the object there is a capacity for verifying it; and in this there is no vicious procedure. In the same way, to one asking why man is rational, the capacity or potency of reasoning is given as the reason, although it is otherwise true that man actually reasons because he is rational. Thus the proposed definitions of Identity may be

admitted as accidentally or relatively better known than what is defined, because perhaps there will be some who penetrate the terms of those definitions more ultimately than the force of the name "same."

8. Identity is divided into "real" and "rational." Real Identity is that which belongs to things independently of the operation of the Intellect. Rational Identity is that which arises from, or consists in, some determinate act of reason. Whether either has species, and what they are, will be more conveniently explained later in connection with the Distinctions opposed to them. For now I note that real identity truly and properly exists on the part of the thing even when no one thinks of it. First, because prior to the thought of the Intellect every thing is not other than or distinct from itself, but is the same as itself. Second, because the Intellect by direct acts regards identity as its object whenever it affirms something. It will be said: real Identity indeed exists on the part of the thing fundamentally, but not formally, until an act of reason supervenes, distinguishing one thing from another and referring them to one another. This is proved because Identity is a certain relation of subject to predicate; nor can two things be identified unless they are presupposed to be somehow two. But since this duality and relation is not given on the part of the thing between extremes that are really indistinct, it must be the work of the Intellect. And thus St. Thomas teaches in many places (e.g. *Metaphysics* V, lect. 11).

9. But against this, 1º, if the extremes on the part of the thing are truly indistinct and exclude true duality, then they are truly the same; for what else is Identity than indistinction and unity excluding duality? Against this, 2º, if identity formally consists in a relation of two things, it necessarily supposes duality and distinction simultaneously posited; but this appears no less absurd than that light should necessarily presuppose darkness coexisting with it. Nor say that the distinction of the extremes belongs to another order, namely rational distinction, which is not opposed to real identity. First, because real identity, insofar as formally constituted, is according to you something rational; therefore it ought to be opposed to rational distinction. Second, because rational denial is also conceived in a relative manner; and yet it cannot consist in a relation and rational distinction, lest identity and distinction in the same order coexist together. The same, therefore, must much more be said of real identity, although conceived in a relative manner. Add that real distinction in no way depends upon an act of reason; therefore neither should real identity depend upon it.

10. Therefore the fact that real identity cannot be conceived or explained by us except in a relative manner and through a certain duality of the extremes which we call the same proves indeed an imperfection of the

human mind, which cannot perceive things, however simple, except through distinct expressions from which a certain duality and relation results; but it does not prove that identity according to itself consists in that duality or relation. Thus we cannot affirm the supreme simplicity of God without thereby forming some plurality and composition of extremes, in which, however, simplicity itself certainly does not consist. Thus also, in order to affirm the privation of every real and rational relation, you will have to form some relation. Will that privation therefore consist in that relation? One thing, then, is Identity; another is the relation of identity, that is, a relation founded upon identity. This relation is a work of reason and is not given on the part of the thing except fundamentally; and this alone St. Thomas intends. But Identity, even before the operation of the Intellect, is given formally in things, that is, truly, properly, and fully constituted. And if the expressions of wise authors sometimes sound otherwise, this is because Identity is taken, not as it is in itself, but reduplicatively as conceived and explained by us.

11. Distinction is diametrically opposed to Identity; therefore it is to be defined or explained in the opposite manner. Distinction, then, consists in this, "that the extremes are truly two or more," or in this, "that one is not the other"; or, to speak more according to the norm of definition, Distinction is "the privation of unity in entity"; or also "the capacity to verify a negative proposition of one concerning another, at least if the predicate is taken directly and substantively." By this limitation you will easily meet certain propositions with an adjectival predicate objected by Fr. Lynce, Metaphysics II, tr. 2, c. 1, from n. 5. Perhaps there will be some reason why a predicate indistinct from the subject cannot be verified of the subject when taken adjectivally, from which we now prescind; but it will always be verified substantively.

Real Distinction Is Explained.

12. Distinction in common is either "real" or "rational." Real Distinction is said to be that which belongs to things independently of known being. Rational Distinction is that which belongs to things only insofar as known through inadequate and precisive concepts. Thus, for example, between the animality and rationality of man there is no rational distinction until the Intellect elicits these concepts, "animal," "rational," by neither of which the whole essence of man is expressed, but rather appears as though divided into parts which nevertheless are not distinct in reality. More concerning rational distinction later.

13. Concerning real distinction it must now be noted that, especially in Aristotle, "to be distinguished" and "to be diverse" are not rarely taken for the same thing. Yet if we speak precisely, "to be distinguished" states the mere exclusion of identity, whereas "to be diverse" adds also the negation of similarity or agreement. For this reason we commonly call images similar to one another distinct, but not diverse. Aristotle also recognizes a difference between "different" and "diverse," so that things are said to differ when they agree in something and disagree in something, whereas things are said to be diverse when they disagree wholly, or agree in nothing. In common usage, however, diversity is taken for the same as difference or dissimilarity.

14. The Eximious Doctor discusses at length the signs from which we can infer real distinction (Disp. 7, Metaphysics, sect. 2). There are two principal ones. The first is real production, which necessarily proves a real distinction between producer and produced; for nothing can produce itself or give being to itself. Hence Theologians prove the real distinction between the Divine Persons. Yet this sign must be understood of primary production, or production as regards first being; for as regards second being, as they say, something can produce itself according to a probable opinion. The second sign is real separability, whereby one extreme can exist without the other in a determinate place or time. This sign most evidently proves the privation of real identity; for nothing can be separated from itself or exist in a place or time without itself. Otherwise the same thing could at some time or place simultaneously be and not be, than which nothing is more contradictory. And this reasoning holds whether the separability is mutual or non-mutual. To these is ordinarily added, as a third sign, any real relation, such as similarity, equality, dominion, etc., for it necessarily requires two extremes.

15. The Scotists reduce the aforesaid signs to separability, at least that which arises intrinsically; indeed, they seem to place in it the concept of real distinction absolutely so called. For according to the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor Scotus, II, dist. 1, q. 5, § "Ad quaest. istam," dist. 2, q. 2, § "Contra istud," just as real Identity is "inseparability intrinsically," so real Distinction is "separability in being arising intrinsically." They are commonly attacked: first, because the Divine Persons are really distinguished from one another although inseparable; second, because according to the Scotists a real distinction is given between a physical whole and its parts taken together, and yet no separability is given. What Mastrius answers to these and other objections we shall see elsewhere.

16. We therefore say that any one of the three signs of n. 14, when posited, proves real distinction, so that if even one of them is known to be present, whatever be the case with the others, real distinction is rendered

indubitable. Nor do separability and real distinction coincide by the very terms. Otherwise, just as there is non-mutual separability, for example in God, who can exist without a creature while a creature can in no way exist without God, so there would be non-mutual real distinction; which is plainly false, whatever Meurisse may say apud Mastrius (Disp. 1, Logic, n. 68), and contrary to the common understanding of the Schools. Certainly dialectical conversions, for example, "No man is a horse, therefore no horse is a man," are judged by all to be formal consequences and therefore everywhere infallible; but their firmness rests upon the fact that real identity and real distinction are always reciprocal. Separability, therefore, even non-mutual, necessarily supposes mutual real distinction. This could easily be demonstrated at greater length were it not acknowledged by nearly all. Here it must be noted that, in order that the distinction of two things may be believed from this principle, actual separation is not required, nor even separability naturally possible; it is enough that separation, although never hitherto effected, be proved possible by the absolute potency of God, whether from a similar case, from the absence of contradiction, or from any other suitable argument.

17. Here it must also be noted that real identity and distinction cannot by any potency be changed in a thing actually existing. For if A, which yesterday existed distinct from B, today became the same as B, an open contradiction would follow, namely that A today would be the very thing it was yesterday and at the same time would not be the very thing. It would be so, as supposed, otherwise the discussion would no longer concern the same A but another; and at the same time it would not, because yesterday it was other than B and today is not other than B but the same as B. I said "in a thing actually existing," because through the change from the state of possibility to the state of existence, or conversely, every created thing, when it begins or ceases to exist, anew acquires or loses absolute and exercised identity with itself, just as it acquires or loses its whole essence and reality taken absolutely and in exercise; consequently it loses or acquires a purely negative distinction from its predicates, situated in the mere absence of identity actually exercised, or in the non-existence of the extremes. Fire, for example, so long as it does not exist, is neither a being, nor a substance, nor fire, in the absolute and exercised sense; but is nothing. Yet in the signified, objective, and quasi-conditioned sense, every thing identifies with itself its essential predicates even in the state of possibility.

18. Real Distinction is divided, 1º, into "positive," "negative," and "mixed," according to the nature of the extremes. Positive Distinction is that which is given between true real beings, as between the Sun and the Moon.

Negative Distinction is that which occurs between fictive extremes, or between privations of beings, which are called negative beings, as between blindness and deafness, or between the absence of a stone and the absence of fire. Mixed Distinction is that which is given between a positive and a negative extreme, as between light and darkness, or between your sight and another's blindness. In another sense a negative distinction may be so called from n. 17, which consists in the pure absence of identity actually exercised between extremes that are positive according to themselves but non-existent, as between the animal and the rational of Antichrist.

19. It is divided, 2°, into "adequate" and "inadequate." Adequate Distinction is distinction according to the whole being, such as that between Peter and Paul, or between Man and Angel. Inadequate Distinction is that which does not affect the whole being of both extremes, but leaves room for identity in some respect. Such is given between a whole and the parts taken singly, as between man and soul. Man is distinguished from the soul because besides it he includes something else, namely the body; and he is not adequately distinguished because he includes the soul in his being and is inadequately identified with it. Therefore this is called "the distinction of including and included." Such also would exist if the forms of fire and stone happened by Divine power to be received in the same individual matter; for then fire and stone would be distinguished only inadequately, namely according to the forms, not according to the subject.

20. Positive Distinction is subdivided into "real absolute" and "real modal." Absolute Distinction is that which occurs between two things neither of which is a mode of the other, as between Peter and Paul, stone and gold, water and coldness. Modal Distinction is that which intervenes between a thing and its mode. A "mode," as the term is taken here, is a certain tenuous and minute entity whose whole being consists in the ultimate determination of a thing for performing some office or receiving some denomination, without which mode, at least taken individually, the same thing can exist absolutely. Thus location, duration, and union are called modes by which the rational soul, of itself indifferent to union with the body or to existence at this or that time or place, is ultimately and formally determined to those offices. Hence non-mutual separability is given between a thing and its mode; for the thing can exist without the mode, for example the soul without union, but the mode can by no potency exist without the thing.

21. It is asked whether the distinction between a thing and its mode is simply to be called real, or rather intermediate between real and rational, so that it is less than real distinction but greater than rational distinction. The

question seems merely verbal. It is certain that the thing can exist while the mode perishes; and this separability, although non-mutual, necessarily supposes the exclusion of simply real identity. For nothing can exist when that with which it is really the same has perished; otherwise it could exist without itself or simultaneously be and not be, than which nothing is more contradictory. Therefore, if distinction is taken for exclusion of identity, that which separates a thing and its mode is wholly real and no less than absolute distinction.

22. But if the distinction is denominated from the extremes, modal distinction is not said simply and absolutely to be "real"; just as the mode itself, although not nothing, nevertheless because of the tenuity of its being is not called simply and absolutely a "thing," but only a "mode of a thing," a "determination of a thing." And in this sense the Eximious Doctor, Disp. 7, Metaphysics, sect. 1, contends that modal distinction is less than real distinction, as he explains especially in nn. 28 and 29. But when in n. 27 he seems to grant that a being and its mode are "really the same," he speaks of improper identity, namely that taken for inseparability and intimate conjunction of mode with thing, as he sufficiently indicates in n. 19. There remains the question whether, besides distinction simply real and rational distinction, a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, or intrinsic virtual distinction, must be admitted. But before this is discussed, the title prefixed to the Chapter must be completed.

There Is No Real Distinction Between Metaphysical Grades.

23. Metaphysical grades are those predicates by which we ascend by degrees from the lowest nature of an individual, as from a base, to the highest nature of being. For example, in Peter these predicates are: "man, animal, living thing, body, substance, being." Among these are also included differential predicates, such as "rational, sentient," etc. For man includes the genus "animal" and the difference "rational"; animal includes the genus "living thing" and the difference "sentient"; and thus with the others. Peter also includes the specific nature of man and the individual difference or haecceity, which is "Peterhood." Caramuel, Metalogica IV, disp. 8, contends that between these predicates, at least between the specific nature and haecceity, and also between the generic and differential predicates of each individual, there is an absolute real distinction, as great, namely, as that between Peter and Paul. He asserts that this is common in the School of

Plato. The same was taught in Majorca by several followers of Raymond Lull, as Servera reports, disp. 5, c. 2.

24. The contrary, however, is proved or indubitably supposed by all Peripatetics. Their most true opinion is proved, 1º: any one of those predicates is truly affirmed of the others; for we truly say, "Peter is a man; Man is an animal; Peter's animal is rational." But things of which one is truly the other are really indistinct, as no one doubts. The Adversaries answer that those predicates are truly affirmed of one another not in the abstract or substantively, but concretely and adjectivally. Hence when it is said, "Man is an animal," the sense is, "That which has humanity is that which has animality," which truth is quite compatible with animality being really distinguished from humanity or rationality. Thus one who says, "The white is sweet," does not identify whiteness with sweetness, because he elicits this sense: "That which has whiteness is that which has sweetness."

25. But against this, 1º: therefore essential predicates are adjacent to Peter after the manner of accidental forms, than which nothing is more absurd. Against this, 2º: therefore, just as the substance of sugar taken specifically is neither white nor sweet, black nor bitter, so the entity of that subject which is said to have animality, rationality, etc., will according to itself be neither really rational nor irrational, sentient nor insentient, corporeal nor spiritual, indeed neither substance nor accident, since it is really distinguished from the forms of these denominations no less than the substance of sugar from whiteness. But the consequence is undoubtedly contradictory.

26. Proposition 2º: all the predicates of Peter are really identified with his haecceity; therefore they are identified with one another, unless the evident principle falls: "Things which are the same as one third thing," etc. The antecedent is proved: all the predicates of Peter through themselves are "this" and not another; therefore through themselves they are their own haecceity, for by this name we denote that by which a thing is "this," co-distinguished from others. The antecedent is proved. First, because an old axiom of the Philosophers is: "Every thing through itself is what it is, and through itself is not what it is not." Second, because otherwise it could equally be said that the haecceity which you superadd is not through itself "this" rather than others, but needs a new haecceity; which likewise will need another new one, especially since it still agrees with the haecceities of other men in the nature of difference and contraction. There will therefore be in Peter an aggregate of infinitely many really distinct haecceities.

27. It will be said: although the several predicates of Peter are their own haecceity, they are not thereby identified with one third thing, because in

Peter there is not one simple haecceity but one composed of many, namely as many as there are higher predicates. Against this, 1º: the Adversaries admit for all the predicates of each individual only one indivisible haecceity, as may be seen in the cited Caramuel. Against this, 2º: if Peter's animal is really indistinct from its own partial numerical haecceity, no reason remains why it should be distinguished from the specific difference, namely rationality, as the Adversaries admit.

28. Add that, if any higher predicates are distinguished from lower ones, all are likewise distinguished, and consequently even the very nature of "being" or "creature"; which the Adversaries also seem to suppose and which is gathered from their arguments. But who does not see that this is chimerical? For if rationality, for example, is really distinguished from being, it will not be intrinsically and by identity apt to exist, since "being" is "that which is apt to exist." If it is not intrinsically and by identity a creature, and nevertheless is something truly existing, it will be God; for there is no middle. Finally, the true opinion is validly proved from the fact that the animality and rationality of man are not really distinct parts insofar as they reside in the rational soul. For it is certain among Catholics that the rational soul is not composed of parts but wholly simple in reality. Nor again are they distinguished insofar as they include the body; for no one distributes the parts of the body between animal and rational. They are therefore distinguished from no side. Hence the beginner will easily perceive that, although body and soul are really distinguished in man, nevertheless the rational and the animal of man are the same really indivisible and indistinct thing; for both "animal" and "rational" are names of the whole of the same composite including body and soul.

29. Objection 1º: the diversity of the operations of sensing and reasoning observed in man requires really distinct principles, no less than the diversity of the operations of roaring and barking; but the principles of those operations are animality and rationality; therefore, etc. Objection 2º: animality can exist without rationality, as in fact occurs in a horse and in every brute; but this separability is an evident sign of real distinction. Objection 3º: the holy Fathers of the Church exhort us to give thanks to God because He made us men and not beasts, stones, or trees (Augustine, Soliloquia, c. 9, in t. 9); therefore our nature could have been joined with the difference and haecceity of a beast. Otherwise, why give thanks? Therefore it is distinguished from the haecceity which it has in us.

30. To 1º I answer by denying the major premise. For if diversity of operations of the same *suppositum* proves distinction of principles, there will be in the Omnipotence of God as many really distinct powers as there are

innumerable differences of creatures, than which nothing is more false. Likewise the same rational soul will have as many really distinct Intellects and Wills as there are species of things known and affections, which no one will tolerate. Diversity of operations, therefore, unless other reasons are added, for example that they occur in distinct *supposita*, as happens with roaring and barking, does not sufficiently prove distinct principles; because the same principle can virtually or eminently contain diverse effects.

31. To 2º: the animality which exists in a horse is not the animality of man, nor could it ever have existed in man. Yet because between the two there is similarity, and this is the foundation of rational identity or intentional unity, man and horse are therefore ordinarily said to be the same in the being of animal; which identity prior to the operation of the Intellect is improper and purely fundamental. To 3º I answer by denying the consequence. For thanksgiving is due to God both because He did not prepare the matter of our body for a brutish or stony form, but for a rational soul, and because, when He was to produce some nature, He produced ours rather than that of a beast or stone. For the rest, it is as chimerical that human nature should be joined with the specific or numerical difference of a stone as that man should be a stone, or should be man-not-man.

CHAPTER II.
Formal Distinction From the Nature of the Thing Is Explained and Rejected.

1. Our authors together with the Thomists hold that positive actual Distinction, which actually distinguishes the extremes before the operation of the Intellect, is everywhere equal and does not admit of more and less within the genus of Distinction, excepting those who in some measure diminish modal Distinction, concerning which above. But the Scotists with their Subtle Doctor, I, dist. 8, q. 4, and frequently elsewhere, subdivide actual Distinction which does not depend on the Intellect into "real entitative," or "absolutely and strictly real," and "formal from the nature of the thing." They say that the first intervenes between "thing and thing," whence it takes the name "simply and absolutely real"; and under this member they also comprehend modal distinction. The second, they teach, is that which distinguishes from one another the "formalities" of the same thing. By "formalities" they understand the metaphysical predicates of the same thing or individual, which have diverse quiddities and objective conceivabilities, although they are so connected and bound together that neither can exist without the other, even by Divine power.

2. They call this Distinction intermediate between rational distinction and distinction simply real. It is greater than rational distinction because it is given actually in things before the operation of the Intellect; but it is less than real distinction because, although both are from the nature of the thing, that is, not dependent upon an extrinsic act of reason, nevertheless the extremes of the one are absolutely things, whereas those of the other are only formalities. Therefore it is called "formal Distinction from the nature of the thing." They add that a Distinction of this kind is compatible with absolute and strict real identity, because the formalities between which it occurs are one and the same thing. If you ask how "thing" and "formality" differ, they answer that the extremes are called "things" when they are beings so complete that one can exist without the other naturally or by Divine power, whether mutually or non-mutually, or at least when one derives origin from the other. Thus are two individuals of any Predicament, as two men, two whitenesses, etc. But they are called "formalities" when they are predicates of the same individual that are wholly inseparable.

3. Hence absolutely real Distinction, they say, is discovered from causality or origin and from separation. Formal Distinction, however, is discovered from definition or description, from exclusion, and from reduplication; that is, two things are formally distinguished from the nature of the thing when they are defined differently, or one excludes the other from its formal quiddity, or something belongs to one precisely as such which does not belong to the other precisely as such, inseparability always being presupposed. This whole explanation of formal distinction is taken from the distinguished Scotist Merinero, disp. 1, De Universalibus, q. 2, sect. 1, who seems to have explained the mind of the Subtle School more clearly than others. Nor does Mastrius differ much, who in many places both in Logic and Metaphysics treats his formal distinction at great length, though not with great success in explaining it. What he himself properly adds will be noted in due course.

4. Thus explained, therefore, the Scotist Distinction is posited by its authors between the metaphysical grades of every individual, between genera and differences, between nature and haecceity; indeed it is transferred even to Divine things. But it is commonly rejected in our School and the Thomistic School with the Angelic and Eximious Doctors by very many arguments, of which I shall now select a few. Argument 1º: if the animality and rationality of man are actually distinguished before the operation of the Intellect, they are wholly really distinguished; but this is contradictory even according to the Scotists; therefore an actual distinction prior to the operation of the Intellect and less than real distinction is

likewise contradictory. The major premise is proved: if the animality and rationality of man are actually distinguished apart from the work of reason, then on the part of the thing they are actually two positive extremes, one of which truly is not the other and can truly be denied of the other; therefore they are wholly really distinguished. The Adversaries grant the antecedent and cannot deny it in their principles, both because every true distinction makes one thing and another, and because by virtue of formal distinction animality excludes rationality from its own quiddity apart from the work of reason.

5. The consequence is proved: for one thing not to be the other on the part of the thing is wholly incompatible with real identity; therefore it imports wholly real distinction. The antecedent is proved. First, because real identity according to the common understanding of men consists in one thing being in reality the other, and therefore in there being in both a unity of essence or entity, as we saw in the preceding Chapter. Second, because for A and B to be really the same thing, and yet for A on the part of the thing not to be B, seems as contradictory in the terms as for A not to be the same as itself on the part of the thing, or not to be the very thing that it is. Third, because one thing being the other on the part of the thing is wholly incompatible with strictly real distinction; therefore conversely one thing not being the other on the part of the thing is wholly incompatible with real identity.

6. It will be said: the Scotist distinction does not make one thing not to be the other "really" or "simply," but only not to be the other "formally." Against this: according to you, the term "formally" does not remove the fact that on the side of the object, with no one thinking, animality and rationality are truly two extremes, that the quiddity of one truly is not the quiddity of the other but they mutually exclude one another, and that one receives an intrinsic predicate of which the other is incapable. But that this is wholly incompatible with the real identity of the two, or with their being the same "really" or "simply," is shown by the proofs of n. 5, as will be evident to one who considers them. Certainly for animality really to be a being and simultaneously actually on the side of the object to exclude being from its own quiddity is wholly contradictory in the terms; therefore likewise, etc.

7. Confirmation: nothing prevents the Scotist distinction from being called a real distinction; therefore such a distinction is either real or none. The antecedent is proved: in the first place, it is not prevented by the fact that the extremes are not things but formalities. First, because modes are not things either, and yet according to the Scotists the distinction between two modes, or between a mode and a thing, is truly real. Second, because the

rationality of man and the roarability of a lion are pure formalities, and yet according to quidditative and formal being they are really distinguished from one another. Third, because positive formal identity, that is, identity according to quidditative and formal being, is strictly real according to the Adversaries and wholly excludes real distinction; therefore positive formal distinction according to quidditative being will be strictly real and will destroy real identity. The *a priori* reason is that the proper concept of real distinction consists in this, that one extreme in reality is not the other, that it can truly be denied of the other, and that it excludes the other from its own quiddity and essence. But all these are verified equally of extremes that are formalities and of extremes that are things.

8. Next, mutual inseparability of the extremes does not prevent it, 1º, because real distinction is compatible with inseparability between the Divine Persons, and according to the Scotists between the whole and the parts taken together. It will be said: between the Divine Persons there intervenes real production, and between parts and whole real causality, which is incompatible with real identity. Against this: production or causality is incompatible with real identity because it entails that one is not the other, namely that the producer is not that which is produced. But, granting formal distinction, one thing not being the other on the part of the thing is not incompatible with real identity. Therefore neither will production be incompatible if such a distinction stands. Moreover, when real distinction is inferred from production because nothing can produce itself, why may it not be answered that nothing can produce itself as regards being formally identified with itself from the nature of the thing, though it can as regards being really the same as itself? For if it is not absurd that one and the same thing should exclude itself and truly on the side of the object be distinguished from itself according to being formally distinct from the nature of the thing, whence will you prove that it cannot in the same sense produce itself?

9. 2º, because according to the Scotists, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would still be really distinguished from Him; and yet in that hypothesis neither production nor separability would intervene. Likewise, in matter and form when united, there is a twofold union, one on the side of matter and another on the side of form, according to a probable opinion presupposed by Mastrius (Disp. 6, Metaphysics, n. 186); and yet those unions, although wholly inseparable from one another and neither caused by the other, are really distinguished. 3º, because if animality and rationality are actually distinguished on the part of the thing, there is no reason why they could not be separated by the absolute potency of God, at

least non-mutually. For they are not modal entities mutually modifying one another; otherwise one absolute entity would not result from them. And the fact that they are incomplete quiddities ordered to one whole does not make them inseparable, as is evident in matter and form. No other source of inseparability appears without manifestly begging the question.

10. For if you have recourse to the real identity of the two, you beg the question. Asked why they are really the same, you answer, because they are wholly inseparable; and asked again why they are thus inseparable, you again answer, because they are really the same. And if you say they are inseparable because they are formalities and not things, you nevertheless beg the question. For, as is evident from Merinero in the place cited, to be formalities and not things consists in their being essentially inseparable. Indeed, unless we abuse words, how can it be denied that formalities, as formally co-distinguished, are truly things? Certainly they are positive extremes opposed to nothing, having true and real quiddities and true existence on the part of the thing, while neither is the mode of the other. What then can they lack in order to be called things?

11. It will be said with Mastrius (Disp. 1, Logic, n. 63; Disp. 6, Metaphysics, nn. 160, 161, 178, and often elsewhere) that the name "thing," properly and strictly taken, states an order to existence and physical causality; and therefore things are not multiplied unless existence and causality are multiplied. But all the formalities of one individual exist through the same existence and terminate the same physical causality. Hence they cannot properly and strictly be called several things, but only several grades of the same thing or essence. This is the ultimate and fundamental difference which Mastrius establishes between things and formalities, which he also calls "realities" and "somethingnesses." But against this, 1º: that several formalities also have several existences formally distinct from the nature of the thing corresponding to them is a very common opinion among the Scotists, as Mastrius admits (ibid., nn. 179, 180), and is held by Lichetus, Smisinch, Faber, and many others.

12. Against this, 2º: by the same arguments by which a manifold formality is distinguished in the essence of man, a manifold formality must likewise be distinguished in man's existence. For this existence, insofar as it is the existence of an animal, receives a predicate which it cannot receive insofar as it is the existence of the rational, namely, to be the reason for agreement with the existence of a lion. It is also otherwise defined, namely by an order to the diverse quiddity which it renders existent. Likewise it has diverse objective conceivability; for these concepts, "existence of an animal" and "existence of a rational being," differ from one another and are no less

unconnected than these: "animal," "rational." The same may be seen in the physical causality of man, in which a manifold formality must likewise be distinguished, namely the causality of animality, the causality of rationality, the causality of haecceity, etc. Consider all the arguments of the Scotists, and, unless I am greatly mistaken, you will find none that cannot equally be applied to causalities and existences of the same individual.

13. Against this, 3º: if physical modes, relations, parts of a physical composite, and all accidents have diverse and proper existences, as Mastrius grants (n. 160 cited), whence will he prove that this privilege is lacking to metaphysical grades if they truly have distinct quiddities on the part of the thing? Certainly he cannot derive the difference from elsewhere than total inseparability; but this difference has both been attacked by us in nn. 8 and 9, and is acknowledged by Mastrius himself in many places to be insufficient. Nor should it be passed over that this author intimates (Disp. 1, Logic, nn. 63, 84; Disp. 6, Metaphysics, nn. 161, 212, and often elsewhere) that metaphysical grades are distinguished from the physical essence and entity and are not truly parts of it, but flow from it by a certain metaphysical emanation before the operation of the Intellect. If these things are true, it follows, 1º, that the physical entity of man is formally neither animal nor rational nor living. It follows, 2º, that the same physical entity will be the first metaphysical root of rationality, animality, etc., which therefore will be mere properties of man physically taken. It follows, 3º, that physical entity, as formally co-distinguished from metaphysical grades, must itself consist of other grades, since it still agrees with and differs from other physical entities in genus or species. But these and other things easily deduced therefrom are absurd to everyone.

14. Argument 2º: Peter's nature is not formally distinguished from the nature of the thing from the haecceity or Peterhood; therefore none of the predicates of man are distinguished from one another in this way. The consequence is legitimate by parity of reason, as the Adversaries do not doubt. The antecedent is proved: Peter's nature, according to being formally identified with itself from the nature of the thing, is this numerically determinate nature and no other; therefore it is not distinguished from its numerical haecceity. The antecedent is proved: Peter's nature according to that being is really distinguished from Paul's nature and the natures of other men; but it is distinguished only numerically, for plainly not specifically or generically. Therefore according to that being it is this numerical nature and no other. The consequence is evident because numerical haecceity is that by which a nature is numerically distinguished from others. The major premise is proved: Peter's nature according to formal being is really identified with

Peterhood, as you grant; but Paul's nature is not really identified with that same Peterhood, since it is actually separated from it. Therefore they are natures really distinguished in a third thing, and consequently from one another.

15. Nor say that this distinction is founded only in Peterhood formally superadded. For if you take both natures according to formal being, you will find in Peter's human nature an essential repugnance to being separated from Peterhood; otherwise, according to its own quiddity, it would no longer be intrinsically inseparable from Peterhood, which you yourself say is incompatible with real identity. But in Paul's nature you will not find such a repugnance, since it is actually separated from Peterhood. Therefore that distinction is already founded in the formal quiddity of both natures. For if one formally identifies with itself a repugnance to being separated from Peterhood, while the other identifies non-repugnance, both have in their formal being the reason why they are distinguished; for repugnance and non-repugnance with respect to the same thing are by the very terms distinguished.

16. Argument 3º: if animality and rationality are distinguished from the nature of the thing, it follows that rationality is likewise distinguished from the nature of specific difference; but this is absurd; therefore so is the antecedent. The minor premise is granted by the Adversaries and can easily be proved from the fact that otherwise one would never arrive at any formality wholly simple from the nature of the thing. For whatever is assigned will still be a difference and such a difference, and therefore will still admit a new distinction, and so to infinity. The major premise is proved: animality and rationality are distinguished from the nature of the thing because they are differently defined and something belongs to animality precisely as such which does not belong to rationality precisely as such, namely to be the reason for agreement with a horse. For these are signs of distinction from the nature of the thing according to the Scotists. But such signs are found equally in rationality and in the nature of specific difference; therefore, etc.

17. The minor premise is proved: specific difference is defined as "a formality contracting the genus," whereas rationality is defined as "the power of reasoning"; and these definitions are diverse, as anyone sees. Likewise rationality, insofar as it is a specific difference, agrees with roarability and the other specific differences; but insofar as it is the power of reasoning, it does not thus agree but rather differs from the other differences. The aforesaid signs are therefore present. The same argument can be made concerning any formality however simple; for insofar as it is a

formality it must be distinguished from itself insofar as it is such a formality. Peter's own haecceity too, insofar as it is the individual difference of human nature, will not be formally the same from the nature of the thing as itself insofar as it is Peterhood; for here too one may proceed in investigating the Scotist distinction by the way of definition and the way of reduplication.

18. The objection is pressed: granting the Scotist distinction, rationality must be formally distinguished from that with which it is formally identified. The absurd consequence is proved: rationality formally identifies with itself a repugnance to its own formal identity with animality, since by its proper quiddity it excludes animality; and nevertheless it must be formally distinguished from that repugnance. This is proved because rationality in that repugnance is similar to all other specific and numerical differences, although it is dissimilar to those same differences insofar as it is rationality. Rationality as such is also defined otherwise than repugnance to formal identity with animality. By the same reasoning it can be proved that rationality is formally distinguished from formal identity itself. For formal identity is defined as "indistinction into several quiddities," or "objective conceivabilities," whereas rationality is defined as "the power of reasoning"; and these definitions are very diverse and unconnected.

19. It will be said from Mastrius (Disp. 6, Metaphysics, n. 214) that distinction from the nature of the thing is not always inferred from diverse definitions, but only when the definitions are given through adequate concepts, and not through an order to operations or other extrinsic connotations, but through essentials. But against this, 1º: when animal is defined as "the principle of sensing," and rational as "the principle of reasoning," they are defined through an order to operations, as is evident; and yet according to you this plurality of definitions proves distinction from the nature of the thing. Indeed, scarcely for the present state can we form definitions except through an order to extrinsic connotations.

20. Against this, 2º: if you ask Mastrius how it can be known that definitions are given through adequate rather than inadequate concepts, or through essentials rather than extrinsic connotations, he will answer (Disp. 8, Metaphysics, n. 214) that a sufficient sign exists when, of several definitions given of the same thing, one can belong to something to which the other cannot belong. For example, because the definition of animal can belong to a brute to which the definition of rational does not belong, the two definitions prove that animal and rational are diverse formalities in man. Thus far Mastrius. I subsume: but the definition of specific difference belongs to something to which the definition of rationality does not belong, namely roarability; likewise the definition of individual difference belongs to

something to which the definition of Peterhood does not belong, namely Paulhood. Therefore specific difference and rationality will be diverse formalities, as also individual difference and Peterhood; which neither the Adversaries admit nor can be admitted without an infinite process of formalities. The same argument presses in the examples of n. 18.

21. Argument 4º: either the rational is strictly, really, absolutely the reason for assimilating man to a horse before the operation of the Intellect, or it is not. If you choose the first, the principal foundation of the Scotist distinction between animal and rational falls, as will be evident in the next Chapter. If you choose the second, then the rational is really and absolutely distinguished from the reason for assimilating man to a horse; consequently there is in every man a mystery equally or more difficult than the Mystery of the Divine Trinity. The consequence is proved: the difficulty of the Divine Mystery consists in this, that Paternity, for example, though really indistinct from the essence of God, is nevertheless really distinguished from Filiation, which is really identified with that same essence; or in this, that Paternity is really the essence, and yet is not really whatever the essence is. But Peter's rational likewise, although really animal, is nevertheless really distinguished from the reason for agreement with a horse, which reason is really identified with that same animal; and therefore the rational is really animal and yet is not really whatever that very animal is. There is therefore in Peter and in every man equal difficulty of mystery; indeed greater, because in Peter there are not the relations of producer and produced which are found in Divine things.

CHAPTER III.

The Arguments of the Scotists Solved.

1. Objection 1º, and the principal one: predicates contradictory in themselves belong on the part of the thing to the animal and rational of man; but such predicates cannot belong unless to subjects truly distinguished before the operation of the Intellect, otherwise affirmation and negation of the same thing concerning the same thing would be verified simultaneously, which is contradictory. Therefore between the animal and rational of man there is a true distinction antecedent to the operation of the Intellect; and since it is not strictly real, it will be formal from the nature of the thing. The major premise is proved: animal on the part of the thing is the reason for assimilating man to a horse; rational, however, is not, since it is rather the reason for differing and dissimilating. But to be and not to be the reason for assimilating man to a horse are predicates contradictory in themselves;

therefore, etc. The difficulty of this argument has driven authors to various solutions, and therefore it is called the cross of intellects. But first of all it must be retorted upon the Adversaries and met by invincible instances, so that, since we carry the cross, the Scotist at least may be the Cyrenian.

2. It is objected, 1º: the rational strictly and really is the reason for assimilating man to a horse; but simultaneously strictly and really it is not the reason for thus assimilating, since rather strictly and really it is the reason for differing; otherwise man would not strictly and really differ from a horse in rationality. Therefore the rational simultaneously is and is not strictly and really the reason for assimilating man to a horse. If you deny the major premise, then the rational is strictly and really distinguished from the reason for assimilating, and consequently makes a mystery more obscure than the Divine Trinity, from n. 21 of the preceding Chapter, a consequence which everyone judges absurd. But if you grant the major and consequently the whole syllogism, I ask whether that is a true contradiction of predicates. If you deny it, let the same answer be given to you. If you affirm it, then, since it is a contradiction of strictly real predicates and proceeds in the strictly real sense, it requires a strictly real distinction of subjects, since it simultaneously posits the being and non-being of the same predicate strictly and really. Therefore the rational will be distinguished from itself not only formally but really; which according to all is wholly contradictory.

3. It is objected, 2º: if the Scotist distinction is sufficiently inferred from similarity and dissimilarity, rationality, as formally co-distinguished from animality, must necessarily admit a new distinction in itself from the nature of the thing. For it is similar to roarability in the nature of specific difference, and at the same time dissimilar in the nature of human difference, or in the nature of a principle of reasoning. Indeed, there will be in man no formality from the nature of the thing that is perfectly simple, and therefore in every individual infinitely many actually distinct formalities must most absurdly be posited. The reason is that any formality, however simple, will necessarily be a true formality, truly simple, knowable, definable, distinct from others; and in all these predicates it must be assimilated to all simple formalities found elsewhere, while simultaneously it must be dissimilar to them in the nature of such a formality. It will therefore be similar and not similar with respect to the same thing. Either, therefore, one and the same simple formality can without contradiction be simultaneously similar and dissimilar to another, or the formalities of the same thing must be multiplied to infinity.

4. Nor say with the Adversaries that there are some formalities, for example numerical differences, which are primarily diverse and differ

wholly, and consequently have no similarity or agreement until through inadequate concepts they are confused by the Intellect. Against this: for Peter and Paul on the part of the thing to be similar, similarity being here taken for any agreement or conformity even in substance, is for them so to be disposed that they are two men, or that the name "man" is verified of both, and that they furnish a foundation for being confused by the Intellect under the concept "man." But Peterhood and Paulhood also are so disposed on the part of the thing that they are two individual differences, that the name "haecceity" or "individual difference" is verified of both, and they furnish a foundation for being confused by the Intellect under various concepts, for example "individuation, formality, reality, conceivability." Therefore on the part of the thing they are truly similar, although at the same time they are dissimilar, as you admit. Or if you say that before the act of the Intellect they are similar only fundamentally and improperly, why may I not say the same of Peter and Paul, or man and horse?

5. Directly to the Objection I answer: to be in some way similar and in some way dissimilar to another neither involves a contradiction nor proves distinction. For similarity mixed with dissimilarity transcends all things and formalities, however simple. Whatever has true being must agree with others at least in the nature of being or reality, and simultaneously differ from the same in being such. Hence, as is commonly and truly said, a wholly pure similarity between two positive extremes truly distinct, to which no dissimilarity is admixed, is altogether impossible. This is evident in the very animalities of man and horse, which the Scotists assimilate so greatly; for since the animality of man requires by reason of itself not to be separated from rationality, while the animality of a horse has no such requirement, they thereby already become dissimilar. The reason why similarity and dissimilarity are joined in friendly alliance is that dissimilarity never destroys the very thing which similarity posits in the same extremes. To explain this, I submit the following doctrine in the very matter of the objection; it can be adapted to any matter.

6. For animal to be the reason for assimilating man to a horse means that both are animals, or that they are two animals; whereas for rational to be the reason for dissimilating man from a horse means that they are not two rational beings, or that not both but man alone is rational. This is the meaning of everyone in expressions of this kind, even of the Scotists, who therefore deny that rational is the reason for assimilating man to a horse because therefrom it would follow that not only man but also horse is rational. But in these propositions, "Man and horse are two animals," "Man, and not horse, is rational," there is no contradiction. For the second does

not deny of man and horse the animalities which the first affirms, but denies rationality of the horse alone, which the first does not posit in the horse. Consequently they are not affirmation and negation of the same thing concerning the same thing and according to the same respect, as contradiction requires. Therefore there will likewise be no contradiction in these other propositions equivalent in sense: "Animal is the reason for assimilating man to horse; Rational is the reason for dissimilating, or is not the reason for assimilating, man to horse."

7. Hence to the Objection I answer by denying the major premise. To its proof, I grant the major and distinguish the minor: if being and not being the reason for assimilating proceed in the same sense, I grant it; if they proceed in a diverse sense, as they actually do according to the common acceptance whenever the reason for assimilating is affirmed under the name "animal" and denied under the name "rational," I deny the minor premise and consequence. The solution is evident from what has been said. But if by both names, whatever the common acceptance may be, the object is signified as it is on the part of the thing, it must equally be denied that on the part of the thing anything is verified of the animal of man which is not verified of the rational, and conversely. For each on the part of the thing is the reason for agreement with a horse, agreement signifying that man and horse are animals; and each is the reason for differing, difference signifying that man and horse are not two rational beings. In the same sense both are the reason for assimilating and both are not the reason for assimilating, but rather for dissimilating.

8. Reply 1º: therefore man can truly be said to be similar to a horse in rationality, just as he is truly said to be similar to a horse in animality. The consequence must be denied absolutely, because that manner of speaking according to common acceptance denotes the existence of rationality not only in man but also in the horse. For the same reason you would absurdly say that an ant is similar to God in omnipotence, although it is in some way similar to omnipotence itself in the nature of being. Or ask the Scotists whether that consequence is true in the strictly real sense. Yet if one prescinds from common acceptance, I distinguish the consequence: man can be said to be similar to a horse in rationality as precisively conceived by the Intellect, I deny it; as really taken, I subdistinguish: by a similarity whereby both are animals, I grant it; by a similarity whereby both are rational, I deny the consequence. In the same way this other proposition must be distinguished: "Man is dissimilar to a horse in animality." For since on the part of the thing the rational truly is animal, it truly grounds between man and horse a similarity whereby both are animals; and the animal of man

itself, because it truly is rational, truly grounds a dissimilarity between man and horse whereby not both are rational.

9. Reply 2º: the same extreme cannot simultaneously be equal and unequal to another; therefore neither can it simultaneously be similar and dissimilar to another. Therefore if animal is similar to horse and rational dissimilar, animal and rational are not the same extreme. I insist: equality and inequality with respect to the same thing require a strictly real distinction of subjects, as is certain; therefore similarity and dissimilarity require an equal distinction, which nevertheless the Scotists deny. Therefore I grant the antecedent and distinguish the consequence: if similar and dissimilar are taken in the same sense, I grant it; if in diverse senses, I deny the consequence. Equality according to common understanding consists in something indivisible, namely in one extreme having nothing more or less than the other but precisely the same amount; and therefore it is immediately destroyed by any inequality. But similarity, according to all, admits more and less, and is taken in a varied genus and manifold sense; therefore it can have dissimilarity admixed. Add that, if equality and inequality are taken from diverse aspects, one, for example, according to length and the other according to breadth, they can coexist in the same subject.

10. Reply 3º: Peter on the part of the thing is more similar to Paul than to a horse; therefore he is similar to Paul in more formalities, and consequently there is in Peter some formality in which he is not similar to a horse. Or you may infer otherwise: therefore Peter is not similar to a horse according to his whole self; otherwise how could he be more similar to Paul? Therefore there is in Peter some reality in no way similar to a horse. I insist: Peter strictly and really is more similar to Paul than to a horse; therefore he is not similar to a horse according to his whole strictly real being, in which therefore not only a reality but a thing not similar must be excepted. Again I insist: Peterhood is more similar to Paulhood than to Bucephalushood; therefore it is similar to Paulhood in more formalities, therefore it is not similar to Bucephalushood according to its whole self. Accordingly, I grant the antecedent and distinguish the consequence: in more formalities which are several through the Intellect, I grant it; which are several on the part of the thing, I deny the consequence. In the other inference I distinguish the first consequence: by a similarity connoting that both are rational, I grant it; by a similarity connoting that both are animals, I deny the first and second consequences.

11. In Peter on the part of the thing there is no plurality of formalities, but one indivisible essence, which as a whole is more similar to Paul than to

a horse and as a whole also less similar to a horse than to Paul. There is no contradiction in this, because the similarities of Peter to Paul and of Peter to horse, although they have the same subject or foundation, nevertheless include or connote diverse terms and, by reason of those terms, produce a diverse sense; and one can be greater, the other lesser, with respect to the other. For this greater or lesser degree does not consist in Peter alone, but on one side in Peter together with Paul, on the other in Peter together with horse. Similarity, however, is not said to be greater or lesser from the entitative quantity of perfection of the extremes alone, otherwise Peter and an Angel would be more similar than Peter and Paul; but rather from a certain disposition of the extremes which grounds more or fewer concepts by which the same extremes are confused or rendered univocal by our Intellect. Hence, because Peter and Paul are so disposed on the part of the thing that they furnish the Intellect a foundation for rendering both univocal not only under generic concepts, for which alone Peter and horse furnish a foundation, but also under the lowest specific or differential concept, namely "man" or "rational," therefore on the part of the thing the similarity of Peter to Paul is said to be greater than that of Peter to horse. Yet in both cases the whole entity of Peter furnishes that foundation, though not alone, but together with the term to which it is compared.

12. Reply 4º: if the whole of Peter is similar and dissimilar to Paul, and the whole also similar and dissimilar to a horse, it follows, 1º, that the dissimilarity of Peter to Paul is greater than the dissimilarity of Peter to horse. Proof: the similarity of Peter to Paul is greater than the similarity of Peter to horse; but each similarity is indivisibly dissimilarity; therefore the dissimilarity of Peter to Paul must likewise be greater than the dissimilarity of Peter to horse, for where similarity and dissimilarity are one and the same they must increase in equal measure. It follows, 2º, that Peter and Paul are no more similar than dissimilar to one another; for since the similarity and dissimilarity of one to the other are wholly identified both on the side of the foundation and on the side of the term, it is contradictory for one to be greater or less than the other. The same reasoning proves also that Peter is not more dissimilar to God than similar. But this difficulty presses the Adversaries with the same force, both if similarity is taken in the strictly real sense and if it is applied to Peterhood compared with Paulhood and Bucephalushood.

13. From n. 11 I answer: just as similarity is not said to be greater or less except by order to more or fewer univocal or confusive concepts which it grounds, so dissimilarity is said to be greater or less only by order to the discriminative concepts which it grounds and connotes. Hence, because

Peter and Paul on the part of the thing furnish a foundation only for individual discriminative concepts, whereas Peter and horse furnish one also for specific concepts, therefore the dissimilarity of Peter to Paul is said to be less than that of Peter to horse. Likewise, because Peter and Paul ground more univocal concepts between themselves than discriminative ones, they are therefore said to be more similar than dissimilar to one another. Therefore I deny the first consequence. To the proof, I grant the major premise and distinguish the minor: each similarity is indivisibly a dissimilarity which has a diverse sense, or which does not destroy the very thing that similarity posits, I grant it; which has the same sense, or which destroys that which similarity posits, I deny the minor premise and consequence. Nor does the added proof prevent this, as I shall immediately say.

14. I likewise deny the second consequence together with the appended proof. For when the procedure is in a diverse sense, lesser degree applied to dissimilarity is not opposed to greater degree of similarity even if they are wholly identified. To understand this, unfold the sense of the expressions. This expression, "Peter is dissimilar to Paul," is true insofar as it is explained thus: "Peter has in himself being Peter, which Paul does not have." But this, "Peter is similar to Paul," is true only in this sense: "Peter is a man, as Paul also is." You now see that the former expression does not destroy what the latter posits, because the former only denies in Paul "being Peter," whereas the latter only posits in that same Paul "being a man." But in Paul, "being Peter" and "being a man" are very diverse objects, since the one is impossible and the other possible.

15. I continue from the doctrine of n. 13. This expression, "The dissimilarity of Peter to Paul is less than the similarity of the two," is not true except when explained thus: "Peter together with Paul does not ground as many discriminative concepts as he grounds univocal or confusive concepts of the two." But in this there is no opposition or necessity of distinction in Peter. For what prevents one and the same entity on the part of the thing from grounding more concepts of one order and fewer of another? Therefore the aforesaid greater and lesser degree do not conflict even though affirmed of one subject. Hence when it is said that similarity and dissimilarity, if they are one and the same, must increase equally, this is true of the same kind of increase, false of a diverse kind. That is, just as similarity is greater not in every genus but in the genus of similarity or of foundation for univocal concepts, so the dissimilarity identified with it is greater in that same genus, since it truly is a greater similarity and greater foundation for univocal concepts. Likewise conversely, just as dissimilarity is

less in the genus of dissimilarity or foundation for discriminative concepts, so similarity is less in the same genus and under the same terms. Therefore nothing is verified on the part of the thing of one which under the same terms does not belong to the other.

16. The remaining Objections are now more easily disposed of. Objection 2º: diverse definitions correspond to the animal and rational, namely "principle of sensing," "principle of reasoning"; therefore also diverse quiddities, for definition and quiddity are convertible. We retorted this objection upon the Adversaries in the preceding Chapter, where it was established that diversity of definitions can be found in a wholly simple formality; especially since the Adversaries do not require for their formal distinction diverse definitions properly so called (Mastrius, Disp. 6, Metaphysics, n. 214), namely those which import genus and difference, for such definitions according to them belong not to formalities but to really distinct essences, but are content with improper definitions conveyed through certain more expressive concepts. Certainly in this sense Peterhood and individual Difference are explained by diverse definitions; and yet Peterhood is formally indistinct from the nature of the thing from individual difference. Likewise being and other transcendental predicates have distinct objective concepts and distinct formal natures, as Mastrius admits (ibid., n. 162); and yet, as he says, they are not formalities distinct from lower predicates from the nature of the thing.

17. Accordingly, diversity of definitions proves diverse quiddities on the part of the thing only when the definitions are adequate to the object, that is, when they explain without precision of the Intellect the real quiddity of the object; but not when they are inadequate, that is, precisive, which suppose and import a rational distinction between the formalities of the object. Such, however, are those alleged by the objection. For the first explains man insofar as expressed by the concept "animal"; the second the same man insofar as expressed by the concept "rational." These concepts are inadequate and precisive and in exercise make a rational distinction, as will be explained in its place. Therefore those definitions suppose a rational distinction made through these concepts; indeed they themselves make it in exercise, since they themselves are inadequate and precisive expressions. In form, I distinguish the antecedent: diverse adequate definitions, I deny it; inadequate or precisive definitions, I grant the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: diverse quiddities by diversity of reason or intentional diversity, I grant it; by diversity from the nature of the thing apart from the work of reason, I deny the consequence. What is added is true with proportion preserved, namely that adequate definition and

adequate quiddity are convertible, and likewise precisive definition and quiddity insofar as precisively conceived.

18. Reply: therefore at least an adequate definition proves distinction from the nature of the thing from everything not expressed by it. Therefore, since this definition, "rational animal," is according to all adequate to human nature and yet does not express haecceities, it must prove a distinction from the nature of the thing between nature and haecceity. But why, indeed, does it not prove real distinction, since it is a definition properly so called, and consequently according to the Adversaries belongs to things and not formalities, as we noted in n. 17? I distinguish the first consequence: an adequate definition proves, etc., in the sense in which it is adequate, I grant it; in the sense in which it is not adequate, I deny the consequence. To the other inference I answer: the definition "rational animal" is adequate only with scientific adequacy, that is, with the adequacy required by the sciences, which do not attend to haecceities but regard them as nothing. In this sense it proves real distinction from everything not expressed by it, if that thing is something within scientific consideration, for example from roarable, neighable, etc. But it is not adequate to the human nature of Peter or another man with the adequacy of physical reality; rather in this sense it is truly precisive, since it does not express "being Peter," which on the part of the thing is the same as rational animal.

19. Objection 3º: wherever composition is given, distinction of parts is given; but on the part of the thing there is in man a metaphysical composition of animal and rational; therefore, etc. I deny the minor premise, because metaphysical composition is the work solely of reason precisively separating animal from rational. And because animal precisively conceived from the differences is considered as indifferent to several species, and through rational is determined to the human species, animal is therefore conceived after the manner of determinable matter, and rational after the manner of a determining form; and from both results a certain metaphorical composition similar to physical composition from matter and form. Hence certain quite frequent expressions which indicate that rational or animal is a part of man's essence, or that from both some plurality is made, for example, "Man is constituted from animal and rational," "Animal is included in man," and others of this kind, are strictly false if they proceed in the real sense; because rational neither constitutes man nor is included in him, but is man himself. Yet they are admitted absolutely because they allude to our manner of conceiving and rational distinction, or also because they are used in an improper sense.

20. Reply: rational on the part of the thing is not the whole essence of man; otherwise man would be sufficiently defined by "rational"; therefore it is only a part of man's essence. Confirmation: this proposition is not true in the real sense, "Man is only animal"; therefore man on the part of the thing is something else besides animal; therefore in man there is one thing and another, and consequently a plurality of predicates in the real sense. To the Reply I deny the antecedent, because rational really taken is the whole man, with whose predicates it identifies all things, no otherwise than the judicative power on the part of the thing is the whole Intellect, although in the logical and precisive sense the Intellect consists as it were of three parts, namely the judicative, apprehensive, and discursive power, among which there is no distinction from the nature of the thing according to the Adversaries (Mastrius, Disp. 6, Metaphysics, n. 214, and often elsewhere). Nor does it follow that man is sufficiently defined by the expression "rational." First, because a definitive concept must be so clear that by its very force it expressly appears how man differs from and agrees with others. Second, because rational through that expression is in exercise precisively separated from animal, which consequently is omitted at least on the side of the act, though it ought not to be omitted.

21. To the Confirmation I grant the antecedent and distinguish the first consequence: he is something else besides animal alone, that is, animal not identified with rational, I grant the consequence if the term "besides" does not suppose such an animal distinct from rational to be found in man; but if it supposes this, I deny the supposition. He is something else besides animal not-alone, that is, animal not distinct from rational, I deny the first and second consequences. Thus it is falsely said even in the real sense, "Man is only animal," because the term "only" indicates that man's animal is not rational. Conversely, it is truly said, "Man is not only animal but rational animal," whereby it is denoted that man is not an animal separated or distinguished from rational, but is an animal which is rational. Yet if the expression, "Man is only animal," yields this sense, "Man is not something non-animal," or "which is not animal," it will be wholly true, because on the part of the thing whatever man is, is animal. Then ask the Scotists whether it is truly said, "Man strictly and really is only animal," or "strictly and really is something else besides animal"; likewise whether it is true that the Intellect on the part of the thing "is only a judicative power," or that Peterhood "is only an individual difference prescinding from thisness."

22. Objection 4º: haecceity is outside the essence of man, and therefore does not enter into the essential definition of man; therefore it is distinguished from essence from the nature of the thing. Confirmation 1º:

human nature on the part of the thing is not essentially singular; otherwise it would be essentially unique and incapable of multiplication, as the Divine nature is. Therefore it is essentially distinguished from singularity. Confirmation 2º: Peter and Paul, since they are of the same species, are not distinguished in essence as man and horse are; but they are distinguished in haecceities. Therefore haecceity and essence are not wholly the same. I answer: haecceity is outside metaphysical essence, but not outside physical essence or essence taken in the real state. By the name "metaphysical essence" are understood the predicates which under our inadequate concepts appear principal and nobler. Haecceity is not among their number, since it is little regarded by the sciences and therefore does not enter under its proper name into the essential definition. Yet this order and diversity of predicates as more or less principal and worthy of greater or lesser consideration by the sciences is not found in the real state, in which there is only one indivisible entity.

23. To the first Confirmation: for nature "to be essentially singular" can be understood in three ways. 1º, such that nature cannot be precisively separated from singularity by a perfect precision of reason. 2º, such that it cannot admit another nature similar or equal to itself. In both senses the Divine nature alone is essentially singular because it is unlimited and simply infinitely perfect in every order. 3º, such that on the part of the thing it is in no way distinguished from singularity. In this sense alone we grant that the human nature existing on the part of the thing in Peter, and likewise that existing in any other individual, is essentially singular; from which no absurdity follows. For it will not therefore be a nature incapable of multiplication like the Divine nature, since it does not exclude coexistence or possibility of several similar natures differing only numerically.

24. To the second: Peter and Paul properly are of the same species and of the same essence, namely an essence which is the same in the state of precision, but not in the real state, in which certainly there is no true and proper identity of Peter and Paul in essence. Otherwise the same essence would commonly be found in several Persons after the manner of the inimitable Mystery of the Trinity. Therefore when in the real sense Peter is said to be "of the same" species as Paul and to be less "distinguished" from Paul than from a horse, the discussion concerns purely fundamental identity and distinction, that is, similarity and diversity which furnish a foundation for Peter to be united with Paul rather than with a horse by the Intellect in the same specific nature. Yet this similarity or diversity on the part of the thing belongs to the haecceity no less than to the nature, as is evident from the solution of the first objection.

25. Objection 5º: in a supernatural act, for example Faith, vitality and supernaturalness are distinguished from the nature of the thing, and yet are strictly and really identified; therefore, etc. The major premise is proved because the supernaturalness of the act requires a supernatural principle, which vitality does not require. I deny the major premise. To the proof: vitality "as such," that is, precisively conceived by the Intellect from natural and supernatural acts, does not require a supernatural principle; but the determinate vitality existing in an act of Faith requires a supernatural principle no less than the supernaturalness of that same act, from which in reality it is not distinguished. Therefore the whole act arises from a vital principle and the whole from a supernatural principle, not by totality of cause but by totality of effect, as will be explained elsewhere. But when we say, "An act of Faith, because vital, does not require a supernatural principle," we do not speak of the vitality of that act as it is on the part of the thing, for thus the expression would be false, but of vitality as precisively conceived by reason.

26. Objection 6º: many perfections which in lower things are dispersed are sometimes found really united in some higher thing by reason of its eminence, for example in God justice, mercy, etc., and in man vegetative and sensitive life, which are really distinguished in brutes and plants. Therefore in God or man there actually exists from the nature of the thing a manifold perfection; but multiplicity does not exist without distinction. I distinguish the consequence: there exists a manifold perfection which is manifold according to our reason, I grant it; manifold on the part of the thing, I subdistinguish: manifold actually, I deny it; manifold fundamentally or equivalently, insofar as it is one perfection equivalent to several perfections distinct elsewhere and therefore furnishes a foundation for being divided into several by reason, I grant the consequence.

27. Reply: those perfections are in God and man formally and not purely virtually or eminently; but they are distinguished in the manner in which they are, for unity and distinction follow upon being. Therefore they are formally distinct. I insist: those perfections are in God and man really; therefore they are really distinct there, since they are distinguished in the manner in which they are. I then grant the major premise, because the adverb "formally," which has very many acceptations, when opposed to the adverbs "virtually" and "eminently," means the same as "truly and properly," or "not metaphorically." God is truly and properly just and merciful, and man truly and properly vegetative and sensitive. But I distinguish the minor premise: in the manner in which they are, they are distinguished from everything which they are not, I grant it; they are distinguished from one

another, I deny the minor premise and consequence. Distinction indeed follows upon being, but distinction from everything that does not have the same being. But whence do you prove that in God or man those perfections do not have the same being? You will say: they do not have the same formal being, otherwise justice would most formally be mercy. Against this: formal being on the part of the thing is wholly the same as real, true, proper, and actual being; in which sense God's justice is mercy most formally, that is, most truly. But if these terms "formal being," "most formally" allude, as they ordinarily do, to the intentional precisive state, you assert something true; but what follows from it?

28. Other objections which could be brought here we shall dissolve in what follows, especially concerning virtual distinction and objective precision, most of whose foundations serve equally for the Scotist distinction, and conversely. Meanwhile observe that expressions invented for the intentional precisive state are to be rejected when transferred to the real state, such as these: "Animal is contractible; rational is contracting"; "Animal is a genus; man is a species, a common nature, indifferent, communicable to many"; and others of this kind. For all denominations of this kind arise from an act of reason precisively separating animal from rational and irrational, and human nature from individuals. For on the part of the thing there is only a manifold determinate nature devoid of indifference or community; nor is man's animal the horse's animal, but another wholly diverse from it, although also wholly similar in another order. Hence when the Scotist compares animal with rational, he must be compelled to speak, not of animal "as such" or indeterminate, but of the animal which is in man on the part of the thing. But if he employs reduplication, for example "animal insofar as," or "insofar as animal," etc., the supposition must be denied in the real sense. For no reduplication is given on the part of the thing, but every reduplication involves an act of reason precisively separating one predicate from another.

CHAPTER IV.

Intrinsic Virtual Distinction Is Proposed and Attacked.

1. One thing is said to be virtually another when it is equivalent to it in order to some office. Hence Virtual Distinction is the same as equivalence to Distinction; and it is present when one and the same thing is equivalent to several things actually distinct. This equivalence, and consequently virtual distinction, can be, first, "in causing," when one thing produces effects which are ordinarily produced by many. Second, "in being," when one thing

identifies with itself perfections which elsewhere are found multiplied. An example of both appears in man, who understands with Angels, senses with brutes, vegetates with plants, and identifies in himself the perfections corresponding to these effects. Third, "in grounding diversity of concepts," when a thing really undivided furnishes a foundation for being divided through inadequate concepts and appearing to the mind as though manifold. And this is ordinarily called fundamental rational distinction, and also extrinsic or mediate virtual distinction, because by means of the rational distinction which it grounds it can verify extrinsic intentional predicates apparently opposed. That Virtual Distinction is given in things in these three acceptations is beyond doubt.

2. Fourth and finally, Virtual Distinction is taken for equivalence to real distinction in order to receiving intrinsic predicates contradictory in themselves apart from every operation of the Intellect. The present controversy concerns this Distinction. Its authors teach that between predicates which are really the same, for example between the rational and animal of man, there is no actual distinction from the nature of the thing, or prior to the operation of the Intellect; and they protest that they vehemently abhor the Scotist distinction. They therefore posit, not distinction, but equivalence to distinction, that is, a power and capacity without contradiction to receive predicates contradictory in themselves just as if real distinction were actually present. Thus, just as real distinction of subjects makes predicates contradictory in themselves simultaneously verified without contradiction, as when it is said, "Man thinks; Stone does not think," so virtual distinction is to produce a similar effect concerning a really identical subject. For although, they say, animal and rational on the part of the thing are in no way truly and properly distinguished, but are one and the same both really and formally from the nature of the thing, there is nevertheless in them a real capacity whereby the animal of man is called "similar to horse" and the rational "not similar," just as though they were two properly distinct extremes.

3. Hence virtual distinction and Scotist formal distinction partly differ and partly agree. They differ in this, that the Scotist Distinction is actual and makes the rational and animal of man actually on the part of the thing not one but two formalities; whereas Virtual Distinction admits only one and the same thing or formality on the part of the thing. But they agree in this, that each serves so that of the same really identical extreme intrinsic predicates contradictory in themselves may be verified. Therefore intrinsic Virtual Distinction is ordinarily defined as "the intrinsic capacity of one thing, antecedent to the operation of the Intellect, to receive without contradiction

intrinsic predicates contradictory in themselves." Whether a Distinction of this kind is to be admitted in the Divine Trinity between Essence and Relations is disputed by Theologians, nor is there one opinion of all. We now inquire, as belongs to our office, whether it is given in created things.

4. And indeed several authors, especially Thomists, assert that it is, whom Fr. Lynce enumerates at length. And although M. Bayona explains the Thomists as though they spoke only of fundamental rational distinction, nevertheless it does not appear how without intrinsic virtual distinction several Thomistic doctrines can stand in Philosophy and Theology; for example, that the action by which God concurs with a creature really produces the physical entity of the act of sin and does not really produce the formal malice really identified with that entity. See Fr. Peinado, Disp. 1, De Universalibus, n. 18. An undoubted patron of this opinion, indeed its father and chief illustrator, is our Lynce, Metaphysics II, whole tr. 4. But the negative opinion is common in our School, and the more recent Thomists, Collegium S. Thomae, Palanco, Gabriel a Conceptione, and Aguilera profess to prove it. It must also be held by us.

5. It is proved, 1º: it is contradictory for the same entity simultaneously to be and not to be really identified with the same extreme; but this would occur if intrinsic predicates contradictory in themselves were verified of the same entity. Therefore it is contradictory for such predicates to be verified of the same entity; and therefore intrinsic virtual distinction is also contradictory. Both consequences are evident, and the major premise is evident. The minor premise is proved, speaking, for example, of these propositions: "The animal of man on the part of the thing is the reason for assimilating man to a horse; The rational on the part of the thing is not the reason for assimilating," where according to the Adversaries the subject of both is really the same entity. First, the former proposition cannot be verified unless the subject is really identified with the reason for assimilating, as is certain to all. But the latter cannot be verified unless the subject is really distinguished from the same reason for assimilating, and therefore is not really identified with it. Therefore one and the same entity would simultaneously be and not be really identified with the same extreme if the predicates, etc., were verified.

6. The minor premise is proved: that proposition cannot be verified unless the subject on the part of the thing truly is not the reason for assimilating. For if it truly is such a reason, how is it truly said not to be? Certainly, "From the fact that a thing is or is not, the proposition is said to be true or false," as Aristotle, received by all, says. But if on the part of the thing it truly is not the reason for assimilating, then on the part of the thing

it is truly distinguished from it; therefore, etc. The minor premise, in which alone someone might cavil, seems evident. For what is more evident than that one thing is truly distinguished from another in that state in which one truly is not the other? Or why is man truly distinguished from a horse on the part of the thing except because on the part of the thing he truly is not a horse? Certainly, just as one thing truly being another proves identity, so one thing truly not being another proves distinction. Therefore, just as one thing truly being another on the part of the thing proves actual identity, so one thing truly not being another on the part of the thing proves actual distinction on the part of the thing; which actual distinction cannot fail to be real according to the Virtualists. And hence follows the same absurdity which we brought against the Scotists in c. 2, n. 21, namely a mystery whereby the rational truly is animal and yet is truly distinguished from something from which animal is not distinguished, namely from the reason for assimilating man to a horse.

7. Confirmation: it is contradictory for "being and not being" to be simultaneously verified except of subjects truly and properly distinct; therefore it is also contradictory for "being and not being such," for example the foundation of similarity, to be simultaneously verified except of subjects truly and properly distinct. Therefore either rational and animal are truly and properly distinguished on the part of the thing, which the Virtualists deny, or being and not being the reason for assimilating are not simultaneously verified of them. The first consequence is proved because that principle known through itself, "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be," speaks not only of "being and not being absolutely," but also of "being and not being such"; and it comprehends contradictory propositions not only with a second adjacent but also with a third. Therefore from that principle it is proved that these propositions, "Peter is white; Peter is not white," cannot be simultaneously verified any more than these, "Peter is; Peter is not," because in both the very same "being absolutely" or being such is immediately denied which is simultaneously affirmed of the same subject, which cannot stand unless the subject simultaneously is and is not the very thing that it is.

8. It will be said, 1º, from our Lynce: the truth of a negative proposition does not always prove distinction of subject from predicate, as is evident in these: "The existence of Antichrist does not exist"; "Divine Paternity is not communicated to the Son." But against this, 1º: each proposition objected is of an adjectival predicate and in the concrete, which kind of predicate, as we noted in c. 1, is not assumed by us as an evident sign of distinction. But now we argue from the negation of a substantive predicate taken in the abstract,

such as "reason for assimilating"; or when in an act of contrition it is truly said, as you contend, "Love is not hatred." Therefore, just as according to the Adversaries it is not truly said, "The existence of Antichrist is not existence," because the predicate is taken substantively and is not distinguished from the subject, so likewise in our matter.

9. Against this, 2º: both propositions objected prove some real distinction. For the first supposes the negative distinction explained in c. 1, namely the privation of identity actually exercised, by virtue of which it is also truly said, "Antichrist absolutely and in exercise is not a man, is not a being," etc. The latter, however, proves mediate real distinction, or distinction in a third thing; for the Father is really distinguished from the Son, from whom the essence is not really distinguished. But neither distinction can be admitted in our case, as the Adversaries do not doubt. Hence the examples are retorted: because neither proposition can be verified through virtual distinction alone. Not the first, because the existence of Antichrist certainly is not virtually distinguished from "existing itself." Not the second, because no Theologian would be bound to grant it unless Faith compelled him to admit a real distinction in a third thing between Paternity and Essence; which distinction in creatures is contradictory even according to Lynce himself. Therefore likewise that proposition, "The rational is not the reason for assimilating," and the others concerning which the question turns, cannot be verified through virtual distinction alone.

10. It will be said, 2º: it is true that "simultaneously to be and not to be such" cannot be verified of a wholly identical subject; nevertheless rational and animal are not a wholly identical subject, but virtually twofold. Against this, 1º: virtual distinction, as Lynce repeatedly says, is not true and proper distinction, but improper and rather a shadow of distinction; nor otherwise can it be distinguished from the Scotist distinction. Therefore it does not make the subject truly and properly twofold, but leaves it truly and properly one and the same. Therefore such a subject is truly and properly comprehended under that principle known through itself which we cited in n. 7. Against this, 2º: it is contradictory for a subject which is merely virtually twofold "simultaneously to be and not to be absolutely"; therefore it is likewise contradictory for it "simultaneously to be and not to be such." The consequence is evident from the same n. 7. Against this, 3º: for this truly to be that cannot stand without identity truly such; therefore for this truly not to be that cannot stand without distinction truly such. See n. 6.

11. It will be said, 3º, and this is Lynce's principal solution: both of the rational and of the animal it is verified simply and absolutely that it is the

reason for assimilating man to a horse. For since animality and rationality are absolutely identified, it is necessary that each absolutely receive the same predicates; for in that sense in which no distinction is given between the two, whatever belongs to one belongs to the other. Hence the proposition, "Rationality is not the reason for assimilating," is not true absolutely and simply; otherwise it would prove real distinction. It is therefore true only in the reduplicative sense, when namely at least tacitly this reduplication is understood: "rationality as rationality"; and in this sense virtual distinction suffices for the truth of the negative proposition. This doctrine perhaps will not please all Virtualists. For I do not think Thomists would say that this proposition, "The formal malice of sin is not produced by God," is not true absolutely and simply, even if malice is really identified with the physical entity of sin, which is simply produced by God. But whoever's doctrine it may be, it must be attacked. Against this, 1º: because by this doctrine the arguments of the Virtualists are wholly weakened, as will appear in the following Chapter.

12. Certainly, whatever contradictories you object to us, if they are truly contradictory in themselves, we shall deny that they are verified in any true sense on the part of the thing concerning a really unique subject. For according to you they are therefore not verified absolutely and simply because absolutely and simply there is no distinction in the subject; and in that sense in which no distinction of subjects is given, it is contradictory for opposed predicates to be simultaneously verified. But according to you in no true and proper sense is a distinction given between animal and rational, since virtual distinction is not properly distinction but a shadow of distinction, as you say. Therefore predicates contradictory in themselves can in no true and proper sense be verified of animal and rational, but at most will be verified in an improper and shadowy sense. Why then are you so heavily armed with contradictories? The reduplicative sense, however, is not given on the part of the thing, but is a work of the Intellect, which through that concept, "rationality as rationality," already conceives the rational separately and distinguishes it by reason from animal. Therefore a proposition which is not true except in the reduplicative sense is not verified independently of rational distinction. Against this, 2º: in the Divine Trinity, from which parity and objection are so often deduced against us, this negative proposition, "Paternity is not communicated," or this, "Essence is not produced," is true absolutely and simply no less than this affirmative, "Essence is communicated," or this, "Filiation is produced." Therefore either the same must be said in creatures, or parity is wrongly drawn from the mystery of the Trinity.

13. The true opinion is proved, 2º. If Virtual Distinction is admitted in creatures, the force of syllogistic form, as ordinarily taught in the Dialectical Institutions, collapses; nor can we trust consequences however legitimately deduced according to the Aristotelian Figures and Moods. The assertion is evident from these examples: "Every animality of man is a reason of similarity with a horse; Every rationality is an animality of man; therefore every rationality is a reason of similarity with a horse. Every love of one who is contrite is terminated at God; Some hatred of one who is contrite is love of one who is contrite; therefore some hatred of one who is contrite is terminated at God." Behold syllogisms properly disposed in "Barbara" and "Darii," which nevertheless from true Premises conclude falsely according to the Virtualists. Hence it follows that those principles, "Said of all," etc., "Things which are the same as one third thing," etc., upon which the whole syllogistic force rests, are commonly falsified. It also follows that reduction to impossibility, whereby namely a defender is compelled to admit two contradictories, is useless, although no proof is more frequent or efficacious. It follows, I say, because although you bring the adversary back to contradictories, he will oppose virtual distinction, that marvelous conciliator of contradictories, and laugh.

14. I speak expressly of syllogistic form as it is ordinarily taught in the Dialectical Institutions. For I do not contend that syllogistic force is destroyed by virtual distinction if some note of even virtual identity of the Extremes with the Middle is employed, as if in each proposition the adverb "virtually" were placed on the side of the verb. But since Aristotle in the syllogistic art nowhere mentions this addition, nor does anyone require it in the Dialectical Institutions, but all are content with identity absolutely expressed by the verb "is" whenever they wish to conclude something concerning the object on the part of the thing, it follows that syllogistic form as handed down in the Schools from Aristotle is defective and ineffective even if conformed to all the rules. Behold a syllogism which no rule of the Summulae condemns: "Every animal is seeing; Every man is an animal; therefore every man is living." Yet, granting the premises, one who wishes to feign a virtual distinction between man and animal will deny its consequence with impunity. No one, therefore, will syllogize safely unless he proves the absence of virtual distinction between the Middle and the Extremes. Accordingly every disputation will devolve upon virtual distinction.

15. Nor does Fr. Lynce satisfy when he says that the syllogisms of n. 13 rightly conclude as they stand because they proceed in the real sense absolutely and without addition; in which sense it is truly said that the

rational is similar to a horse, for that it be such it suffices that mediately, namely by means of animal with which it is identified, similarity belongs to it. But if, he says, the syllogism is formed thus: "Animal is immediately similar to horse; Rational is animal; therefore Rational is immediately similar to horse," it concludes badly, because by reason of that addition "immediately," which is placed in the Conclusion and not in the Minor, the terms are varied and argument proceeds from merely real identity to virtual identity. But besides what was said in nn. 11 and 12, against this: even that proposition, "Rational is immediately similar to horse," if it does not import a rational distinction but speaks of rational on the part of the thing, ought properly to be verified no less than this, "Rational is absolutely similar to horse." Therefore by that addition "immediately" it does not lose its truth.

16. The antecedent is proved: according to Lynce that proposition would not be true because "animal" mediates between "rational" and "similar"; for the similarity of horse is immediately identified with animal, and then by means of animal is also identified with rational. But this is false if we speak properly; therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved: where there are not properly two extremes, there cannot properly be a middle between two. But virtual distinction, which alone is found between "rational," "animal," and "similar," does not properly make two or three things, as the Virtualists admit. Therefore it is false that "animal" properly mediates between "rational" and "similar." Therefore this proposition is true: "Properly speaking, Rational is immediately similar to horse." If you deny this consequence, I prove it efficaciously: in that sense in which nothing mediates between rational and similar, rational is immediately similar; but in the proper sense nothing mediates, as we have seen; therefore properly speaking rational is immediately similar to horse.

17. If you grant this, I infer, 1º: therefore this proposition too is true: "Properly speaking, the hatred of one who is contrite is immediately terminated at God"; from which, if the argument of Lynce soon to be cited has any force, it follows that the hatred of one who is contrite, properly speaking, denominates God as hated, than which nothing is more absurd. I infer, 2º: therefore the Contradictories upon which virtual distinction rests are not properly verified of the same entity. For of these, "Animal is immediately similar," "Rational is not immediately similar to horse," the first is properly, the second only improperly verified. But thus no virtual distinction is needed, as is evident in these statements: "Christ is a Lion; Christ is not a lion," if the first proceeds in a metaphorical sense and the second in a proper sense. I infer, 3º: therefore similarity and dissimilarity with respect to the same thing are properly verified of the rational, since

properly speaking rational is immediately similar and immediately dissimilar to horse; and yet rational certainly is not virtually distinguished from itself.

18. Finally, virtual distinction is ordinarily refuted by this twofold way. 1º: a capacity to receive predicates contradictory in themselves without any true and proper distinction is contradictory to a real entity; therefore virtual distinction is contradictory. The antecedent is proved: it is contradictory to a real entity to have the capacity to be a chimera; but by the very terms there is no more manifest chimera than a subject simultaneously conjoining in itself two contradictories without any distinction truly such. Or why is it judged by the very terms chimerical that the same thing should simultaneously be and not be man? Therefore it is contradictory to a real entity to have the capacity to receive, etc. If you say that such conjunction is not chimerical when virtual distinction is given, you beg the question. For virtual distinction is nothing other than the capacity to receive contradictories without any true and proper distinction. Therefore to say that contradictories are not contradictory in the same subject when virtual distinction is present is to say that they are not contradictory when there is a true capacity for them, that is, that they are not contradictory when they are not contradictory. But this very thing is what we ask: how are they not contradictory without a distinction truly such?

19. 2º: once virtual distinction is admitted, any absurdity whatever can be defended with impunity, and nothing will be secure for me in Philosophy. This is proved because there is no more efficacious way to refute an absurdity introduced by another than deduction of a twofold contradictory. But one who wishes to fortify himself with virtual distinction will easily laugh at or swallow without scruple any contradictories whatsoever. For by what reasoning could the Virtualists convict one who maintained that the same thing produces itself and is produced by itself, or is simultaneously produced and not produced, namely according to virtually distinct being; likewise that the same will according to diverse virtualities simultaneously loves and hates the same object; indeed, that the same act according to one virtuality and another is simultaneously love and hatred of one object; and finally that the same thing simultaneously exists and does not exist, or is and is not man? Whence, I ask, will you prove that "to exist" is excluded from a subject by "not to exist," if "to be similar" is not excluded by "not to be similar"?

CHAPTER V.
Arguments for the Virtual Distinction Are Answered.

1. Passing over the arguments answered in Chapter 3, which are also employed by the Virtualists, Objection 1, and principally from Father Lynce: the act of contrition by which a man detests sin in view of the supreme goodness of God is really love of God and hatred of sin, as is now presupposed from Theology. But contradictory predicates belong, prior to the operation of the intellect, to those formalities of love and hatred which are really identified. The minor premise is proved: in the act of contrition, love terminates at God, and hatred does not terminate at God; but to terminate and not to terminate at God are contradictories; therefore, etc. The major premise, insofar as it says that hatred does not terminate at God, is proved: if hatred terminated at God, it would denominate God as hated; but no formality of contrition denominates God as hated; therefore, etc.

2. Proof of the major premise, 1º: a form communicated to a subject or object capable of it bestows upon it its proper denomination; but God is capable of the denomination of being hated; and, moreover, for the form of hatred to be communicated to God as object is nothing other than for it to terminate at God; therefore, etc. 2º Love in one who is contrite denominates God as loved precisely because it terminates at God; therefore, if hatred also terminates at God, it will likewise denominate God as hated. 3º It is impossible for cognition, production, or union to terminate at some object or term without denominating it known, produced, or united; this is also evident in heat, whiteness, and other forms which, if naturally united to a subject, bestow their formal effects upon it; therefore likewise, etc. 4º The will is denominated loving and hating by the act of contrition because both love and hatred are received in it; therefore, if both hatred and love terminate at God, God will be denominated hated and loved. By the same reasoning it can be proved that love does not terminate at sin as hatred does, for otherwise some sin would be denominated loved.

3. First, the objection admits an evident rejoinder from the real distinction, since by the same force it proves a real distinction between the love and hatred of one who is contrite. For either hatred absolutely and really terminates at God, or it does not. If the former is said, then it absolutely and really denominates God as hated; and this can be proved by the same arguments and examples of union, production, whiteness, etc., as will be evident to anyone who considers them. If the latter is chosen, then

contradictories are verified absolutely and simply of the hatred and love of one who is contrite; but according to the adversaries a virtual distinction does not suffice for such contradictories. Nor should it be said that, for hatred to denominate God, it is not enough that it terminate at God absolutely and simply, but it is required that it terminate immediately. For, on the contrary, hatred, properly speaking, also terminates immediately at God, as we showed in the preceding chapter. Moreover, the examples objected against us in n. 2 prove that every form absolutely and simply communicated to a capable subject necessarily bestows its formal effect.

4. I answer: in the act of contrition there is not love or hatred "as such," that is, with indifference to this or that species, to this or that object; for such love or hatred is repugnant in reality. Therefore there is a determinate species of hatred or love, that is, an affection which determinately is love of God and determinately is hatred of sin, not of another object; for species of affections are customarily designated by the name of the object placed obliquely. Nor is that hatred hatred of sin in just any way, but hatred of sin because of God supremely loved as the motive for detesting the sin opposed to Him. Hence it cannot prescind from a relation or conversive tendency toward God, so far is it from being in any way distinguished from such a tendency in reality. This is both because no affection can prescind from its motive, otherwise it could be conceived without a motive and formal object, from which it takes its species; and because hatred thus prescinded would detest sin for its own sake, or at least not because of God, and consequently would not be the hatred of one who is truly contrite. Similarly, love is not love of God in just any way, but of God as the motive for detesting sin, and therefore cannot prescind from an aversive tendency from sin. The act of contrition, therefore, is inseparably a tendency or termination conversive toward God and aversive from sin, because it turns toward God by turning away from sin, and turns away from sin by turning toward God; just as the very same motion by which one proceeds from place A to place B is a recession from A and an approach to B. Hence, if we speak of these determinate hatred and love, it is false that anything is verified in reality of hatred which is not verified in the same sense of love, and conversely, as I now show.

5. In form, I answer by denying the minor premise. To the proof, I answer by denying the major premise; and in its proof I again deny the major premise, if it speaks, as it must, not of just any hatred but of the hatred of one who is contrite. For since this hatred terminates at God as the motive for detesting sin opposed to His goodness, it rather denominates God as loved. Nor do the appended proofs stand in the way. To 1º, I answer by

distinguishing the major premise: it bestows its proper denomination, of which the subject is capable in relation to such a form, I grant; of which the subject is not capable in this relation, I deny the major premise. Then I distinguish the minor premise: God is capable of the denomination of being hated from hatred of Himself, or in relation to a form which is hatred of God, I grant; from hatred of sin because of God, or in relation to such a species of hatred, I deny the minor premise and consequence. God is not capable of the denomination of being hated from just any hatred, but from one that arises from cognition of God as hateful. But the hatred found in contrition arises rather from cognition of God as supremely lovable, since from this motive it detests sin. Consequently it is at once and inseparably love of God, terminates at God, and bestows upon Him its proper denomination. But what denomination? That of being loved, which is also proper to this hatred and is the only denomination of which God is capable in relation to such a form. It does not bestow the denomination of being hated upon God, but upon sin; and sin likewise is not capable of receiving another denomination from such a form.

6. To 2º, I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: because it terminates at God in just any way, I deny; because it terminates at God as supremely good and lovable, I grant the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: if hatred also terminates at God in the same sense in which love does, I deny; if in the contrary sense, I grant the consequence. We have already said that the hatred of one who is contrite terminates at God antecedently known as supremely good and lovable, and consequently is at the same time love of God and bestows upon Him the denomination bestowed by love. To 3º: first, if production and union are not purely such, but identify with themselves other predicates, or are equivalently a twofold form, the antecedent is false. Thus the eduction of a material form, which according to a probable opinion is at once the production of the form and its union with matter, although it truly terminates at matter, does not denominate matter produced, but united. Hence, although hatred which is purely hatred denominates every one of its terms hated, the same must not be said of hatred which at the same time is love by identity, as in our case.

7. Next, although union, production, and cognition necessarily bestow their denomination, as it were generically, upon their proper term, nevertheless, if they have several terms, they need not bestow upon each all the special denominations which they contain. Thus the union of matter with form, although it denominates both united, nevertheless in particular denominates the form as informing and the matter as informed, not conversely. Thus production denominates the effect produced and the cause

producing, not conversely. Thus the cognition of Faith denominates the mystery believed because of another, but the revelation known for its own sake; or, what comes to the same thing, it denominates revelation the formal object in second act and the mystery the material object. The same thing commonly occurs in acts of the will. For example, love of medicine solely because of life denominates the one loved because of another and the other loved for its own sake, the one as a mere means and the other as an end, nor can such denominations be interchanged. Therefore likewise the act of contrition does indeed denominate both terms, sin and God, as affectively attained; but in particular it denominates God loved and sin hated, nor is it permissible to interchange the denominations.

8. There is no parity with color and whiteness, because absolute physical forms, since they are not equivalently several forms and do not at the same time regard several subjects, if once united to some subject, bestow upon it the one formal effect which they contain. But intentional forms, and even physical modal forms, as we recently saw, since they often regard diverse terms and contain diverse denominations, need not bestow upon each subject whatever denominations they contain, but according to the diverse character of those subjects they bestow its own denomination upon each, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said. Nor should it cause difficulty that some really one form is said to be virtually or equivalently twofold or manifold; for from this there does indeed follow a virtual distinction in being, concerning which see n. 1 of the preceding chapter, but not the distinction which we now reject, namely, a capacity for contradictories. Nor should it cause difficulty that, from several denominations contained in the same form, we say that one and not another is bestowed upon a certain subject. For it does not follow from this that contradictory predicates belong to really indistinct denominations, namely, being bestowed and not bestowed in relation to the same subject; because denomination does not consist in the form alone, but in the form together with a capable subject. Therefore, if the subjects are really distinct, the denominations are also really distinct, at least inadequately.

9. To 4º, I answer by denying the consequence. For the will undergoes both denominations because it is capable of receiving both from one form in relation to diverse things, and because the act of contrition does not regard diverse wills as receptive subjects. But it does regard diverse terms, namely God and sin, each of which is incapable of both denominations, loved and hated, from the act of contrition as from a form.

10. But against the solution given, Objection 1 is urged: if the hatred of one who is contrite terminates at God, it follows that God is capable of the

denomination of being hated from this form; otherwise some form could naturally be united to a subject incapable of the formal effect of that same form. I answer: a form which is not equivalently twofold and contains only one formal effect cannot naturally be united to a subject incapable of that one formal effect. But if a form contains several formal effects, it can naturally be united to a subject capable of only one denomination and not another; examples of this doctrine have already been given. Hence contrition, since it is equivalently a twofold act, of love and hatred, can terminate at God, who is capable only of the denomination of being loved, although it could not do so if it were pure hatred of sin.

11. Objection 2: because love is not virtually distinguished from pursuit of the object, love of some thing without pursuit of that same thing is repugnant. Therefore, if the love of one who is contrite is not virtually distinguished from hatred, it cannot be love of God without also being hatred of God. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: precisely because love is not virtually distinguished from pursuit, I deny; because of this and because by the terms "love" and "pursuit" there is signified an order to the same object and no equivalence in being to a twofold act is implied, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. Since these terms, "love" and "pursuit," as also "hatred" and "aversion," do not indicate equivalence to several acts or a relation to diverse terms, but are convertible even in common or generically, so that one is an explanation of the other, it is not surprising that love of one object is always pursuit of that same object. But everything is otherwise with the terms "love and hatred" when applied to the act of contrition. Therefore, in a sound sense, love can be of God while hatred is not of God but of sin.

12. Objection 3: therefore love is of God and hatred is not of God; but to be of God and not to be of God are contradictories, just as a cloak's being Peter's and not being Peter's; therefore the contradictories are not avoided. I answer by distinguishing the first consequence as to the second part: and hatred is not of God in the sense in which love is of God, I deny, for just as love is love of God, so hatred is love of God; in a different sense, I grant the consequence. Then I distinguish the subsumed minor premise: to be of God and not to be of God in the same sense, I grant; in a different sense, I deny the minor premise and consequence. This assertion, "The hatred of one who is contrite is not of God," is true only insofar as it means that such hatred is not hatred of God and therefore merely denies the identity of that hatred with another act which would be hatred of God. But this assertion, "The love of one who is contrite is of God," is true when it means that such love is love of God, and consequently affirms nothing which the preceding assertion

denies. Therefore the one does not contradict the other. For to be love of God and not to be hatred of God are not contradictories, but both are truly affirmed of the love of one who is contrite, and both equally of the hatred of one who is contrite.

13. Objection 4: these propositions, "Contrition is love of God; Contrition is hatred of God," differ only in the words "love" and "hatred"; but according to us these words signify the same without any distinction in reality. Therefore, if the former proposition is true, the latter must also be true. I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: those words signify the same when the oblique expression "of God" is attached to one and "of sin because of God" to the other, I grant; when "of God" is attached to both, I deny the minor premise and consequence. We have already noted above that species of affections, as also of cognitions, are commonly distinguished verbally by the oblique expression. Hence the expression "hatred of God" signifies a species of hatred very different from that denoted by "hatred of sin because of God"; and this second species of hatred alone is found in contrition identified with love. Consequently, since the latter proposition by no means signifies this species, it does not have the same object as the former and does not share in the truth of the former.

14. Objection 5: if the hatred of one who is contrite terminated at no object, it would denominate none as hated; therefore, if it terminates at some object, namely God, it denominates that object hated. The consequence is evident because, where negation is the cause of negation, affirmation is the cause of affirmation, as the proverb says. I deny the consequence. To the proof: that proverb is true when the negation is the sole or adequate cause of the negation, but not when it is a cause sufficient indeed, yet neither sole nor adequate. This is what occurs here. If hatred did not terminate at God, this would indeed be a sufficient cause for its not denominating God as hated, but it is not the sole cause. For even if it does terminate at God, there can be another cause why it does not denominate Him in this way, namely, because it is at the same time love of God, is moved by cognition of Him as supremely good, and has at the same time another term upon which it bestows the denomination of being hated, namely sin. Moreover, that form of argument is inept, as is evident from these examples: "If Peter did not exist, he would not be king; therefore, if he exists, he is king. If thing A is not an animal, it is not a man; therefore, if it is an animal, it is a man." For it is being supposed that from the opposite of the condition one may rightly infer the opposite of the conditioned; and no Summulist would fail to reject this.

15. Once this objection, sufficiently entangled in terminology, has been answered, the others easily collapse. Objection 2: the same cognition can be clear and intense with respect to God and at the same time obscure and remiss with respect to a creature, or conversely. Therefore it can admit intrinsically contradictory predicates of itself. The consequence is evident, for since obscurity is the privation of clarity and remission the privation of intensity, obscurity and clarity are contradictorily opposed, and likewise remission and intensity. The objection proves that a thing can be really identified with its privation, for example light with darkness, life with death, than which nothing is more absurd. It also proves more than a virtual distinction, for those contradictories proceed in an absolute real sense. Therefore I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. To the proof: obscurity as such is the privation of clarity as such; but obscurity of cognition with respect to one object is indeed the privation of clarity with respect to that same object, yet it is not the privation of clarity with respect to every object, nor is it incompatible with such clarity. Therefore, if obscurity is with respect to God and clarity with respect to a creature, or conversely, there is no contradiction; for that clarity is not identified with the privation of itself, but with the privation of another wholly distinct clarity which is not in such cognition. The same should be said of remission and intensity. Add the manifest rejoinder: clarity with respect to God alone, insofar as it is virtually indistinct from itself, certainly is not clarity with respect to a creature; therefore it is at the same time clarity and is not clarity; therefore it receives contradictories without a virtual distinction.

16. Objection 3: we see and intuitively know whiteness, and we do not see or intuitively know the dependence of whiteness upon God, which is really identified with whiteness. Therefore contradictory predicates now belong to really indistinct things. The antecedent is evident because otherwise we would see God Himself, since an essential dependence upon some term cannot be seen or intuitively known without that term. I press the objection: these contradictories are verified in an absolute real sense; therefore they prove a real distinction. I press again: whiteness, insofar as virtually distinct from such dependence, is essentially connected with it, for it really requires identity with such dependence, and this kind of requirement imports the greatest connection. Therefore, when we see whiteness, we see its connection with dependence upon God. Therefore, if the objection proves anything, we see the dependence itself, which is the term of that connection, and consequently we shall also see God.

17. Moreover, I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: and we do not see the dependence, etc., in the sense and manner in which we do not see

whiteness, I grant; in the sense and manner in which we see whiteness, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Both whiteness and its dependence upon God are seen in one sense and not seen in another. Both are seen under this expression, "whiteness," and both are not seen under this other expression, "dependent upon God." Or, what comes to the same thing, both are seen by a vision sufficient for the intellect to elicit this intuitive cognition, "This object is whiteness," by which act whatever is really the same as whiteness is intuitively known; and both are not seen by a vision sufficient for the intellect to have this intuitive cognition, "This object depends upon God." For this representation, although elicited by the intellect, cannot be intuitive by virtue of ocular vision, but will be abstractive and acquired by discourse. The reason is that it expressly compares whiteness with God; and comparative cognition, in order to be intuitive, must arise from a proper species of each extreme of the comparison, as I presuppose from the doctrine of the soul. But neither sight has such a species with respect to God, nor does it suggest or can it suggest one to the intellect. Therefore whatever is verified of whiteness is equally verified of its dependence upon God and conversely, since each is seen and intuitively known by certain acts, and each by other acts is neither intuitively known nor seen.

18. Nor does it follow from this that God is seen. For the term of a connection or dependence must be known only when the dependence is known by comparative or relative cognition or expression, such as "dependence upon God"; but not when the connection or dependence is known by an absolute expression, such as the concept "whiteness" and the material vision by which it is aroused. Here note: when we commonly say that dependence "as such" is not seen by us, or is not seen "explicitly," the sense is that we do not elicit a vision corresponding to the words "dependence upon God," or one which immediately arouses such an expression in the mind. Otherwise, if the discussion concerns such dependence taken specifically and as it is in reality, it is seen as explicitly and known as intuitively as whiteness, from which in that state it is in no way distinguished; but it is seen and known by an absolute expression which does not contain a comparison with a term exceeding the entire sphere of the visual power.

19. Objection 4: in an angel substance and perfection are virtually distinguished, for an angel exceeds a man in perfection, whereas he does not exceed him in substance; for, as is commonly said, substance does not admit of more and less. I answer: in a real sense an angel exceeds a man in substance, for he is a better and more perfect substance. Substance is said

not to admit of more and less either because the aspect of substance "as such" is equally verified of substances unequally perfect, or rather because substance is not intensified and remitted by degrees in the same subject, as quality is. But the objection is reformulated otherwise, namely: the similarity of two angels to one another is really identified with their entitative perfection, and nevertheless contradictory predicates belong to similarity and perfection. It is proved: the similarity of two angels, supposing them to be of the same species, is that in which two angels do not exceed two men, for two men are as similar to each other as are two angels; but entitative perfection is that in which two angels undoubtedly exceed two men. Yet to be that in which two angels do not exceed two men and that in which they do exceed them are contradictories; therefore, etc.

20. I answer: there is no contradiction here, because excess and non-excess, as they are taken here, proceed in different senses. That angelic similarity is said not to exceed human similarity insofar as it does not ground more univocal concepts; for by relation to this kind of concepts a similarity is called greater or less according to what was said in Chapter 3, from n. 11. It does not, I say, ground more concepts, because just as two angels can be rendered univocal or confused as far as the concept of the lowest species inclusively, so that they cannot be discerned except by purely individual concepts, so too are two men disposed in relation to the concepts corresponding to them. But angelic perfection exceeds human perfection insofar as it is a more excellent object. Yet what contradiction, I ask, is there in two angels grounding no more univocal concepts of themselves than two men do, while nevertheless presenting to their respective concepts a more excellent object? In sum, this is to say that those concepts are not more numerous, yet are concepts of a better object. Otherwise, the excess or non-excess which belongs to perfection belongs in the same sense to similarity, and conversely; for each exceeds by an excess signifying that angels are a better object, and each does not exceed by an excess signifying that angels ground more univocal concepts.

21. Objection 5: the will and intellect, although really identified, verify contradictory predicates; for the will loves and does not understand, the intellect understands and does not love. Likewise the will is free, the intellect is not free. Confirmation: the intellect is more identified with itself than with the will; for it can be prescinded from the will but cannot be prescinded from itself. But it is identified with itself both really and virtually; therefore it is not identified with the will, at least virtually. I answer: if the will and intellect are really identified, those expressions are true only in a formal sense presupposing precision and a distinction of reason between

will and intellect; for in the real sense both intellect and will love and understand. But when it is said that the will is free and the intellect is not free, if we speak in the real state, the sense is that the whole entity of the soul is free in relation to acts of the affective line, and that whole entity is likewise not free in relation to acts of the representative line. To the confirmation, I answer by denying the major premise if we remain in the real state; for real identity does not admit of more and less. That the intellect can be prescinded from the will but not from itself proves an extrinsic virtual distinction, that is, a fundamental distinction of reason, which we by no means deny. Nevertheless, we do not grant that in reality there is in one predicate a prescindibility which is not found in another really identical predicate. But this will be discussed below, where formal precision is treated.

22. Objection 6: in prime matter the requirement and the obediential capacity for forms are really identified; and yet they receive contradictory predicates, for the capacity is for several forms, while the requirement is not for several, but for only one. I answer: whatever is truly affirmed or denied of the capacity is verified in the same sense of the requirement. It is truly said of the capacity, "It is a capacity for several forms; it is not a requirement for several"; and this same thing is verified of the requirement under the same terms, for the requirement of which we are speaking is a capacity for several forms and is not a requirement for several. Similarly, this predicate, "It is a requirement for only one form," is verified as much of the capacity as of the requirement of matter. The fallacy of the objection consists in taking these terms, "is for several, is not for several," without expressing the predicate directly understood there. If it is expressed, there is no difficulty. For we shall deny that it is verified of prime matter that "it is a capacity for several forms and is not a capacity for several," or that "it is a requirement for several and is not a requirement for several." Therefore only this is verified: "It is a capacity for several forms and is not a requirement for several," where the same predicate is not denied and affirmed; for the term "requirement for several forms" signifies a species of requirement really distinct from all the predicates of prime matter.

Corollary.

24. Finally, it must be noted that both Scotists and Virtualists frequently have recourse to the mystery of the Divine Trinity, both to prove their distinctions and to reinforce the arguments which we oppose to them. For it is certain that the Divine Essence is really identified with the Relations or

Personalities, and nevertheless certain predicates apparently contradictory are verified of the Essence and Relations, for example: "The Essence is communicated; Paternity is not communicated. Filiation is produced; the Essence is not produced." But, as we have already noted above, it is inappropriate to argue from this to created things. First, because on account of such contradictories the mystery of the Trinity is judged unknowable by the light of nature alone, and is believed only by bringing the intellect into captivity to the obedience of Faith. Yet the adversaries neither demand a similar captivity for created things, nor, if they did, would they be acting as philosophers.

25. Secondly, because such predicates would not be verified in the Trinity without a real distinction in a third thing; for it is not possible that Filiation be really produced and the Essence really not produced unless Filiation were really distinguished from the Father, from whom the Essence is not distinguished. But no Scotist or Virtualist admits in created things a real distinction of two things in a third without a real distinction between themselves. Thirdly, because a purely virtual distinction, nor a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, does not suffice for verifying contradictories in an absolute real sense, as Father Lynce admits and as seems evident. But those predicates of the Divine Triad are really and absolutely verified. Fourthly, because by this recourse one could defend, for example, that in man the rational is produced while animal is not produced, or even that the rational is really distinguished from a horse while animal is not really distinguished from a horse. But this would be absurd to all the adversaries.

26. Therefore a virtual distinction, and still more a Scotistic distinction, must either be altogether denied in the Divine things, even between the Essence and Relations, as it is in fact denied by several theologians who free the apparently opposed predications from contradiction solely by a real distinction in a third thing, otherwise called an inadequate or mediate distinction, or even solely by a distinction of reason; or it must not be admitted as pure, but as involving in its concept a real distinction in a third thing, and consequently must be banished from other Divine predicates except those proper to the Trinity; or finally, if it is admitted either in the mystery of the Triad or in the mystery of Divine Liberty, while it can and should easily be denied among the other absolute perfections of God, it must be so restricted that it is not a capacity for any predicates contradictory of themselves, but only for those which Faith teaches or which are plainly gathered from the doctrine of Faith. It must also be added that such predicates cohere only in an unlimited and infinitely perfect subject,

and only in that sense in which such a subject surpasses human comprehension. Hence those predicates alone are to be excepted from the general principle, "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be," insofar as this principle embraces propositions with a third element adjoined, at least adjectivally; nor is the exception to be grounded otherwise than upon the title of infinity insofar as it surpasses human comprehension.

CHAPTER VI.
The Distinction of Reason and the Opposed Unity or Identity Are Explained.

1. The distinction of reason, as it is now taken, is not that whose extremes are fictitious beings of reason; for this can be called a real distinction, at least a negative one, since, once the extremes have been posited or feigned, it exists without a new operation of the intellect. It is therefore that distinction which is made by reason, that is, by acts of the intellect, between extremes or predicates which, although real, are not really distinct, for example between the rational and the animal in man, when one is conceived in some way without the other, or each by diverse concepts. For just as there is a real distinction whenever in the real state one exists without the other or is diverse from the other in reality, so by a certain analogy there is said to be a distinction of reason whenever in the intentional state, or in its being as known, one in some way exists without the other or appears diverse from the other. For example, through the concept "animal," the sensitive object exists in some way in the mind without the rational, because the whole force of that concept can suitably be explained without saying that the object is rational. Similarly, through these two concepts, "animal" and "rational," had simultaneously, the sensitive and discursive object appear diverse, because the whole force of either concept is explained differently, namely by relation to diverse operations, sensing and reasoning, without either concept requiring assistance from the other.

2. Two kinds of this distinction are commonly mentioned. One is called a distinction "of reasoning reason"; the other, a distinction "of reasoned reason." The first is that which has no foundation in the thing, but is made by the intellect either through synonymous concepts, such as "sword, blade," or by repetition of the same concept, such as "man, man." Such a distinction is made or presupposed between the subject and predicate of an identical proposition. The second is that which has a foundation in the thing, from which foundation several diverse and inadequate concepts can

be elicited concerning a really identical object, that is, concepts of inadequate clarity, each of which does not exhaust the whole cognoscibility of the object even with respect to us. For example, man can naturally be known by us with all the clarity corresponding to these words, "rational, risible, wonder-capable animal," etc. Therefore, when he is known only with the clarity corresponding to the word "animal," he is known by an inadequate concept, and by one diverse from the concept corresponding to the word "rational," and likewise with the others. The foundation of this diversity is the real diversity of the operations of sensing, reasoning, laughing, etc.

3. We shall now speak only of the distinction of "reasoned reason," because it alone is properly a distinction of reason. For the one called a distinction of "reasoning reason," since it has place everywhere and introduces no diversity even apparently into being as known, does not deserve the name of distinction even in this order. A distinction of reason is also customarily added which they call "according to implicit and explicit"; it occurs when one predicate involves another in its concept, though the latter is not clearly expressed. Thus "being" is involved in the proper concept of "substance"; and in the concept "Divine will," according to the opinion of many who assert that the attributes and perfections of God formally include one another, the Divine Intellect is formally contained. The distinction which exists between a definition and the thing defined differs little or not at all from this. For these two concepts, "man" and "rational animal," one of which is the definition of the other, differ only according to greater and lesser explication, not according to their core, so to speak, since the one is the explication of the core involved in the other. But each distinction of this sort must be reduced to the distinction of "reasoning reason," or at least is not to be numbered among distinctions properly so called, even in the line of reason; for nothing is more common than to assert or presuppose formal identity, that is, identity of reason, between the definition and the thing defined.

4. Therefore the proper distinction of reason, which alone is the distinction of "reasoned reason," is divided into fundamental and actual, or formal. The fundamental distinction is not so much a distinction as the foundation of a distinction which gives the intellect occasion to distinguish. The actual or formal distinction is that which is actually made through acts of the intellect. This is called either precisive or positive. The precisive distinction is made when the intellect, by a simple inadequate concept, expresses one predicate while thinking nothing meanwhile about the other predicates of the same object as such, as when it attains man precisely

through the concept "animal"; for then animal remains precisively distinct from rational. This is also customarily called an "inadequate" distinction of reason, or more suitably an "incomplete" distinction, because it places only one extreme of the distinction in the mind and awaits the company of another concept or other concepts in order that the duality or plurality of predicates be completed. The positive distinction, which is also called "adequate," or rather "complete," is made when two or more predicates of the same thing simultaneously appear, each through its proper concept, as when the intellect has at the same time these two concepts, "animal" and "rational"; for then a certain duality of extremes is positively and completely placed in the mind.

5. Some add a negative distinction of reason, which they teach to be made by a judgment denying the identity of the extremes, for example, "Animal is not rational." But they are not to be followed, because if such a judgment denies only identity of reason, it does not make but presupposes a distinction of reason already made, and reflexively knows it; just as this act, "Man is not really a horse," does not make but presupposes the real distinction. But if that judgment denies real identity, it is not the distinction of reason which we are now explaining; for this distinction, as commonly understood in the Schools, is not opposed to real identity but to formal identity, nor does it destroy real identity in the mind but merely omits it on the part of the mode. A distinction of reason is indeed made in that judgment through the expressions "animal" and "rational" considered in themselves; but it is not made by the words "is not." Conversely, just as the affirmative judgment "Animal really is rational" does not make a proper identity of reason, so too, just as a mental expression of a man is not called a man of reason, a mental expression of real identity is not called identity of reason.

6. More truly it can be added that each distinction explained in n. 4 is, in a different sense, called and is both "precisive and positive": precisive, because each is made through concepts which purely prescind from the real identity of the extremes; positive, because each positively excludes the formal identity of one extreme with the other. Nevertheless, the incomplete distinction, because it places only one extreme in the mind and separates it from another as possible, can also be and commonly is called a "negative" distinction of reason, or, if preferred, a "mixed" distinction, just as the real distinction of an actually existing thing from a merely possible thing.

7. But since we have said that the distinction of reason is made through concepts diverse from one another, it is asked how great the diversity of the concepts must be. I answer: a distinction of reason requires concepts so

dissimilar that they render the predicates definable in diverse ways, so that neither is defined through the other nor through its explication. Thus our authors commonly hold. This is proved, 1º because the "formal aspect" of any object means the same as its "definition," as St. Thomas teaches in a thousand places from Aristotle (St. Thomas, q. 2, *De veritate*, a. 1, ad 11; I, q. 13, a. 6; V *Metaphysica*, lect. 7, lit. f). Therefore those predicates are properly distinguished according to "formal aspect" which differ according to "definition"; therefore concepts which render predicates definable in diverse ways make a proper distinction of reason. 2º This is proved inductively through all the things said to have or not to have a distinction of reason. For there is no true distinction between the definition and the thing defined precisely because, of these concepts, "man" and "rational animal," one is the definition of the other; nor is it made by synonymous concepts because both correspond to the same definition; but it is truly made through the concepts "animal" and "rational" because they are explained by diverse definitions, namely "principle of sensing" and "principle of reasoning." The same will be evident in the others. Moreover, for something to be "of the aspect" of another is taken as the same as being placed "in its definition" (St. Thomas, III *De anima*, lect. 12, lit. g). Therefore, for something to be "outside the aspect" of another, and consequently to be distinguished from it by reason, will be the same as not being placed in its definition.

8. But it should be noted from St. Thomas, IV, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3, C., that although "the formal aspect in things which have a definition is the very definition of the thing," nevertheless some predicates have an "aspect" although they cannot strictly be defined, such as the supreme genera, ultimate differences, and Divine attributes, in which genus and difference are not found as strict definition requires. In these, therefore, "aspect" is taken for definition broadly understood, that is, for an expression by which the force and character of such predicates is in some way disclosed insofar as they underlie each common name or customary concept. Therefore Wisdom and Goodness are distinguished by reason in God because the whole property, force, or character of the concept "Wisdom" can be explained without the concept "Goodness," or another concept which is its explication, and likewise conversely. Nevertheless, it does not prevent a distinction of reason if in the definition of one predicate mention is made of the other obliquely, or by way of something connoted, as when "Peterhood" is defined as "the ultimate difference contracting man to the individual." Here "man" is indeed mentioned, but obliquely and as a connoted term, almost in the way in which God is placed in the definition of a creature as such, and the object in the definition of a science or art. Therefore a

distinction of reason stands provided one concept enters the definition of the other neither directly nor through the explication of itself.

9. The proposed explanation of the distinction of reason is truer and more expeditious than that handed down by others, namely that a distinction of reason is then made from two concepts when the intellect, being aware of the terms, however much it reflects upon one concept or examines it attentively, cannot arrive at the other nor say that the object of both is the same. For example, because the intellect by virtue of the concept "animal," however much it reflects, cannot arrive at the concept "rational" nor say that the object is rational, they say it therefore distinguishes animal from rational by reason. Among others, Father Ulloa maintains this explanation (in *Logica Major*, disp. 1, c. 5), speaking of the logical distinction of reason, while he explains the metaphysical distinction of reason through diverse definabilities. Nevertheless, it is opposed, 1º, by the fact that animal is distinguished by reason from the differences rational and irrational even when taken indeterminately, just as man is distinguished from individual differences. For unless it prescinded from them even so taken, it would not be properly universal but a vague individual or vague species. Yet anyone aware of the terms who reflects upon the concept "animal," for example when he sees from afar an animal moving, will immediately infer that the object is rational or irrational; just as from the concept "man" he will immediately gather the identity of the object with Peter, or Paul, or John, etc.

10. It is opposed, 2º, by the fact that between animal and rational, or neighing, there is a mutual distinction of reason; and yet, once the concept "neighing" is well penetrated, one immediately arrives at the concept "animal." It is opposed, 3º, by the fact that metaphysical properties under their proper names are inferred from the proper concept of the essential difference; for anyone skilled in the matter will easily infer from this concept, "It is rational," therefore "it is risible, capable of wonder," etc.; and yet no one denies a distinction of reason between these predicates. Nor should it be answered that such inferences are not formal but material. For this inference also is material, "It is a man, therefore it is rational," as is evident from the Summulae, and yet of itself it excludes a distinction of reason. Nor should it likewise be said that the aforesaid inferences are compatible with a metaphysical distinction of reason but exclude a logical distinction. For what, I ask, is more common in the Schools than to admit a logical distinction of reason between animal as such and the specific differences even vaguely taken? Or between neighing and animal? Or between the essential difference and metaphysical properties? Therefore a

different distinction of reason is gratuitously constructed for logicians and another for metaphysicians, both because this seems contrary to common understanding and usage, and because according to all there is a great affinity between the two sciences.

11. But it will be objected: the same difficulty exists in our opinion; for if someone penetrates the force and character of the cognition "rational," he ought to know that the object is an animal and is risible. Therefore the concept "animal" or "risible" ought to enter into the perfect explication of the concept "rational." I deny the assertion; and in its proof I distinguish the antecedent: he ought to know it merely by arguing, I grant; he ought to know it by defining or quasi-defining, I deny the antecedent and consequence. That the rational is animal would then be known by defining if it could not be fully explained whence or under what title it deserved the name "rational" and verified the concept corresponding to such a name unless it were said to be an animal. But this is not so; for precisely from its being known as a principle of discourse there is obtained the title by which it fully deserves the name "rational" and properly verifies the concept designated by that name, so that the intellect can say: "Even if this object were nothing except a mere principle of reasoning, nothing would thereby be immediately lacking to the propriety of the name and the verification of the concept." Therefore, by virtue of the concept "rational," it is known merely by argument that the object is animal and risible, because that concept arouses knowledge previously had from elsewhere that the principle of reasoning is not found in things except identified with the principle of sensing and laughing. This same thing is commonly expressed in other terms by saying that from the concept "rational," animal is known not "formally" but "inferentially."

12. Now, if it is asked what is the reason or cause of the aforesaid dissimilarity of concepts which, although they have the same real object, nevertheless import diverse definabilities or definitions, I answer: first, the reason *a posteriori* is experience; for we commonly experience that, of two concepts of the same object, we can fail to penetrate and explain the entire, as it were, core of one without recourse to the other or to its explication. Next, there is no intrinsic reason *a priori* beyond the nature and character of the concepts themselves, just as there is no reason *a priori* why man is rational rather than capable of neighing. Finally, the extrinsic reason *a priori* is the fecundity of the object together with the imperfection of the human mind. For just as a physically one cause, for example the Omnipotence of God, can produce diverse effects, each of which imitates and, as it were, physically represents the perfection of the cause, though imperfectly and

diversely, so a really one object can impress upon the intellect species for diverse cognitions of itself, each of which is an intentional imitation and representation of the same object, though imperfectly and diversely. An example is a man seen from afar. First he sends a species producing the concept "body," by which he is not discerned from a trunk or stone; then, as he approaches and progressive motion is perceived, he causes the concept "animal," by which he is discerned from a trunk but not from a brute; then, coming nearer, he moves the intellect to the concept "man"; and finally to the concept "Peter."

13. In this fecundity of objects together with the imperfection of the intellect consists the foundation of the distinction of reason, which foundation various authors explain in various ways. Some reduce the whole matter to the imperfection of the human intellect, which, since it cannot perceive by one intuition the entire perfection of things as God or an angel does, conceives it as though in parts. Yet this is not the sole cause, both because the intellect could often elicit an adequate concept and, by command of the will, uses an inadequate species and elicits a precisive concept, and because the intellect does not distinguish equally concerning every object; therefore it is proportioned to a foundation found on the part of the object. Others assign as foundation the diversity of effects, principles, or connoted things. For because man, for example, can be conceived in relation to diverse effects, such as discourse and laughter, he therefore grounds a distinction of reason between the predicates rational and risible. This foundation is indeed very frequent, but not the only one. For between color and the difference of whiteness there is a distinction of reason although no diversity of connoted things appears. Moreover, a distinction of reason has place in the very connoted things themselves although no recourse to other connoted things is apparent without a vicious circle or infinite regress.

14. Others, following a learned and acute recent author of ours, say that the foundation of the distinction of reason is always some real distinction on the part of the object. This foundation can be assigned in three ways. The first is an inadequate real distinction of the objects directly attained, namely when one concept attains the same thing as another and something beyond it. Thus "color" and "whiteness" are distinguished by reason under these concepts, because the first confusedly attains all species of colors, while the second attains only one. The same is evident in the concepts "animal" and "rational." The second is a real distinction existing, not indeed between the objects directly known, but between other objects previously apprehended, after whose likeness we conceive the former. Thus, for Immensity and

Eternity to be distinguished by reason in God, the real distinction which we know between created location and duration provides the foundation, after the likeness of which we conceive those attributes of God. The third is a real distinction in the effects or extrinsic connotations of the same thing. From this foundation we distinguish by reason intellect and will, rational and risible, and in every cognition vitality and representation, because cognition as vital connotes a power, while as representative it connotes an object.

15. These views are conceived suitably enough. Nevertheless, someone can say that no foundation is here assigned for the mutual distinction between Peterhood and the aspect of man. If there were one, it would especially be that taken from the inadequate real distinction of the objects, because the concept "man" extends to more things than "Peterhood." But from this foundation there follows only a non-mutual distinction of reason, as is evident in the concepts "Peterhood, individual difference," or in the concepts "being, intrinsic subsistence," according to the common opinion concerning the transcendence of being. Moreover, color as such is distinguished by reason from all its differences as simultaneously expressed by this concept, "Every difference of color"; and yet no real distinction exists as a foundation, as will be evident to anyone who examines the matter.

16. Others have recourse to an eminence of perfection found in the object, for example in man, who, because he identifies in himself perfections dispersed in inferior things, provides a foundation for each to be separately conceived. But neither is this foundation always present. For what eminence of perfection will be found in a stone or in a mode of location, in which nevertheless predicates distinct by reason can be conceived? Others finally assign as foundation the real similarity and dissimilarity of one object with others, whence the intellect receives occasion to distinguish that in which the thing is similar to others from that in which it is dissimilar. I admit that a mixture of similarity with dissimilarity is always presupposed on the part of the object for a distinction of reason, whether mutual or non-mutual; nevertheless, it is not always antecedently known, as experience testifies. Therefore it must be said that the foundation of the distinction of reason is not always of one kind, but varies according to the variety of objects, and that among the foundations enumerated from n. 13 sometimes one and sometimes another is present, perhaps even others diverse from these, all of which can generically be reduced to the fecundity of the object discussed in n. 12.

17. Here it must be noted, against Fathers Peynado and Ulloa, that through an act of the intellect really indivisible, for example through this apprehension "animal and rational," supposed really indivisible, an actual

positive or complete distinction of reason cannot be made. Thus Father Quirós, disp. 16, n. 14, following the Excellent Doctor, who, disp. 7, *Metaphysica*, sect. 1, n. 8, speaks thus: "A distinction of reason requires a distinction," meaning a real one, "at least in the concepts themselves and in the denomination taken from them." The reason is that, once that indivisible act is posited, from no source is there an actual distinction between animal and rational: first, not a distinction intrinsic to the object, as the adversaries admit; next, not an extrinsic distinction consisting in cognition. For since the cognition is one and does not represent one without the other but indivisibly represents both, how can it denominate one as distinct from the other?

18. Certainly, according to the common sense of authors, a distinction of reason is made only through an act prescinding one thing from another; and if the precision is reciprocal on each side, a mutual and complete distinction of reason is made. But that act neither prescinds animal from rational nor rational from animal, since on the side of the act it is an expression of both. Add that every distinction, in that line in which it is a distinction, posits one thing and another; but by virtue of that act there is no otherness, no duality, either on the part of the object or on the part of the act. Moreover, there is the authority of St. Thomas, I, dist. 2, a. 3, C., where he plainly teaches that the Divine attributes are not rendered distinct by reason except through a plurality of conceptions of our intellect; and in the answer to 6 he says generally: "Something is one in reality and manifold by reason when one thing corresponds to diverse conceptions and names."

19. Nor does it stand in the way that by that act the real identity of animal and rational does not appear. This is not sufficient for the extremes to appear or to be made several by reason; just as conversely, although through such an act no real plurality or diversity of animal and rational appears, nevertheless according to the adversaries they do not thereby appear or become one by reason. Therefore there is a middle between "being several by reason" and "being one by reason," since these are extrinsic denominations requiring concepts of a special nature. There is, I say, a middle whenever there is a concept which neither requires a uniform definition and therefore is not unity of reason, nor contains actually diverse expressions and therefore is not an actual distinction of reason. Such is the concept of which we speak, and which therefore is a distinction of reason only "equivalently," insofar as it is equivalent to two diverse apprehensions, "animal" and "rational." In sum, a distinction of reason requires two things: both that the concepts be actually distinct and that they be diverse in definition. If either is lacking, a distinction of reason is lacking.

20. From what has been said it is easy to gather what identity of reason is. It is a concept, whether one or manifold, by which the object is constituted as uniformly definable, that is, as excluding diversity of expressions one of which is not explained through the other or through its explication. Therefore, for predicate A to be the same by reason as predicate B is for it to be definable through B, or not to be explainable without its being said to be B. Among authors who deny the Scotistic distinction and the intrinsic virtual distinction, this identity is called "formal identity"; just as the distinction of reason is also called a "formal distinction." Hence "to be formally distinguished" is commonly taken as the same as "to be distinguished by reason," and "to be formally the same" as "to be the same by reason." Mediate definability is sufficient for formal identity, so that if A is defined through B, B through C, and this through D, A is formally identified not only with B but also with C and D. Therefore man formally contains all higher predicates. Both formal identity and formal distinction can be either mutual or non-mutual; for man, for example, formally identifies animal with himself, although animal, conceived as such, is not formally the same as man. But this requires an explanation which will be given more conveniently later.

21. Formal unity, or unity of reason, often coincides with the formal identity just explained. It is also often taken for a concept which so attains really several objects that it prescinds from plurality and constitutes them all as uniformly definable. Thus the concept "man" is the formal unity of all individuals of human nature in the aspect of man, and the concept "animal" is the formal unity of brutes and man in the aspect of animal. To this unity is opposed signified plurality of reason, that is, representation of real plurality as such. Finally, for the use of terms it should be noted that identity and distinction of reason are commonly attributed only to extremes presupposed to be really identified. For although man and horse, in their being as such, could be said to be distinguished by reason because the aspect and definition of man is one thing and that of horse another, usage has nevertheless prevailed such that the distinction of reason is disregarded when it concurs with a real distinction. But plurality of reason, or intentional plurality, is predicated either of extremes distinguished by reason, and then it is exercised plurality, that is, plurality exercised or made through reason; or of extremes which are known as really several, and then it is signified plurality.

22. I have chosen to dwell upon these matters because a correct and clear idea of the distinction of reason is necessary for resolving innumerable difficulties in Philosophy and Theology. Therefore it will be explained still

further in Chapter 8. We have presupposed, however, that the distinction of reason consists in the concepts themselves or acts of the intellect and consequently is extrinsic to the objects. We are well aware that this supposition displeases modern Thomists, who think that the distinction of reason is fictitious and intrinsic to the object. But, besides what was said in Treatise 1, Disputation 2, Chapters 4 and 5, a fiction of this sort will be refuted on the occasion of the controversy immediately following.

CHAPTER VII.
Whether the Distinction of Reason Can Be Made by Objective Precision or Only by Formal Precision.

§ 1. Explanation of Both Positions and Opinions of the Authors.

1. The name precision, derived from material cutting, is attributed to those acts of the intellect which, from predicates really identified, in some way cut out one for themselves and represent it while omitting the others. If precision properly effects a division in the object, that is, if precisive cognition so attains one predicate of the object that the others really identified with it are truly left unknown and unattained, it is called "objective precision," or "precision on the part of the object." But if cognition in reality attains the whole reality of the object and all predicates really indistinct from it, yet with such slight clarity of representation that by virtue of it the object appears just as though it had only one predicate, it is called "formal precision," or "precision on the part of the act," or "on the part of the mode." For example, the cognition "animal" will be objective precision if by it such a division is made in the entity of man that the animal reality remains attained, known, and represented, while the rational reality truly remains unattained, unknown, and unrepresented. But it will be formal precision if it attains the whole entity of man, though with imperfect and slight clarity, just as if man were merely an animal and nothing beyond.

2. Since, therefore, we have said that the distinction of reason is made through precisive concepts, we now ask by what precision it can be made: objective or merely formal? This question is very celebrated at the present time, and scarcely any other is disputed with greater contention and subtlety, especially among our recent authors, in Logic and Metaphysics. Among the older authors it is not found treated expressly, "because," says Mastrius (disp. 6, *Metaphysica*, n. 292), "at that time it would have been a sacrilege to deny objective precisions. But the more recent Fathers of the Society," Mastrius continues, "always wishing to introduce something new

by which to attack the Scotistic and Thomistic doctrine, which was always Peripatetic... attempted to erect and defend Nominalism against Scotus and St. Thomas; hence in the present question they deny all objective precisions, upon which the entire metaphysical doctrine of Scotus and St. Thomas rested," etc. But this learned Scotist speaks too harshly, too censoriously, and also departs too far from the truth in the present matter. First, because we shall plainly show in this chapter that objective precision is contrary to the mind of St. Thomas. Second, because, if Scotistic and Thomistic doctrine was always Peripatetic, Peripatetic doctrine will teem with contradictions; for who does not know that Scotistic doctrine commonly contradicts Thomistic doctrine, especially in "metaphysics"? Recall as an example the formal distinction from the nature of the thing between metaphysical grades. Nor should the charge of novelty cause difficulty, since it could easily be answered and turned back upon the accuser, were the matter worth the effort.

3. Among modern philosophers, therefore, all who admit the Scotistic distinction or the intrinsic virtual distinction defend objective precision, and rightly so, since there is scarcely any basis for denying objective precision between predicates which are either formally distinguished from the nature of the thing or intrinsically virtually distinguished. Hence there is no dispute with these at present; rather, in this controversy it is presupposed that neither of those distinctions is compatible with real identity. Among the others, the more recent Thomists defend objective precision, and the Trinitarian Course adheres to them, as does Mastrius (ibid., n. 398) even where the Scotistic distinction is absent. The same precision is defended among our authors by Coninck, Compton, Suárez Lusitanus, Izquierdo, Reverend Father Thirsus, and others, especially the more recent manuscript authors, who have illustrated this controversy with great acuteness. Conversely, the more common opinion of our authors maintains that objective precision is impossible, and consequently that the distinction of reason is accomplished by formal precision alone. Thus, among others, hold Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Alphonsus, Téllez, Quirós, Peynado, Ulloa, and commonly the more recent manuscript authors. Many outside our School agree, such as Aversa, Bonaspes, Calagurritanus, and Servera. We too embrace this opinion.

§ 2. Objective Precision Is Rejected.

4. The common and invincible argument against objective precision is as follows. Predicates strictly contradictory cannot belong to a subject which is

one and the same; but they would belong if objective precision were posited. Therefore such precision cannot exist between really identified predicates. The major premise is granted by the adversaries, who therefore labor in various ways to avert a contradiction of predicates. Proof of the minor premise: if objective precision is posited, the animal in man is truly known by the cognition "animal," and the rational is truly not known by the same cognition; but to be known and not to be known by the same cognition are predicates strictly and terminologically contradictory, just as to be produced and not to be produced by the same production. Therefore contradictory predicates belong to animal and rational, which are one and the same.

5. The argument is pressed and explained, 1º: for animal simultaneously to be known and not known by the same cognition is an evident contradiction and wholly repugnant according to all; but this contradiction follows from objective precision. It is proved: animal is first known by the cognition "animal," as is said; and then the same animal is simultaneously not known by that cognition; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise by an expository syllogism, whose efficacy is especially evident when an animal seen from afar is known from motion to be an animal without being recognized as rational: "This rational thing is not known by this cognition 'animal'; but this animal is this rational thing; therefore this animal is not known by this cognition 'animal.'"

6. It is pressed, 2º: the rational is necessarily known when the animal with which it is identified is known. Therefore, if it is simultaneously not known, as is maintained, the rational itself now undergoes contradictories, which according to all is repugnant. Proof of the antecedent: because the rational is that very reality which is known and terminates the cognition; for it is the animal reality, and this is what is known and terminates cognition. Therefore the rational itself is necessarily known, if this syllogism in Barbara has any force: "Every animal in man is known by cognition A; but every rational is the animal in man; therefore every rational is known by cognition A." Moreover, animal and rational are not one and another part of man but indivisibly the same entity. Therefore it is impossible for man to be known insofar as he is animal and not known insofar as he is rational, no otherwise than an indivisible point, because it lacks parts and sides, if once touched, is necessarily touched wholly and from every side.

7. It is pressed, 3º: it is impossible for animal to be produced, united, or white without all these predicates simultaneously belonging to the rational. Therefore it is likewise impossible for animal to be known without the rational being known. Proof of the consequence: the antecedent is true because otherwise some true being would be simultaneously joined in the

same subject with its own non-being, or with the privation of itself; whereby the first principles, "Everything either is or is not," and "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be," would be violated. But the same absurdity follows if, when animal is known, the rational is not known by the same cognition, namely that "being known" is simultaneously joined with its own non-being, or the privation of itself. Nor should it be said that "to be produced and not to be produced" are physical and intrinsic contradictories, and therefore require a real physical distinction, whereas extrinsic contradictories such as "to be known and not to be known" do not.

8. For against this, 1º, extrinsic predicates are no less repugnant to being and not being simultaneously in the same subject than intrinsic predicates. This is so both because contradictory opposition is everywhere the greatest, because the principles known by the light of nature just mentioned admit no exception, because animal's being simultaneously known and not known by cognition A is altogether impossible according to the adversaries, and because simultaneously to be and not to be seen, right, left, or comprehensively known, although these are extrinsic contradictories, is altogether repugnant without a real distinction, as the adversaries also do not doubt. Against it, 2º, from extrinsic contradictories arising from precisive cognition intrinsic contradictories also follow. For, once the cognition "animal" is posited, the intellect will simultaneously be knowing animal and not knowing rational, and consequently simultaneously knowing and not knowing a really identical object. Yet "to know" and "not to know" are as much physical and intrinsic contradictories in the intellect as "to be produced and not to be produced." The cognition itself also will simultaneously be and not be intrinsically a representation, tendency, and image of the same object.

9. The common solution of the recent authors distinguishes two kinds of predicates: some belong to things according to physical being, or in the physical and real state, independently of the operation of the intellect, such as the predicates "to be produced" and "white"; and these cannot simultaneously be affirmed and denied without a distinction proportionate to them, that is, physical and real. Others belong to things according to being as known, or in the intentional state in which they underlie acts of the intellect; and these, at least when they flow from inadequate and precisive cognition, for example the predicates "genus, species, abstract, precisively known," etc., require only a distinction of reason for their simultaneous affirmation and negation. For since they are contradictories of reason, they require a distinction in their own line, not in the real line. The precisive and inadequate concept itself exercises this distinction of reason. Hence they

infer, 1º, that the predicates "known and not known" by the cognition "animal," as applied to animal and rational, are not contradictory, because they are not verified of a subject which is "the same" in the line of reason. For although the subjects are one and the same really, they are nevertheless two formally, or by reason; and this duality is not presupposed in the object but is exercised by the cognition "animal" from its own inadequate mode of tending.

10. They infer, 2º, that it is false to say absolutely that the same entity of man is simultaneously known and not known once the cognition "animal" is posited; for a negation stated absolutely destroys the whole and indicates that no cognition, even inadequate, terminates at man. Therefore it is verified only that the entity of man is known "inadequately" and is not known "adequately"; in which there is no contradiction. They infer, 3º, that the expository syllogism in n. 5 commits the fallacy of accident and concludes badly, because it argues from the real state to the intentional state and improperly leaps from real identity, which it affirms in the minor premise, to identity of reason in the conclusion. Therefore it is similar to the fallacious syllogism given by St. Thomas (Opusc. *De fallaciis*, c. 9), namely, "I know Coriscus; but Coriscus is the one approaching; therefore I know the one approaching"; or also to one which changes personal supposition into simple supposition, for example, "Animal is a genus; but man is animal; therefore man is a genus." This is the substance of the doctrine of the recent authors. Against it, the preceding argument is renewed.

11. It is reformulated, 1º: it is impossible for animal to be produced and rational not to be produced because the denomination "produced" falls upon the real and physical being of animal, which is the very being of rational; but the denomination "known" also falls upon the real and physical being of animal. Therefore it is impossible for it not likewise to fall upon rational. Proof of the minor premise: the denomination "known" falls upon that which the cognition "animal" attains; but this cognition attains the real and physical being of animal, as is certain, for it is not reflexive but direct cognition, nor a formal second intention but a first intention. Therefore, etc. It is said: that cognition indeed attains the physical being of animal, but not the whole of it. Against this: production cannot attain animal without attaining the whole precisely because production attains the physical being of animal, in which one part is not animal and another rational, since the whole is indivisibly both. But cognition also attains the physical being of animal, for according to the recent authors and according to the truth it has no other being for its object. Therefore it must also attain the whole.

12. It is reformulated, 2º: the denomination "known," for we are always speaking of the precisive cognition "animal," does not belong to animal insofar as distinguished by reason from rational. Therefore either it also belongs to rational, or contradictories will be verified without any distinction. Proof of the antecedent: animal as distinguished by reason from rational is animal as known and as already involving precisive cognition, for according to the recent authors of our School the distinction of reason is the very precisive cognition itself. But the denomination "known" does not belong to animal as already known and involving the direct cognition itself, for that cognition does not denominate itself nor have itself for its object. Therefore neither does it belong to animal as distinguished by reason from rational. It will be said: that denomination belongs to animal as distinguished by reason from rational, with the word "as" reduplicating the distinction, not by way of the thing denominated but by way of the state in which animal actually is when it is denominated known.

13. Granted. Therefore when it is said that animal is known as distinct from rational, it is not meant that the entire denomination "distinct" is known and terminates cognition, but only that bare animal is said to be known at the time when it is actually distinguished from rational, such that the distinction itself is not even partially denominated known. Therefore the bare being of animal alone, insofar as really distinct from the distinction of reason itself, is the subject of the denomination "known." Then I argue thus: therefore rational is the subject of the same denomination and truly terminates the cognition. Proof of the consequence: animal terminates cognition and is the subject of denomination insofar as it implies no distinction from rational; but the same functions which animal exercises insofar as it implies no distinction from rational are necessarily exercised also by rational, as is evident. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: animal exercises those functions insofar as really distinct from the distinction of reason; but insofar as it is distinct from the distinction of reason, it implies no distinction from rational, since, as we presuppose, it altogether rejects every other kind of distinction. Therefore, etc.

14. By the same form one can prove that the denominations "distinguished by reason, prescinded, inadequately known" belong no less to rational on the part of the object than to animal. For they all belong to animal insofar as it is wholly indistinct from rational and insofar as it implies no precision or inadequacy with respect to rational; for they all belong to animal insofar as really distinct from that cognition which is the entire distinction, precision, and inadequacy. Confirmation: the distinction or precision of reason does not intrinsically change animal when it transfers it

into the intentional state, since subjectively it resides wholly in the intellect. Therefore animal, after being transferred into the intentional state, remains as intrinsically rational as it was before. Therefore rational is also transferred into the same state and is consequently rendered known. I prove this consequence: although the intentional state is extrinsic to animal, what is transferred into it is the intrinsic being itself of animal. Therefore, if this intrinsic being remains intrinsically rational within that extrinsic state, how will rational not be in the same state?

15. Nor should it be said with the Reverend Thomists that the distinction of reason is intrinsic to the object because it is a distinction feigned by the intellect on the part of the object, and that the intellect distinguishes animal from rational by reason only by apprehending animal as intrinsically distinct from rational. For against this, 1º: even if a fictitious distinction between animal and rational were granted, it would not suffice to verify that animal is truly known and rational truly not known by the cognition "animal," as all defenders of objective precision maintain. This is both because these are true and real contradictories, which cannot cohere without a true and real distinction of subjects, and because by virtue of that distinction it could only be said that rational "fictitiously" does not terminate the cognition "animal," not that it "truly" does not terminate it. Against this, 2º: precisive cognition does not feign nor conceive a thing otherwise than it is, as St. Thomas frequently teaches (e.g., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1; Opusc. 70, q. 1, a. 3), approving the common scholastic saying, "There is no falsity in prescinding and abstracting." Hence the Thomists themselves commonly say that beings of reason are not feigned except through comparative cognition. Therefore cognition objectively prescinding would introduce contradictory predicates before there is a fictitious distinction.

16. Against this, 3º: St. Thomas, to be cited in the following section, plainly teaches that a distinction of reason, even a positive or complete one, consists in the acts of the mind themselves. Against this, 4º: if cognition apprehends animal as intrinsically distinct from rational, it does not apprehend a true and real animal but a chimerical one; no otherwise than if it apprehended animal as intrinsically identified with a stone, it would apprehend a chimerical animal. For it is as repugnant to the true animal existing in man to be intrinsically distinguished from rational as to be intrinsically identified with a stone. Indeed, for the animal in man to be apprehended as thus distinct is for it to be apprehended as though it positively excluded in reality the real identity of itself with rational. But the animal in man, if it were such in reality, would undoubtedly be chimerical. Therefore, when it is apprehended as though it were such, it is apprehended

as chimerical. Nevertheless, the Thomists rightly judge one thing, namely that objective precision cannot be explained unless an intrinsic distinction in the object is conceived. For otherwise the entire precision remains on the part of the act and leaves animal intrinsically unchanged, which therefore carries rational along with itself under whatever denomination it undergoes and into whatever state it is transferred, as we argued in n. 14.

17. From what has been said it will be inferred that the Objectivists speak improperly when they say that the predicate "known" belongs to animal according to intentional being. For although that predicate is intentional, it nevertheless belongs to animal according to physical being, since this is the subject of the denomination "known"; just as the denomination "holy through Grace," although it is a supernatural and accidental predicate, nevertheless falls upon the natural and substantial being of the soul. It will also be inferred that a fallacy is sought in vain in the expository syllogism of n. 5. For the syllogism concerning Coriscus approaching, cited by St. Thomas, is fallacious because from cognition of Coriscus it argues to cognition of an accident really distinct and separable from Coriscus, namely cognition of the approach or act of coming. But our syllogism argues from cognition of animal to cognition of an object really indistinct from animal, namely rational. Indeed, the example can be reversed. This form is not fallacious: "This man is Coriscus; but Coriscus is approaching; therefore this man is approaching." Therefore this entirely similar, or indeed identical, form is not fallacious: "This rational thing is this animal; but this animal is known, is the term of cognition, and is transferred into the intentional state; therefore this rational thing is known, is the term of cognition, and is transferred into the intentional state."

18. But, to block escape to intentional predicates, the argument from contradiction is reformulated, 3º: if animal is known and rational is not known by cognition A, physical and intrinsic contradictories are verified of animal and rational, which is repugnant even according to the adversaries. The consequence is proved: if animal is known by cognition A, it is intrinsically capable of terminating that cognition; for cognition of a real object presupposes in it a capacity to be known, which is called transcendental truth and intrinsic cognoscibility. For the same reason, if rational is not known by cognition A, it is not intrinsically capable of terminating such cognition; for cognition cannot change the object. But to be intrinsically capable and not to be intrinsically capable with respect to the same cognition are physical and intrinsic predicates. Therefore, etc.

19. The common answer is that the whole entity of man is intrinsically capable of being known inadequately, and at the same time the whole is not

capable of being known adequately through the cognition "animal." Hence there is no contradiction because capacity and incapacity proceed in different senses. If it is inferred: therefore the whole entity of animal and rational is capable of being known by that cognition not wholly, but only insofar as it is animal, for this and nothing else can "inadequately" signify; they grant the consequence and add that the same capacity which belongs to animal belongs equally to rational in reality. For animal is capable of being rendered by such cognition a known animal without rational, and rational is equally capable of this same thing, namely that animal without rational be rendered known by that cognition. But against this, 1º: in the same terms it could safely be defended that the whole entity of animal and rational is intrinsically apt for animal to be produced without rational; or even that the whole composite of Peter and a horse is intrinsically capable of terminating the cognition "man"; or that there is in water and fire an intrinsic power by which fire burns without water.

20. Against this, 2º: animal is not intrinsically capable of animal being known without animal. Therefore, if it is intrinsically capable of animal being known without rational, intrinsic capacity now diversifies animal from rational, or the contradiction revives in this way: animal, as is said, is not intrinsically capable of being known without animal; yet at the same time it is so capable. I prove this: according to the opponent, animal is intrinsically capable of being known without rational; but rational is animal itself. Therefore animal is intrinsically capable of being known without animal. Against this, 3º: the intrinsic capacity to terminate cognition extends to the whole entity of man, as is granted. Therefore actually terminating cognition must belong to the whole entity of man. The consequence is evident because that whole terminates cognition A in second act which in first act was cognoscible by it, just as that whole terminates production and union which was intrinsically producible and unitable in relation to them. But that whole is cognoscible in first act to which the intrinsic capacity of terminating cognition extends.

21. Finally, objective precision can be rejected and formal precision proved by two further arguments. Let the first be this: if animal terminates and rational does not terminate the same cognition, it follows that some intrinsic predicate is found in animal which is not found in rational; but this is repugnant, given the complete real identity of both. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: if animal terminates and rational does not terminate cognition A, this is because there is in animal some proportion to such cognition which is not found in rational; for if the same proportion existed in both, both would terminate cognition A. Thus the fact that Peter, and not

a horse, terminates the cognition "man" necessarily depends upon some proportion by which Peter, and not the horse, is commensurate and adapted to such cognition. But such a proportion is something intrinsic to animal, since it belongs to it as adequately distinct from cognition; for we are not speaking of the proportion of cognition to itself, but of the proportion of animal specifically taken to cognition. Therefore there is now found in animal an intrinsic predicate which is not found in rational.

22. It is pressed, 1º: cognition of a real object, although it exercises a distinction of predicates, does not make but finds the proportion or disproportion of the object to itself, as is certain. Therefore, if objective precision is posited, the proportion remaining in animal with respect to cognition A and the disproportion remaining in rational with respect to the same cognition are not made by cognition but found. From this it follows that before cognition intrinsic proportion and disproportion with respect to the same thing were mingled in an indivisible entity. It also follows that the proportion and disproportion belonging to animal and rational as distinguished by reason are not intentional predicates, since they are not made by cognition. Therefore they are physical predicates; consequently a distinction of reason will suffice for verifying opposed physical predicates, which is absurd even to the adversaries.

23. It is pressed, 2º: every cognition is an intentional image of its object, and for this reason has a similarity with the object (cf. St. Thomas, q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 6, C., and often elsewhere), consisting in this, that the object is in being as cognition is in representing. Cognition does not have this similarity with things which it does not regard as its object. Therefore, if cognition A regards animal as object and not rational, it will be an image and likeness of animal rather than rational. Therefore animal, as really distinct from cognition, is in being as that cognition is in representing, whereas rational is not so. Therefore animal, as really distinct from cognition, is otherwise in being than rational. But otherness in being is physical and intrinsic otherness. Therefore there is physical and intrinsic otherness between animal and rational. It is pressed, 3º: the composite or aggregate of the animal reality and the cognition "animal" is diverse from the composite or aggregate of the rational reality and the same cognition "animal," since in one composite there is a true and real denomination which is not found in the other, namely the denomination "known." But that diversity is not intentional, since it does not consist in cognition, which is the same in both composites. Therefore it is physical diversity and consists intrinsically in animal and rational as distinguished from cognition.

24. Let the second argument be: if objective precision is granted, animal would simultaneously be known and unknown by the cognition "animal." The absurd consequence is proved: animal would be known, as is presupposed; yet it would also be unknown. I prove this: once the cognition "animal" is posited, rational would remain in the state of the unknown; but rational in this state remains animal and retains animal with itself without any distinction. Therefore animal also would remain unknown. Proof of the minor premise: rational in the state of the unknown is rational in the physical state, for it is not in the intentional state; but rational in the physical state retains animal with itself without any distinction. Therefore, etc. It is pressed: animal in the state of the known does not retain rational with itself precisely because it is affected by a distinctive and precisive cognition by which it is separated from rational. But rational in the state of the unknown is affected by no distinctive and precisive cognition, since none terminates at rational. Therefore, conversely, it retains animal with itself in the state of the unknown. Certainly rational in that state is not denominated "prescinded" or "distinguished by reason" from animal; for this denomination is indivisibly the same as the denomination "known," which then does not belong to rational. But rational necessarily remains animal in that state in which it is neither prescinded nor distinguished by reason from animal.

§ 3. Formal Precision Is Proved from St. Thomas and Explained.

25. From what has been said it is evident that objective precision between really identified predicates is impossible. It remains, therefore, that the distinction of reason can be made by formal precision alone, since there is no middle way. Father Hurtado, disp. 6, *Metaphysica*, sect. 4, subsect. 3, in the sixth edition, demonstrates from St. Thomas's Opusc. 9 that this is the opinion of St. Thomas. But because some Thomists, pressed by the evidence, reject that opusculum as one numbered among the uncertain works of St. Thomas (cf. Treatise 1, disp. 2, c. 3, n. 2), I therefore show the same thing from the unquestioned writings of the Angelic Doctor as follows. The distinction of reason between the Divine attributes is made only by concepts formally prescinding; therefore no distinction of reason between predicates really identified is made otherwise. The consequence is legitimate by parity of reason; nor do the adversaries judge otherwise of the distinction of reason concerning created things than concerning the attributes of God, once these are distinguished by reasoned reason, as St. Thomas frequently teaches, expressly in I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 2, C., where he says: "The attributes of God are

one in reality; and because each of them is in God according to its most true aspect, and the aspect of Wisdom is not the aspect of Goodness as such, it remains that they are diverse by reason, not only on the part of the one reasoning but from the property of the thing itself."

26. I therefore prove the antecedent. St. Thomas, in the place cited, in the following a. 3, asks: "Whether the plurality of aspects by which the attributes differ is only in the intellect, or also in God?" This is to ask whether that plurality is made by formal precision alone or also by objective precision. For if it is made by formal precision alone, the distinction remains on the part of the act, and consequently the plurality is only in the intellect. But if by objective precision, the distinction remains on the part of the object, and consequently the plurality of reason is in God. Therefore, to answer the question, St. Thomas establishes that the "aspect of the thing" is the "conception of the intellect" concerning the thing itself, and that this "aspect," or "conception," is "in the soul as in a subject." Then, after saying that our intellect "has diverse conceptions of God, which are diverse aspects," he adds that "to the plurality of these aspects something corresponds in the thing which is God, not indeed a plurality of the thing, but full perfection, from which it happens that all these conceptions are applicable to Him." Finally he concludes that this plurality "is on the part of God Himself, insofar as there is something in God corresponding to all these conceptions, namely His full and complete perfection; but not in such a way that any diversity or multiplicity is posited in the thing which is God by reason of these attributes."

27. One sees that to these conceptions of ours, "wisdom, goodness," by which the distinction and plurality of the attributes of God are made, no plurality, no multiplicity, no diversity corresponds on the part of the object, but only God's full and complete perfection. Yet this plainly cannot stand if those conceptions objectively prescind. The reason is evident: through concepts objectively prescinding there is posited on the part of the object a multiplicity and diversity of realities. For either, as the Thomists maintain, a fictitious distinction intrinsically affecting the object is posited, which cuts it into diverse realities; or the concepts themselves, as our authors maintain, by their own subtlety divide the object and as a result make several diverse realities on the part of the object. Therefore it cannot stand with such precision that "no diversity or multiplicity is posited in the thing which is God by reason of these attributes." Here note that "no" multiplicity is posited on the part of the object, that is, "none"; whereby not only real but intentional multiplicity is excluded, for this too is "some" multiplicity. Read

the whole article and it will plainly be seen that this is the mind of the Angelic Doctor.

28. This is confirmed from I, q. 13, a. 4, C., where St. Thomas, explaining the same distinction of reason among the attributes, says: "Just as to the diverse perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle, represented variously and manifoldly through the diverse perfections of creatures, so to the various and manifold concepts of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple thing, imperfectly understood according to such conceptions." He repeats the same in the answers to 2 and 3. Here formal precision is clearly delineated and objective precision plainly excluded. For God is represented through many and various precisive concepts just as He is represented through the various and manifold perfections of creatures. But when one creature represents God's power, another His wisdom, another His goodness, etc., the entire distinction and multiplicity remains on the part of creatures and is in no way transferred to God, as no one doubts. Therefore, when precisive concepts represent, one God's power, another His wisdom, etc., the distinction, diversity, and multiplicity in no way pass into God but remain wholly on the part of the concepts; to all of which, on the part of the object, "there corresponds one altogether simple thing, imperfectly understood according to such conceptions." Is this not formal precision, which represents everything that is in the object, but "imperfectly"? Can this be objective precision, which necessarily makes it the case that to these concepts "power, wisdom" there corresponds not "one altogether simple thing" but rather a twofold perfection distinct on the part of the object?

29. The Angelic Doctor teaches this same doctrine clearly in q. 2, *De veritate*, a. 1, C.: "We see," he says, "in things outside the soul that each thing in some way imitates God, but imperfectly; hence diverse things imitate God in diverse ways, and according to diverse forms represent the one simple form of God, because in that form there is united whatever perfection is found distinctly and manifoldly in creatures. Likewise our intellect, according to diverse conceptions, represents the Divine perfection, because each conception is imperfect.... Therefore there are several conceptions in our intellect representing the Divine essence; hence the Divine essence corresponds to each of them as a thing to its imperfect image," etc. Thus far St. Thomas, graphically depicting formal precision, whose characteristic is to represent the entire really simple perfection of the object, but imperfectly on its own part, that is, with subjectively imperfect and inadequate clarity, though terminatively adequate; in the way, for example, in which the sun imitates the whole God, since it represents "the one simple form of God,"

but imperfectly on its own part, that is, by an imitation subjectively imperfect and inadequate although terminatively adequate.

30. But that the mind of St. Thomas may appear clearer than the sun, let the same q. 2, *De veritate*, a. 1, ad 3, be heard. When he had objected to himself that the name "Science" cannot be said of God because "it does not signify His entire perfection, and if it does not signify the whole, it signifies nothing of Him, since in God no part is found," so far is he from answering that a part is found in God through fiction or objective precision that he instead solves the argument in these words: "Since names are signs of intellectual conceptions, a name is related to signifying the totality of a thing according as the intellect is related to understanding it. But our intellect can understand the whole God, though not the whole totally; for it is necessary that of Him either the whole be understood or nothing, since in Him there is neither part nor whole. But I say not totally because it does not perfectly know Him according as He is cognoscible in His own nature.... Likewise the names predicated of God signify Him wholly, though not totally."

31. One sees, I think, our opinion together with its fundamental reason, which applies to every really indivisible object, that is, wherever there is real identity. This concept "animal," or this other one, "wisdom of God," is precisive. But why? Because such a concept, say the Objectivists, does not understand the whole man or the whole God, but only some reality, leaving the others unknown and unattained. The authors of our opinion protest against this doctrine by the very argument of St. Thomas: namely, if that concept attains man or God, it necessarily attains the whole, "for it is necessary that either the whole be understood or nothing, since" in God "there is neither part nor whole," just as neither is there in man when he is considered not according to physical parts but according to really identified predicates. Therefore, when it is said that the concept does not understand the whole, contradictories are posited, namely that the whole is understood and the whole is not understood by the same concept. Thus we reject objective precision. But with the same Angelic Doctor we explain formal precision in this way. That precisive and inadequate concept is such, not because it does not understand the whole man or the whole God, but because it does not understand the whole "totally," that is, "because it does not perfectly know Him according as He is cognoscible in His own nature."

32. For since man, for example, is cognoscible with all the clarity corresponding to these words taken together, "rational, risible animal," etc., when he is known only with the clarity corresponding to the word "animal," and think the same of the others singly, he is indeed known wholly, but not "totally," because he is not known with all the clarity which by his own

nature he deserves and can ground even with respect to us. Thus a single degree of Grace sanctifies the whole soul, but not totally. Thus a small light illuminates the whole surrounding air, but not totally, since the same air can be more illuminated. Thus, when several partial causes simultaneously produce an indivisible effect, for example when the power and impressed species produce cognition, each cause produces the whole according to the totality of the effect, and yet each is an inadequate cause and does not act totally according to the totality of the cause. Thus finally, to use the example of St. Thomas, every creature, for example the sun, is an imitation of God, a physical representation of God, indeed of the whole, but not totally; and therefore is rightly called an inadequate imitation, a partial representation.

33. Therefore our concepts concerning an indivisible thing are called "inadequate" not objectively but formally, not terminatively but subjectively, not on the part of the object but on the part of the act; and in the same sense they are called "precisive," because by their inadequacy they make us speak of the object as though it were cut into parts. Now compare our opinion with the doctrine of St. Thomas and judge whether we truly are Thomists. As regards the Excellent Doctor, it is much truer that he agrees with us. For, omitting what Father Peynado and others report, the Excellent Doctor says, disp. 7, *Metaphysica*, sect. 1, n. 5: "A distinction of reason is made through inadequate concepts of the same thing; for although through each the same thing is conceived, through neither is everything that is in the thing exactly conceived." Note that through each "the same thing" is conceived, but through neither "exactly," that is, "not totally," as St. Thomas said. "A distinction of reason," he says in the same place, n. 8, "requires a distinction at least in the concepts themselves." But if one concept divides the object into two realities, as the adversaries maintain, why are distinct concepts required? He agrees in Book IV, *De Trinitate*, c. 4, n. 17, saying: "A distinction of reason, as actual, is nothing other than a denomination from distinct and inadequate concepts of the same thing."

CHAPTER VIII.

The Opposing Arguments Are Answered.

Many arguments are raised both by the Thomists and by our authors for objective precision and against formal precision; to pursue them minutely would be endless. We shall answer the principal ones and at the same time give doctrine by which the others can easily be met.

§ 1. The First Objection Is Proposed, and the Distinction of Reason Is Explained More Precisely.

1. Objection 1: if objective precision is excluded, a distinction of reason between predicates really identified is impossible; but this is absurd to all Scholastics. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: if objective precision is excluded, really identified predicates, for example animal and rational, cannot be made two by reason. Therefore they cannot be distinguished by reason, just as those things cannot be really distinguished which cannot be really two or more. Proof of the antecedent: if objective precision is excluded, through the same cognition by which animal is attained, rational is attained in the same manner, without any partition or separation. Therefore animal and rational, whatever cognition they terminate, cannot fail to remain united in the intellect. Therefore they cannot be made one thing and another by reason, and therefore cannot be made two.

2. Confirmation 1: the extremes between which a distinction of reason obtains are not formal concepts, for these are really distinct. Therefore they are objective concepts, or formalities in the object corresponding to formal concepts. But unless objective precision is admitted, distinct formalities or two objective concepts, "animal" and "rational," cannot correspond on the part of the object to these concepts. Confirmation 2: things which agree by reason in all predicates cannot be distinguished by reason, just as things which really agree in all predicates, even individual ones, cannot be really distinguished. But if objective precision is excluded, animal and rational agree in all predicates and denominations of reason; otherwise the contradictories which we are attempting to avoid would follow. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 3: animal is not distinguished or prescinded from itself by the concept "animal" precisely because through such a concept it agrees most perfectly with itself and does not receive diverse denominations. But the same thing happens to rational according to our principles. Or otherwise: animal is denominated prescinded and distinct from rational, and not from itself. Therefore rational is that from which animal is prescinded, and animal is not that from which animal is prescinded. Therefore contradictories are now verified of them.

3. To these are added the points which the Thomists emphasize for a distinction feigned in the object, and which can briefly be proposed thus. If there is no objective precision, there is no objective distinction; but if there is no objective distinction, or distinction on the part of the object, there is

no distinction of reason. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: if there is no objective distinction, only a distinction consisting in cognition remains. But this is not a distinction of reason but a real distinction, just as cognition itself is a real being. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 1: cognition is "representatively" a distinction of the predicates of the object. Therefore it is a representation of a distinction; just as an image which representatively is Caesar is a representation of Caesar. Therefore a distinction existing on the part of the object is proposed to cognition.

4. Confirmation 2: a purely extrinsic distinction is impossible. Therefore, if the distinction of reason is not intrinsic to the object, it is impossible. Proof of the antecedent: first, because distinction is a property of being, just as unity is; but a property of being extrinsic to being is impossible. Second, because for one thing to be distinguished from another is for it to be that very thing which it is and not another; but each thing has this through itself and not through something extrinsic. Third, because extrinsic identity is impossible; for since identity renders one thing supremely intrinsic to another, it would follow that one thing is supremely intrinsic to another extrinsically, which is terminologically impossible. Therefore an extrinsic distinction is likewise impossible. Confirmation 3: there are as many kinds of distinctions as there are kinds of beings. Therefore, just as there are beings of reason feigned with a foundation, so there ought likewise to be a distinction of reason feigned with a foundation. Confirmation 4: by these concepts, "animal" and "rational," the extremes are no less represented as several than by these, "Peter" and "Paul." Therefore in both cases objective plurality and distinction are represented.

5. To answer the argument, recall the doctrine which we gave from the Angelic and Excellent Doctors in Chapters 6 and 7, § 3: namely, that a complete distinction of reason exists only through concepts actually distinct and diverse in definition. For things really identified are said to be distinct by reason only insofar as they underlie diverse denominations bestowed by reason. Hence, and this must be kept before the eyes, the "precisive," or "incomplete," distinction of reason which is said to be made when only the concept "animal" exists is not a distinction by reason of animal from rational except in relation to the possible concept "rational." That is, it does not distinguish animal from rational specifically taken on the part of the object, but from rational as representable through the concept "rational," with the word "as" reduplicating representability, not merely intrinsic representability but extrinsic representability constituted by the possible concept "rational."

6. Moreover, it must be noted, 1º: the extremes or subjects which are denominated distinct by reason are not the formal concepts themselves, for these are really distinct from each other. The concepts themselves are indeed the distinction of reason, or the form denominating the object as distinct by reason; but they are not for that reason themselves distinct by reason. Thus an act of the visual power is not seen, and yet it is vision, or the form constituting something as seen. Thus also cognition of another possible world is the intentional existence of another world, and yet that cognition does not exist intentionally but physically. In other terms, formal concepts are not distinct by reason "as that which," but "as that by which." Nor again are the extremes distinct by reason "as that which" the complete denominations or concrete things resulting from the entity of the object and distinct cognitions, such that on one side a concrete thing is taken from the entity of man and the cognition "animal," and on the other a concrete thing from the same entity of man and the cognition "rational"; for these concrete things are really inadequately distinct, just as white and sweet are really inadequately distinguished when the same subject is simultaneously affected by whiteness and sweetness.

7. Therefore the extremes distinct by reason as that which are the really identified predicates themselves insofar as known by diverse concepts, with the expression "insofar as" reduplicating the concepts, not by way of a subject which is denominated "distinct by reason," not even partially, but by way of a purely denominating form; no otherwise than a possible world is said to exist intentionally as that which only insofar as known, without cognition thereby being reduplicated by way of a subject, but only by way of a form. The reason is that for an object to be distinct by reason is for it to be known diversely, or through concepts diverse in definition. Therefore, just as the denomination "diversely known" falls uniquely upon the entity of the object as that which, and by no means upon the concepts themselves, so too does the denomination "distinct by reason"; although each denomination constitutively and essentially imports the cognitions themselves as forms and cannot exist or be understood without them.

8. It must be noted, 2º: the distinction of reason is not properly such in the genus of distinction, but is a certain improper imitation of true distinction. For true distinction necessarily brings it about that one thing truly and properly is not another, and excludes their true and proper identity. But between really identified extremes a distinction which would bring about such effects is repugnant, as is abundantly evident from what was said above, indeed from the terms themselves. The distinction of reason does consist in denominations or forms which are true and proper in

another genus, namely insofar as they render the object truly and properly known and truly and properly definable by diverse definitions. But the same forms receive the name "distinction" only improperly or metaphorically in relation to the object. For they do not render it properly twofold, but as though twofold, apparently twofold, because, once diverse inadequate concepts of the same object are posited, the intellect defines and explains it just as though it were really twofold. Suppose Demetrius, the same bilocated man, is in a school and in the forum, dressed here in a white garment and there in a black one. From the twofold location and dissimilar dress, which are truly and properly such in the genus of dress and location, there will result a certain apparent and metaphorical distinction of the man, who, insofar as constituted in those circumstances, will perform the function of two men and therefore appear twofold, although he is really one.

9. Therefore the distinction of reason is commonly called by our authors an "apparent" distinction: not indeed in the sense in which an object is said to appear in cognition, where "to appear" is taken for "to be disclosed" or "manifested," for a distinction of reason is not the object of direct cognition; but in the sense in which the flowering beauty of meadows is called an apparent smile, or the instinct of a serpent apparent prudence, "to appear" being taken for "to imitate analogically." Nevertheless, a distinction of reasoned reason can be called a distinction properly such in the line of reason, not only because there is another far more improper distinction, namely that of reasoning reason, but also because it has all the propriety which the line of reason permits. Therefore it is improper and apparent only in the genus of distinction simply speaking, for it does not properly participate in the concept of distinction which belongs to real distinction. What we have said of the name "distinction" is to be understood equally of the name "precision"; for where there is real identity, cognition does not properly prescind but as though prescinds one from another, unless precision signifies only inadequacy on the part of the act, which we explained in the preceding chapter, § 3; for this is truly and properly found. From what has been said, a distinction of reasoned reason can be defined thus: "A twofold inadequate cognition of the same object by which the object is made as though twofold when it is rendered diversely definable."

10. It must be noted, 3º: rational is not altogether the same in the real sense and in the formal sense, and the same should be understood of animal and every other predicate. For rational taken in the real sense, which is also called objective rational, signifies only the entity of man specifically taken as it is in reality; but rational in the formal sense, or formally taken, is rational "under the aspect" of rational. In this sense the entity of man is now taken

as actually known by a concept corresponding to the name "rational." For, as St. Thomas says (I, q. 13, a. 4, C.), "The aspect signified by a name is the conception of the intellect concerning the thing signified by the name." Therefore, when we speak of an object "under the aspect" of rational, we do not speak of it taken bare, but as it is under the conception of the intellect to which the name "rational" corresponds. And rational is taken thus whenever this name is reduplicated, as when it is said "rational as such," or "insofar as rational." Hence it will be gathered that animal and rational "insofar as such," or "under the aspect of such," are really inadequately distinct, because they are the same object insofar as denominated by really distinct concepts.

11. With these points presupposed, to the objection in n. 1, I deny the major premise. To the proof, I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: they cannot be made two properly, I grant; improperly, or as though two, I deny the antecedent and consequence. To the proof: I admit that animal and rational are so united through one cognition that no otherness results, which proves that one cognition does not suffice for a distinction of reason, as we noted in n. 5. But through diverse cognitions they are not so united as to exclude apparent otherness and duality, consisting in this, that the intellect can define and explain the object just as if it had a twofold essence. To Confirmation 1: the extremes of the distinction of reason are not formal concepts except as that by which, from n. 6. Therefore the extremes as that which are objective concepts improperly and apparently two, and this kind of duality does not require objective precision. Here note that the expression "objective concept" is sometimes taken for the entity of the object specifically considered; in this sense two properly objective concepts cannot be given where there is real identity. At other times it is taken for a second intention concretely, or for the entity of the object as denominated through a direct formal concept. In this sense two non-synonymous apprehensions of the same object correspond to two objective concepts as formal effects really inadequately distinct; nevertheless, insofar as thus distinct, these are not the extremes as that which of the distinction of reason (cf. Father Peynado, here disp. 2, nn. 31-32).

12. To Confirmation 2: animal and rational specifically taken agree in reality in all predicates, and also insofar as they underlie one cognition. But taken formally, or under their respective aspects, they do not so agree. For to animal under its aspect belongs being a genus and being confused with brutes; but to rational under its aspect belongs being, not a genus but a difference, being discerned from brutes, and being defined otherwise. What the expression "under its aspect" signifies was explained in n. 10. But it will

be said: to be and not to be a difference, to be discerned and not discerned from brutes, are truly contradictory; therefore they require a truly real distinction between animal and rational. I distinguish the consequence: between animal and rational under their respective aspects, I grant; specifically taken, I deny the consequence.

13. Animal and rational under their respective aspects signify diverse forms, or formal concepts, and consequently are concrete things really inadequately distinct. Therefore, just as it is truly and without contradiction said, "Sugar, insofar as white, is the object of sight and not of taste; and the same, insofar as sweet, is the object of taste and not of sight," so too does it occur in our matter. For what contradiction is there in the whole entity of man having from the concept "rational" the denomination of being a difference and being distinguished by reason from brutes, and the same entity having from the concept "animal" the denomination of being confused by reason with brutes and denominated a genus together with them? Nevertheless, this variety of predicates, which in fact is founded upon a real distinction of forms, also presupposes or induces an apparent distinction of subjects. For it causes us to speak of the entity of man in relation to such denominations just as though it were twofold, just as we speak of the substance of sugar in relation to sight and taste as though it were twofold.

14. To Confirmation 3: objective animal, in the same manner in which it is distinguished and prescinded from rational, is also distinguished and prescinded from itself, if the discussion concerns the concept "animal" alone. For it is distinguished from rational not insofar as rational is unknown on the part of the object, but insofar as represented or representable through the concept "rational," according to what was said in n. 5; and in this same sense it is also prescinded from itself, namely insofar as represented or representable through the same concept "rational." Therefore, that animal is prescinded from rational and not from itself is true only in the formal sense, in which one and the other are taken under their respective aspects. The sense is that animal insofar as thus conceived is prescinded from its entire entity insofar as conceived through the concept "rational," but not from its entire entity insofar as explicable under the concept "animal," that is, insofar as definable in relation to sensation, or through "principle of sensing." This same thing is verified of rational under the same terms. Hence no contradictories follow concerning animal and rational objectively taken, but only insofar as they are taken formally under their respective aspects, in which sense they are really inadequately distinct.

15. To the Thomistic objection, I grant the major premise and deny the minor premise. To the proof: a distinction consisting in cognition, although it is a real being, is not a real distinction of the predicates of the object. For since distinction is the exclusion of identity, it is real only if it excludes real identity. Thus cognition of Antichrist, or of another possible world, is called by all the intentional existence of the object. Will cognition, because it is a real being, therefore be called real existence? Or will it denominate Antichrist as really existing? By no means. For existence is called real only from the effect of placing a thing outside physical causes, or excluding the privation of being in reality. The same should therefore be understood here. But that there be no dispute about the word, this proposition, "A distinction consisting in cognition is a real distinction," should be distinguished thus: it is a real distinction with a reality removing real and physical identity, I deny; with a reality not removing that identity, I subdistinguish: it is real intentional, I grant; it is real physical, or outside the soul, I deny.

16. To Confirmation 1: distinction is representatively in cognition, not as the thing represented, as Caesar is in his image, but as the mode of representing of two cognitions diverse in definition. See the quibble over the word "representatively" refuted above, Treatise 1, disp. 2, c. 5, n. 40. To Confirmation 2: a distinction which is not proper but metaphorical can certainly be purely extrinsic, just as intentional existence is extrinsic because it is called existence only metaphorically. Nor do the appended reasons stand in the way. For real distinction alone is a property of being, not the distinction of reason; otherwise a fictitious distinction which the Thomists place between real predicates would be a property of real being, which would be remarkable. Similarly, when it is said that each thing through itself is what it is and not another, the discussion concerns real distinction, as the Thomists themselves must also admit; for animal does not through itself have that which it has solely through a fictitious distinction of reason. Nor is anything else to be said of identity. For extrinsic real identity is impossible, just as extrinsic real existence is impossible. Nevertheless identity of reason, like intentional existence, can be extrinsic, and then it will render one thing intrinsic to another extrinsically, that is, according to extrinsic being, insofar as it will bring it about that the intentional being of each is one and the same in definition.

17. To Confirmation 3: for there to be as many kinds of distinctions as there are of beings, it is enough that two beings of reason feigned with a foundation, for example two privations, be distinguished from each other by a similarly fictitious distinction; there is no need to distinguish real predicates fictitiously. Moreover, although a fictitious distinction between

real predicates is or can be given, it will not thereby be the distinction of reason treated by Logic and Metaphysics; for the distinction worthy of scientific knowledge is not one of feigning reason, but of reason inadequately conceiving. To Confirmation 4, I deny the parity. For through the concepts "Peter" and "Paul," the extremes appear with predicates positively excluding one another in reality, namely Peterhood and Paulhood; and therefore they appear as really several. But through the concepts "animal" and "rational," although the intellect formally prescinds from the identity of the extremes, nothing is expressed which excludes one extreme from the other on the part of the object. Hence these concepts are indeed had through species of several things, namely diverse operations, but they do not for that reason represent the extremes as objectively several; just as one who conceives an angel through species of a body does not thereby conceive the angel as a body. Add that all these arguments militate against the doctrine of St. Thomas which we gave in Chapter 7, § 3.

18. But because we call the distinction of reason metaphorical, the adversaries rise against us, crying that it is absurd for the whole metaphysical structure, which rests entirely upon the distinction of reason, to be reduced to metaphors and appearances. For from this it follows that there will be no metaphysical composition from genus and difference, since the whole object is conceived by any cognition, whether generic or differential. There will likewise be no rooting and emanation of passions, or metaphysical properties, from the essence; for on the part of the object there will be no distinction of essence and property, and consequently no emanation; and formal concepts, on the other hand, are not related as properties and essence. The distinction of the Predicables and the Predicamental tree will also be empty. Indeed, whatever is discussed concerning Universals will be metaphorical, for example when the Universal is said to be one, prescinded, and indifferent to inferiors. But this would be to reduce many of the most subtle disputations of the Schools to empty things.

19. Yet this objection first does nothing for the Thomists, whose fictitious distinction on the part of the object certainly is a distinction only in a highly improper and apparent sense. For every fictitious being is a being only in appearance, and scarcely deserves the name of being even metaphorically. Therefore, if a fictitious distinction is the basis of the entire metaphysical structure, that structure is founded upon something more than merely airy. Next, neither does it help the other adversaries, according to whom the entire metaphysical distinction, composition, emanation, diversity of Predicables, unity, and indifference is extrinsic to the objects

and consists solely in acts of the intellect tending in a certain way. But if these names signify nothing intrinsic, they are improper and reduce the whole force of the metaphysical structure, not to the reality of the object, which remains intrinsically unchanged, but to a combination of formal concepts which is dissolved and vanishes at the pleasure of the one conceiving.

20. Therefore the terms we employ in the metaphysical structure must be explained by all in a metaphorical sense, yet such that beneath them there lies something truly and properly real in another genus, by reason of which we do not use those names emptily. For just as Sacred Scripture does not speak emptily when it attributes repentance and anger to God, or calls God fire, lion, etc., because although these names belong metaphorically to God they nevertheless denote something truly and properly found in God which has some similarity with their proper signification, for "God's repentance," says St. Augustine (I *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*, c. 20), "is an unexpected change for men in things established under His power"; and God, says St. Thomas (q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 5), "is said to be angry because He operates in the manner of one who is angry when He punishes, and He is also called fire because He operates in the manner of fire when He purifies"; and He is called lion (I, q. 13, a. 6) because "He is similarly disposed to act strongly in His works as a lion in its own"; so the same must be said in our matter.

21. For metaphysical composition denotes that the whole object is truly and properly known by two inadequate concepts mutually diverse in definition, by one of which it is rendered univocal with others and by the other distinguished from others. Here there is a certain similarity to physical composition, since the object appears as though having two parts, one common like physical matter, the other discretive like physical form. Likewise the rooting or emanation, for example, of the risible from the rational as a property from an essence denotes that the intellect proceeds from cognition of man under the concept "rational" to cognition of the same under the concept "risible," with the foundation taken from the order of operations, in which the act of laughing presupposes the act of understanding. That progression is called "emanation" because, just as in the physical state heat emanates from fire as its property, so in the intentional state the object under the aspect of risible as it were flows from itself under the aspect of rational. We call an "essential predicate" the object as known in relation to nobler operations, such as discourse in man; and a "metaphysical property," the same object as known in relation to less noble operations, or those consequent upon others. The distinction of the

Predicables and the order of the Predicamental tree also denote the variety of concepts by which objects can be conceived and denominated, and it is of great importance for the sciences to know well the force of these concepts so that they may judge objects fully. But more will be said of these matters, as also of the unity of the Universal, in their proper place below.

§ 2. The Remaining Arguments.

22. Objection 2: one who sees a man moving from afar, while the human figure is not yet perceived, knows from the motion that it is an animal, but does not know the rational. Therefore he objectively prescinds. Proof of the minor premise: first, because he can give no account of the rational, but rather, if asked whether that object is rational, will answer: "I do not know; I am entirely ignorant." Second, because he perceives no sign of rationality and has no species of it. Confirmation: one who thus sees a man at least does not clearly and evidently know the rational, but at most doubts it; yet he knows the animal clearly, evidently, and without doubt. Therefore he does not know both in the same manner; therefore he objectively prescinds. I answer by denying the minor premise. For in the same manner in which animal is then known, objective or real rational is also known, namely by a cognition by virtue of which it can be said that that entire object is a principle of sensing. To the proof: no account can then be given of rational under the name or concept "rational," nor under other expressions explaining that same concept; yet an account can be given under the name or concept "animal," and under others pertaining to the explication of this concept, such as "sensitive living thing, principle of sensing." For whatever account is given of animal is also given of objective rational, since they are one and the same.

23. That, when asked whether that object is rational, he answers "I do not know" or "I am ignorant," proves only that he lacks cognition expressed by the name "rational." Therefore such an answer does not deny every cognition terminating at that whole object, nor is this the intention of the questioner, but whether there is cognition sufficient for the name "rational" to be applied to the object. Therefore the meaning of the respondent is, or ought to be: "I know the whole object, but not totally, because I do not know it with all the clarity with which it can be known; and therefore I do not know whether the name 'rational' belongs to it." Hence he will then truly say, "I know that object to be animal and I do not know it to be rational," because these are reflexive propositions having for their object the direct cognitions "animal" and "rational." Hence they are equivalent to these: "I

have the cognition 'animal,' and I do not have the cognition 'rational'"; or to these: "The cognition which I have of the whole object is sufficient for me to attribute to it the name 'animal,' and is not sufficient for me to attribute to it the name 'rational.'" Here there is certainly no contradiction.

24. Moreover, it is false that there is then no sign and no species of objective rationality. For since that motion is indivisibly produced by a rational animal, it cannot fail to be a real sign of each, and necessarily sends to the eyes a species representative of its whole principle; for the impressed species does not objectively prescind. Nevertheless, that species is not apt for the concept "rational," but only for the concept "animal," which is proper also to objective rationality. To the confirmation: the whole object is known clearly and evidently with the clarity and evidence proper to the cognition "animal," and the whole object is not known clearly and evidently, but dubiously, with the clarity and evidence proper to the cognition "rational." Or, as others speak, the whole is known evidently in relation to sensation, and the whole is not known evidently in relation to discourse. Hence no diversity is posited on the part of the object, but solely on the part of the cognitions. Nevertheless, one can then truly say, "I do not evidently know the object to be rational," in the sense explained in n. 23.

25. Here are some examples by which the entire objection is answered. When a color is seen from afar without one's being able to discern whether it is green, red, or blue, one evidently knows it to be a color while at the same time being ignorant of its difference; and nevertheless one attains that very difference on the part of the object, since one has intuitive cognition, which cannot objectively prescind, as most of the opposing authors also teach. Similarly, one clearly and evidently knows wood to be a whole continuum, and nevertheless one either is ignorant of the constitution of the continuum or knows it only doubtfully or probably, although the continuum cannot for that reason be prescinded from its essential constituents. The same is evident in this concept, "the thing endures," which is evident to us and cannot objectively prescind from that in which duration essentially consists; and yet through it we do not evidently know whether duration consists in a mode distinct from the enduring thing or not. We also often are ignorant whether the man whom we see present is the very same whom we formerly knew or knew elsewhere, although we do not for that reason prescind him from identity with himself. Therefore by these expressions, "I doubt, I do not know, I am ignorant of this or that," every cognition and every evidence of that object is not excluded; otherwise one would falsely and impossibly say to a foreign man suddenly encountered, "I do not know you," while knowing him. Therefore only the cognition or evidence corresponding to the

words then being used is excluded. This is the same thing others express by saying that the verb "I know" or "I am ignorant" is taken sometimes in scholastic strictness, sometimes in a civil sense accommodated to familiar speech.

26. Objection 3: the animal in man can be known without discourse being known. Therefore it can also be known without the rational being known. Proof of the consequence: because the rational, since it is a transcendental relation and order to discourse, cannot be known while discourse is unknown; for an order and relation cannot be known without its term. Therefore whenever animal is known while discourse is unknown, it is known without rational. Confirmation: when neither discourse nor sensation is known, neither rational nor animal is known. Therefore when discourse is not known, rational is not known. The consequence is evident: rational signifies an order to discourse no less than rational and animal signify an order to discourse and sensation. I answer by denying the consequence. To the proof: an order and relation cannot be known without its term by comparative cognition, insofar as it is referred to such a term; but it can be known by absolute cognition, or even by comparative cognition by which that same order is referred to another term, if it has several. Therefore, since rational on the part of the object is an undivided order to discourse and sensation, it can be known in relation to either of these operations. Consequently, the order to discourse itself is wholly known through the concept "animal" in relation to sensation, wholly indeed subjectively and on its own part, although not wholly terminatively, or according to all its terms.

27. To the confirmation: first, I deny the consequence, even if the antecedent is admitted. The antecedent would be true because no operation remains through whose connotation that object may be known; but although discourse is unknown, another operation of the same rational thing remains, namely sensation. Next, the antecedent is false, because through absolute cognition, for example through the concept "substance," the whole real being of animal and rational is known even if nothing concerning connotations or operations is thought. Finally, the entire objection is answered by the material vision of color, which does not objectively prescind and consequently truly attains and sees the order of dependence of color upon God, although it does not attain God Himself. See above, Chapter 5, nn. 16-18.

28. Objection 4: objective precision would be repugnant precisely because through it contradictory predicates would be verified of really indistinct subjects; but this reasoning has no force. Therefore, etc. Proof of

the minor premise, 1º, because according to St. Thomas (q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 1, ad 5), "Concerning that which is the same in reality and differs by reason, nothing prevents contradictories from being predicated, as the Philosopher says in III *Physica*; as is evident because the same point, one in reality and differing by reason, is a beginning and an end, and insofar as it is a beginning it is not an end, and conversely." 2º Because the abstraction of a common nature from inferiors imports by its terms an intentional separation by virtue of which one is known while the other remains unknown: first, because otherwise it is neither "precision" nor "abstraction"; second, because no abstract aspect would be univocal if it included the inferior differences; third, because St. Thomas expressly teaches this (I, q. 40, a. 1, C.), saying: "In abstraction made according to universal and particular, that from which abstraction is made does not remain; for if the rational difference is removed from man, man does not remain in the intellect, but only animal." 3º Because neither in our opinion are contradictories avoided, for it will at least be true that animal is formally and on the part of the act prescinded from rational and is not formally and on the part of the act prescinded from itself.

29. I answer by denying the minor premise. To proof 1º: St. Thomas applies that doctrine to physical and intrinsic contradictories of the Divine Trinity; for he immediately infers there: "Hence, since essence and property are the same in reality and differ by reason, nothing prevents one from being communicable and the other incommunicable." Will it then be inferred that in created things, through a distinction of reason alone, these predicates can be verified: "to be really communicated and not communicated, to be produced and not produced"? Moreover, we also grant with St. Thomas that of a subject really the same and distinct by reason, insofar as thus distinguished, predicates can be verified which without such a distinction would be contradictory, for example that of the rational and animal in man, one is a difference and the other is not a difference, one discerns from brutes and the other does not. Yet we differ from the adversaries in this: they attribute these predicates to the same subject according to the same form, namely according to the concept "rational," and therefore in no way avoid contradiction; but we attribute them to the same subject according to really diverse forms, which a distinction of reason necessarily imports, and thereby remove the contradiction. See what was said in n. 13. Therefore we admit that just as "a point insofar as it is a beginning is not an end, and conversely," so animal insofar as animal is not rational, and conversely, provided this is understood in the formal sense and the discussion concerns

animal and rational under their respective aspects, according to what was said in n. 10.

30. To proof 2º: that abstraction imports a true separation of expressions or formal concepts, but only a metaphorical and apparent separation of objects; and "precision and abstraction," insofar as these names are transferred to the object, can be said only in this sense. See n. 9. The univocity of an abstract aspect is not prevented by differences attained on the part of the object, but by their expression on the part of the act, that is, by their being expressed under their respective aspects. For those things are univocal "whose name is common and the aspect signified by the name is altogether the same." But all the real differences of animals, when attained by the concept "animal," have this name in common and also one uniform aspect, namely the conception which is the aspect signified by the name, as St. Thomas said above in n. 10. When the same Holy Doctor denies that what is abstracted from remains in the intellect, he speaks in the formal sense, in which we too say that in the abstraction of animal from man, man does not remain in the intellect, namely under the aspect of man or under the concept "man." But he remains under the aspect of animal and under the concept "animal"; nor does St. Thomas deny this, as was established above. To proof 3º: that animal is formally and on the part of the act prescinded from rational by the concept "animal," and is not so prescinded from itself, are contradictories in the thin bark, not in the core. For, if rightly explained, they mean this: the whole objective rational animal is expressed by a cognition by virtue of which it can be said, "It is an animal," or "It is a principle of sensing"; and simultaneously the whole is not expressed by a cognition by virtue of which it can be said, "It is rational," or "It is a principle of reasoning." In sum, this is simply that the concept "animal" terminates at the whole objective rational animal but is not the concept "rational." See n. 14.

31. Objection 5: the will can love one of really indistinct predicates without the other. Therefore the intellect can know one without the other. Proof of the antecedent: the will can love good in common without loving sin, which is a certain species of good, not honorable but pleasurable. But good in common is really indistinct from its species. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: the will does not sin by loving good in common, which is its natural specifying object; but it would sin if it loved sin. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: first, because the will naturally inclines toward its specifying object; therefore, if it sins in the love of that object, it will have from nature an implanted inclination toward sin, which is absurd. Second, because the will would be a morally evil power if its specifying object

involved moral evil. Confirmation: the will often loves a means as useful to one end and not as useful to another, even though its usefulness to both is really the same. It also often loves, in a good simultaneously useful and honorable, the honorable aspect while caring nothing for the useful, or conversely.

32. I answer by denying the antecedent. To the proof: if good in common is taken as an aspect indifferent even to prohibited pleasurable good, it cannot be loved without fault, whether it is objectively or formally prescinded. For when an object is proposed as no more determined to moral goodness than to moral evil, the will acts imprudently and rashly if it embraces it so confusedly that it does not determine itself to the honorable. At least that love, if it objectively prescinds, will be neither good nor evil, since on the part of the object it equally prescinds from honorable and dishonorable. Therefore it will be an indifferent act in the individual, which according to the more common Theology is impossible. The specifying object of the will, since it is established by nature, is something real and independent of our precisions; otherwise the will would lack a specifying object and would not be a power of a determinate species before objective precision supervened. But really and before precision there is no good "as such," but a collection of particular goods, in which prohibited pleasurable good is included. Therefore this collection will be the natural specifying object of the will, in which, consequently, sin is adequately included.

33. Therefore a twofold specifying object of the will must be distinguished. One is by way of an end; and this is Beatitude, toward which the will naturally inclines and in whose love it does not sin. The other is by way of an objective sphere; and this is good in common, not indeed objectively prescinded, but embracing all particular goods. It is called a specifying object for no other reason than because the will can love any good whatever, whether merely pleasurable or honorable, and cannot be borne toward any object which does not appear in some way good, at least pleasurably. The will has this character from nature without thereby being a naturally evil power; for although it is evil to love sin, it is not therefore evil to be able to love it, otherwise the liberty bestowed upon us by God would be evil. It would indeed be evil if it could love nothing except sin; but it is not so restricted, but rather left in its liberty so that, from the goods comprehended within its objective sphere, it can choose any. The inclination of the will toward good, if merely natural and not derived from the sin of our first parent, is not toward good in common insofar as indifferent to prohibited pleasure, but precisely toward honorable good. To the confirmation: the will always loves on the part of the object whatever is

really identified in it; nevertheless it does not always love totally on the part of the act, that is, it does not always have an act by which, for example, it refers a means to all the ends for which it is useful.

34. But since the adversaries appeal to the will, it is useful from this also incidentally to confirm our opinion. Sorrow and detestation for a committed sin under this concept, "offense against God," attain on the part of the object all committed sins in species and in the individual. Therefore the concept "offense against God," although precisive and abstractive, attains on the part of the object all differences of sins. The consequence is legitimate. Proof of the antecedent: one who remembers only one sin but is guilty of several, and conceives sorrow and detestation for it from this general motive, "because it is an offense against God," is sufficiently disposed for the remission of all sins in species and in the individual, at least for remission to be received in the Sacrament, as is certain. But no one is disposed for the remission of a sin for which he does not grieve, or which he does not truly retract; and no one retracts what sorrow and detestation do not attain. Therefore, etc.

35. Objection 6: if objective precision is not admitted, many absurdities follow. For, 1º, the existence of God will not be able to be evidently known by natural light without the Trinity of Persons being known. 2º One who elicits the concept "being" will know everything cognoscible and will not be ignorant of the secrets of hearts and the decrees of God, even in particular or in the individual. 3º Every cognition will be comprehensive, since it so knows the whole object that no predicate or formality of it is hidden from the knower. 4º There will be no true distinction of the formal object from the material, for example in Metaphysics, since the aspect of Being will not be truly distinct from the aspect of Body and the other inferiors. Likewise there will be no true distinction between the True and the Good, and consequently the specifying object of intellect and will will be the same. 5º The intellect will be no more precisive than the material visual power, since the latter too can attain its object now clearly, now confusedly. Indeed, it will be less precisive than a physical cause; for the latter can objectively prescind, as the Dominican Lynceus proves from the doctrine of the Jesuits themselves, according to whom the intellect produces the vitality of the beatific vision but not its supernaturality; God produces the material element of sin but not its formal malice; the impressed species produces the representation of cognition but not its vitality.

36. Yet these absurdities easily vanish. To 1º: when God is known by natural light, the Trinity of Persons objectively taken is known in the same manner, namely by a cognition by virtue of which it can be said, "God exists,

is one, is wise," etc.; nevertheless neither the existence of God nor the Trinity is known by a cognition by virtue of which it can be said, "God is Triune in Persons." It is in relation to cognition of this sort that theologians say the mystery of the Trinity is above the light of natural reason and naturally unknowable. Hence it is truly said that God is naturally known to be one, and not known to be triune, according to what was said in the solution to Objection 2. But concerning objective precision between the Essence of God and the Relations, see Father Hurtado, disp. 6, *Metaphysica*, sect. 4, subsect. 8.

37. To 2º: it is not absurd that all these things be known under the confused concept "being," but that they be known under clear and discriminative expressions. Certainly this judgment, "All secrets of hearts in the individual are honorable," has for its object all individual secrets; for if even one were dishonorable, such a judgment would be falsified. Nevertheless it can be granted that the secrets of the heart are not known "in particular" or "in the individual," because this expression is reflexive and merely denies discrete cognition of one from another. It will be said: through the concept "being," the aspect of being is known clearly and discretively; therefore all differences of being are similarly known. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it is known clearly and discretively with a clarity by which it is discerned from non-being, I grant; with a clarity by which one being is discerned from another being, I deny the antecedent; and under the same distinction, the consequence. For all the clarity, discreteness, or confusion which belongs to being objectively taken belongs in the same sense to its differences.

38. To 3º, I deny the consequence with St. Thomas, q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 1, ad 2, where, after objecting to himself, "If God is simple, He is wholly attained by the blessed; but what is wholly attained is comprehended; therefore God is comprehended by the blessed," he answers thus: "God is wholly attained by the mind of the blessed, but not totally, because the mode of Divine cognoscibility exceeds infinitely the mode of a created intellect. And thus a created intellect cannot understand God as perfectly as He is intelligible, and for this reason cannot comprehend Him." The same should be understood of every cognition inadequate on the part of the act, which is therefore not comprehensive because it attains the whole object not totally, that is, not with the full perfection and clarity of act which the object deserves.

39. To 4º: the distinction of the formal object from the material does not depend upon objective precision. First, because the external senses, according to the adversaries commonly, do not objectively prescind, and yet

sight, for example, is said to attain "formally" the aspect of color and "materially" the aspect of quality. Second, because between the True and the Good "as such" there is no objective precision. Third, because according to the Thomists the aspect of Being which Metaphysics regards as formal is not objectively prescinded from the differences. Therefore the formal and material object, when really identified, are distinguished only through diverse expressions of the intellect, which according to the capacity of the objects are sometimes a distinction of reasoned reason, sometimes a distinction according to implicit and explicit. Once this distinction is posited, the denomination "formal object" or "material object" is taken from the character or mode of tending of the acts of the power or science. For because the acts of Metaphysics, for example, ground this judgment, "Unless the object verified the concept 'being,' even if it verified the concept 'body,' it would not be attained through the acts of this science," therefore Metaphysics is said to regard the aspect of being as formal object and the aspect of body as material object. The same should be said of the True and the Good with respect to intellect and will.

40. To 5º: the intellect is no more precisive on the part of the object than the visual power, but it is more precisive on the part of the act, because it can have more acts, increasingly abstractive and universal, by which it attains the same object. For it can attain color under the aspect of this color and under the aspect of color, and thus far, but no further, the visual power can do the same; and in addition under the aspect of quality, accident, dependent upon God, and finally under the aspect of being. As regards the physical cause, I wonder that Lyncean eyes see in our authors what is not there. Nothing is more constant in our School than that a partial physical cause really produces an indivisible effect wholly according to the totality of the effect, although not according to the totality of the cause, expressly when the question concerns the impressed species and the intellect producing the beatific vision in company with the supernatural light. The malice of sin, if really identified with the material entity, is physically produced by God, though God is determined by the created will under the presupposition of a permissive decree; for which reason the existence of sin is not attributed to God.

§ 3. Certain Points to Be Noted.

41. For the completion of the question thus far discussed, observe the following. 1º When we say that animal is known without rational, not "on the part of the object" but "on the part of the act," the sense is that animal is

never known without rational objectively and specifically taken; nevertheless animal is known without an act or cognition by virtue of which it can be said, under this expression, "it is rational." Hence some quibble ineptly when they say that for rational not to be known "on the part of the act" is the same as for there to be no act knowing rational. Ineptly, I say, because that expression does not deny every act terminating at rational, but only an act corresponding to the name "rational." 2º These expressions, "rational is not formally animal; it is outside the aspect of animal; it does not pertain to the metaphysical essence of animal," and similar ones are true although they do not signify a proper objective separation. For they are explained thus: rational as such, that is, as known by this expression "rational," is not defined by the concept "animal" nor by its explication; likewise it does not enter into the explication of animal as such nor pertain to its definition founded upon the concept "animal." For this is the "metaphysical essence" of animal, namely objective animal insofar as defined under the concept "animal."

42. Other expressions sufficiently frequent must be explained similarly, for example: "Man reasons, and differs from brutes, not because animal but because rational; God punishes because just, not because merciful; the beatific vision is produced by the intellect not insofar as supernatural but insofar as vital; the creature depends upon God insofar as creature, not insofar as being." Their sense is: man through the concept "rational" is distinguished from brutes and is so known that he can be called a principle of discourse, but not so through the concept "animal." God is known wholly from the effect of punishment under the concept "just," and not under the concept "merciful." From this concept, "The vision is vital," arises this one, "The vision is produced by the intellect"; but not from this other, "The vision is supernatural." The concept "creature" is well explained through "dependence upon God"; but the concept "being" is not thus explained, otherwise it would not belong to God Himself. In general we speak of things insofar as we have them in cognition. For "names," says St. Thomas (I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 2), "do not follow the mode of being which is in things, but the mode of being according as it is in our cognition." This has place especially when reduplication is added to a name, "as, insofar as, because," etc., as we already noted above in n. 10.

43. 3º It is not rightly said that through the concept "animal," animal is known explicitly and rational implicitly. For those things alone are said to be known "implicitly" by concept A which, under another non-synonymous concept, are the definition of that same concept A or pertain to its explication. Thus the predicates of man insofar as conceived in this way,

"rational animal," are said to be known "implicitly" by the concept "man." Thus also the higher predicates "living thing, body, substance" are said to be "implicitly" known by the concept "animal." Therefore this expression has no place where there is a perfect and mutual distinction of reason, but only where the discussion concerns concepts making an imperfect distinction of reason, or a distinction according to implicit and explicit, concerning which see Chapter 6, n. 3. And when it is said that by the same concept animal is known explicitly and substance implicitly, no difference is indicated on the part of the object. The sense is that in that concept there is the expression "animal," but not the expression "substance," although the latter belongs to the explication of the expression "animal" when this is unfolded and laid open. Still less is it rightly said that through the concept "animal," animal is known clearly and rational confusedly; for whatever confusion or clarity is in that concept terminates at the whole objective rational animal without difference.

44. 4° Whenever St. Thomas signifies that the distinction of reason is in the object, he speaks of the fundamental distinction; or, if he understands the formal distinction, he places it in the object not "subjectively" but "verificatively," insofar as there is in the object a perfection sufficient to verify the diverse conceptions of our intellect. This will be plainly seen in his words cited in Chapter 7, § 3, among which is what the Thomists could desire: "Each of the attributes is in God according to its most true aspect, and the aspect of Wisdom is not the aspect of Goodness as such." Yet the Holy Doctor himself so explains this that "no diversity or multiplicity" is posited in God by reason of these attributes, but only "full perfection" corresponding to our diverse concepts. Hence he says (I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5): "The aspects of the attributes are founded or rooted in the intellect as regards the firmness of their being, because, as was said, the intellect is their subject; but in the Divine essence as regards the firmness of their truth."

45. 5° If anyone should argue thus: the distinction of reason, although apparent, does not avoid contradictories. For if through the concept "animal," animal is apparently distinguished from rational and not from itself, it can truly be said, "Rational is that from which animal is apparently distinguished; animal is not that from which animal is apparently distinguished." But these are no less properly contradictory than these: "The beauty of a meadow is apparently a smile, and it is not apparently a smile." Each proposition must be distinguished: "Rational is that from which, etc.," when rational is taken under the aspect of rational, I grant; when it is taken under the aspect of animal, I deny. Likewise, "Animal is not that from which, etc.," when animal is taken under the aspect of animal, I grant; when it is

taken under the aspect of rational, I deny. Hence it is evident that nothing is verified of rational which is not verified in the same sense and under the same form of reason of animal, and conversely. The whole contradiction vanishes through the real diversity of forms.

46. But if the point is pressed thus: therefore the extreme from which animal under its aspect is apparently distinguished and prescinded is really distinguished from it, since animal under its aspect and rational under its aspect are concrete things really inadequately distinct, from n. 10. I distinguish the consequence: it is really distinguished from it according to that by which it is an extreme, I grant; according to that which is the extreme, I deny the consequence. See n. 7. It is one thing for a real distinction of forms to remove the contradiction of predicates, and another for the really distinct forms themselves to be, as that which, the extremes of precision and apparent distinction, as is evident from the example of sugar in n. 13 and of the bilocated man in n. 8.

47. 6º Some, with Father Izquierdo, defend objective precision in this manner. They say that the abstractive cognition of our intellect in this state does not attain things immediately in themselves, but in a certain phantasm, substitute, or idol which the intellect forms for itself and substitutes in place of things, and which these authors call the "objective being of the thing." Once this is posited, they say that animal is objectively prescinded from rational, not immediately in itself, but in its objective being, because through the concept "animal" the intellect attains the objective being of animal and does not attain the objective being of rational. But, omitting that it is falsely presupposed that abstractive cognition does not attain things immediately in themselves, against this, 1º: in any idol or substitute the same argument applies as in the cognition "animal," namely that it cannot without contradiction be substituted for animal without being substituted for rational, nor can it truly be said to be the "objective being" of one without being and being said to be the "objective being" of the other. Against this, 2º: the cognition "animal" denominates at least mediately the animal according to real being as known. Therefore does it denominate rational in the same manner, or not? If the former, there is no precision in the substitute; if the latter, the contradiction returns. See Father Peynado, here disp. 2, sect. 1.

48. 7º Finally, intuitive cognition can formally prescind. Thus Fathers Hurtado, Oviedo, Quirós, Peynado, and Ulloa. This is evident in the material vision of a color from afar, and also in the beatific Vision, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas cited above in n. 38. It will be said: intuitive cognition is borne toward the object as it is in itself; therefore it cannot be precisive. I deny the consequence, because to be borne toward the object as it is in itself

is to attain it through its proper species, and in this intuitive cognition differs from abstractive cognition; but it is not to attain it with all the clarity with which it can be known as it is in itself. This inadequacy of clarity is formal precision. Likewise an affective formal precision must be admitted in acts of the will. Nevertheless the beatific Vision cannot make a distinction of reason in God, because there will never be a duality of Visions by which the object appears as though twofold, such that real identity is prescinded from on the part of the act. Nor likewise can a distinction of reason be made through external Sense or the Will, since neither Sense nor Will is Reason.

DISPUTATION II.
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIVERSAL.

CHAPTER I.
What Is the Universal? And Does It Exist in Reality?

1. The universal is said to be "that which, although one, extends to many." Thus a law enacted for all is called universal "in obliging." Thus the first Cause, and also the Sun with respect to sublunary things, is called universal "in causing." Thus also the expression or concept "every man" is called universal "in signifying" or "in representing." At present we are concerned only with the universal "in being" and the universal "in predication." The former is called the metaphysical universal and is defined from Aristotle (7, *Metaphysica* cap. 13; 2, *Analytica Posteriora* cap. 18) as "one apt to be in many"; the latter is called the logical universal and is defined from the same Aristotle (1, *Peri hermeneias* cap. 5) as "one apt to be predicated of many." These are commonly held to differ from each other either only as implicit and explicit, or also as essence and property rationally distinct. For in the order of reason we first conceive the aptitude of a thing to be in many, and afterward the aptitude, as though resulting from it, to be truly predicated of many; for aptitude to be in many implies a real identity, which is the foundation of true predication.

2. Two things, therefore, pertain to the essence of the universal: unity and aptitude for many. Unity, according to principles soon to be established, cannot be intrinsic to the nature that is called universal, but must be

extrinsic, namely, situated in the precisive and abstractive act of the intellect. Aptitude for many presupposes the real identity of that nature with many, either existing or at least possible, and adds an act of the intellect by which the nature is expressed in such a way that, as thus conceived, it can uniformly belong to many. For example, human nature, insofar as expressed through the concept "man," is universal, because it is one apt to be in many and to be predicated of many. It is one because, as thus conceived, it presents no plurality or division of itself into several men, and therefore remains intentionally undivided and consequently one. It is apt to be in many and to be predicated of them because, on the side of the object, it has a real identity with many individuals, and is expressed in such a way that the intellect can uniformly apply it to many.

3. It should be noted, however, that this aptitude does not regard many in just any way, but many having the same name and account as the common nature, which is multiplied or divided in them, so that the term under which the nature is called universal, for example the term "man," can be uttered in the plural and joined to numerals, "two, three," etc. Hence human nature under the concept "man" is universal because it can be multiplied in individuals of whom it is truly said, "they are two men, three men," and so forth, to each of whom the name "man" and the account or definition of man belongs absolutely. From this it is clear why the Divine nature, although belonging to several Persons, is not universal: namely, because it always remains individual in the being of nature and is not multiplied into three natures or three Gods, but into three Persons who are the one God.

4. It is also clear why Peter, although divisible into several things, namely body and soul, is not universal: because he is not divided into several things to which the name "Peter" or his definition belongs absolutely. For it cannot be said absolutely that "the soul is Peter," but only with the addition "inadequately." For the same reason the Ocean is not universal in relation to the several waters into which it can be divided, because it is not thereby divided into several Oceans. Yet the universal nature need not be really identified with its inferiors according to universality, that is, according to the indifference and unity which it receives from indefinite cognition. It must therefore be identified only according to the direct term which receives the extrinsic denomination "universal." This direct term is customarily called the "objective aspect," because it is the object corresponding to the formal aspect, that is, for example, to the conception "man" and to the definition "rational animal."

5. It should also be noted that, for a universal to be actually constituted, it is not required that the nature actually exist in many in reality, as is clear

in the nature of the Sun, which, when conceived indefinitely, is universal because many Suns could exist, although in fact they do not. Indeed, for any species to be actually constituted as universal, the existence of no individual is required; the possibility of several is sufficient. Actual unity, however, is required, because concretes constituted by an extrinsic intentional form, such as "one apt for many," although they do not always require the existence of the subject, always require the existence of the form, as is clear in "Antichrist known."

6. Having given this cursory account of the universal, which will be explained more fully in what follows, it is now asked whether, and in what way, the universal can exist. Certain ancients asserted that there is no universal, and consequently denied altogether the sciences, which are all concerned with universals. The ancient Nominalists admitted both sciences and universals, but only universals in signifying, that is, universals consisting solely in names that signify universally; hence the appellation "Nominalists" arose. The refutation of all these can be seen in the Conimbricenses (*In Praefat. Porphyrii* q. 4, art. 2). Against this antiquated philosophy it is sufficient for us to say that the universal in being and in predication, implying a real nature as that which, and an intention of reason as that by which, can in no way be denied, since evident experience shows that the real nature of man, animal, tree, etc., is commonly conceived by us in such a way that abstraction is made from every haecceity, division, and multiplication. But by the name "universal," the Peripatetics understand precisely a real nature as thus conceived and nothing else. Others, on the contrary, establish universals in reality and prior to the operation of the intellect according to all their constitutive features, that is, according to unity and multiplicability. On this matter there is more than one manner of speaking, as I shall now show.

Various Opinions Establishing the Universal in Reality Are Reported and Refuted.

7. The first opinion, attributed to Plato by Aristotle, whether in good or bad faith, a matter on which various other philosophers and Fathers of the Church speak differently, as may be seen in the Conimbricenses (loc. cit. art. 3), asserts, or asserted, that in the concavity of the Moon there exist universal natures, eternal, incorruptible, ingenerable, and separated from singulars, which are called Plato's Ideas, and which descend by production to singulars in such a way, however, that they are neither generated when a singular is produced nor corrupted when it perishes. This opinion, whoever

held it, is delirious. First, because no positive being is eternal and indestructible except God, since such a being would claim Divine attributes for itself. Second, because a nature or idea of this kind would be really distinct from singulars, since separated or separable from them, and at the same time would be really identified with them, since truly affirmable of them as their own proper nature or essence. I omit other considerations by which Plato's Idea can easily be shown to involve contradictions.

8. The second opinion, whose author is Fr. Fonseca (l. 5, *Metaphysica* cap. 28), distinguishes a threefold state of human nature, for example: first, the state of possibility, which this author calls the state of essence and solitude, in which human nature is really separated by precision from haecceities, precedes them, and is indifferent to any one of them, and consequently is really universal and so before the operation of the intellect; second, the state of existence, in which the nature loses its former universality because it is now determined by a haecceity and is singular; third, the state of formal abstraction or objective existence, in which the nature is stripped of haecceities by reason and restored once more to universality.

9. This opinion has no supporters, because that state of universality and real indifference appears wholly fictitious. 1º Because, just as nature in the state of existence is nothing except this or that singular nature, so too in the state of possibility; for that is possible which afterward actually exists. 2º Because the indifference of nature in the state of possibility, if it is destroyed by existence, can never exist in reality; it will therefore be sheer nothingness or a chimera. 3º Because nature in the state of existence is identified with haecceity, as Fonseca does not seem to deny; therefore it could not precede haecceity and be really separated from it by precision unless it were separated from itself.

10. Caramuel (*Grammatica audax* p. 1, medit. 2, art. 2), in support of this opinion, ingeniously discusses the example of the words "pharetra," "tenebrae," and the like, which in themselves are really indifferent as to whether their middle syllable have a long or short quantity in verse, although none actually occurring in verse fails to be determinately short or determinately long. But I ask: is that quantity really distinguished from the whole word or not? If the former, it is irrelevant; for the indifference of a subject to various accidents really distinct from it is not the universality of which we are speaking, as is shown by the indifference of the will to love and hatred, or of a man to whiteness and blackness. If the latter, indifference of this kind is indeed found in the word "pharetra" as mentally abstracted from its individuals and intentionally one, but it is by no means found in a word that is really one. For the word "pharetra" whose middle syllable occupies

two measures is really distinct from a similar word whose middle syllable occupies only one; and this real distinction is found even in the state of possibility. Poets, however, are permitted to use either.

11. The third opinion is that of Fr. Bartholomew Amicus and certain more recent authors, who assert that human nature, for example, is universal in reality because it is one in many. The unity, however, in which the difficulty lies, they say is not numerical but formal, specific, and essential. For since human nature in reality is not divided into several essences specifically distinct, by that very fact it is specifically undivided; and this indivision is unity. If one asks in what this unity in reality consists, they say that it consists in the real similarity and agreement men have with one another; for true similarity is a certain unity, since according to Aristotle, "Similar things are those whose quality is one." Hence the whole controversy with these authors is reduced to this: whether the similarity and real agreement of several things ought to be called true unity or identity.

12. This opinion is rejected, 1º because similarity rather indicates a division and plurality of extremes, one of which is as the other; for it is a real relation, or its foundation. Therefore no one is said to be similar to himself, nor can the nature of the Divine Word be said to be similar to the nature of the Father. Similarity, therefore, does not deserve the name of identity or unity. And whatever may be said about the name, it is at least not a unity sufficient for a universal: both because the universal, insofar as it is one, cannot indicate plurality, and because the universal must be apt to be predicated of, or identified with, any inferior absolutely and without addition. But human nature, as one only by a unity of similarity, cannot be said absolutely of any man; otherwise the plurality of men, one of whom is as another, would truly be said of Peter. It is rejected, 2º because, if real similarity is true identity or unity, a creature will be really identified with God under the account of being, under the account of substance, and also under other predicates in which it is often really similar to God, especially man, who was made "to the image and likeness of God" (Gen. 1). Human haecceities themselves also, since they are really similar under the account of haecceity, will be one haecceity in reality, and no less universal than human nature.

13. It may be said: human nature in reality is not divided into several natures specifically diverse, or into several species; therefore it is undivided and one in species. I answer by distinguishing the consequence: it is undivided and one fundamentally, I grant; formally or actually, I deny the consequence. In reality there is only one species fundamentally, which is nothing other than several really similar men providing a foundation for the

intellect to bring them together under one indefinite and specific concept. But this foundation is not actual unity; it is plurality. It may be urged: human nature in reality is not a multiple species; therefore it is one species. But this form of argument does not follow from the terms, as is evident in the altogether similar argument: "Human nature is not several trees, nor several Gods; therefore it is one tree or one God." For one does not validly argue from the negation of multiplicity to unity unless the subject is presupposed to be constituted in that line of being in which multiplicity is denied of it.

14. But if the argument is reformulated thus: human nature in reality is a species of nature; but it is not several species; therefore it is one species. First, the major can be denied, because "species" is a name of second intention and consequently is not properly and formally verified of nature as it is in reality, but as it is under the concept "man." Next, granting the major and the minor, I distinguish the consequence: it is one species by a unity opposed to diversity, I grant; by a unity opposed to plurality, I deny the consequence. Unity and indivision are often opposed to diversity or notable dissimilarity. In this sense Aristotle said that similar things are "those whose quality is one," and equal things "those whose quantity is one," that is, not dissimilar, not diverse except individually.

15. In this sense human nature in reality is not several species but one, because to be several species means to be divided into several notably dissimilar natures, and human nature excludes such a division of itself in reality. But this acceptance of unity is improper, since it coexists with true and proper actual plurality in the same real state; for human nature with that indivision joins in reality an actual division of itself into truly and properly many natures, namely those of Peter, Paul, John, etc., one of which truly and properly is not another. But from the terms themselves and in everyone's apprehension, unity and indivision properly taken are opposed to multitude and plurality. Therefore specific division and multiplicity are not excluded in reality by unity properly so called; for since specific multiplicity denotes dissimilarity, it is sufficiently excluded by unity of similarity, which is an improper and purely fundamental unity. If it is still urged that unity of precision, although improper, suffices for the universal, and therefore unity of similarity, although improper, will likewise suffice, the answer will be found below in chapter 3.

16. The fourth opinion is that of certain recent authors, who conceive the universal in reality as follows. Divine perfection in reality is one and by reason is multiple, because by reason we distinguish in God several attributes, each of which is Divine perfection. That this is a universal in reality is proved because unity of reason with real plurality suffices for a

universal through the intellect; therefore real unity with plurality of reason suffices for a universal in reality. They reason similarly about any transcendental predicate, for example the account of being, which, as it is in Peter, for example, is really one but by reason is multiple, because many formalities can be distinguished in Peter, each of which is a being.

17. This conception, leaving aside other refutations, is effectively rejected because it does not preserve the universal of the kind we are now seeking, namely one that is common to several according to that objective aspect which is said to be one, so that the names which belong to it, taken specifically, can be used in the plural. For Divine perfection physically taken as it is in reality, in which sense it is one, is the whole of God; just as Peter's entity, insofar as it is one in reality, is the whole of Peter. But neither God nor Peter is common to several attributes or formalities rationally distinct in such a way that we have several Gods or several Peters rationally distinct. The name "Divine perfection" is indeed common to all the attributes; but this proves that from all of them, as rationally distinct, a common account of Divine perfection can reflexively be abstracted which is universal through the intellect. It does not prove a universal in reality, for that common name is not common insofar as it signifies the whole of God, or, what is the same, insofar as it signifies God's perfection as really one. The same should be said of the name "Peter's being."

18. The fifth opinion is that of the Scotists, who, adhering to their formal distinction from the nature of the thing, defend a universal in reality. But not all do so in the same way, as may be seen in Mastrius, both disp. 4, *Logica* q. 2, and disp. 9, *Metaphysica* q. 5. They all teach that human nature, for example, is in reality really and absolutely identified with the individuals and their singularities or haecceities, while at the same time being formally distinguished from them from the nature of the thing. But in establishing its universality they divide into two manners of opinion. Some say that human nature is one and common to several "through inherence, so that one and the same humanity" (these are the words of Mastrius, loc. cit. *Logica* n. 10) "is really found in all men; for example, the humanity of Peter and the humanity of Paul differ only extrinsically, namely by reason of the added differences," that is, haecceities. Bonettus, Canonicus, Meurisse, and several other Scotists hold this. They do not, however, wish to call this unity of common nature "numerical," but "formal and essential," which they say is less than numerical unity.

19. This opinion is attacked by Mastrius together with other Scotists, and rightly so. For from it follows, 1º that there are not several men, but only several singularities, just as in the Trinity there are not three Gods because

of the unity of Deity or of the Divine nature. Hence the strangeness of the mystery of the Trinity is transferred to creatures, since human individuals are really the same as one nature while at the same time really distinct from one another. It follows, 2º that the same humanity is in Christ the Lord and in Judas the betrayer; hence the same humanity will be adorable and detestable, friendly and hostile to God, at once damned and glorified. It follows, 3º that God could not annihilate Peter while the others remained; for the whole nature and essence of Peter would remain in Paul, and only the singularity could be destroyed. Similarly, God could not create a new man; for creation is production from nothing, whereas whoever the man produced might be, something of him would precede, namely the humanity which preexists in other men. It follows, 4º that the humanity of Antichrist now exists and does not exist: it exists because other men now exist, and it does not exist because the singularity of Antichrist does not now exist, with which humanity is really identified. For since separability in existence is an evident sign of real distinction even among Scotists, it is repugnant that of two things really identified one should exist without the other. By the same argument it is also proved that God could not destroy Peter's singularity without destroying his humanity.

20. Nor do the Scotists remedy these absurdities by asserting that the humanity of all men is not numerically one but formally and essentially one. For 1º the absurdities deduced in the third and fourth places remain intact. 2º Formal unity is true and proper unity and identity in reality according to the adversaries; therefore of one and the same humanity it is truly and properly verified that it is in Heaven and in Hell, etc. 3º Formal unity is a stricter unity and a greater identity than absolute real identity; and therefore Peter's nature is more one and more identified with itself than with Peterhood, because it is formally identified with itself and really identified with Peterhood. It is so one with itself as to exclude every duality from the nature of the thing, which nevertheless it does not exclude insofar as it is one with Peterhood. But if the humanity of all were absolutely one and the same really, it would be numerically one, or at least all the absurdities objected would follow with full force; therefore all the more, etc. 4º Multiplication, according to the adversaries, lies solely on the side of the singularities, without multiplying nature in the being of nature. Therefore, whatever may be said about the name "numerical unity," human nature is no more multiplied in individuals than the Divine nature in the Trinity, nor will there be several men any more than several Gods. See further arguments in Mastrius, loc. cit. *Metaphysica* from n. 111.

21. Because of these difficulties, Merinero, Mastrius, and most Scotists deny that in reality there is one nature common through inherence in several, and acknowledge as many natures or humanities as there are men. Yet they admit in reality a nature common "through indifference," which they call the "negative universal." By this name they understand the nature of each man, for example Peter, which, insofar as it is formally distinguished from Peterhood from the nature of the thing, does not of itself imply a repugnance to being joined disjunctively or divisively with any haecceity of other men, although it is extrinsically impeded by Peterhood, with which it is in fact identified. They say this indifference or community is not positive but negative; that is, as they explain, not free and unimpeded, but actually impeded extrinsically by Peterhood, through which nature is in fact contracted, yet in such a way that even in the state of contraction it retains non-repugnance to other haecceities. Hence it remains indifferent to many by an aptitude not proximate but remote, in almost the same way as matter existing under one form remains indifferent to other forms. See Mastrius disp. 9, *Metaphysica* q. 4, art. 1.

22. This opinion also is rejected, 1º because, even if the Scotist doctrine were true, a logical or metaphysical universal in reality would not thereby be preserved. For Peter's nature would not be multiplicable in the being of nature, but, remaining one and the same, would be capable of conjunction, in a divided sense, with many haecceities. But this does not suffice for the true universality of which we are speaking. For otherwise every singularity would also be universal, since according to this opinion it could be joined with all humanities in a divided sense. Hence nothing in reality would be perfectly singular. Moreover, there would be as many universal natures beneath the human species as there are men. Moreover, by a stronger title the Divine nature would have to be called universal, since it does not repugn to identity with several Persons, and indeed jointly or in a composite sense.

23. It is rejected, 2º because, if Peter's nature is of itself apt, at least in its first production, to be joined equally well with Paulhood or with the haecceities of other men, and is determined at God's pleasure to one rather than another (all this is taken from Mastrius disp. 9, *Metaphysica* nn. 74, 75, 98, and elsewhere), then this conjunction or contraction could not occur through a real identity of nature with haecceity, contrary to what all Scotists presuppose and teach (cf. Mastrius cit. n. 74). The proof is that real identity is not so variable, even by God's absolute power, that things now really identified could have existed really distinct, or conversely; for then a thousand chimeras would be possible, for example a man-horse or goat-stag. Yet it would be so variable if this doctrine stood: for Peterhood and Peter's

humanity, which are now really identified, could have existed really distinct, since that humanity could have been joined to Paulhood and Peterhood to Paul's humanity, in which event they would undoubtedly have been really distinct.

24. In addition, separability is incompatible with real identity according to the Scotists. But Peter's humanity and Peterhood would be separable. Mastrius denies that they are separable after they exist. But he denies this gratuitously: both because, if God could prevent their real identity at the first instant without removing the existence of the extremes, why could He not afterward destroy that identity while leaving the extremes intact? And also because, if separation occurred, no contradiction would follow. Moreover, that inseparability would at least not arise intrinsically, since each extreme of itself does not repugn to conjunction with others, and each is negatively indifferent. But it is customary among Scotists to explain real identity through intrinsic inseparability.

25. I omit other ways of conceiving a universal in reality, which can easily be refuted from what has been said and what will immediately be said. I note only that none of the patrons of a universal in reality speaks of the logical universal, or that which is proximately predicable of many; for no one doubts that this requires a precisive act of reason. They all therefore speak of the metaphysical universal, or universal in being, which they wish to exist in reality not merely fundamentally, for this is not denied even by us, but formally or actually, namely with actual unity and communicability. In this sense the present question proceeds.

CHAPTER II.

The Repugnance of a Universal in Reality Is Proved in General, and Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

1. The opinion denying a universal in reality is common in our School and in the Thomistic School. In addition to what was said in the preceding chapter, it is proved briefly as follows. A universal in reality is repugnant if there is repugnance in reality in the unity and communicability of the same being to several things with which it is really identified and in which it is really multiplied according to its proper name and account. But such communicability and unity are wholly repugnant in reality. Therefore, etc. The major is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter according to the common understanding of the Schools. I prove the minor: unity in reality is intrinsic and real unity, while communicability of this kind implies intrinsic and real plurality under the same name and the same account. But

real unity and plurality of the same being under the same account are wholly repugnant, since they would be intrinsic division and indivision, intrinsic unity and non-unity, in the same sense, and would make several men in reality intrinsically one single man. Therefore, etc.

2. Confirmation 1º: real and intrinsic contradictories cannot belong to extremes really identified. But, if a universal in reality were posited, such contradictories would belong to nature and singularity really identified. This is clear because nature would be intrinsically communicable and indifferent to many, while the singularity with which it is really identified would not. Confirmation 2º: if there were a universal in reality, there would exist in creatures something more difficult than the mystery of the Trinity, namely one nature which at the same time would be several natures, which would certainly be more mysterious than one nature which at the same time is several Persons. Confirmation 3º: from Aristotle, who in 7, *Metaphysica*, especially cap. 14, attacks the Platonic universal with arguments equally applicable against any universal in reality; and in 1, *De anima* text. 8, he says, "The universal is either nothing or posterior": posterior, that is, resulting from the consideration of the intellect, as the Commentator explains there, and likewise St. Thomas there lect. 1 and Opusc. 55.

3. Therefore, in reality the universal exists only fundamentally, insofar as there is a foundation for the intellect to abstract a real nature and separate it by precision from real multiplicity, and thus formally constitute a universal. That foundation is several individuals really similar to one another, which, according to the measure of their similarity, afford the intellect occasion to bring them together under one indefinite, generic, specific, or other concept. A foundation can also be taken from a single individual of a finite and limited nature, which for that reason does not repugn to the coexistence of other similar individuals. For from this non-repugnance the intellect takes a foundation for separating by precision the nature of such an individual, for example the Sun, from singularity.

4. Objection 1º, in favor of Plato's Idea: the sciences are said to concern necessary, eternal, immutable things, which are neither generated nor corrupted. But the sciences concern universals. Therefore there are universals endowed with these attributes and thus really separated from singulars. Confirmation: unless there is a common nature separated from singulars, the intellect would be deceived when it conceives it without singulars. I answer: all these attributes are ascribed to the objects of sciences, not as regards existence, but as regards the verification of scientific propositions. For example, because this proposition, "Man is a rational animal," when expounded in this sense, "Whenever man exists, his quiddity

is rational animal," is true from eternity in the Divine Intellect, and would also be true in a created intellect if it existed from eternity, and because its verification is necessary and immutable and does not depend on man's being generated or corrupted, therefore its object, which is man universally conceived, is called necessary, eternal, etc., without requiring a real separation from singulars. For the same attributes also belong to singulars in the same sense insofar as they fall under the concept "man." To the confirmation: the intellect would indeed be deceived if it conceived the nature as objectively separated from singulars. But it does not conceive it in this way; it precisely understands the nature without thinking of singulars, that is, without expressing them under the account of such. In this there is no falsity, according to the saying, "There is no falsehood in those who make precision."

5. Objection 2º, in favor of the other opinions: if only one man existed, there would exist in reality a human nature that was one and multiplicable; therefore there would be a universal nature. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: multiplicable by division of itself into several human natures, I deny; multiplicable, that is, not excluding the possibility and existence of other similar natures differing only numerically, I grant the antecedent. For in this sense only the Divine nature is essentially incapable of multiplication. But I deny the consequence, because multiplicability so understood does not suffice for a universal, since it does not render that nature apt to be in many. It may be replied: at least that nature intrinsically does not repugn to the communication of itself to several individuals; otherwise, when conceived by the intellect as common to several, it would be conceived with a predicate repugnant to itself. Therefore it is universal, at least negatively. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it does not repugn to the communication of itself alone, or taken separately, as it exists in reality, I deny; to the communication of itself insofar as brought together by the intellect with other similar natures, I grant the antecedent; and I deny the consequence, unless by negative universality fundamental universality is understood. Hence that nature is not conceived with a predicate repugnant to itself, because it is not conceived as common except insofar as it is conceived confusedly together with others. It does not intrinsically repugn to that community, but affords its foundation. These matters will become clearer below.

6. Objection 3º: singular and universal are correlatives. Therefore, if one exists in reality, so does the other, just as, if there is a master in reality, there is a servant. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: they are correlatives according to being, I deny; according to being said, I further distinguish: by a

relation of opposition and repugnance, in the manner in which real being and chimerical being are correlatives, I grant; by another kind of relation, I deny the consequence. And I press the objection: the unity and multiplicity of God are correlatives; therefore there will be a multiple God in reality, just as there is one God. We are speaking of a universal in reality, which for us is chimerical. The universal made by the intellect, however, implies a relation to the singular, at least when the latter is taken according to second intention.

7. Objection 4º: the nature of all men in reality is definable by a single definition. Therefore it has one essence or quiddity, for quiddity corresponds to definition. I grant the consequence if we are speaking of fundamental unity, which is unity of similarity. But if we are speaking of formal or actual unity, I distinguish the consequence: it has one essence by a unity presupposed before the operation of the intellect, I deny; by a unity bestowed through the operation of the intellect, namely through the concept "man" or through the definition itself, "rational animal," which also in exercise separates by precision from singularities and unites the natures of all men, I grant the consequence. Nor will it ever be proved that another kind of unity on the side of essence is required for it to correspond to one definition.

8. Objection 5º: several men in reality are not formally, essentially, or specifically distinguished, but only numerically; otherwise they would belong to distinct species, and some essential predicate would belong to one without belonging to another. Therefore they have in reality a formal, essential, or specific unity. Confirmation 1º: the human nature of all individuals is not essentially multiple; otherwise Peter would be essentially multiple, since he includes whatever belongs to the essential concept of human nature. Therefore the nature is essentially one. Confirmation 2º: the division and multiplication of human nature into individuals is not a formal but a material division. Therefore it leaves human nature formally undivided and one.

9. I answer. To the objection I distinguish the antecedent: they are not distinguished, etc., by a distinction inducing diversity or dissimilarity, I grant; by a distinction inducing true entitative plurality of essences, I deny the antecedent. And I distinguish the consequence: they have in reality a unity, etc., opposed to entitative plurality of essences, I deny; a unity opposed to diversity, which is unity of similarity and therefore an improper and fundamental unity, I grant the consequence. See the preceding chapter, nn. 14 and 15. We employ this distinction lest equivocation creep in. Moreover, it is absolutely true that several men in reality are not

distinguished "specifically," but are of the same species, because in common usage specific distinction denotes diversity, while specific identity in reality denotes similarity of essences that are in truth many. In the same sense it is true that they are not distinguished "essentially" or "formally," because these adverbs commonly mean the same as "specifically." Hence either they refer to the intentional state, or, if they refer to the real state, they do not deny an entitative distinction of essences but only dissimilarity. Thus several men do not belong to distinct species because they have essences that are indeed distinct but not diverse. Nor does an essential predicate belong to one which, as separated by reason through precision, does not belong to another, although in reality the predicates of one are numerically distinct from the predicates of another.

10. To Confirmation 1º: the nature of all men in reality is "essentially multiple" if this means the same as "multiple, with a similar essence"; but not if it means the same as "specifically multiple" or "multiple by dissimilar essences." When it is said that Peter includes whatever belongs to the essential concept of human nature, the meaning is that he includes whatever pertains to the definition of human nature under the concept "man," namely all the predicates by which man as such is defined. Multiplicity of nature is not among these, and consequently Peter does not become essentially multiple. To Confirmation 2º: the division of nature into individuals is called "material" in relation to the sciences, which are not concerned to know individuals under the account of such, and therefore in relation to them it is material that nature is actually multiplied numerically. Hence only division into specifically diverse essences is in this sense called "formal," or something belonging to the formal aspect. Yet this division is "formal" if by that name is denoted a division that multiplies not only haecceities but also natures and essences.

11. It should be noted here from the Excellent Doctor (disp. 6, *Metaphysica* sect. 1 et seq.) that human nature in reality has not only individual unity in each man but also formal unity, from which the intellect does not wholly abstract. By the name "formal unity" is not here understood unity of reason, for this is "formal extrinsic unity"; rather, intrinsic unity arising from essence is understood. Peter's nature has this unity not only because it has in itself indivision into several human natures, but especially because it is intrinsically undivided into natures diverse in species or genus and intrinsically separated from the nature of a horse, lion, stone, etc. From this unity or indivision, I say, nature is not wholly separated by precision through the intellect, although it is separated from individual unity; for even

under the concept "man" it appears intrinsically undivided and indivisible into several things dissimilar in genus or species.

12. Nevertheless this formal unity of human nature in reality is indistinct from individual unity and consequently is not a single unity but is multiplied entitatively, just as human nature itself and individual unity are multiplied. Hence it does not suffice for a universal in reality. Indeed, by itself it does not even suffice for the universal through the intellect to be called one, because insofar as it accompanies nature in the state of abstraction, it is not an intrinsically single unity, nor a multiple unity, but purely abstracts from its own multiplication and precisely signifies indivision into several dissimilar things. Likewise, nature itself in that state appears neither intrinsically multiple nor one, according to the well-known saying from Avicenna: "Horseness, as horseness, is neither one nor many." Human nature, therefore, under the concept "man" is separated by precision from intrinsic formal unity insofar as the latter is entitatively multiple, though not insofar as it excludes division into things diverse in genus or species.

13. Objection 6º: the absence of all men from eternity is one; for otherwise, since infinitely many men are possible, there would be infinitely many actual absences from eternity, which is repugnant. On the other hand, that absence is multiplicable in reality, since the absence of Peter is one and that of Paul another, etc. Therefore it is a universal in reality. I deny the major, for absence is nothing, and therefore properly is neither one nor multiple. But according to the manner in which it is apprehended by us after the likeness of a certain objective negation, there are as many absences as there are non-existing men, namely infinitely many from eternity. No absurdity follows from this infinity; for to say that there are infinitely many absences of men from eternity means precisely that infinitely many men do not exist from eternity. Certainly, if absence were something actual, it would absurdly be posited from eternity whether as one or as multiple; for it is repugnant that anything actually posited outside God should exist from eternity, especially independently of God's action.

14. Reply: one man is in himself the negation of all things from which he is distinguished. Therefore one absence too could be the negation of all men. I answer: the antecedent is true of a respective radical negation, that is, of the repugnance of each being to identity with the things from which it is distinguished. But it is not true of the absolute formal negation by reason of which a thing was not in the state of existence from eternity. Such a negation or absence is necessarily multiplied in its own manner according to the multiplicity of non-existing things, as is established from the very separability of the absences.

15. Reply 2º: the absence of the capacity to roar is multiple, since it exists in all men; on the other hand it is one, since the capacity to roar which it excludes is one. Therefore in reality it is one and multiple and consequently universal. I answer: if the discussion concerns absolute absence by which the capacity to roar is excluded from the nature of things, I deny the major, for such an absence does not exist in men. But if the discussion concerns respective absence, I deny the minor, for such absence, although it concerns one capacity to roar, is multiplied through the multiple subject, as is clear in the privation of form A, which is multiple according to the multiplicity of prime matter. This is especially true when the respective absence is radical, or consists in a repugnance of identity, as in the case of the argument.

16. Final objection: the object of science and of the intellect is universal; but an object precedes the act of the potency or faculty of which it is the object. Therefore the universal precedes the act of the intellect and of science. I answer by distinguishing the minor: the object precedes, etc., according to the nature subjected to universality, I grant; according to universality, I further distinguish: according to fundamental universality, I grant; according to formal universality, I deny the minor and the consequence. The object of science and of the intellect is called universal because it is considered universally, that is, through acts by which the universal is formally constituted, the nature with the fundamental universality explained in n. 3 having preceded.

CHAPTER III.
The Universal Through the Intellect Is Established.

1. Since universals must be admitted by the common consent of philosophers, and cannot exist in reality according to all their constitutive features, it remains that they are fully formed through the intellect. That this can occur is proved as follows. The universal is one apt to be in many, or communicable to many. But through the concept "man," for example, human nature, which is really multiplied in individuals, is rendered one apt to be in many. Therefore it is rendered universal. The minor is proved with respect to unity, and afterward must be proved with respect to aptitude or community. Human nature through the concept "man" is rendered uniformly definable, so that under that concept the humanity which is in Peter is not defined differently from the humanity which is in Paul or any other; for whoever is defined as man must be defined as "rational animal." Therefore it is rendered formally one.

2. I prove the consequence from Aristotle, 5, *Metaphysica* text. 11, who argues thus: "Those things are called one whose account, stating what-it-was-to-be, is indivisible from another account signifying the what-it-was-to-be of a thing; for every account is of itself divisible." St. Thomas expounds this passage there, lect. 7, lit. I: "Those things are called one which are so related that the definition of one, which is the account signifying what it is to be, is not divided from the definition of another, which also signifies what it is to be. For the definition itself, namely considered in itself, must be divisible, since it consists of genus and difference. Yet it may happen that the definition of one is indivisible from the definition of another when two have one definition … as ox and horse agree in the one definition of animal," etc. The reason for this doctrine is that for several natures to be rendered uniformly definable is for them to be rendered of one account, since "account" and "definition" are the same, as we showed above and as Aristotle here presupposes. But to be rendered of one account is to be rendered one by reason, formally one.

3. Furthermore, human nature through the concept "man" is separated by precision from every multiplicity, to such an extent that by the force and efficacy of that concept alone it can never appear as a multiple nature, however much it be defined and explained. Therefore, insofar as it appears under such a concept, it has no division. Therefore it is one. This consequence is clear from Aristotle, loc. cit., who says: "Universally, whatever things have no division are called one insofar as they do not have division; thus, if insofar as man there is no division, one man; but if insofar as animal, one animal." St. Thomas says there, lect. 8: "Universally, this is true, that whatever things do not have division are called one according to that in which they do not have division. Thus things not divided in that which is man are called one in man, as Socrates and Plato; and things not divided in the account of animal are called one in animal." This agrees with the common definition by which one is called "undivided in itself and divided from every other." For humanity under the concept "man" is both divided from every non-human nature and undivided in itself, or in its species, since abstraction is made from numerical plurality.

4. It is now easily perceived, and granted by all once unity of reason is presupposed, that nature through that concept is rendered apt for, or communicable to, several. For the aptitude and communicability proper to universal nature is an actual indifference whereby it is known without fiction as really identified with several. But this indifference presupposes on the side of the object the real identity of that nature which is rendered intentionally one with at least several possible things; or, what amounts to

the same, it presupposes a radical or fundamental aptitude and communicability, which according to the Thomists is the materiality of nature, while according to others it is the finitude and limitation of perfection, and adds abstraction by precision from every plurality and inferior difference. For human nature, when separated by precision and as though stripped of every individuating difference, retains nothing by which it repugns to Peter, Paul, or other individual men. Indeed, the whole repugnance to Peter's nature being known as identified with Paul arises from the fact that it is known as the same as Peterhood. If, therefore, abstraction by precision is made from this and from the other haecceities, it remains free of repugnance and consequently indifferent.

5. One must not, however, suppose that human nature is indifferent so as to be known as identified with several through the concept "man" itself; otherwise through that concept abstraction would not be made from plurality and the nature would not be made one. Through this concept, therefore, it is rendered indifferent in such a way that whenever, as thus conceived, it is compared with individual men, it immediately appears to belong to them by identity. But this comparison must necessarily be made through other concepts, either apprehensive or judicative. Finally, the whole proof can be confirmed as follows: if human nature existed in reality just as it appears under the concept "man," namely separated by precision from every individuating difference and having no actual division, it would absolutely be a universal in reality. Therefore, if through the intellect it acquires these conditions, it will be a universal through the intellect.

6. From what has been said it follows that the universal is a concrete composed of subject and form. The subject receiving the denomination "universal" is a real nature which is multiplied in reality. The denominating form is abstractive cognition, for example "man," "animal," "living thing," through which nature is separated by precision from real multiplicity; for from this form, although extrinsic, the object is denominated one and common to several in the manner explained. Hence this form itself is unity and community in the abstract, and the intention of universality. Therefore those Thomists should not be heard who wish that intention, in which unity and community consist, to be fictitious, intrinsic to the object, and attained through direct cognition. For we have more than sufficiently refuted this in tract. 1, disp. 2, cap. 4, nn. 33-37, and cap. 5, nn. 25-28, where we gave clear testimonies of St. Thomas in favor of our doctrine and showed from the Holy Doctor that the intention of universality is immaterial, because it is received in the soul as in a subject, and is not properly in the thing outside the soul as in a subject, but as in an object. Likewise, that "cognition makes

the universal actually be universal, and is something formal in the universal"; and that "the universal is one by the unity of cognition." In the same chapter 5 we answered whatever the Thomists object against this.

7. It should be noted here that it is one thing to speak of human nature "according to itself," and another to speak of the same nature "in the being of a universal." In the first way nature is considered in the state of abstraction, but not according to the extrinsic predicates arising for it from such a state; rather, it is considered according to the wholly intrinsic predicates by which it is defined in such a state, namely animal and rational, and whatever is formally included in these. These are called predicates "of first intention" and predicates proper to nature "in personal supposition," and they are the same things which can be known as identified with several according to n. 5. In the second way nature is considered according to predicates deriving to it from the state of abstraction, that is, from precisive cognition, namely according to the denominations "one," "common," "indifferent," "universal," "genus," "species," etc. These are called predicates "of second intention" and predicates proper to nature "in simple supposition," and they cannot belong to individuals as such or be identified with them. See St. Thomas, Opusc. *De ente et essentia* cap. 4, where he explains this matter excellently. Hence it follows why it is said that nature "according to itself" is neither one nor multiple: namely because it is defined neither through unity nor through multiplicity in personal supposition.

Various Difficulties Against the Doctrine Given Are Resolved.

8. It may be said, 1º: the nature denominated universal exists in reality, and only the form comes from the intellect. Therefore there is no reason why the universal should be said to exist through the intellect rather than in reality. I answer: first, by the name "universal in reality" we understand a universal wholly independent of the intellect according to all its constitutive features. Moreover, denominations are attributed to that which posits the form or ultimate determination, as is clear in the denomination "known," which is said to be through the intellect even though the thing known exists in reality.

9. It may be said, 2º: human nature under the concept "man" is no more one than multiple, for that cognition equally abstracts by precision from the real unity and multiplicity of nature. Therefore at most nature under that concept will have precision from its division and indivision, but by no means positive indivision or unity, for positive unity requires absence of division. I

answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it is no more one by intrinsic real and numerical unity, I grant; by extrinsic intentional unity, I deny the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: it will have precision from real numerical division and indivision, I grant; from extrinsic intentional division and indivision, I deny the consequence. The concept "man" equally separates nature by precision from real multiplicity and singularity, since it expresses neither on the side of the act; and therefore nature, insofar as thus conceived, is no more really and intrinsically one in number than multiple, that is, it is equally not defined by unity as by multiplicity. But by that very fact this concept positively excludes from itself multiplicity of reason, since of itself it immediately excludes an expression through which nature would appear in the intellect as multiple, in which expression multiplicity and division of reason consist. Therefore nature under that concept has an absence of intentional division, and consequently positive intentional and extrinsic unity.

10. It may be said, 3º: nature in the state of abstraction appears intrinsically as being. Therefore it appears intrinsically one, for being and one are convertible, and unity is a metaphysical attribute or property of being. I answer by distinguishing the consequence: it appears intrinsically one by formal unity, I grant; by numerical unity or unity of singularity, I deny the consequence. I am speaking of intrinsic formal unity, which I proposed from the Excellent Doctor in the preceding chapter, nn. 11 and 12, where I showed that nature is not wholly separated by precision from such unity, yet is not constituted universal by it alone unless extrinsic unity is added. For formal unity, insofar as it accompanies nature in the state of abstraction, does not exclude the numerical plurality of nature and of itself, although it excludes specific or generic plurality. Hence whenever we say that human nature according to itself, or in the state of abstraction, is not intrinsically one, we are speaking of numerical unity. For formal unity, since it is the specific difference itself, namely rationality, is certainly found in man as such, though abstracting from the numerical plurality which that same formal unity has in reality. See Cajetan on cap. 4 of *De ente et essentia*, at the words of St. Thomas: "If it is asked whether this nature can be called one or many, neither should be granted, because both are outside the concept of humanity." And note that this argument is not answered by fictitious unity, because the latter is not a property of real being; nor again by objective precision, because this does not separate man as such from transcendental predicates.

11. It may be said, 4º: the fact that cognition is one in itself does not suffice for it to denominate nature one, just as the fact that it is singular and

spiritual in itself does not suffice for it to denominate nature singular and spiritual. Otherwise Divine cognition, which uniquely represents all things, would denominate them one and universal. I grant the whole argument. We do not say that nature is made one by cognition because cognition is one in itself, but because it has a unifying mode of tending, that is, one which makes precision from the real multiplicity of nature. This is clear in the concepts "man" and "men." Each is one in itself, but each does not render human nature extrinsically and intentionally one, because of their diverse manner of tending. The second expresses, on the side of the act, the plurality of the object as such; the first abstracts by precision from plurality and therefore presents human nature, which on the side of the object is multiple, on the side of the act in such a way that the intellect defines and explains it as though it were one. This is to have a unifying manner of tending and in exercise to constitute or denominate an object that is really multiple as one through reason. Nor for this reason must cognition denominate the object singular or spiritual, for the object is incapable of such denominations from an extrinsic form (cf. supra tract. 1, disp. 2, cap. 5, n. 40). Nor likewise does Divine cognition make an object multiple in itself one or universal, since on the side of the act it cannot abstract by precision from objective plurality.

12. It may be said, 5º: unity of reason is improper, just as distinction of reason is. Therefore it does not properly constitute a universal, just as unity of similarity, because it is improper, does not suffice for the universal. Confirmation 1º: to be a man merely through the intellect is not truly to be a man. Therefore to be one or universal through the intellect is likewise not truly to be one or universal. 2º The universal is essentially one, since it is defined through unity. Therefore it is not one merely extrinsically. 3º If precisive cognition were the unity of the universal, then when the cognition "man" is multiplied, human species would be multiplied, just as when individual unity is multiplied, individuals are multiplied. 4º The unities by which man and horse are constituted universals are not specifically distinguished, for two species in the being of a universal differ only numerically. But the two concepts "man" and "horse" differ specifically. 5º The cognition "man" is singular; therefore, if it is a unity, it is a singular unity; therefore it cannot be a specific and universal unity. 6º The cognition "man" is at most a precisive unity, but the universal requires positive unity. 7º Universal nature is one objective concept; therefore it must have objective unity. Finally, cognition receives unity from the object. Therefore it cannot confer unity upon the object.

13. I answer: unity of reason is improper if compared with real unity, yet it is proper in the line of reason, for it truly and properly excludes division

belonging to the line of reason, which consists in the expression of several as several. Thus the unity of friendship or the political unity of the parts of a republic is improper if compared with physical unity, although it is proper in the moral line. Hence the disparity with unity of similarity is clear. For the latter, since it does not pertain to the intentional but to the real physical line, would have to exclude real division in order to be proper unity in its own line. Yet it by no means excludes such division, but rather positively indicates plurality. Therefore in no line is it unity properly so called, nor does it render nature undivided either really or intentionally. From this it also follows that the universal through the intellect, although it may be called improper in comparison with a universal in reality if such existed, is nevertheless absolutely proper. First, because no other more proper universal is possible; second, because it has as much propriety as the sciences require. The sciences are certainly content with universality of reason, since it suffices for them to define, for example, the whole human species by one definition and to discuss it as though it were really one.

14. To Confirmation 1º, I deny the consequence, because the denomination of man is of itself physical and intrinsic; hence, if it is not physical, it is no denomination at all. But the denomination of one can be extrinsic and of reason, as has been proved, while the denomination universal cannot be intrinsic to its subject. And the point is pressed thus: to be white merely through the intellect is not truly to be white; therefore to be known through the intellect will not be truly to be known. To 2º: the universal adequately taken, or insofar as it is a concrete composed of subject and form, namely of nature and cognition, is intrinsically and essentially one, because intentional unity belongs to the essence of this concrete. We call unity extrinsic only to the universal taken specifically, that is, to the physical nature denominated universal. Thus cognition belongs to the essence of the concrete "known," yet is extrinsic to the thing denominated thought.

15. To 3º: the universal or species is an accidental concrete. But accidental concretes are not multiplied by multiplication of forms of the same account if the subject is the same. Thus God, known by a thousand cognitions, is not called several known things but one thing known a thousand times. Likewise, therefore, human nature, when the concept "man" is multiplied, is not several species but the same species formed in several ways. Individual unity, on the contrary, since it is not an accidental form of the individual but wholly intrinsic and substantial, necessarily induces several individuals if it is itself multiplied. To 4º: the concepts "man" and "horse" differ in physical species, which is taken from the

diversity of objects, yet they do not differ in reflexive logical species, or under reflexive consideration by Logic, which does not weigh cognitions from the diversity of their objects except insofar as this suffices to discern the five Predicables from one another. Otherwise it attends only to the unifying mode of representing, and this mode is similar in both concepts.

16. To 5º: the cognition "man" is a singular unity with respect to itself, not with respect to the object; and it is a universal unity with respect to the object, not with respect to itself. Likewise it is a representation of the object and not a representation of itself; or likewise it is the physical existence of itself and the intentional existence of the object, not conversely. There is no difficulty in this, since it is certain and obvious that not all denominations which the form receives as that which can be attributed to the subject or object, nor can all those which the form contains with respect to the subject make the form itself as that which. Certainly, that a form singular in itself should denominate an object universal is no more difficult than that a form unknown in itself should denominate an object known. See St. Thomas, Opusc. 55 and 56. To 6º: although the cognition "man" is a precisive unity insofar as it neither states nor excludes the real plurality of the object, it is nevertheless a positive unity in the line of reason, because it positively removes plurality of reason from itself, as we already explained above in n. 9.

17. To 7º, I deny the consequence, because universal nature is indeed one objective concept, but it is not objectively one; it is extrinsically and intentionally one, or one "by the unity of cognition," as St. Thomas says. Likewise, according to the Thomists, that nature is one real objective concept, but is not really one, since it is only fictitiously one. To the final argument: cognition derives unity from the object as from a foundation, and the object receives unity from cognition as from a form. Cognition presupposes in the object a fundamental unity consisting in the similarity of several, and the object formally receives from cognition an actual extrinsic unity consisting in precisive expression. Nor is the object compared with cognition as a physical or univocal cause, but as an extrinsic formal cause, which need only precontain the perfections of the effect fundamentally.

18. It should be noted that whatever is objected to us in this objection presses the Thomists more strongly. For fictitious unity is certainly improper and shadowy, and constitutes only a shadowy universal. Likewise, just as a man fictitiously constituted is not truly a man, so neither is that truly universal which is fictitiously constituted. Again, since the universal is essentially one, it will have a fictitious essence if its unity is fictitious. Again, if the fiction of unity is multiplied in human nature, the human species will be multiplied. Again, the unities of the human and equine species will be

beings of reason specifically diverse, namely from the diversity of the foundation and subject in which they inhere. Again, if cognition is one from the object, it must presuppose unity in it; yet it does not presuppose but practically causes fictitious unity.

19. Certain other objections which the Thomists make against us will be touched upon in chapter 5. It must always be denied to them that universal nature is conceived as one, as common, as universal, as indifferent, as species or genus, through the direct cognition by which it is abstracted from differences, for example through the cognition "man" or "animal." For such denominations are the object of reflexive cognition and are constituted in exercise by direct cognition as by a form, no otherwise than the denomination "known." Likewise, all these denominations fall solely upon the object as that which. Cognition itself, however, is indeed extrinsic unity, universality, predicability, genericity, etc., but is not universal, predicable, etc., except purely as that by which.

CHAPTER IV.

What Is the Object of the Cognition Constituting the Universal?

1. It is asked what is attained on the side of the object by the cognition "man," and similarly by other precisive cognitions through which the universal is formally constituted. The patrons of objective precision answer that through the cognition "man" only the essential predicates of human nature are attained, separated by precision on the side of the object from all differences of individuals. They also say that nature thus separated by precision remains in the state of abstraction neither really one nor multiple, and belongs neither to Peter, Paul, another man, nor to all men, but is only the true essence of human nature, which is intentionally one. Therefore, they say, nature so taken is adequately predicable, and according to its whole objective aspect, of all and each of the individuals, because it precisely signifies the true essence of human nature, which is truly affirmable of all men. Nevertheless, although this nature belongs to no one in the intentional state because it abstracts from all, in the real state it is the nature of all and is really identified with all men.

2. This doctrine is subject to all the difficulties of objective precision and is especially attacked by many strong arguments commonly found in our authors. For the present it is briefly attacked thus: the object of the cognition "man," according to everything that terminates cognition, cannot be predicable of individual men without any disjunction or inadequacy on the side of the object. Therefore it is not human nature such as is posited

objectively by those who make precision. I prove the antecedent: that object cannot be really identified with individual men according to everything that terminates cognition. Therefore neither can it be predicable of individual men, etc. The consequence is clear, because nothing is truly predicable or affirmable of a subject unless it is really identified with it. I prove the antecedent: according to the adversaries, that object is human nature, which is really identified with all men. But what is really identified with all cannot be really identified adequately with individuals adequately distinct from one another. Therefore, etc.

3. The point is urged, 1º: although the object of the cognition "man" abstracts by precision from real identity with Peter, it is nevertheless something which before cognition was really identified with Peter. Therefore through cognition it cannot become predicable of Paul. I prove the consequence: through precisive cognition that which before cognition was really identified with Peter cannot become really separable from Peter, for intentional separation, even if made through objective precision, does not induce real separability of things really identified, as no one doubts. But if it became predicable of Paul, at least apart from disjunction, it would become really separable from Peter, since it could be really identified with Paul, who according to his whole self is really separable from Peter. Therefore through cognition that object cannot become predicable of Paul.

4. The point is urged, 2º: from this doctrine it follows that the following syllogism is expository and legitimate: "Peter is man; Paul is man; therefore Peter is Paul." The absurd consequence is proved because the middle term is perfectly distributed, namely the term "man," which according to everything it signifies on the side of the object is applied without disjunction to each extreme, and in this application consists the perfect distribution of the middle in an expository syllogism. Nor should it be said that the middle is applied adequately to each intensively but not adequately extensively. For to be applied not adequately extensively means nothing other than that the middle remains indifferent to application to others. But the term "man" signifies on the side of the object no reality which is not applied to Peter. From this, however, the real identity of Peter with Paul and all the others of whom such a middle is truly affirmable necessarily follows. This is clear: things which are the same as one third thing adequately taken, namely according to its whole reality, are necessarily the same with one another. Therefore, if Peter and Paul are extremes really the same as the whole object of the cognition "man" according to the entire reality terminating cognition, they are necessarily identified with one another. Nor does it matter that the unity of that middle or object is extrinsic and improper. For even a heap of

stones has an improper unity, yet if any extremes are the same as one whole heap of stones, they will be the same with one another.

5. The point is urged, 3º: if the preceding doctrine is true, the sense of this proposition, "Peter is man," will be: "Peter really identifies with himself human nature, which in reality is the proper nature of Paul, although it is the proper nature of no man insofar as it is in the state of abstraction." But this sense is undoubtedly false; otherwise Peter would really identify with himself a nature from which he is distinguished in reality. These arguments have special force against those who make objective precision and commonly teach that the universal is preserved in actual predication.

6. The point is urged, 4º: the object of the cognition "man," according to the proposed conception, is as it were a mass of human nature collected from all individuals and cleansed of haecceities as though of bran. But such a mass is difficult and obscure in many respects. First, because it cannot be cleansed of haecceity without being cleansed of itself, for before cognition haecceity was human nature itself. Second, because this mass, since it cuts away only haecceities, coalesces from the natures of all men, so that whatever is in Paul apart from Paulhood is found there, and so with the others. But a mass composed of the natures of all cannot be really identified with Peter and therefore cannot be predicated of him, for Peter is not the nature of all men, nor does he identify with himself whatever is really in Paul apart from Paulhood. Third, if a mass of this kind is taken from all men, then afterward, when one comes to application or predication, the whole cannot be attributed to individuals without injury to the rest, but must be distributed proportionally among all so that each receives his own portion; or, if the whole is attributed in full to each, their real identity with one another necessarily follows.

7. Let our conclusion therefore be this: the object of the cognition "man," and proportionately the same should be understood of every act constituting the universal, is all the natures of men, or all human individuals. Thus all defenders of formal precision, from which this conclusion necessarily follows. For since the cognition "man" attains the essential predicates of human nature which in reality are identified with all individuals, it must attain all these individuals on the side of the object unless it makes objective precision. This is proved, 1º by the authority of Augustine the Great, *Categoriae* cap. 1, who says: "When you have said 'man' by one word, you know all"; likewise, "When someone says 'horse,' he will indicate all"; again, "When you say 'lion' or 'bull,' all that are anywhere fall under the one name of the nature." He teaches the same of the names "animal," "tree," "gem," and others. Therefore according to Augustine the

cognition corresponding to the name "man," "horse," "lion," etc., knows all men, horses, or lions wherever they are.

8. It is proved, 2º by the authority of St. Thomas, first in Opusc. *De ente et essentia* cap. 3, where he says: "Whatever is in the species is also in the genus, as not determined. For if animal were not the whole that man is but a part of him, it would not be predicated of him, since no integral part is predicated of its whole." He there confirms this doctrine at length and also applies it to species with respect to individuals. And in 7, *Metaphysica* lect. 12, lit. e, he says: "Genus is predicated of species; hence it must in some way signify the whole." Lect. 9 and many other places agree. Hence it is clear that the concept "animal" attains the whole that man is, and for the same reason the whole that horse is, and so of the rest; but "in some way," that is, not on the side of the act, as all admit, but on the side of the object. For if it does not in this way attain the whole man, animal as such will on the side of the object be a part of man and therefore could not be predicated of him.

9. Again, in Opusc. 55, where he speaks thus of the species or cognition constituting the universal: "It is singular only in the intellect and universal insofar as it has a uniform account toward all the individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is equally the likeness of them all," etc. He immediately adds the example of one statue representing many men. And in Opusc. 56 he says: "The universal is one in cognition, because although several things precisely as several do not constitute one intellection, nevertheless several insofar as they are similar constitute one intellection, so that the intellect cannot distinguish among similar things insofar as they are similar; and therefore the intellect apprehends man and ass insofar as they agree in one operation, namely sensation," etc.

10. It is proved, 3º by reason. The object of the cognition "man" is true and real human nature, as no one denies. Therefore it is either the nature of Peter, or determinately of another, or of all men. But it is not the nature of Peter alone or of another determinate man, since this could not be predicated of all. Therefore it is the nature of all, and consequently that cognition terminates in all men on the side of the object. The point is urged, 1º: the object of the cognition "man" is predicable of all and each of men. Therefore it must include all the natures of men. I prove the consequence: if it did not include even one nature, it could not be predicated of that man, since it would include nothing really identified with such a subject. The point is urged, 2º: the concept "man" attains on the side of the object the immediate foundation of universality or abstraction, for this foundation is that which precedes as capable and apt to terminate a precisive concept. But the immediate foundation of universality or abstraction is the real

agreement and similarity of several, and this necessarily implies a multitude of men. Therefore this multitude is necessarily attained by the precisive concept.

11. The point is urged, 3º: the concept "man" attains the object which it intentionally unites or renders one. But it unites that which before cognition was divided and multiple. Yet before cognition nothing was divided and multiple except all the individuals of human nature. Certainly, unless this is so, it would be false to say that Peter and Paul are one under the account of man, or man and horse one under the account of animal. First, because the unity arising from the concept "man" or "animal" would no more affect the inferiors than if they were really distinct from the common account, for such is the force of objective precision. Second, because two things cannot be called one under an account which, insofar as it is one, is separated from them. More clearly: man and horse are not really one under the account of animal, as is presupposed; nor, according to the contrary position, are they intentionally one under that account. Therefore they are in no way one. I prove the minor: according to the opposing position, the account of animal is intentionally outside man and horse, and thus taken is neither man nor horse on the side of the object. But in the sense in which that account is neither man nor horse but outside both, man and horse are not one in it, just as they cannot be really one in a predicate which in the real sense is neither man nor horse but outside both. Therefore, etc. Yet the consequence is contrary to Aristotle and St. Thomas cited in the preceding chapter, nn. 2 and 3, and contrary to common understanding.

The Principal Difficulty Against Our Opinion Is Resolved.

12. Against the opinion just stated it will be objected that it destroys the predicability of the universal. For the object of the cognition "man" will not be universal unless it is rendered adequately predicable of individual men, since inadequate predicability does not suffice. Otherwise Peter would be universal in reality, since he is one and inadequately predicable of many, namely of the body and soul of which he consists. But that object, if it embraces all men, cannot be adequately predicable of individuals, or predicable according to its whole self, for every man cannot be predicated of any one man. Yet this objection presses the adversaries no less, as we saw above from n. 2, indeed more strongly, since the solution we shall immediately give cannot assist them. The common answer of more recent authors is that the object of the cognition "man" is predicable of Peter, for example, adequately intensively but not adequately extensively; or, what

amounts to the same, adequately on the side of the act and inadequately on the side of the object. But I have never been able to acquiesce in these terms.

13. First, because the denomination "predicable" does not fall upon the act but upon the object, as all admit. Therefore the object of the cognition "man" is denominated adequately predicable of Peter, at least intensively. But that object is the collection of all men. Therefore this whole collection receives the denomination "adequately predicable intensively of Peter." But how can the whole collection of men be rendered truly and absolutely affirmable of Peter, who is only a part of the collection? Will it be true that the whole intensive perfection of human nature really identified with Paul can also be really identified with Peter? Certainly the intensive perfection of human nature is not separated by precision on the side of the object from extensive perfection. Therefore, if the whole intensive perfection is denominated predicable of Peter, the whole extensive perfection will also be so denominated. 2º The denomination "predicable of Peter," which arises from the concept "man," does not belong to Peter's nature alone, for it belongs to universal nature, and Peter's nature is not universal by itself but insofar as intentionally united with the others. Therefore the denomination "predicable of Peter" belongs to Peter's nature insofar as it is intentionally one with the others and indistinct from the others. Therefore it likewise belongs to the others in the same way, and consequently to all adequately on the side of the objects, just as to Peter's nature.

14. 3º If human nature adequately taken on the side of the act "man" is truly affirmable of Peter, then so taken it is adequately really identified with Peter, for nothing is truly affirmable of Peter without disjunction unless it is really identified with him. Therefore nature so taken is not the nature of all but of Peter alone. They say that nature is adequately predicable of Peter on the side of the act not positively but negatively, namely insofar as it is absolutely predicable of Peter without any inadequacy or division being expressed on the side of the act, or without the need to add the adverb "inadequately," although in reality only Peter's nature is positively predicable of Peter. But against this, 1º: predicability with respect to individuals belongs to universal nature in the same sense in which unity and universality belong to it. But unity and universality positively belong to the collection of all men. Therefore predicability does also.

15. Against this, 2º: if all men are the object of the cognition "man," such an object cannot be predicated absolutely of individuals or without the addition "inadequately." It matters little that no plurality is expressed in that cognition; for the cognition "Peter" likewise does not express the plurality or division of body and soul, yet its object is not predicable of the individual

parts without the addition "inadequately." Against this, 3º: if all human natures, insofar as they fall under the concept "man," are not one thing positively predicable of individuals, the human species will not be one predicable but there will be as many predicables, and indeed by the predicability proper to the universal, since it is bestowed through the concept "man," as there are individual men. The consequence is contrary to common understanding, but it is proved because, if the whole object of the cognition "man" is not positively predicable of individuals, only Peter's nature will be positively predicable of Peter, only Paul's nature of Paul, and so with the others, without there being any positive predicability common to all natures, or belonging uniformly to all, or after the manner of one. For the same predicability belonging to one nature will not belong to another. Therefore all human natures under that concept will be like a disjoined broom in the being of positive predicability, and consequently there will be as many positive predicables as there are men in reality.

16. I therefore judge that the solution of this difficulty depends upon the mode of tending of the cognition constituting the universal. This mode is indefinite, that is, as the word itself indicates, indeterminate, and consequently at least implicitly and equivalently vague or disjunctive, and hence apt for confused or disjunctive supposition, in which it may be verified by any one of the many things it signifies. Therefore the indefinite concept "man" can be resolved in the same way as these expressions: "a certain man," "some man," "one man," or "one of the men." So Fr. Hurtado, disp. 5, *Metaphysica* sect. 10, n. 157; John Baptist de Benedictis, lib. 2, *Logica* q. 1, cap. 10, toward the end; Sylvester Maurus as regards the substance of the matter, q. 35, *Logica*; Arriaga, disp. 6, *Logica* sect. 6, subsect. 3, with respect to an indefinite concept placed in actual predication; and more expressly Ulloa, disp. 2, *Logica Major* from n. 91.

17. This is proved, 1º from Aristotle, 4, *Metaphysica* cap. 2, who says: "The same is one man, being man, and man; nor does the repeated expression signify something diverse, namely 'man' and 'man' and 'one man.'" But the term "one man" vaguely signifies all men, since it means the same as "one of the men" and can be verified by any of them. Therefore the same must be held of the term "man." 2º From St. Thomas, who in Opusc. 55, before the middle, says: "Genus signifies forms, though not determinately this or that form, which doctrine," that is, difference, "determinately expresses, and which is not other than that which was indeterminately signified through the genus." Therefore the concept "animal" signifies the human, leonine, equine, etc., forms, not determinately but indeterminately; and the form which the

concept "rational" determinately signifies is not other than that which the concept "animal" signifies indeterminately.

18. Nor is it useful to evade the authority of that Opuscule as uncertain. For St. Thomas teaches the very same much more clearly in Opusc. *De ente et essentia* cap. 3, from which I select the following words as a specimen: "Whatever is in the species is also in the genus as undetermined." Likewise: "This name 'body' can be taken in such a way that it signifies a certain thing having a form from which three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever that form may be; and in this way body will be the genus of animal, because there is nothing in animal which is not implicitly contained in body. For the soul is not other than that form through which three dimensions could be designated in that thing. And therefore, when I said that body is that which has such a form from which three dimensions can be designated, I understood therein whatever form it might be, whether soul, stoniness, or any other form. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in body or in the form of body, insofar as body is its genus. And such also is the relation of animal to man."

19. Likewise: "Animal is genus insofar as it signifies a certain thing from whose form sensation and motion can arise, whatever that form may be, whether merely a sensitive soul or a soul at once sensitive and rational. Therefore genus indeterminately signifies the whole that is in the species." Likewise: "Genus signifies a certain form, yet not determinately this or that, which the difference determinately expresses, and which is not other than that which was indeterminately signified through the genus." Likewise: "The nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual, just as the nature of the genus with respect to the species." Likewise: "This name 'man' signifies the essence of man as a whole, insofar as it does not prescind from designated matter but implicitly and indistinctly contains it, just as it was said that genus contains the difference; and therefore this name 'man' is predicated of individuals." Thus far St. Thomas. From his words it is plainly gathered that the names "body," "animal," and "man" are verifiable in order to predication just as if they meant: "something rooting three dimensions through the form of man or of stone, etc.; something capable of sensing through a rational or irrational soul; something having this or that individual essence of man." Such names therefore have an implicitly or equivalently vague or disjunctive tendency.

20. It is proved, 3° by reason. The term "man" in order to predication does not have a copulative or collective tendency. Therefore, since it also does not have a tendency determinately toward one individual man rather than others, it remains that it has an indeterminate and vague tendency. I

prove the antecedent: the term "man" renders its object truly affirmable of each and all the things it contains; but a term signifying copulatively does not do so. This is clear in the term "every man" or "every animal," which because of its copulative tendency cannot render the object truly affirmable of a subject, whether inferior or equal. As Aristotle says in 1, *Peri hermeneias* cap. 5: "There will be no true affirmation in which the universal note of predication is added to that which is universally predicated, as 'every man is every animal.'" This is true, says St. Thomas there, lect. 10, lit. f, "even if the predicate is convertible," as "Every man is every risible thing; for it would be necessary," adds the Angelic Doctor, "that each one man should be all animals or all risible things, which is repugnant to the account of the singular which is taken under the universal." On the contrary, as the Holy Doctor observes in the same place, a term signifying vaguely or affected by a particular sign is verifiable of a universal subject, for example: "Every man is some animal." Hence it follows that the term "animal" has a tendency consonant with the term "some animal" and dissonant with the term "every animal."

21. Confirmation 1º: these terms, "animal" and "some animal," are convertible in predication, so that this is a valid inference: "It is an animal; therefore it is some animal," and conversely. They are, I say, convertible by reason of form or mode of tending, for in every matter the indefinite term and the vague or particular term reciprocally follow one another, as experience will readily show. Therefore the term "some animal" is no less extensive, no more determinate either on the side of the object or on the side of the mode, than the term "animal." The consequence is clear, for according to the rule of elementary logic, an affirmative inference does not hold from a more extensive term to a less extensive one. On the contrary, from neither of these predicates is the consequence valid to the predicate "every animal," because although this does not differ from them in object, it differs in the copulative mode of tending. Confirmation 2º: if judgment is a composite quality, as a probable opinion holds, or if it is imagined to be such, the universal will be preserved in this actual predication, "Peter is man," as all seem to grant. Therefore the object embracing the natures of all men will truly be predicated of Peter. But all natures cannot truly be predicated of Peter unless they are signified vaguely or disjunctively. Therefore the term "man," preserving an indefinite tendency, is equivalent to a term signifying vaguely or disjunctively.

22. From this it is clearly perceived how the object of the cognition "man" includes all men and nevertheless is adequately predicable of each. For although only Peter's nature is determinately predicable of Peter, all

natures can indeterminately or vaguely be predicated of Peter, provided Peter's nature is one of the extremes of the disjunction. For it is truly said, "Peter is some man," or "is one of the men," where on the side of the predicate all men are indeterminately signified. Nor for this reason must that whole object be identified with Peter or belong to Peter. For adequate identity of the predicate with the subject is indeed inferred from adequate predicability in a determinate sense, but not from adequate predicability in an indeterminate sense; from the latter there is inferred only the adequate identity of the subject with one extreme of the disjunction. Hence predicability with respect to individuals affects the whole universal object; yet identifiability or identity with individuals does not affect the whole. Hence also that parity of Peter with respect to his parts disappears, because the name "Peter" signifies body and soul collectively.

23. But against this doctrine it may be said, 1º: this tendency, "some man," does not constitute a universal but a vague individual. Therefore the same should be said of the term "man" if it signifies vaguely. First, there are not lacking those who deny the antecedent, and not without probability. But, granting it, I deny the consequence, because the former term expresses on the side of the act a division of the object, since it means the same as "some one of the men" or "one out of many men." Therefore it cannot bestow upon the object unity of reason, which consists in the expression of several while making precision on the side of the act from real division or plurality. But the term "man" indicates no division and is therefore apt to bestow indivision and unity of reason. Furthermore, we do not say that the term "man" is formally disjoined or disjunctive, but only virtually and equivalently so. Although formal disjunction indicates division of several, virtual disjunction does not.

24. It commonly happens that two things are equivalent in one respect while formally differing. The Sun is said to be virtually fire because it heats and illuminates as fire does, without it following that the Sun is formally hot because the thing which is formally fire is hot. Concepts or words equivalent in sense likewise often differ formally in their mode of signifying, by reason of which difference a function can belong to one which does not belong to the other, specifically the function of constituting a universal. Thus in these propositions, "Man is animal," "Man is just," the subject constitutes a universal and preserves unity of reason; and yet in these other propositions equivalent to them in sense, "Every man is animal," "Some man is just," the subject does not have unity of reason nor constitute a universal.

25. But from this it may be said, 2º: the proposition "Man is animal," and any other indefinite proposition in necessary matter, is equivalent to a

universal proposition. Therefore the term "man," retaining an indefinite tendency, can be equivalent to the term "every man." Therefore an indefinite tendency is not equivalently disjunctive. This argument at most proves that the term "man" is equivalent to both tendencies, "every" and "some," since even an indefinite proposition in contingent matter is equivalent to a disjunctive one. And thus I once taught that the sense of this assertion, "is a man," should be explained as "is some or every man." I now see, however, that this is not necessary. Yet it could still be answered that the term "man" has of itself an indifferent tendency to be determined by reason of the matter to either distributive or disjunctive supposition, just as the term "some eye" is of itself indifferent to being drawn by reason of the matter either to a purely vague and disjoined supposition or to a particular and disjunctive supposition, as is clear in these statements: "Some eye is required for seeing," "Some eye sees." It could also be said that an indefinite term, although it sometimes is equivalent to a copulative term when it is the subject, never is so when affirmatively predicated. But we are now speaking of an indefinite tendency insofar as it constitutes an object as predicable or affirmable.

26. Leaving these matters aside, I answer that the term "man" by reason of itself, or from its own mode of tending, is never equivalent to the term "every man." This is both sufficiently clear from what has been said and presupposed by Aristotle and St. Thomas, 1, *Peri hermeneias* lect. 10 and 11. Therefore an indefinite proposition is equivalent to a universal neither in any contingent matter nor in every necessary matter, as is clear whenever an inferior is predicated of a superior, for example "Animal is capable of reason," and also whenever the predicate requires a vague supposition of the subject, for example "An eye is required for seeing," "Food is necessary for man to live," which are indefinite propositions in necessary matter without being equivalent to universals. Therefore an indefinite proposition is equivalent to a universal only in necessary matter in which the predicate is superior or equal to the subject and belongs determinately to its parts. Even then the equivalence is not by reason of form or of the sign, but only by reason of matter or "by reason of the thing signified," as St. Thomas says (1, *Peri hermeneias* lect. 10, lit. e, ad fin.), namely because the predicate "animal," for example, if it belongs to some man, must belong to all. Hence one who says that man is animal virtually and mediately asserts that every man is animal, because the latter follows from the former by reason of the matter. In reality the particular proposition "Some man is animal" has an equal equivalence to the universal, but because expressly it differs more from it

than does the indefinite, this kind of equivalence is preferably attributed to the latter.

27. It may be said, 3º: the universal must be adequately predicable not only of individuals but of all inferiors together. Therefore the cognition by which it is constituted must copulatively signify the natures of all. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: of all inferiors taken together distributively, I grant; collectively or copulatively taken, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. If all men are taken copulatively, this proposition, "Every individual of men is man," would have this sense: "The collection of all men is man"; but in this sense it is false no less than these: "An army is man," "A city is man," "The College of the Apostles is man." Therefore the universal "man" is predicable of all individuals only distributively, namely in such a way that although it belongs to all simultaneously in time, it is applied to each only singly. Otherwise one could truly say, "Every human individual is every man," contrary to what St. Thomas taught us above from Aristotle. But in the distributive sense a disjunctively taken predicate is verified of all inferiors together, for it is truly said, "Every man is some man," just as according to St. Thomas (1, *Peri hermeneias* lect. 10, lit. f, ad fin.) it is truly said, "Every man is some animal."

28. It may be said, 4º from Arriaga: a simple incomplex apprehension, for example "man," represents all men copulatively because it apprehends them all simultaneously, and copulatively to represent is nothing other than simultaneously to apprehend all. But since Arriaga, loc. cit. above, admits that the expression "man" in actual predication represents all men disjunctively, he is bound to resolve the objection. For when it is said, "Peter is man," the expression "man" represents all men not successively but simultaneously in time, yet represents them disjunctively. Moreover, when it is said, "A horse is necessary for riding," or even "Man is just," every horse and every man is simultaneously attained, and yet according to all the mode of attaining is equivalently vague or disjunctive. Again, the same difficulty occurs in the complex apprehension "some man" or "some one of the men," where all are simultaneously apprehended in time without being apprehended copulatively. Therefore copulative tendency does not consist precisely in the simultaneous representation of several, but in a special mode of representing which becomes known to us from verification. If it cannot be verified except by several together, the tendency will be copulative; but if it can be verified by any one separately, it will be disjunctive, either formally or equivalently.

29. It may be said, 5º: therefore the concept "man" signifies no object determinately. I answer by distinguishing the consequence: determinately by

specific determination, I deny; by individual determination, I grant the consequence. That concept signifies human rather than equine or leonine nature, etc., and this is to signify determinately by specific determination. But it does not signify the nature of this man rather than that man, but the nature of all indeterminately; and this is individual indetermination. Similarly, the concept "animal" implies generic determination and a corresponding specific indetermination from its mode of signifying, as St. Thomas taught us above.

30. Finally it should be noted that, although an indefinite predicate in a negative proposition supposes distributively, for example in "A stone is not man," which is equivalent to "is no man," it does not therefore cast off an equivalently disjunctive tendency. For even a term formally disjunctive is drawn by a preceding negation to distributive supposition, as when it is said, "A stone is not some man," according to the rule "not some is none." The distribution therefore arises from the negation. It should also be noted that the difference between disjoined and disjunctive suppositions is not taken from the mode of tending of the terms, which is the same in each, but either from the character of the matter when the term is subject, or from the condition of the subject when the term is predicate. Hence the same term "animal," or even "some animal," when predicated in a universal affirmative supposes disjointly or confusedly; but when predicated in a particular or singular affirmative, it supposes disjunctively. All this is established from elementary logic and from the easy descent in either case. But that distinction does not hinder the present purpose, for either supposition, or aptitude for either, preserves the adequate predicability of the universal. It should moreover be noted that the term "man" can abstract by precision from and rationally distinguish its object from the multitude indicated by the term "some man," although one is inferred from the other, according to what was said disp. 1, cap. 6, nn. 9-12.

CHAPTER V.

The Remaining Arguments Against the Conclusion Concerning the Object of the Act Constituting the Universal Are Resolved.

1. Against the principal conclusion established in the preceding chapter against those who make objective precision concerning the object of the universal act, Objection 1º: the cognition "man" constitutes its object as one. Therefore it must abstract by precision from the multiplicity of individuals. But it does not abstract from that which it attains. Therefore it must not attain the multiplicity of individuals. Confirmation 1º: that cognition either

attains several as several or several as one. If the former is said, it does not abstract from plurality; if the latter, it attains several in such a way that it wholly cuts away plurality. Confirmation 2º: if that cognition attains all men, it has the same object as the cognition "every man." But the latter does not render the object one or universal. Therefore neither does the former. Confirmation 3º: that cognition can attain all individuals only as similar. But as similar they are several. Therefore it attains them as several. Confirmation 4º: the cognition "city," "people," or "army" attains several men in a confused and unifying manner, yet does not constitute their nature universal. Therefore the same should be said of the cognition "man" if in reality it attains several men.

2. I answer. To the objection: the cognition "man" attains multiplicity on the side of the object and nevertheless formally, or on the side of the act, abstracts by precision from it, because it is not the expression "multiple man," nor can it be defined through such an expression. Therefore it constitutes the object as one by reason, since it renders it uniformly definable and intentionally undivided, as was proved in chapter 3. To Confirmation 1º: that cognition does not attain several as several, for this signifies plurality exhibited on the side of the act. Nor does it attain several as one if "as" reduplicates unity belonging on the side of the object, for it sets before itself no one entitative unity of the whole of human nature. Yet it does attain several as one if "as" precisely reduplicates the unifying mode of tending of cognition. Therefore it abstracts by precision from real plurality and unity, and by that very fact bestows in exercise extrinsic formal unity, as was explained above.

3. To 2º: those two cognitions have the same object but not attained in the same way. One formally abstracts or makes precision from the plurality which the other expressly exhibits. Therefore one rather than the other is unfit to render the object formally one and universal. Thus the concepts "some man" and "every man" have the same object, yet one rather than the other constitutes a vague individual. Thus, according to St. Thomas (cf. supra disp. 1, cap. 8, n. 8), although the whole of God is attained by the cognition of the Blessed and the whole by Divine cognition, the latter rather than the former denominates God comprehended. To 3º, I deny the major, because although the similarity of several precedes as the foundation of universal cognition, similarity as such need not appear on the side of the act, as is indicated by the reduplication "as similar." Therefore that cognition abstracts by precision from the similarity of several and only indefinitely presents on the side of the act the several as they are man. For it does not have a clarity by reason of which it could be said, "This object is several

similar things," but only a clarity which can be explained thus: "This object is rational animal." Indeed, according to the adversaries, the similarity of several is the foundation of univocal abstraction, yet abstractive cognition objectively abstracts from it.

4. To 4º, I deny the consequence, because the cognition "city," and understand the same of the others, does not render the nature of the citizens universal for two reasons. 1º Because it unites the citizens copulatively or collectively, for it is verifiable only of their collection. But such unification does not suffice for a universal, which must be predicable of any inferior and of all distributively taken. 2º Because it does not perfectly abstract by precision from multitude, for a city as such cannot be defined except through a multitude of men ordered by the form of a republic. Therefore it does not bestow upon the object unity of reason, which necessarily excludes the expression of multitude as such. All things are otherwise in cognition attaining several individuals under the expression "man," as is clear from what has been said. But note that the term "city," although collective and not indefinite in relation to citizens, is nevertheless indefinite and not collective in relation to cities in particular or individually, namely Salamanca, Rome, etc.; for it attains these in the same way as the cognition "man" attains individual men. Therefore city as such is a universal.

5. Objection 2º: if through the cognition "man" multiple individuation is immediately attained, there is immediately attained the form through which human nature is formally multiple. Therefore, although that form is not expressed on the side of the act, human nature, insofar as it falls under the cognition "man," will still be formally multiple. I prove the consequence: although nature under the concept "man" does not appear under the expression "rational," it is nevertheless formally rational under that concept. But this is true for no other reason than that the form through which nature is formally rational, namely objective rationality, is immediately attained. Therefore, if the form through which nature is formally multiple is immediately attained, nature under that concept will be formally multiple, although that form does not appear under its proper expression. Confirmation: cognition is not the form through which human nature is rendered multiple, for that form consists solely in individuating differences. Therefore, if such differences are immediately attained by the concept "man," nothing is lacking to nature under that concept for it to be called formally multiple.

6. I answer: the antecedent is ambiguous. For if "formally multiple" means the same as "specifically multiple" (cf. supra cap. 2, n. 9), the supposition that human nature is formally multiple through any form must

be denied. Rather, it is said to be multiplied "materially" through individuations. If, however, "formally" means the same as "intentionally," or "through a form of reason," the form through which nature is rendered formally multiple is not real multiple individuation immediately attained in just any manner, but immediately attained under the account of such, that is, attained through a concept of this clarity, "multiple individual," or something similar. But it is false that such a form is attained by the concept "man." Finally, if "formally" means the same as "actually," the form through which nature is actually multiple in reality is indeed attained; but this does not suffice for it to be formally multiple through reason unless that form is attained under the account of multiplicity. Hence I deny the consequence. To the proof, I deny the minor: human nature under the concept "man" is not formally rational precisely because objective rationality is immediately attained, but because it is formally implicitly attained under the account of such, that is, through an expression which, although it is not the expression "rational," can nevertheless be defined through it. Individual multiplicity is not attained in this way through the concept "man."

7. To the confirmation: cognition is not the form through which nature is really multiple, but it is the form through which it is multiple in the intellect. For unless there is cognition expressive of multiplicity as such, a nature really multiplied will not be multiple through reason but undivided and one. Add that from the terms themselves multiplicity of reason does not depend on real multiplicity. For rational and risible, compared with one another, are not really many, yet are made many through reason by cognition as by a form.

8. Objection 3º: the cognition "man" rationally distinguishes nature from individuating differences. Therefore it does not attain these on the side of the object. I prove the consequence: if it attains the differences, it unites them through reason and gathers nature and the differences together as into one. But if cognition does this, it cannot rationally distinguish nature from the differences. Therefore, etc. I prove the minor: the cognition "man" cannot rationally distinguish animal from rational; but this is for no other reason than that it unites both through reason. Therefore, etc. I answer: that cognition distinguishes nature from differences insofar as the latter are known or knowable under the account of such, that is, under concepts discriminating one individual from another, such as "Peterhood," "Paulhood," etc. But it does not distinguish by a distinction completed through the concept "man" alone, for one precisive concept does not elicit a duality of reason between extremes really indistinct, as we explained in its proper place (supra disp. 1, cap. 8, n. 5).

9. That cognition therefore unites differences and nature and at the same time distinguishes them, but in different senses. It unites them in relation to itself, since it represents them all after the manner of one. It distinguishes them in relation to concepts discriminating individuals, because from the concepts "man" and "Peterhood" there results a certain apparent otherness and metaphorical duality of objects. Hence it follows in what sense indefinite cognition "abstracts nature from differences": namely by an abstraction lying wholly not on the side of the object but on the side of the act. Nature is abstracted from differences not objectively or specifically taken, but taken formally under the account of such. Nor is it the same thing for nature to be abstracted from differences and for nature without differences to be transferred to the intentional state; for to the state constituted through the cognition "man" the differences are also transferred according to everything they are on the side of the object. Therefore in such a state nature is not without differences except when the differences are formally taken. To the proof I deny the minor, for another cause remains, namely that the cognition "man" represents neither animal nor rational explicitly under the account of such. It is therefore unfit to distinguish one from the other either in itself or in relation to another cognition, at least by a mutual distinction of reason.

10. Objection 4º: if the cognition "man" attains all individuals, it attains infinitely many objects, namely infinitely many possible men. Therefore it will become infinitely perfect, which is absurd. I prove the consequence: it will contain in itself infinitely many formalities distinguished by a reasoned distinction of reason, for in it the representation of Peter could be distinguished from the representation of Paul, and so of the others, so that there would be as many formally distinct representations as there are possible men, and consequently infinitely many. But every formality of representation, insofar as distinguished from the others, implies a perfection. Therefore cognition will contain infinitely many perfections and consequently become infinitely perfect. The objection has an evident counter-instance in these concepts: "infinitely many men," "all and each possible being," "everything knowable," and the like, which certainly imply a reference to infinitely many objects, since they cannot be verified of any finite collection. Moreover, every beatific Vision is cognition of an infinite object as such, and of an infinitely more perfect infinite than the infinite multitude of possible men. Is that Vision therefore infinitely perfect?

11. To the objection, therefore, I deny the consequence. To the proof: first, granting the major, I distinguish the minor. Each formality implies a perfection properly distinct from the perfections of the other formalities, I

deny; improperly and apparently distinct, I grant the minor. And distinguishing the consequent similarly as to its first part, I deny the second. From the fact that our intellect can distinguish formalities of some being without end, infinity of perfection does not follow unless those formalities independently claim infinity for themselves, as do the Divine attributes, because a distinction of reason does not properly multiply the perfections of the object. This is clear both in the examples just given and in the cognition by which we believe that God is infinite and can do infinitely many things, and in the beatific knowledge of Christ's soul, which according to St. Thomas, III^{a}, q. 10, a. 3, knows infinitely many things in the Word, and indeed comprehensively, without therefore becoming infinitely perfect. See Cajetan there.

12. Next, I deny the major, namely that infinitely many formalities can be rationally distinguished in the cognition "man." For that cognition cannot be conceived as representing Peter without by that very fact being conceived as representing the other men. The reason is that, since it represents Peter precisely as man, it cannot be conceived as representing Peter without being conceived as having the bare and indefinite expression "man." But such an expression is inseparably an image and representation of all men. It may be said: animal is rationally distinguished from rational because animal can be found somewhere without being rational; but a representation of Peter can also be found which is not a representation of Paul. Therefore, etc. I answer by distinguishing the minor: a representation of Peter as Peter, I grant; a representation of Peter as man, I deny the minor and the consequence. The parity with animal proves at most that the representation of Peter can be rationally distinguished from the representation of Paul in an act identifying with itself these expressions, "Peter" and "Paul," for one of these can be found without the other in the sense in which animal can be found without rational. But it by no means proves this of the representation of Peter precisely as man, which can nowhere be found without the representation of Paul likewise as man.

13. Objection 5^{o}: none of us has a species of all possible animals. Therefore none of us can elicit a cognition terminated at all of them. Therefore the cognition "animal" does not terminate at all animals. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: a proper, quidditative, or intuitive species, I grant; a confused and abstractive species, I deny the antecedent. I likewise distinguish the consequence with respect to confused and abstractive cognition, such as the cognition "animal." Thus for clear quidditative or intuitive cognition a proper species of the object is indeed required, but for confused and abstractive cognition an alien species can serve, as is clear in

the cognition we have in the present state of spiritual objects. It is therefore not surprising if a species impressed by any individual animal, under that account in which it is similar to the others, namely a species of sensation, can be an abstractive species of all animals and serve for their confused cognition. All are bound to admit this in the species productive of the cognition "infinitely many animals."

14. Objection 6º: therefore the human species formally constituted is nothing other than all individuals confusedly known. Consequently when it is said, "Man is a species," the sense will be, "All human individuals, confusedly known, are a species." Therefore the term "man" then supposes for all individuals no less than when it is said, "Man is animal." It will therefore be permissible to descend thus: "Therefore Peter is a species, and Paul is a species," etc., just as it is permissible to descend thus: "Therefore Peter is an animal, and Paul is an animal," etc. But this is contrary to the precepts of elementary logic, which make simple supposition immobile and incapable of resolution. Otherwise this syllogism would also be valid: "Man is a species; Peter is man; therefore Peter is a species." Yet this difficulty equally presses the adversaries. Posit man objectively separated by precision from individuals: even then in the proposition "Man is a species," the subject stands in the direct term not for the concept but for the nature, for the concept is not a species predicable as that which, but purely as that by which. Therefore the term "man" stands for the same direct term as when it is said, "Man is animal," where too on the side of the subject the nature separated by precision and universal is retained. Why, then, can there be descent and resolution of the subject into individual instances in one proposition rather than the other? Or why is the former syllogism defective if this one is not defective: "Man is animal; Peter is man; therefore Peter is animal"?

15. Therefore, answering for all positions, I grant the first inference and also the second, provided "confusedly known" is a term formally appellated by the predicate. I distinguish the third: the term "man" then supposes for all individuals no less, etc., and in no different way, I deny; no less, but in a different way, I grant. Then I deny the final inference. Predicates of second intention, such as "species," "genus," etc., make the subject suppose simply, that is, suppose for the real object, not in just any manner, but insofar as clothed with that determinate cognition denoted by the name of the subject, for example "man," so that, if the direct term of the subject is separated from such cognition, the predicate cannot be applied to it. The reason is that predicates of second intention formally appellate the subject as it sounds and are not otherwise applied to it except by reason of the intentional form

under which it is then named. Therefore "Man is a species" has this sense: all human individuals, while they fall under the cognition "man," are denominated species by it. But when the predicate appellates formally, it ceases to be verified of the direct term of the subject if this is taken under another form or puts off the former. It is truly said, "A just man is heir of Heaven"; but if the form of justice is removed, the predicate "heir of Heaven" is not verified of that same man. Therefore one also argues badly thus concerning sugar: "This white thing formally disperses vision; this white thing is this sweet thing; therefore this sweet thing formally disperses vision."

16. Hence it is clear why that descent is not permissible: "therefore Peter is a species, and Paul is a species, and so the other men," because although the subject is the same as regards the direct term in the copulative descent enumerating all individuals and in the proposition "Man is a species," the intentional form under which it is taken is not the same. In the descent the subject is taken under the name and cognition "Peter," "Paul," etc., a form which the predicate "species" rejects, since it determinately requires the subject under the form of the cognition "man," just as the predicate "heir of Heaven" determinately requires the subject under the form of Grace, and the predicate "dispersing vision" the subject under the form of whiteness. Therefore the proposition "Peter is a species" signifies that this man is denominated species by the cognition "Peter," which is false. It is also clear why the syllogism objected in n. 14 is invalid, because the supposition and appellation are changed. It is further clear why copulative descent is permissible from the proposition "Man is animal": because the supposition of the subject is personal and the predicate does not formally appellate the intentional form but belongs to the subject taken specifically. If it is asked whether it is truly said, "Peter, insofar as man, is a species," I answer that it is truly said if it signifies only that the object of the cognition "Peter," while falling under the concept "man," receives the denomination of species, at least as a partial subject. It is otherwise if it denotes, as appears more readily, that the account of species belongs to Peter in the same way as it belongs to human nature.

17. Reply: according to our principles, once the cognition "man" is posited, all individuals remain known. Therefore Peter and any other individual truly receives the denomination of being known by the concept "man." But the denomination "human species" is nothing other than the denomination "known by the concept man." Therefore Peter truly receives the denomination "human species." Hence, just as from this antecedent, "Man is indefinitely known," it rightly follows that Peter is indefinitely

known, Paul is indefinitely known, etc., so it will follow that Peter is a species, Paul is a species, etc. I answer: if we speak of individuals not in the formal but in the objective sense, that is, according to the being which they have on the side of the object, in which sense our conclusion speaks of the object of the act constituting the universal, I grant the first enthymeme and the subsumed minor, and distinguish the final consequent: Peter truly receives, etc., as a partial subject, I grant; as the total subject, I deny the consequence, for that denomination falls indivisibly upon all individuals. Likewise, I grant that it rightly follows that Peter is indefinitely known, and indeed is a species, as a partial subject of the denominations "indefinitely known" and "species," but by no means as their total subject. Nothing absurd follows from this.

18. But if we speak of individuals in the formal sense, namely as known under the account of such, once the cognition "man" is posited, it is false in strict dialectical speech to say, "Peter is indefinitely known," or "Peter is a species," or "Peter receives the denomination known by the concept man." Indeed, strictly speaking it is false to say, "All human individuals are known by the concept man." The reason is that, since these predicates, "indefinitely known," "species," etc., are terms of second intention, they make the subject suppose simply and formally appellate the subject as it sounds, namely by reason of the expression by which it is then named. Therefore those propositions, rigorously taken, signify that Peter is indefinitely known by the cognition "Peter" and receives from that same cognition the denomination "known by the concept man"; likewise that all individuals, under and from this expression "all human individuals," are known by the concept "man," or are a species. This sense is false both in our opinion and in everyone's.

19. Objection 7º, from the Thomists: besides the universal in representing, such as the cognition or word "man," a universal in being must be admitted; otherwise the opinion of the Nominalists would be revived, which St. Anselm severely rebukes (*De incarnatione Verbi* cap. 2, ad fin.), calling them "heretics of dialectic" who "think universal substances are nothing but the condition of a word." But in our opinion there is no universal in being. Therefore, etc. I prove the minor: in our opinion there is only confused cognition of singulars and the singulars themselves. But neither is a universal in being: cognition is not, because it is only universal in representing; the singulars themselves are not, because they are not one thing but many. Therefore, etc. If it is said that singulars are not intrinsically one thing but are constituted one extrinsically by confused cognition, against this, 1º: the universal in being must be adequately distinguished from the universal in representing, which is confused cognition. Otherwise there

will be no universal beyond that admitted by the Nominalists. The proof is that a universal formally constituted by cognition is not formally other than cognition, for nothing is formally distinguished from that by which it is formally constituted. Therefore the universal we admit is formally the very same universal as that of the Nominalists, namely cognition universally representing.

20. Against this, 2º: whatever we admit the Nominalists also admitted, namely confused cognition of singulars and the singulars themselves, nor could they be ignorant that singulars are extrinsically denominated confusedly known. Therefore we establish nothing beyond Nominalism. Against this, 3º: the cognition "man" is universal in representing. Therefore it represents something universal. But it does not represent itself. Therefore it represents a universal adequately distinct from itself. Against this, 4º: if the universal is nothing other than a complex of singulars and confused cognition, since this whole complex is real and truly capable of existing in reality, there will be a universal in reality according to all its constitutive features. Or otherwise: the universal is not one by real unity, but cognition is something real. Therefore cognition is not the unity of the universal in being. Against this, 5º: cognition makes the universal not taken entitatively but taken representatively. But cognition so taken formally implies that which it represents. Therefore it makes the universal insofar as it represents unity and universality on the side of the object; or, if it represents only a multiple individual, cognition taken representatively will formally imply multiplicity and consequently will not formally constitute one.

21. I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. To the proof we say that the appended answer is true, namely that the singulars themselves objectively taken are formally constituted one and universal through indefinite cognition as through an extrinsic form, so that singulars indefinitely represented are the universal as that which, while cognition is only as that by which. Nor do the attacks stand. To 1º: the universal in being is adequately distinguished from the universal in representing according to the direct term, though not according to the whole denomination "universal in being." But distinction according to the direct term suffices for it to be false that there is no universal besides that which is in representing. Likewise it would falsely and with dialectical heresy be said that the universal is nothing besides a fictitious being of reason; yet according to the Thomists the denomination universal is not adequately distinguished from such a being. Likewise it would be false, and with a heresy more than dialectical, to say that the adopted son of God and heir of Heaven is nothing besides a supernatural being, namely Grace; and yet the denomination "son

and heir" is formally constituted through Grace. Hence the universal in being and the universal in representing are indeed indistinct "formally," that is, according to the form, but are also distinct "formally," that is, "truly and properly," according to the subject denominated as that which. For the subject in the one universal is a really multiple nature, while in the other it is cognition itself. In the same sense the Thomistic universal both is and is not formally indistinct from a fictitious being, and the adopted son of God both is and is not formally a supernatural being.

22. To 2º: the Nominalists, as the Excellent Doctor well notes (disp. 6, *Metaphysica* sect. 2), perhaps disagree with the other Scholastics only in their manner of speaking. For they admit indefinite cognition of several really similar things, but do not wish the denomination "universal" and "predicable" to be attributed to the object indefinitely known, but only to the cognition or name "man," for example. Yet because from this manner of speaking it follows that the sciences, which concern universals, do not concern things but only concepts or names, the Nominalists are rightly rebuked as departing from the doctrine of Catholic dialectic. We speak and think very differently, for we say that the universal of which the sciences treat stands in the direct term and as that which, not for cognition or a name but for the real object, with cognition connoted obliquely or as that by which. In sum, according to us, for the multiple individual to be denominated indefinitely known is for it to be formally constituted a universal in being, and this very thing the Nominalists deny. Certainly, if any Nominalist asserted that nature is objectively separated by precision from differences and fictitiously denominated one and fictitiously related to inferiors, he would say whatever the Thomists say. Yet if he at the same time wished the universal of which the sciences treat to stand only for the fictitious relation, he would without doubt be rejected by the Thomists, who would rightly deny that they subscribe to Nominalism.

23. To 3º: by the same argument it could be proved that the cognition "every man," which certainly is universal in representing, must represent a universal; or that God or the Sun must cause a universal because each is called universal in causing. Cognition therefore is called universal in representing in no other sense than insofar as its representation is one in itself and is terminated at really several objects, just as one cause in itself flows into several effects. To 4º, I deny the consequence if "in reality" signifies a complex or universal adequately existing outside the soul, in which sense we reject in the present treatise a universal in reality. If, however, by the name real being or being existing in reality there is broadly understood whatever exists without fiction, the consequence is entirely true

and has been clearly proved by St. Thomas (cf. supra tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 4, n. 33; cap. 5, n. 26). Nevertheless it must be denied that cognition should be called absolutely real unity with respect to the object, for unity is not called real unless from the effect of removing intrinsic real multiplicity. Unity of reason or intentional unity does not have this effect, even if it consists in a non-fictitious being. See what was said in a similar matter concerning distinction of reason (in hoc tract. disp. 1, cap. 8, n. 15).

24. To 5º: cognition makes the universal in exercise and in the genus of formal cause when "taken representatively," that is, according to its confused and indefinite mode of representing. And since this mode is not distinguished from the entity of cognition, cognition also makes the universal "taken entitatively." Yet cognition does not make the universal "taken representatively" if this means "taken according to that which it itself represents." Hence for cognition to make the universal, it need neither represent the unity or universality of the object nor formally imply the multiplicity of individuals which it attains on the side of the object. Thus cognition taken representatively makes something known, comprehended, and scientifically known; yet it need not for that reason represent cognition, comprehension, or science.

25. Finally, it is objected: the sciences concern universals. But they do not concern singulars nor confused cognition of them. Therefore the universal is something besides singulars and their cognition. I answer by distinguishing the minor: they do not concern singulars under the account of such, that is, as known through concepts distinguishing one from another, I grant; they do not concern singulars under a common account, that is, as known through an indefinite concept of the whole species or genus, I deny the minor and the consequence. The sciences are said to concern universals because they discuss individual things, for example things of the human species, through acts which are not verified of Peter rather than Paul but equally and uniformly of all, as when they define man and demonstrate of him that he is risible, capable of wonder, etc. And this is in reality to discuss singulars, but under the condition that the singulars be conceived indefinitely or universally, so that they uniformly receive whatever is predicated of them. Here it should be noted from St. Thomas, Opusc. 56, around the middle, that no science considers the universal, adequately taken, through itself, that is, according to both form and substrate or subject simultaneously. For Logic considers through itself only the form, because "it does not consider man insofar as he is man, but insofar as he is species." The other sciences, however, consider the universal with respect to the subject

matter: "for the natural philosopher does not consider mobile body insofar as it is genus, but insofar as it is mobile body."

CHAPTER VI.
Whether Comparative Cognition Is Required for the Full Constitution of the Universal.

1. A threefold cognition, or knowledge, can concern a universal nature. The first is purely precisive, directly attaining a nature that is really multiple and exercitively prescinding it, on the part of the mode, from real multiplicity, while saying nothing of the inferiors as such. Of this sort is the cognition "man," or "animal." This is called purely abstractive cognition, or absolute and simple abstraction, because it does not compare the common nature with the inferiors. The second is a reflexive, purely apprehensive cognition, which reflexively compares the nature already precisively abstracted and intentionally one with the inferiors, apprehending its identity or agreement with many, yet without actually judging that it is in them. Such is this apprehension: "a nature mentally one and applicable to many"; or, "animal appearing neither as man nor as horse, yet capable of being in man and horse by identity." This is called comparison, or comparative cognition, but simple comparison; because, although it is complex in the line of apprehension, it nevertheless lacks that composition of subject and predicate which is proper to judgment. The third is judicative cognition, which actually predicates and affirms the universal nature of the inferiors; and this is called composite comparison. Whether this third cognition makes or preserves the Universal will be discussed in the following question. For now we ask whether the Universal is fully constituted by absolute abstraction, or whether it requires in addition the comparative cognition placed second.

2. I assert 1º: "The metaphysical Universal is formally and ultimately constituted by simple abstraction." Thus commonly our Authors, with the more recent Thomists agreeing, such as the College of St. Thomas, Palanco, Gabriel of the Conception, and others, after Master Soto, q. 3, *De Universalibus*, against many other Thomists and Scotists, whom Mastrius, speaking without distinction about the Universal in act, cites and follows (Disp. 3, Log. q. 3). Yet those Thomists agree with us that the metaphysical Universal is made by abstraction; they teach this, however, not in the genus of formal cause, as though cognition itself were the form of the Universal, but in the genus of efficient cause, insofar as abstraction practically fashions

unity on the part of the object. This doctrine has already been sufficiently refuted above.

3. The assertion is proved: simple abstraction, for example the cognition "man," fully constitutes "one apt to be in many," or "one indifferent to many"; but this is the metaphysical Universal; therefore, etc. The minor is clear from the definition given in chap. 1, n. 1. The major, moreover, was expressly proved in chap. 3, from n. 1 to 6. And it can now again be confirmed from Aristotle, Metaph. X, text 1, who teaches that certain things are one "whose account is one; others whose intellection is one; others whose intellection is indivisible, etc." There St. Thomas, lect. 1, lit. d, says: "Some things are said to be one because of one account; such are those whose intellection is one, which are apprehended by the soul in one apprehension; and those are said to be apprehended in one apprehension whose apprehension is one and indivisible." And shortly afterward he adds: "One in species is indivisible insofar as it is one according to science and cognition." Likewise: "The intellect apprehends as one that in which all the inferiors agree. And thus in the apprehension of the intellect the species becomes indivisible, although it is really diverse in diverse individuals." Thus far St. Thomas, plainly teaching that individuals become rationally one by the unity of a universal Species by the very fact that they are known uniformly and indefinitely in one apprehension.

4. But if such an apprehension renders the nature one, it cannot fail to render it indifferent to many. For it renders it one precisely insofar as it mentally strips it of differences; but a nature thus stripped becomes mentally indifferent, just as it would be really indifferent and communicable to several if it were really stripped of differences, as the Platonists dreamed. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1, says: "The intention of universality, namely that one and the same thing have a relation to many, arises from the abstraction of the intellect." Here it should be noted that the Universal is said in two ways to be apt to be in many. 1º Purely really, or by merely real identity; and this aptitude is not physical but logical, like that which any thing has for being what it is. Consequently this aptitude does not arise from the intellect, but is presupposed on the part of the object. 2º Intentionally, or by real identity as known; namely because the universal nature is apt, through supervening comparative acts, to be apprehended or judged as really identified with several, notwithstanding the unity acquired by abstraction (Peynado, hic disp. 5, n. 2). This is the aptitude which formally arises from abstractive cognition. For, once the cognition "man" is posited, if the intellect should from elsewhere apprehend Peter, Paul, and

other individual men, it will immediately detect the identity or agreement of that abstract nature with each of them.

5. I assert 2º: "The logical Universal is fully constituted by simple abstraction and does not require comparative cognition." This also is the more common opinion of our authors, especially the more recent, against the Scotists and almost all the Thomists, to whom some of ours adhere. The Thomists and many Scotists are moved by the fact that the logical Universal is formally constituted by a relation of reason, which they understand as fictitious, to the inferiors; and this relation does not exist until it is fashioned by comparative cognition. Our own authors who require such cognition rely on another foundation, to be reported below. Recall from chap. 1, n. 1, the definitions of each Universal, metaphysical and logical; and observe that, according to the opinion of many, predicability belongs to the essence even of the metaphysical Universal, no less than rationality belongs to the essence of man. Consequently the metaphysical and logical Universals are distinguished only as the implicit and explicit at the highest level. If this is true, our present assertion follows of itself from the preceding one and requires no other proof. Nevertheless, it is more commonly taught or supposed throughout the School that predicability is as it were a property of the metaphysical Universal, but belongs to the essence of the logical Universal, because the latter is defined through predicability, and therefore is signified in common by the name "Predicable," and in particular by the name "Genus, Species, Difference," etc. This being posited or admitted:

6. The assertion is proved 1º: simple abstraction fully forms the metaphysical Universal, as we now suppose with most of the Adversaries; therefore it also fully forms the logical Universal. The consequence is proved: because the logical Universal, according to the common mode of opinion, is not a physical property of the metaphysical Universal, as heat is a property of fire, but is a metaphysical property, as True, Good, and One are called properties of Being. Therefore between the two Universals there is not a real distinction, but only a distinction of reason. Therefore the cognition that forms one is not really different from that which forms the other. Hence the Excellent Doctor, whom the Adversaries allege for themselves, Metaph. disp. 6, sect. 8, n. 2, expressly teaches that the Universal which they call "in being" either is nothing at all, or is the very Universal "in predicating," and that the two coincide in reality and differ only insofar as we explain one by order to being and the other by order to predication. Certainly this difference does not argue a real distinction, as is clear in the True and the Good, one of which is explained by order to the intellect and the other by order to the will. Moreover, the metaphysical Universal is no

less relative than the logical; for it cannot be conceived or explained except by order to many in which it is or can be. Therefore either both or neither requires comparative cognition under the title of relation.

7. It is proved 2º, specifically against the Thomists. Comparative cognition presupposes the logical Universal already constituted; therefore it does not constitute it. The antecedent is proved: comparative cognition represents a nature as universal, as superior, as common and agreeing with several, not indeed merely exercitively, as the Thomists maintain, but signately. But cognition presupposes that which it signately represents. Therefore it presupposes the nature as already possessing those denominations in which logical universality consists according to the Thomists. The major is proved: comparative cognition has this or a similar tendency: "a nature one and common to several, superior with respect to each, and apt to be predicated of them." But this tendency signately represents the nature as common, as superior, etc., no differently than this expression, "rational nature," signately represents the nature as rational; therefore, etc. The point is pressed 1º: this apprehensive cognition, "a nature apt to be predicated," just as signately represents predicability as does this judicative cognition, "a nature is apt to be predicated," as is clear from the examples, "rational nature," "a nature is rational." But cognition does not effect, but presupposes, what it judicatively predicates, as the Adversaries do not deny.

8. The point is pressed 2º: a formal definition does not exercitively effect, but presupposes, the essence of the thing defined. But comparative cognition is the definition of the logical Universal, since it tends in this or a similar way: "one nature apt to be predicated of many," or "common to many." Therefore it does not exercitively make, but presupposes, the essence of the logical Universal. The point is pressed 3º: that the sun is universal in causing, and the concept "every man" in representing, does not depend upon that universality being reflexively and comparatively known. Therefore likewise the fact that a precisive nature is universal in being and in predicating does not depend upon reflexive comparative cognition. Certainly no reason appears why, of these apprehensions, "the sun is a universal cause with respect to sublunary things," "a nature is universal with respect to its inferiors," the first should presuppose, whereas the second should exercitively make, the universality which it expresses.

9. It is proved 3º, against our authors who hold the contrary in this matter. The cognition "man" constitutes the nature in an intentional state and, at the same time, by removing differences, frees it from every impediment to predication of any individual. Therefore it renders it

predicable of any individual and thus logically universal. The consequence is clear: because a nature already actually apprehended and freed from the impediments to predication remains ready for predication; and to be predicable, or apt to be predicated, is nothing else. They say that through the concept "man" the nature is rendered proximately comparable to many, or proximately apt intentionally to be in many through simple comparison, and they judge that the metaphysical Universal is constituted by this aptitude. Yet they say it is not rendered proximately predicable, or proximately apt to be predicated, which proximate aptitude they require for the logical Universal, but only remotely so. For an aptitude is not proximate unless nothing must intervene between it and the act to which it refers. But between the aptitude bestowed by the concept "man" and actual predication something must intervene, namely simple comparison; for the intellect cannot arrive at the actual predication of man of Peter unless it first compares Peter with man as such and apprehends the identity or agreement of the two. Therefore a nature is not proximately apt to be predicated of Peter or anyone else until apprehensive comparison supervenes. This comparison consequently presupposes the metaphysical Universal and constitutes the logical Universal by constituting the proximate Predicable.

10. But against this doctrine, by which alone these Authors are moved, our proof proceeds as follows. In order for human nature to be constituted proximately predicable, insofar as suffices for the logical Universal, it does not await those acts which are required on the part of the intellective potency for predication, unless they are otherwise required so that the nature may be present to the intellect and free of impediments which, on the part of the nature itself, could obstruct predication of any individual. But comparative cognition, although required on the part of the potency for predication, is nevertheless not required for the nature to be intentionally present, nor for it to be free from the impediments of multitude or singularity, which alone obstruct predication of any individual on the part of the nature. Therefore human nature does not await comparison in order to be constituted, etc. The consequence holds, and the minor is certain, because human nature through the concept "man" is rendered intentionally present and is formally prescinded and stripped of all multitude and singularity.

11. The major is proved 1º: because unless it were true, human nature in the being of the logical Universal would have to be constituted by the impressed species of singulars, by the command of the will determining the intellect both to comparison and to judgment, and by the applicative decree of Omnipotence concurring with the intellect in predication. For all these

are required on the part of the potency for a nature actually to be predicated, and in them all the reason of the contrary position applies, as will be clear to anyone applying it. But this is unheard of and plainly false, since Logic has no concern for these acts when it explains the predicability of the Universal. 2º Because between the aptitude bestowed by the concept "man" and simple comparison something must intervene on the part of the potency, namely the absolute apprehension of singulars; for apprehending singulars is prior to comparing them with the common nature. Yet according to the Adversaries the nature does not await such apprehension in order to be constituted proximately comparable, insofar as suffices for the metaphysical Universal.

12. 3º Because otherwise a nature could never be fully constituted a logical Universal, which consequently, insofar as fully constituted, would be impossible. The consequence is proved: the fully constituted logical Universal must be proximately predicable of all and each of its inferiors, even possible ones, taken by name or singly, as Dialecticians commonly suppose. Therefore, if proximate predicability is not constituted before comparison, the logical Universal will not be fully constituted until a comparison of the nature with all and each of the inferiors by name exists. But such comparison is impossible, since the individuals, for example human individuals, are infinite. Therefore the fully constituted logical Universal will likewise be impossible. Nor say that the difficulty is common, because the Universal, whether it requires comparison or not, must be predicable of infinitely many taken singly, while actual predication of infinitely many singly expressed is impossible. Do not say this. For in order that the Universal be actually predicable of infinitely many, simultaneity of predication is not required, but simultaneity of aptitude for any predication among infinitely many possible predications; just as an active cause simultaneously contains infinitely many effects of the same species, and the metaphysical Universal is simultaneously proximately apt for infinitely many comparisons. But in our opinion this simultaneity of aptitude is constituted by simple abstraction. If, however, it were constituted by comparison, it could not be understood until infinitely many comparisons simultaneously existed, which is impossible.

13. The point is pressed: man as such, once comparison with Peter is posited, either is constituted a logical Universal with respect to Paul and the rest, or is not. If the first is said, then human nature is rendered proximately predicable of Paul without being actually compared with him, although comparison with Paul is required for predication of him; and thus the whole foundation of the Adversaries collapses. If the second is said, then man as

such is not rendered predicable of Peter by that comparison in the manner of a logical Universal. This is clear because the logical Universal is not proximately predicable of only one, otherwise it would not differ from an individual. But man as such is rendered by that comparison proximately predicable of Peter alone, not of Paul nor of the others; therefore, etc. And from this it follows that man as such cannot be made predicable by any comparison in the manner of a logical Universal, to which uniform predicability of all and each individuals is necessary; for it can never be verified that it has been compared with all and each. Nor will a comparison with all confusedly known under the concept "every man" or "infinitely many individuals" suffice. For the Universal must be proximately apt to be predicated of each as known under the proper concept of each; for why should it be more apt of Peter and Paul so known than of the rest? Therefore the aptitude of the Universal will not be proximate until these proper concepts supervene, which certainly are prerequisite to predication.

14. 4° By examples. Prime matter is constituted proximately apt in the being of a subject to receive form through dispositions belonging on the part of the matter, prescinding from conditions required on the part of the Agent. Suppose the matter of wood to be dry and hot in the highest degree, and God to deny concurrence to the active causes for the production of the form of fire. Then certainly the matter would be proximately apt and ultimately disposed for reception of the fiery form, although some condition prerequisite to actual reception would be lacking, namely the will of God to concur with the active causes. But because this condition is required only on the part of the Agent and is not among the passive dispositions required on the part of the subject, the matter is therefore said to be proximately and ultimately disposed even without it. Similarly, a stone already polished and endowed with a suitable shape for placement in an arch is judged on its own part proximately apt and ultimately disposed for placement. Yet before it is actually placed, several things remain to be done beforehand, for example that the artisan free his hands and apply himself to the work, that he likewise shape the other stones, and that he prepare instruments for raising and supporting them. From what has been said, therefore, we conclude in our matter that there is a twofold proximate predicability: one purely passive, by force of which nothing on the part of the common nature obstructs predication of any inferior; and this predicability alone, for which simple abstraction suffices, is intrinsic to the logical Universal and constitutive of it. The other is active, which renders the potency on its own part ready for the exercise of predication; and this indeed requires comparative cognition, but

is extrinsic to the logical Universal, which it presupposes as fully constituted in the being of such a Universal.

Objections Are Proposed and Resolved.

15. We shall now solve the objections against the second Conclusion, which is the principal and more difficult one; and by this anything opposing the first will likewise be solved. It is objected 1º, from the Thomists: the logical Universal formally consists in a fictitious respect, or relation of reason, to inferiors; but that relation is not made except through comparative cognition. Therefore this cognition is necessary for the logical Universal to be made. The minor is certain, for a fictitious relation is not made unless it is known, and it cannot be known except by comparative cognition of the foundation with the term. The major is proved 1º from St. Thomas, both q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 11, where he says that "the intellect devises the relations of Genus and Species by considering the order which is in the intellect to things *ad extra*"; and Summa Theologiae I, q. 28, a. 1, where he says: "The respect signified by things which are said relatively is sometimes only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing with another, as when it compares man with animal as Species with Genus"; and also those places in the preliminary matters where the Thomists contended that, according to St. Thomas, the intention of Universality is a being of reason.

16. It is proved 2º: the logical Universal is formally constituted through a respect to inferiors; but not through a respect which is real. Therefore through a respect of reason, or fictitious respect. The major seems certain, both because the Universal is formally constituted by that through which it is defined, while it is defined through order to many or toward many; and because, formally as such, it is superior, while a superior as such formally implies order to inferiors. The minor is therefore proved: first, because a respect between extremes really indistinct cannot be real, while the Universal is not really distinguished from its inferiors. Secondly, because there is not in reality a nature one and common to several or superior to several; but there would be if the relation of superiority were real.

17. I answer by denying the major. To the first proof: when St. Thomas says that the intellect devises relations, etc., he speaks of a relation "according to predication," or quasi-transcendental relation, which is not fictitious but consists in direct precisive cognition. For this cognition, while without fiction it denominates a nature apt to be known in many and predicated of many, renders it quasi-transcendentally related to many, after the manner of a physical aptitude. The intellect does not make this relation

through reflexive comparative cognition, but signately knows it once it has already been made, since it "devises it by considering the order which is in the intellect to things *ad extra*." These words plainly signify that such an order is already in the intellect before reflexive consideration; just as if it were said that the intellect devises the transcendental relation of man to discourse by considering the order which is in rationality to the act of reasoning.

18. But if St. Thomas understands a fictitious relation, either he takes it purely fundamentally, or, if formally, he neither signifies nor intends that such a relation pertains to the constitution of the Universal, but only that, because of the imperfection of the intellect, the Universal already constituted cannot be reflexively conceived by us without a fictitious relation being apprehended at the same time. Thus God as superior, as creator, as lord, is not constituted by a fictitious relation, which nevertheless is necessarily or frequently apprehended by us whenever we conceive God under that aspect. Likewise, for a man to be deprived of sight does not consist in a fiction of the intellect, which nevertheless is necessary for privation to be apprehended by us. Say the same in answer to the second testimony of St. Thomas and to the other passages repeated by the Thomists. And lest there be any doubt about the mind of St. Thomas, reread what was said in treat. 1 (Disp. 2, chap. 4, from n. 33, and chap. 5, from n. 11), where the doctrine of the solution just given is also confirmed (ibid., chap. 5, from n. 34 to 38).

19. To the second proof: the major is true of a quasi-transcendental respect, or one "according to predication," which consists in aptitude for predication of many and imitates the aptitude of a fully polished stone for conjunction with others in a structure. Such a respect does not require the term to be actually posited, but only possible. Nor does the definition of the Universal through order to many prove anything else. For it is certain that an aptitude or capacity of the thing defined for some term or function cannot be explained or conceived by us under the aspect of such an aptitude except by comparative expressions mentioning that term or function as possible; yet on the part of the object there corresponds at most to these expressions a transcendental respect indistinct from the aptitude itself. Examples are the definitions of animal and rational by order to sensation and reasoning, and likewise the definition of the metaphysical Universal, which can be formed only in relative terms.

20. Superiority, insofar as it properly signifies a relation, is not constitutive of the Universal, but only insofar as it is broadly taken for community or breadth of predicability, which none of the inferiors,

whenever it exists in the intellect, can equal. But superiority so taken is not a predicamental respect and does not require existence of the term, as is clear in Omnipotence, which from eternity is a power superior to created power, and also in an Angel, who would possess a nature superior to human nature even if no man actually existed. Certainly, if the entity of Grace were divinely produced outside a subject while no natural entity existed, it would not therefore cease to be a "supernatural being," although by this name superiority with respect to natural being is expressed. But that such superiority, breadth, community, quasi-transcendental order, and whatever pertains to the formal constitution of the Universal is a real being within the soul, although it is not found in reality, that is, outside the soul, we have often shown above, and it is now tiresome to repeat it.

21. It is objected 2°, from our own Authors: the Universal is not proximately predicable until the intellect apprehends its agreement with the inferiors, for the intellect judges this agreement in predicating and cannot judge things unknown. But such agreement is not apprehended except by comparative cognition. Therefore this cognition is required for the Universal to become proximately predicable. Confirmation: that cognition renders an object proximately predicable from which actual predication can immediately follow; for if something must intervene, the object will be predicable only remotely or mediately, just as it will not be proximately visible until it has conditions between which and actual vision nothing intervenes. But actual predication can immediately follow comparison alone, whereas it cannot immediately follow simple abstraction; therefore, etc. This objection has already been anticipated and solved in the proof of the Conclusion. Now, from what was said there:

22. I answer by distinguishing the major: it is not proximately predicable by active proximity, which is extrinsic to the logical Universal, I grant; by passive proximity, which alone is intrinsic to the Universal, I deny the major. And granting the minor, I similarly distinguish the consequence. The same distinction must be applied to the Confirmation, and it must be denied that the logical Universal is not understood as fully constituted until it is proximately predicable by a proximity which actual predication immediately follows. For proximity suffices with this qualification: "insofar as concerns the common nature." Nor is it absurd that the logical Universal be said to be mediately and remotely predicable if account is taken of everything required from every side for predication, as the Adversaries are bound to admit when account is taken of the decree of God or the command of the will. For it is said to be proximately predicable only on its own part and insofar as it is opposed to the fundamental predicability which a nature really existing in

similar individuals possesses before it is constituted common and indifferent by simple abstraction. Thus, to turn the example back, an object locally present, colored, and illuminated is said to be proximately visible to a man whose eyes are closed, although the opening of the eyes must intervene before actual vision. Furthermore, it could be said with Hurtado (Disp. 5, Metaph. sect. 8, in ed. 6) that reflexive apprehension of the agreement of the common nature with the inferiors is not required for actual predication, but that apprehension of the agreement exercitively and directly suffices, such as is given in simple abstraction itself.

23. It is objected 3º: an actually predicable cannot exist unless an actually subjectable exists; but the Universal is actually predicable. Therefore it does not exist unless the inferiors are actually subjectable, which they cannot be without comparative cognition. The major is proved 1º because correlatives are simultaneous in time, nature, and cognition, while predicable and subjectable are correlatives. 2º Because an actual predicate cannot exist without an actual subject; therefore likewise, etc. I press the objection 1º: therefore the metaphysical Universal will not be actually comparable unless the inferiors are in turn actually comparable, which they are not without their own apprehension. Therefore the metaphysical Universal is constituted by this apprehension. I press it 2º: therefore there cannot exist something actually predicable of all individuals in particular unless all in particular are actually subjectable by means of comparison, which is impossible. I add that any individual can be rendered actually subjectable without comparison, namely once its absolute apprehension is posited, for example "Peter," or "this man."

24. Furthermore, I deny the major: because for the Universal to be actually predicable, it suffices that it actually possess whatever it requires of itself in order to be assumed by the intellect into predication. But for this the coexistence of the Universal with inferiors already actually known and proximately subjectable is not necessary; it is enough that the inferiors be possible in this way. To the first proof: predicable and subjectable need not be predicamental correlatives, but can be quasi-transcendentally referred, as productive and producible, or receptive and receivable. Such correlatives, although they must be simultaneous in cognition, that is, although one cannot be reflexively known as relative without the other, need not be simultaneous in time and nature. Thus Omnipotence from eternity is actually productive of creatures, although passive producibility does not actually exist from eternity. Matter also can be actually receptive of form before receptibility on the part of the form actually exists. To the second, I deny the consequence: because the denomination "predicate" implies by the

terms themselves actual application and conjunction with a subject, which therefore must necessarily coexist. But the denomination "predicable precisely" implies aptitude and indifference; and aptitude for something does not of itself imply coexistence of the term. Thus between these denominations there is the same difference as between "productive" and "producing," or between "receptive" and "receiving."

25. It is objected 4º: the whole being of the Universal is to be known, since it does not exist in things but in the intellect. But the Universal as such is not known except by comparative cognition. Therefore the whole being of the Universal consists in this cognition. Confirmation: the Universal is a term of second intention; therefore it is not constituted by first intention, such as abstractive cognition. Here again both objections of n. 23 return. I distinguish the major: the whole being of the Universal is to be reflexively known as Universal, I deny; it is to have the really multiple nature known by indefinite cognition, I grant the major; and I grant the minor and deny the consequence. I admit that the Universal is not signately and reflexively known except by comparative cognition; yet I deny that it is not fully constituted before it is so reflexively known, just as the denomination "known," which likewise does not exist in things but in the intellect, is fully constituted before it is reflexively known that the object is known. To the Confirmation: these terms, "Universal, Genus, Species," and the like, are called second intentions because they signify a thing as already known by direct abstraction. Their object, however, is not a formal second intention, as it would be if it consisted in reflexive comparison, but an objective second intention, namely the thing known, or the concrete whole composed of the real object and its direct cognition, which is a formal first intention and the objective second intention, or its form; as is clear from the preliminary matters, where one may reread the fine passage of St. Thomas explaining what object corresponds to this account or conception, "Genus" or "Species" (treat. 1, disp. 2, chap. 2, n. 14).

26. It is objected 5º: human nature under the concept "man" is indifferent to being a predicable or subjectable Species according as it has been compared either with individuals or with a Genus. Therefore, in order to be determinately a predicable Species, it requires cognition by which it is compared with individuals. Confirmation 1º: because white as such is not a Predicable of a determinate species until comparative cognition supervenes. If by this cognition it is compared with subjects, for example Peter and Paul, it will be Accident, the fifth Predicable; but if with this white and that white, it will be Species, the second Predicable. The same occurs in Property, indeed also in Genus and Difference. For animal, for example, although it is

a Genus by comparison with Species, if nevertheless it is compared with its incomplete individuals, namely this animal and that animal, it assumes the character of Species. From this argument Suárez, Metaph. disp. 6, sect. 8, n. 5, teaches that the division of the Universal into five Predicables has no place until comparison with diverse things is made. Confirmation 2º: the Universal through simple abstraction becomes only one from many and regards the many as a term "from which." But the logical Universal must furthermore be one in many or toward many, which it regards as a term "to which." Therefore, besides abstraction, it requires comparison by which it is referred to the inferiors.

27. To the objection, I deny the antecedent, namely that human nature is so indifferent. For by force of the cognition "man" it is determinately a predicable Species and at the same time subjectable, with respect to diverse things, namely individuals on one side and Genus on the other, without awaiting comparative cognition for this. For those denominations require only the simultaneous aptitude of human nature so that, if the individuals are known, it may be predicated of them as superior, and, if the generic nature is known, it may be subjected to it as inferior. Such aptitude arises from the concept "man," just as according to the Adversaries there arises from it the simultaneous aptitude of the nature to be compared with individuals as superior and with the Genus as inferior. To the first Confirmation: similarly I say that white as such, even before comparison, is constituted under both the fifth and the second Predicable, with respect to diverse things; the same should be understood proportionately of Property, Genus, and Difference. For by abstraction it is rendered apt to be predicated contingently of subjects outside their essence, but of its own individuals as their whole essence. Thus the same act of contrition pertains simultaneously to two species of affections, namely love and hatred. Thus also the same white as such, according to the Adversaries, is simultaneously the proximate foundation of both Predicables.

28. The Excellent Doctor, in the cited place, speaks thus concerning the division of the Predicables: "Those five members do not seem always and universally capable of being conveniently distinguished until a relation or comparison is added." This is most true. For since most Universals identify with themselves the predicability of two members, as the examples objected against us prove, a reflexive cognition is necessary which, by comparing the Universal with diverse inferiors, distinguishes by reason within it the predicability proper to each member, so that by means of this reflexive distinction of reason the five Porphyrian Predicables remain unmixed. But this does not prove that comparison is necessary for the predicability of the

logical Universal to exist, but only for it to exist as reflexively distinguished into five members. In the same way, if the potencies are really identified with the soul, cognition comparing the soul with its diverse acts, although not required in order that the rational soul be fully capable of understanding and willing, is nevertheless necessary in order that the potency of the soul be divided into Intellect and Will.

29. Hence the Excellent Doctor is undeservedly alleged for the contrary opinion, both in the passage objected against us and in the same disp., sect. 6, nn. 8, 10, and 12. For there he expressly distinguishes a twofold Universal. One is absolute, which he teaches to be fully made through abstraction, and of which, among other things, he speaks thus in n. 9: "In that nature so conceived there is a new unity of reason, because it has one concept indivisible into several similar concepts; it also has community, or aptitude, to be in many and predicated of them. Therefore nothing is lacking to it for the character of a Universal," namely both metaphysical and logical, as is clear from the words "to be in many and predicated of them." The other is respective, or relative "according to being," that is, predicamental; and this is made when, reflecting upon the absolute Universal, we compare it with the inferiors, from which there results a certain quasi-predicamental relation, either purely fictitious or consisting in the comparison itself. But nowhere does the Excellent Doctor teach that the Universal so taken is that logical Universal about which we dispute, namely that which is defined as "One apt to be predicated of many," although in another sense it may be called logical, namely insofar as it is made through an act of Logic, whose office it is reflexively to inspect the Universal already made and compare it with the inferiors, so as to bestow upon it the name "Genus, Species," etc.

30. Hence it is also clear that what the Angelic Doctor often teaches is true and causes us no difficulty: namely, that the intellect attributes to the known object the intentions of Genus, Species, etc., insofar as it compares that object with inferiors which are outside the soul. For although animal abstractly known possesses whatever this formal second intention "Genus" signifies, the intellect cannot say, "Animal is a Genus," until it reflexively knows the abstract animal and compares it with its inferiors; just as it cannot say, "The soul is intellective," until it compares the soul with the acts of understanding which it can elicit.

31. To the second Confirmation: abstraction alone suffices for the Universal to regard many both as a term "from which" and a term "to which." For while the nature is known without the many, it becomes one from many; and since by this very fact it remains apt and indifferent to be applied to many, it also becomes potentially one in many, or one toward

many. Nor is there any absurdity in the fact that by the same cognition the nature is known without the many while remaining at the same time apt to be applied again to many by judicative cognition; just as according to the Adversaries it is rendered by the same form abstracted from many and proximately comparable with many, where there is likewise a term "from which" and a term "to which"; or as circular motion regards the same point as a term "from which" and "to which," because it returns to the point from which it departed.

CHAPTER VII.

Whether the Universal Is Preserved in Actual Predication.

1. In order that the meaning of the proposed controversy may more easily be understood, I premise two things. 1º In mental judgments or predications in which no multiplicity, inferior difference, or singularity is expressed, the Universal is undoubtedly preserved, that is, the common nature precisively abstracted from its inferiors. Hence in this judgment, "Animal is sensitive," universality remains intact both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate; and in this one, "Man is animal," it also remains on the part of the subject, and indeed on the part of the predicate there remains at least a certain universality restricted to human animal. The whole dispute, therefore, concerns judgments in which a nature appearing common is predicated of a formally multiple subject, as "Every sensitive thing is animal," or of a formally singular subject, as "Peter is man," or at least of an inferior subject, as "Man is animal." For in these it is doubtful whether the predicate retains the universality which it previously had in the simple apprehension "animal" or "man."

2. 2º It is commonly held as established, or supposed, that the Universal is preserved in actual predication if the judgment is a quality composed of really distinct apprehensions which discharge the functions of subject and predicate. For then, in the judgment "Peter is man," the apprehension "man" is the same and tends in the same manner and to the same object within predication as outside it. For neither its object nor its mode of representing can change without its essence changing, as the common opinion throughout the School holds. Therefore, if such apprehension makes a Universal outside predication, it also makes or preserves one within it. Nor perhaps say that a judgment can be really composite without the Universal being preserved in "Peter is man," namely if the expression "man," which is part of the judgment, is not the apprehension previously possessed, but

another tendency similar indeed on the part of the mode yet dissimilar in object, since it attains only Peter's nature.

3. For, to omit that this is contrary to the universally received understanding, against it stands 1º that at least in this really composite judgment, "Every man is man," or "Every sensitive thing is animal," there is no reason why the expression of the predicate should not make a Universal, as will be clear to anyone examining the matter, although whatever difficulty exists in predication of a singular subject applies there. Against it stands 2º that the mental expression "man," whether it is an apprehension or part of a judgment, is affected by the same species and has an entirely similar mode of tending, nor from its force alone can the intellect account for the multiplicity of human nature or for one individual rather than another, since on the part of the act it prescinds from all. Whence, therefore, will diversity of objects arise? Or why will there not in both cases be an indefinite representation of the whole human nature, or of all men? The case is different with the spoken word "man," which can be similar or identical in sound and nevertheless, from a variety of circumstances or association with other words, vary its object; for it has signification by convention.

4. We therefore suppose for the present the highly probable opinion in the doctrine of the soul, namely that a judgment or mental proposition is a simple quality, that is, a really indivisible act lacking every actual composition of parts. This being posited, the question is whether the Universal is preserved when actually predicated of a singular, inferior, or multiple subject on the part of the act, as in the propositions expressed in n. 1. Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Compton, Izquierdo, and also many Thomists and Scotists deny this; all of them are cited and followed by Peynado, disp. 5, n. 45. On the contrary Lynceus, Quirós, Juan Bautista de Benedictis, and, to a great extent, Ulloa affirm it; and the same seems to be the more common opinion of the Thomists, to whose cited authorities Master Bayona subscribes. And indeed there is no reason for Thomists to think otherwise, since they constitute the Universal not formally through cognition but through a distinction fictitiously made on the part of the object between the common nature and its differences. Hence, since they otherwise teach that through every judgment a distinction of subject and predicate is fashioned, it follows that through "Peter is man" man remains rationally distinct from Peter, and consequently there is no reason why it should lose universality. The principal difficulty, therefore, concerns our Authors, who with St. Thomas call the Universal "One by unity of cognition."

5. A third opinion, intermediate between the preceding extremes, may be added: namely that in predication of a singular subject the Universal is

preserved as regards the positive element, but not as regards the negative. The concept forming the Universal, as Peynado notes from the concordant opinion of our authors in the cited place, n. 37, and as is abundantly clear from what has thus far been said, is essentially constituted by two elements, one positive and the other negative. The positive is to represent a nature which is in reality actually or potentially multiple; the negative is not to represent the differences, at least on the part of the act. This opinion therefore asserts that in this act, "Peter is man," and similar acts, the positive element of the form of the Universal is preserved, namely representation of the whole human nature in its full breadth; but the negative element, which is to represent no difference, is not preserved. I once held this opinion, and I said so; nor do I now think otherwise, although I use other terms. Later, however, I found the same opinion in Sylvester Maurus, q. 35, Log., where he maintains that in predication of any inferior the "entirely confused Universal" is not preserved, but nevertheless the "scientific Universal" is preserved, by which infinitely many individuals coalesce into one predicate.

§ 1. First Assertion.

The Universal Absolutely and Simply Is Not Preserved in Affirmative Predication of a Formally Multiple or Inferior Subject.

6. Thus hold the Authors of the first opinion. The Assertion is proved with respect to predication of a multiple subject. If the judgment is a simple quality, this act, "Every man is animal," or this one, "Man and horse are animal," does not render the nature of animal absolutely one by unity of reason, nor intentionally undivided. Therefore the Universal absolutely and simply is not preserved in it. The consequence holds, because that unity and indivision belong, according to all, to the concept of the Universal. The antecedent is proved: that act expressly represents the nature of animal as identified with a really multiple subject; therefore it expressly represents it as multiplied. This is clear because in a created nature to be identified with many and to be multiplied are the same; consequently the multiplicity of the nature is expressed whenever its identity with many appears, whatever the singular opinion to the contrary of Juan Ulloa, to be rejected in the following chapter. Then thus: but an act expressly representing the multiplicity of an object does not render it absolutely one by unity of reason, nor intentionally undivided. Therefore, etc.

7. The subsumed minor is proved 1º from Aristotle and St. Thomas cited above (this disp., chap. 3, n. 3), who teach that a really multiple object becomes rationally one only insofar as it has no division in the mind. But through cognition which is a representation of plurality as such, the object undoubtedly has division in the mind. 2º Because a really multiple object is not rendered rationally one unless it is prescinded and abstracted from every difference by which it is really multiplied; but one does not prescind or abstract from that which cognition exhibits on the part of the act. Therefore St. Thomas, Opusc. 49, says: "The intellect abstracts the Genus from the species insofar as it understands the nature of the Genus without understanding the differences; similarly it abstracts the Species from individuals insofar as it understands the nature of the Species without understanding the individuating principles." And again: "Thus therefore it is one from many only insofar as it is understood apart from the individuating principles." And Contra Gentiles II, c. 52: "When the differences constitutive of Species are removed, the nature of the Genus remains undivided, because the same differences which constitute Species divide the Genus." 3º Because nothing is more constant in our School than that an act under which an object appears as multiple is not a unity of reason and cannot be the form of the Universal, as is clear in these apprehensions: "animals, men, every man, people, army," which for no other reason are unfit to constitute the nature of men one and Universal.

8. The Assertion with respect to predication of an inferior or singular subject is proved by the same arguments. For this act, "Peter is man," is a representation of Peterhood as such; therefore formally and on the part of the act it expresses one of the differences dividing human nature. Hence it does not constitute the latter entirely intentionally undivided, nor does it prescind and abstract it from every individuating principle, as is required for absolute unity and universality. The point is pressed: a concept perfectly constituting the Universal must be univocal; but a univocal concept must express the objective account in such a way that it appears entirely the same and uniformly related to all inferiors without any diversity, as is clear also from the definition of univocals. But human nature under the concept of which we speak does not appear entirely the same and uniform with respect to all individuals, since it appears identified with Peterhood, which is an account diversifying the nature and differentiating it from the other individuals.

9. It may be said: although the Universal is not preserved in the aforesaid acts on the part of the multiple or singular subject, nevertheless it could be preserved on the part of the predicate, where an expression

equivalent to the apprehension "man" or "animal" is given. But against this: if the judgment is indivisible, as is now supposed, the formal subject and predicate are not one part and another, but one indivisible expression. Therefore in predication of a multiple subject no expression is given which is not a representation of plurality as such, just as in man really taken there is no predicate which is not rational. But representation of plurality as such cannot be indivision and unity of reason, since it is rather plurality of reason and intentional division. Therefore it cannot be the form of the Universal. Likewise, in predication of a singular subject no expression is given which is not a representation of singularity as such; therefore none is given which prescinds and abstracts the nature from every singularity, as is necessary for a perfect Universal.

10. Reflexive cognition can indeed prescind in such judgments the formal predicate from the subject, and then an expression of human nature will remain rationally distinct from the expression of multitude or of thisness. But this does not suffice for perfect universality to be preserved in such judgments. First, because the present inquiry concerns only whether those judgments of themselves and without reflexive cognition retain or make a perfect Universal. Secondly, because the expression of man as reflexively prescinded from the expression of multitude or thisness is not universality of the object, but at most prescinds from unity and plurality of reason, or from formal universality and singularity. The reason is that cognition forming the Universal must of itself positively exclude the expression of every individuation and real plurality of the object, or must not be really identified with such an expression, but must imply the lack of it in itself, as we already noted above (cited chap. 7, n. 11) and as is gathered from what has just been said; otherwise the same cognition would simultaneously be precision and non-precision, division and indivision, unity and intentional plurality of the same object. But the expression of man as reflexively prescinded from the expression of a multiple or singular subject does not have in itself the lack or exclusion of this expression, as is manifest. Therefore, etc. Hence in such judgments there is an expression equivalent to the apprehension "man" or "animal" as regards breadth of object, as I shall soon say, but not as regards the force of denominating the object perfectly prescinded and intentionally one.

§ 2. Second Assertion.

A Predicate Universal of Itself, When Predicated of an Inferior or Singular Subject, Retains the Entire Objective Breadth Proper to the Universal.

11. Thus hold all the Authors cited above, chap. 4, n. 16, in favor of the equivalence of an indefinite tendency to a disjunctive one; nor do most patrons of the second opinion reported in n. 4 seem to intend anything else. Peynado expressly holds the contrary (Disp. 5, n. 48), and more recent authors commonly follow him. The Assertion is proved 1º by destroying the principal and almost sole foundation of the contrary opinion. The reason why, in this act, "Peter is animal," the expression "animal" would not attain on the part of the object all species and individuals of animal, which is the objective breadth proper to the Universal, as we showed above, would be that the predication would then follow to be false, since it would affirm of Peter all the species and individuals with which Peter cannot be identified. But the predication can be true although it in some way affirms of Peter all the species and individuals of animal, as is clear in this act, "Peter is some animal," and also in this, "Every man is some animal," which attains and affirms of every man all species and individuals of animal without thereby ceasing to be true, according to St. Thomas (In I *Perihermeneias*, lect. 10, lit. f) and according to all. Therefore our Assertion is not weakened on that ground.

12. If it is said that disjunctive predication must be excepted, I infer: therefore the rule assumed is no longer universally true, namely that nothing can truly be affirmed of Peter except what is really identified with him, namely his own nature. Therefore before attacking us on that ground, it must first be proved that an indefinite tendency, or the one corresponding to it in judgment, is not equivalent to a disjunctive one in verification. But this is not easily proved, especially since we proved the opposite by authority and reason in chap. 4, from n. 16. Nor does any new difficulty worthy of solution now arise concerning that equivalence, unless perhaps what the Thomists object, namely that a disjunctive term cannot be distributed, whereas a common term signifying indefinitely can be distributed. But this has no force. For each term is virtually distributed in the predicate of a negative proposition, as we noted in the cited place, n. 30. Likewise each can be mediately distributed insofar as it can be predicated of a distributed subject; for it is just as true of every man to say "is some animal" as "is animal." But

for one rather than the other to be capable of being immediately affected on the part of the subject by distributive signs, so that "Every animal" is said suitably but "Every some animal" unsuitably, it can suffice that one be virtually disjunctive and the other formally so. Yet it should not therefore be conceded that the term "animal," when immediately affected by the sign "every," remains indefinite; for it is in reality already another term, although similar in sound to the indefinite one.

13. It is proved 2º: this act, "Peter is animal," has greater breadth on the part of the objective predicate than this, "Peter is man," or "is this rational animal." Therefore it retains the objective breadth proper to the Universal. The consequence holds even according to the Adversaries. The antecedent is proved from this proposition, "Peter is this rational animal," or "is man," from which it rightly follows, "therefore Peter is not a horse"; but the same does not follow from this other proposition, "Peter is animal." Therefore the latter has greater breadth, etc. The major is certain, and the consequence seems legitimate, because if one does not predicate something broader than the other, the object of both is entirely the same, and consequently whatever follows from one follows from the other, especially since we are speaking here of material inference. The minor is proved from this proposition, "Peter is not animal," from which follows: "therefore Peter is not a horse." Therefore the same does not follow from "Peter is animal." The consequence is proved: these propositions, "Peter is animal," "Peter is not animal," are contradictory; but the same conclusion cannot be inferred from contradictories, since one destroys what the other asserts and produces an entirely opposite sense. Therefore, etc.

14. The point is pressed 1º: from this antecedent, "Peter is a horse," it rightly follows, "therefore Peter is animal"; for, as is clear from the Summulae, from affirmation of any dividing Member follows affirmation of the Divided whole. Therefore from this antecedent, "Peter is animal," it cannot in turn be inferred, "therefore Peter is not a horse." The consequence is clear, for otherwise one contradictory would follow from the other; for, as the unshaken rule of the Summulae teaches, "Whatever follows from the Consequent follows from the Antecedent." The point is pressed 2º: this proposition, "Philip is King," is not equivalent to this, "Philip is King of Spain." Therefore, because on the part of the objective predicate it attains every royal dignity, it has the breadth proper to the fifth Predicable. The antecedent is proved: if they were equivalent, "Philip is King" would not be contradictory to "Philip is not King"; but this is false by the very terms. Therefore, etc. The major is proved: these propositions, "Philip is King of Spain," "Philip is not King," are not contradictory, since both can be false if,

namely, Philip becomes King of France alone. Therefore, if "Philip is King" has the same force as "is King of Spain," neither will "Philip is King" and "Philip is not King" be contradictory.

15. If perhaps it is said that the propositions "Peter is animal" and "Peter is man" are indeed equivalent on the part of the object, but not on the part of the mode, and that for this reason the same is not inferred from each: against this 1º, because the whole difficulty just proposed concerning royal dignity remains intact. Against this 2º, because if diversity on the part of the mode imports no diversity or inequality of object, there is no reason why the same should not be inferred from each proposition, as is seen in these: "Peter is man," "Peter is rational," or "is capable of wonder." Against this 3º, because if they are equivalent on the part of the object, from this antecedent, "Peter is a horse," it no more follows that Peter is animal than that he is man. Against this 4º, because the diversity on the part of the mode is as great, at least regarding the positive element, as it would be if the judgment were a composite quality; but then diversity on the part of the mode would not permit equivalence on the part of the object. Therefore, etc. Finally, and effectively, against this: diversity on the part of the mode causes one proposition rather than the other to presuppose of itself an apprehension extended on the part of the object to every animal; otherwise it would not even presuppositively be a predication of a Universal, against the doctrine of the Adversaries. The apprehension in question is "animal." But no predication of itself presupposes apprehension of objects which it does not attain. Therefore diversity of mode causes one rather than the other to attain the whole object of the apprehension "animal."

16. If it is said again with some recent authors that from the proposition "Peter is animal" it is rightly gathered that Peter is not a horse, but that the same is not gathered from its contradictory: for "Peter is not animal" either denies every animal or only Peter's animal. If the first, it will not be contradictory to the affirmative, because it denies more than is necessary to falsify it, since for this it would suffice to deny Peter's animal, which alone the affirmative attains. If the second, it cannot be gathered from it that Peter is not a horse, as is evident of itself. But this doctrine, for which Peynado provided an occasion (hic disp. 5, n. 54), seems entirely to be rejected. For I ask: does this proposition "Peter is not animal" ever attain every animal on the part of the object, or does it never attain anything except Peter's animal alone? If the first is chosen, then 1º it always attains that whole object, since it always has the same mode of tending and expressing in necessary matter and always presupposes the same apprehensions; no differently than the simple apprehension "animal" always and everywhere regards the same

object. Therefore 2º, at least when it attains every animal, its contradictory "Peter is animal" must attain the same object; otherwise they will not be affirmation and negation of the same thing about the same subject. It must, I say, attain it quasi-disjunctively, so that the sense of each is equivalently: "Peter is no animal," "Peter is some animal," and thus one precisely affirms what is necessary for the falsity of the other. Therefore it can already happen that actual predication of a singular subject retains the objective breadth proper to the Universal.

17. If the second is chosen, it will have to be said that the objective predicate of no negative proposition can extend more broadly than the subject. Hence one who says, "This stone is not animal," will not deny every animal of the stone, but one individual of animal, and by force of the form will allow that stone to be any one of the remaining animals. Likewise one who says, "This devil is not holy," will indeed remove from the subject a certain individual holiness, but not every holiness. But these things stray far from common sense. Add that the proposition "Peter is not animal" is rightly converted thus: "No animal is Peter," as the Coimbrans teach from the common doctrine (In I Prior., chap. 2, q. 1, a. 4), nor did Fonseca teach the opposite where Peynado cites him. Therefore that proposition is equivalent to "Peter is no animal." Add furthermore that the proposition "No man is animal" does not deny only rational animal, but every animal, as is clear from its converse, "No animal is man." Therefore a predicate common of itself can have greater breadth than its subject in negatives. Why should the same not occur in the proposition of which we speak? Furthermore, the rule of the Summulists, "A negation placed before the verb distributes a predicate common of itself," will never have place where the subject is singular, for then the predicate will never be capable of distribution, since it too will be singular on the part of the object. I omit other dialectical principles by which this doctrine can be shown to be contrary to established teaching.

18. Therefore the fact that, in contradictories, one must deny no more than what is necessary for the falsity of the other, although it chiefly applies regarding the subject, nevertheless, if it is also understood of the predicate, rather confirms our opinion. For since "Peter is not animal" denies every animal, as we have now shown, its contradictory "Peter is animal" must affirm quasi-disjunctively every animal, so that the predicate is equivalent to "is some animal." First, because something similar is required on the part of the subject for contradiction; for the sign "No" contradicts only the sign "Some." Secondly, because if it affirms only Peter's animal, both propositions could simultaneously be false by reason of form, as is seen in

contingent matter under a similar form, for example: "Philip is not King," "Philip is King of France." For this reason the Summulists deny that these are contradictories: "No man is animal," "Peter is animal"; because, although by reason of matter they can neither both be true nor both be false, nevertheless by reason of form they certainly can, as is clear in contingent matter.

19. On this occasion our assertion is incidentally strengthened. For the objective predicate of this proposition, "Every man is animal," extends beyond rational animal. I prove it: if it does not extend farther, that proposition can be converted simply; but this is contrary to the laws of Dialectic. Therefore, etc. The major is proved: this proposition, "Every man is rational animal," is converted simply, at least by reason of matter; for from it one rightly concludes, "therefore every rational animal is man," for no other reason than because the predicate does not extend beyond the subject but is convertible with it. Since therefore by your position this same reason applies to the other proposition, it too can, at least by reason of matter, be simply converted. And hence such Conversion will be proper to every universal affirmative, even by reason of form; for that belongs by reason of form which follows from such a genus of propositions in any matter whatsoever. But, if what you say is true, every universal affirmative proposition, in whatever matter it is formed, necessarily demands a predicate equal and convertible with the subject; this being granted, simple Conversion in affirmatives follows of itself. Therefore, etc.

20. Hence also is strengthened the doctrine established in chap. 4 concerning the equivalence of the terms "animal" and "some animal." For the proposition "Every man is animal" is, according to all, rightly converted thus: "Therefore some animal is man"; but wrongly thus: "Therefore every animal is man." Hence follows 1º that the predicate "animal," insofar as affirmable or affirmed, is rightly expounded by a disjunctive tendency, but not by a copulative one. It follows 2º that this predicate extends on the part of the object to all animals, just as the subject "some animal" does; otherwise the subject of the Converse would extend farther than the predicate of the Converted proposition, contrary to the rules of Conversion.

21. Finally, our Assertion is proved by those arguments commonly adduced for the preservation of the Universal. I shall briefly touch upon two. The first: if the Universal is in no way preserved in predication of a singular subject, it will not be predicable, or capable of being predicated, of any inferior except purely in an ampliative sense, namely in the sense in which wood is capable of being burned, by a burning which destroys the wood. The Adversaries admit this, but it seems absurd. For, to omit many things

commonly opposed to this doctrine, it follows that every predication will be of equal of equal, and none of superior of inferior, whereby many precepts of the Summulae are rendered useless. They say that, in order that this predication, for example "Peter is animal," be called absolutely a predication of superior, it is enough that the predicate be superior presuppositively, insofar as it presupposes the apprehension "animal," whose object is superior, that is, more universal, than Peter; just as one who sees is called absolutely blind when blindness preceded.

22. But first, since that which actually and formally belongs to a thing is more properly said of it than what belongs to it only presuppositively, just as "One who is not blind sees" is more properly said than "A blind man sees," it follows that this predication is more a predication of equal of equal than of superior of inferior. Next, to omit other things, a predication is not said to be of superior merely because a universal apprehension somehow precedes; otherwise, if after the apprehension "animal" there followed the act "This animal is Peter," it would be a predication of superior. Therefore it is required, as the Adversaries themselves teach, that the universal apprehension precede not accidentally but of itself. Then thus: therefore the judgment "Peter is animal" of itself requires and presupposes an apprehension terminated at all animals. But there is no reason why it should presuppose it in this way if the judgment itself does not predicate all animals, but only Peter's animal. First, because for judging that his own determinate rational animal is identified with Peter, the apprehension of lion and horse is just as extraneous as that of stone and Angel. Secondly, because an apprehension ought to precede a judgment for no other title than that the Will commanding it not proceed blindly, or that the intellect not judge of unknown things and pass sentence upon an object before its merits have first been proposed and known through apprehension; for which purposes the apprehension of the extremes of predication, at least together with apprehension of the identity of each, undoubtedly suffices. Therefore, if the aforesaid predication of itself presupposes apprehension of a universal object, it too attains that whole object.

23. I see, however, that the argument taken from predicability is not entirely firm once the simplicity of judgment is posited. For if a judgment is not composed of apprehensions, Universals made through apprehensions can never actually be predicated, although they are called predicable. Nevertheless, in our opinion it can be said that the apprehensive Universal is reduced to the act of predication, not indeed as regards form, for we all exclude this from actual predication when we suppose the simplicity of judgment, but as regards the whole substrate with another form equivalent

for the use of the sciences. For animal, which through apprehension is denominated a Universal, is afterward predicated with the same breadth or objective amplitude of Peter or any other inferior under the form of judgment. This form, although it does not retain perfect universality because perfect abstraction is lacking, nevertheless is of equal value for the use of the sciences as if it retained it; because it is truly a predication of superior of inferior, that is, of a broader object of a less broad one; likewise it truly preserves the rules of Conversion and other dialectical rules, and serves for acquiring the sciences no less than if the judgment were composed of apprehensions. In this sense Maurus above not unsuitably said that the "scientific Universal" is preserved in actual predication.

24. The other argument: if the proposition "Peter is animal" attains only Peter's animal, it will truly be said, "Peter alone is animal," just as it is truly said, "Peter alone is Peter's animal." The Adversaries deny the consequence because the proposition "Peter alone is animal" not only affirms his animal of Peter but also implicitly denies to other subjects the animal proper to each; for it contains these exponents: "Peter is animal, and everything other than Peter is not animal." But they do not satisfy. For, as the Summulists unanimously observe, when an Exclusive is expounded, the predicate of the Underlying proposition and of the second Exponent must be the same. Hence a proposition exclusive on the part of the subject is usually defined as "one which excludes other subjects from the same predicate," or "from participation in the same predicate." But according to you, "Peter is animal," which is the Underlying proposition, predicates only Peter's animal. Therefore this same animal must be the predicate of the second Exponent, namely "Everything other than Peter is not animal," or "Nothing besides Peter is animal." But thus even this negative will be true, since it is equivalent to "Nothing other than Peter is Peter's animal." Therefore the aforesaid Exclusive, whether considered in itself or in its Exponents, will be verified on your principles. See Fonseca, Instit. Dialectic. III, chap. 19.

§ 3. Consequences.

25. From what has thus far been said it is inferred 1º that whenever a predicate otherwise universal is affirmed of an inferior subject, both the breadth proper to the Universal and also abstraction, precision, and unity are preserved, not indeed perfect and absolute, but imperfect and in a qualified sense, namely with respect to other inferiors which are not then assumed as subject. Animal, for example, in this act, "Every man is animal," remains prescinded and abstracted with respect to lion, horse, and other

animals besides man, all of which become rationally one. The reason is that all are attained on the part of the object without their plurality or difference appearing on the part of the act. It may be said: by that act animal is not rendered predicable of lion, for one cannot say, "Lion is every man is animal." Therefore it is not rendered Universal with respect to lion. But this amounts to nothing. For all concede that the Universal is preserved in an indefinite predication of equal of equal, for example, "Animal is sensitive"; and nevertheless one cannot say, "Lion is animal is sensitive." Therefore, once the simplicity of judgment is posited, no one disputes whether the Universal is preserved in such a way that under the same judicative act it can be predicated of other subjects; for it is evident that this cannot be done. Hence the whole controversy is whether it retains there the objective breadth together with perfect abstraction from differences. Moreover, since animal there does not prescind from man, what wonder if under that act it is not predicable of lion?

26. It is inferred 2º that in negative predications, at least those which are true, a predicate common of itself and not immediately affected by any quantitative sign remains simply Universal. For example, in "No stone is animal," animal remains not only with breadth comprising all animals on the part of the object but also with perfect unity and abstraction on the part of the act. The reason is that such an act represents animal without expressing any plurality or difference of it; for the plurality of stone which it expresses is not plurality of animal. It may be said: that act is equivalent to "Every stone is no animal," and therefore is rightly converted thus: "Therefore no animal is stone." Hence it equivalently contains this expression, "no animal," which is an expression of multitude. I distinguish the antecedent: it is equivalent as regards verification, I grant; as regards the mode of tending, I deny the antecedent, and under the same distinction the consequence. Thus "Man is animal" is equivalent to "Every man is animal," since in necessary matter an indefinite proposition is equivalent to a universal one; and nevertheless man in the former rather than the latter retains the abstraction and unity proper to the Universal, as all commonly concede, for no other reason than the diverse mode of tending.

27. Nor does Conversion obstruct this. For in negatives concerning a common predicate, Conversion requires reflexive cognition that the predicate is common of itself; for if it is singular of itself, Conversion through the syncategorematic term "No" will be false, as is clear in this: "No stone is God; therefore no God is stone." But since a common predicate cannot be reflexively known as common, or as a Universal, except through comparative cognition with many inferiors, as is clear from the preceding

chapter, it follows that the aforesaid Conversion does indeed presuppose cognition of the plurality of animal, but a reflexive cognition distinct from the direct judgment "No stone is animal." Nor infer from this that this Conversion is not made by reason of form but by reason of matter. For it is enough, in order that it be verified to be made by reason of form, that after the predicate is discovered to be common of itself, the inference may safely be made in any matter, whether contingent or necessary.

CHAPTER VIII.
The Contrary Arguments Are Weakened.

We anticipated several in the preceding chapter. Likewise, many things which militate against one Assertion are disarmed by the other. Nevertheless:

§ 1. Against the First Assertion.

1. It is objected 1º: the indivisible judgment "Every man is animal" is equivalent not only to the apprehension "every man," which is intentional plurality of the object, but also to the apprehension "animal," which is extrinsic indivision and intentional unity of all animals. Therefore it is intentional plurality and division of animal in such a way that it simultaneously renders the nature of animal intentionally undivided and one, and consequently absolutely and simply Universal. The consequence seems clear because, just as the power of one active cause equivalent to two effects as much as those two, so the force of one indivisible act equivalent to two will be able to effect as much in the genus of formal cause as those two. But the two acts, "every man" and "animal," in the genus of formal cause render animal intentionally divided and undivided. Therefore an indivisible act equivalent to each will be able to effect the same. The antecedent, however, appears certain, both from the mode of tending which that judgment exhibits and because it of itself presupposes each apprehension as an exemplar which it imitates in representing.

2. Confirmation 1º: because it is not repugnant that the same act be simultaneously confused and clear with respect to the same object; and therefore, according to many, one indivisible act can be faith and science concerning the same object. Therefore, although an indivisible judgment clearly expresses the plurality of animals, it can simultaneously be a confusion and intentional unity of those same animals. Confirmation 2º: indefinite and definite, or discriminative, representation are no more

opposed regarding the same object than disjunctive and determinate representation; for disjunctive representation is indeterminate and consequently by the very sound seems to exclude determination. But a simple act can represent the same object both determinately and disjunctively, as in "Peter is some man," which determinately represents Peter as such and simultaneously disjunctively as one of the men. Indeed, a simple act can identify with itself a vague and a determinate affirmation of the same object, as is clear in "Peter, who is a man, is either Peter or John." Therefore a simple act can also represent a really multiple object indefinitely, as does the apprehension "animal," and simultaneously definitely or discretely, as does the apprehension "every man" or "every animal." But indefinite representation renders the object rationally one absolutely and simply.

3. Confirmation 3º: the judgment "Every man is animal" attains all individuals of animal in the manner of one. Therefore it renders them all intentionally one, and consequently a perfect Universal. The antecedent is proved: the only reason it would not attain all in the manner of one is that it attains some, namely human animals, in the manner of many; but this reason does not obstruct. Proof: an act attaining the same object in the manner of two objects can attain it both in the manner of one and in the manner of many. But that judicative act attains human animal in the manner of two objects, both because it causes it to appear as animal and as man and because it attains it as subject and as predicate. Therefore it can attain all animals, including human ones, in the manner of one. Confirmation 4º: the aforesaid judgment renders all animals definable by one definition. Therefore it renders all rationally one and is a univocal concept of all. Confirmation 5º: it is not repugnant that the same act prescind a nature from differences and at the same time attain the same nature together with the differences; for from this it follows only that the same act is simultaneously a departure from the differences and an approach to them. But that this is not repugnant is clear from the example of circular motion, which regards the same point as term "from which" and "to which."

4. I answer the objection by distinguishing the antecedent: it is equivalent to the apprehension "animal" in positive predicates, I grant; in negative predicates, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. The apprehension "animal" attains on the part of the object all animals and represents them all under the aspect of animal, that is, so that of that whole object it can be said that it is a sentient living thing. Likewise it represents all in a mode equivalently disjunctive in order to predication. These I call the positive predicates of that apprehension, and in these the judgment imitates

it. But the same apprehension is at the same time in itself a negation or exclusion of an expression by which any difference or plurality as such of the object appears; for it cannot identify such an expression with itself. Behold the negative predicate in which it is repugnant that the judgment "Every man is animal" imitate it, as is evident once the simplicity of judgment is supposed. But in this very negation consists the fact that the apprehension "animal" renders the object rationally one and undivided, as is clear from our proof and from the force of the names "unity" and "indivision," which imply absence of division and plurality in the line in which they are verified. Therefore the judgment is not equivalent to the apprehension in these respects. Thus the soul of man is equivalent to the soul of a lion in the positive power of vegetating and sensing, but not in exclusion of rationality. Nor does the parity of the active cause obstruct. For equivalence between the sun and fire, for example, in producing similar or identical effects is compatible with entitative diversity of causes; but equivalence with respect to the same formal effects, which are not distinguished from the entity of the cause, is not so compatible. Indeed, not even among active causes entitatively diverse can equivalence be given with respect to all effects.

5. To the first Confirmation, I deny the assumption, because clarity and obscurity, or properly so-called confusion, with respect to the same thing are as opposed as light and darkness. Those who hold that faith and science concerning the same material object can be identified deny that faith must be positively or exclusively obscure. They think only that quasi-permissive obscurity on the part of its proper motive belongs to the account of faith, because that motive of itself neither produces clarity nor requires clarity to be produced from elsewhere, yet does not prohibit it from being produced by another motive. Hence they do not say that an act which is at once faith and science concerning the same object becomes clear and obscure, but that it becomes absolutely clear and does not become clear with a clarity produced from the motive of faith, which of itself would permit the act to become obscure unless the motive of science concurred.

6. To the second, I deny the major together with the attached proof, namely that every disjunctive or vague representation is indeterminate. If the representation is purely disjunctive or vague, as in these apprehensions, "some man," "Peter or John," then it is indeterminate because it excludes determination from identity with itself. But a disjunctive representation can be given which is not pure, but identifies with itself a determinate expression. Although this seems difficult, it must nevertheless be admitted by all once the simplicity of judgment is supposed; and then it is repugnant that this representation be indeterminate. Thus a purely vegetative soul is

irrational and insentient; but not so if, as can happen, it is vegetative not purely. Likewise, to use the example just objected, an act of faith is positively obscure when it is faith purely, but not when it identifies with itself the clarity of science. But indefinite representation, both from the force of the name and from common usage, is constituted by non-expression of the multiplicity or objective unity or any inferior difference. Hence it is entirely repugnant that it remain indefinite if it identifies with itself a discriminative expression of the same object. Nor does the judgment under discussion contain an indefinite expression, but only one equivalent to the indefinite according to positive predicates, in accordance with n. 4.

7. To the third, I distinguish the antecedent: in the manner of one with a unity excluding in itself formal or rational multiplicity, I deny; by another genus of unity, let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequence. In order that an object really multiple become rationally one as required for the Universal, it is not enough that it somehow be attained in the manner of one. For this apprehension "college" or "people" attains several men in the manner of one without constituting their nature one by the unity proper to the Universal. Therefore it must be represented in the manner of one such that the cognition, which is its extrinsic unity, positively excludes in itself the formal multiplicity of the object. This is by no means excluded by a cognition identifying with itself the expression of the object as multiple. Hence, whatever may be the case as to whether the judgment under discussion attains human animal in the manner of two objects, it will never denominate it one in the manner required for the perfect Universal.

8. To the fourth, I distinguish the antecedent: by one definition not adequate to the clarity of the formal thing defined, I grant; by one adequate to that clarity, I deny the antecedent and consequence. This indivisible act, "Every man is animal," because it identifies with itself the expression "animal," has a clarity explicable through this definition, "sentient living thing," which is the definition of all animals. But because it also identifies with itself the expression "every man," it has a clarity to which there also corresponds this explanation, "multiple rational animal." Therefore that act, which as simple is wholly the formal thing defined, is not proved univocal or unifying of all animals from definability, since rather a multiform definition corresponds to it. To the fifth: that the same act should prescind a nature from differences and simultaneously attain it together with the differences, I mean not merely on the part of the object but also on the part of the act, is as contradictory as that it should attain it by knowing the differences and not knowing the differences. For what is it to "prescind" one thing from another except to know one without knowing the other, either on the part of

the object or at least on the part of the act? The point about approach and departure must likewise be denied as contradictory in the sense of the objection; nor does circular motion depart and return by the same way, but by a different one, or through a different part of place, which is in no way repugnant.

9. It is objected 2º from the Thomists: the judgment "Peter is man" rationally distinguishes man from Peter; but man rationally distinguished from Peter, since it is otherwise prescinded, as we maintain, from the remaining individuals, remains perfectly universal. Therefore, etc. The major is proved: by force of such a judgment Peter is subject and man is predicate; but the predicate is formally distinguished from the subject, at least when the predication is not identical. Therefore, etc. Confirmation: physical union and composition are repugnant unless between extremes actually physically distinct. Therefore intentional union and composition are repugnant unless between extremes actually formally distinct. But judgment is an intentional union and composition of subject and predicate. Therefore it renders one formally distinct from the other. This objection rests upon the Thomistic doctrine that every mental proposition fashions on the part of the object an intrinsic distinction between subject and predicate. This doctrine has been sufficiently effectively refuted in the preliminary matters (Disp. 2, chap. 4, from n. 24), and its foundation fully solved there (ibid., chap. 5, nn. 30, 31, 43, and 44), especially if the judgment is a simple quality (ibid., n. 45). From what was said there, once the simplicity of judgment is posited, I deny the major. In the proof I distinguish the minor: the predicate is formally distinguished from the subject by a distinction presupposed to the judgment, I grant; by a distinction made through the judgment, I deny the minor and the consequence.

10. To the Confirmation: when a proposition is said to unite and compose the predicate with the subject, the discussion concerns either a spoken proposition or a mental one supposed to be composed of apprehensions. But if it is supposed, as now, to be a simple quality, it contains within itself no actual union or composition, but at most a virtual or equivalent one, insofar as it is equivalent to distinct apprehensions regarding the positive element and provides a foundation for the expression of the predicate to be reflexively distinguished by reason from the expression of the subject, and thus for a certain reflexive composition of the two to be considered there. The entire enthymeme together with the subsumed minor can also be granted and the consequence then denied, because in order that a judgment be a union and composition of subject and predicate, it need not precisely render the one distinct from the other, but

either render or presuppose them distinct, according to what was said in the cited places.

11. It is objected 3º: in this true judgment, "Man, insofar as he is a Species, is perfectly prescinded from Peter," perfect universality and precision of man from Peter is preserved; otherwise the proposition would be false. Therefore man can be perfectly prescinded from Peter by an act expressing Peterhood. I deny the antecedent in the sense of the question, namely that this act through itself prescinds man from Peter and is the form of the perfect Universal. For the proposition is true not because it makes the Universal, but because it reflexively attains and represents the Universal made through the apprehension "man." Therefore this apprehension is what prescinds man from Peter. That judgment, which is a reflexive proposition, indeed represents man already prescinded, but does not prescind him. Say the same of this judgment: "Peter and the other men, confusedly known, are one universal nature."

12. It is objected 4º from Juan Ulloa (Logic. Maj. disp. 2, chaps. 4, 5, and 6), who, although he holds that in no predication which immediately affects an otherwise common term with singular, universal, or particular quantity or sign can the nature signified by that term remain Universal, for example in these, "This man is man," "Every man is man," "Some animal is animal," nevertheless contends that the Universal simply speaking is preserved with respect to all its inferiors whenever a predicate otherwise Universal is affirmed of these or those inferiors signified through their proper concepts, as in these predications: "Peter is man," "Man and horse are animal," "Every man is animal." Thus, I say, it is objected: any of the concepts just mentioned, for example "Every man is animal," first attains a nature which in reality belongs to all animals, as we freely concede; moreover, it does not clearly and expressly propose the multiplicity of that nature. Therefore it constitutes that nature simply Universal. The consequence holds because a concept attaining a nature which in reality is multiple without expressing its multiplicity perfectly constitutes the Universal.

13. The minor is proved: the mode of tending of this predication, "Every man is animal," is entirely similar to the mode of tending of this one, "Every Divine Person is God." But the latter does not have by its essence to represent the multiplicity of God, but only the multiplicity of those who are God. Therefore neither does the former have by its essence to represent clearly the multiplicity of animal, but only of those who are animal, namely men. To anticipate solutions, Confirmation 1º: whether the signified nature is or is not multiple in reality is not a legitimate rule for knowing whether cognition clearly proposes or does not propose its multiplicity. This is clear

because the cognition "man" signifies a nature which in reality is multiple and nevertheless does not clearly express its multiplicity; and conversely this false cognition, "Every God is Omnipotent," clearly signifies a multiplicity of the Divine nature, which nevertheless is incapable of multiplication. Therefore the sole rule is the mode of tending of cognitions. Since, then, the mode of tending of both predications just adduced is entirely similar, either both or neither signifies the multiplicity of the predicate.

14. Confirmation 2º: the singularity or multiplicity of the subject of actual predication is not poured into the predicate. Therefore the fact that in "Every man is animal," "Peter is animal," the subject is proposed as multiple or singular does not prove that the predicate is clearly proposed as singular or multiple. The antecedent is proved because in this predication, "Every Divine Person is God," the subject is multiple while the predicate is essentially one; and in these, "God is a Divine Person," "Peter is some man," the predicate is multiple although the subject is entirely singular.

15. Confirmation 3º: the sign "every" immediately falling upon the subject does not impede the universality of the predicate. Proof: it would impede it insofar as of itself it signified the multiplicity of the predicate; but it does not so signify. This is proved: if of itself it signifies multiplicity of the predicate, it will signify it always and everywhere; yet this is clearly false in the stated predication, "Every Divine Person is God," which otherwise could not be true. Nor does recourse to incapacity of the object help. For because the sign "every" of itself signifies the multiplicity of the subject upon which it immediately falls, it therefore always signifies it truly or falsely, even if the object is in itself incapable of multiplication, as is clear in this predication, "Every God is Omnipotent," which is false for no other reason. Therefore if it also of itself signifies the multiplicity of the predicate, it will always signify that multiplicity truly or falsely, whatever the object may be.

16. Confirmation 4º, by an *a priori* reason: the concept "Every man is animal" proposes the nature of animal as identified with many in such a way that it prescinds from whether such a nature is virtually distinguished, or not virtually distinguished, from those many; understand the same of a formal distinction from the nature of the thing. For from such a concept, unless something else is added, one unsuitably gathers that animal is or is not virtually distinguished from men. Therefore it formally prescinds from the multiplicity of the nature of animal. The consequence is proved: a concept prescinding from that by whose position a nature would not be multiple, and by whose removal it would be multiple, prescinds from whether the nature is or is not multiple. But virtual distinction between the

nature of animal and the many subjects to which it is communicated is that by whose position the nature would not be multiple, as is clear in the Divine nature, which is not multiple although it is identified with many Persons because it is virtually distinguished from them, and by whose removal the nature will be multiple, as really occurs in creatures. Therefore, etc. The point is pressed: for a nature to be multiple in reality does not consist precisely in its being identified with many, as is seen in the Divine nature, but further adds virtual indistinction between the nature and those many. Therefore likewise for a nature to be multiple in the intellect does not consist precisely in its appearing identified with many, but it must further appear virtually indistinct from them. But the nature of animal does not thus appear through the concept of which we speak. Therefore, etc.

17. This is the whole foundation of the aforesaid Author, devised and advanced with sufficient subtlety. But it is displeasing 1º because the whole rests upon the difficulty of the mystery of the Trinity. If we wish to measure logical things and the customary modes of signifying created objects from that mystery, the accustomed form of the expository syllogism will often fail, and in the present point it could happen that a created nature is truly affirmed of a multiple subject without being prescinded from real unity or singularity, just as occurred when the Divine nature is affirmed of many Persons. It is displeasing 2º because, even were it granted that the multiplicity of animal is not clearly signified by those judgments, animal would not therefore be perfectly Universal; for it would not be abstracted or prescinded nor rationally distinguished from all inferior species, as is required for the Universal according to St. Thomas cited above (preceding chap., n. 7) and the common doctrine. It is displeasing 3º because a created nature is not prescinded from that which is essential to it and called into doubt by no one. But incapacity for a virtual or formal distinction from the nature of the thing sufficient to render a nature essentially one while identifiable with many after the manner of the Divine nature is so essential to every created nature that no one calls it into doubt. Therefore a created nature does not prescind from incapacity of this sort, but formally includes it no less than finitude and limitation. By this very fact the entire *a priori* reason upon which the objection rests and which is given in n. 16 collapses.

18. Therefore to the objection in n. 12, I deny the minor. To the proof, I deny the major, because just as the mode of tending of these apprehensions, "animal," "God," is not entirely similar, since the former is a common term and the latter singular, and the former prescinds from real unity of its object while the latter does not, since the true God cannot be prescinded from unity, so neither is the mode of tending of those predications entirely

similar, since they imitate as far as they can the apprehensions of themselves prerequisite, and the second of itself signifies the predicate as positively repugnant to multiplicity, while the first does not signify it thus. To the first Confirmation, I concede everything except what is supposed in the consequent, namely that the mode of tending of both predications is entirely similar. Indeed, I turn the argument back thus: this predication, "Every Divine Person is God," from its mode of tending does not prescind from the unity of the Divine nature, since unity is as essential to it as true Divinity. Therefore this predication, "Every man is animal," if entirely similar in mode of tending, does not prescind from the real unity of the nature of animal. But an act not prescinding an object from real unity cannot render it Universal, as is certain. Therefore, etc.

19. To the second. First, as regards multiplicity, I distinguish the antecedent: the multiplicity of the subject is not poured into a predicate proposed as essentially incapable of multiplication, I grant; into a predicate not so proposed, I deny the antecedent. Or otherwise I distinguish: it is not poured into the predicate if this does not exclude a virtual distinction sufficient for identity of one with many really distinct, I grant; if the predicate positively excludes such a distinction, as according to all every created nature excludes it precisely because it is finite, I deny the antecedent; and under the same distinction the consequence. Next, as regards singularity, I distinguish the antecedent: the singularity of the subject is not poured into the predicate so as to impede or restrict its breadth, I grant; so as to make it appear as containing in its signification one singular thing, which suffices to impede perfect precision, abstraction, and unity of reason, I deny the antecedent; and in the same sense the consequence. Nor does the proof of the antecedent hinder these distinctions, as will be clear to anyone considering it.

20. To the third. The mental sign "every," once the indivisibility of judgment is posited, always impedes the universality of the predicate, not because it always signifies its multiplicity of itself, but because of itself it signifies that multiplicity whenever it is not found identified with an expression limiting its signification, such as an expression of the predicate as singular or as essentially one; and this expression likewise impedes the universality of the predicate, as no one doubts. Hence such a sign never allows the predicate to be perfectly Universal, because it either signifies multiplicity of the predicate or expresses its intrinsic unity by identifying with itself the aforesaid expression; and in either way it does not permit the predicate to be Universal. Nor does it follow that the sign "every" can sometimes fail to signify the multiplicity of the subject upon which it

immediately falls. For from the fact that the signification of a mental sign can be limited it does not follow that it can be entirely destroyed, or that such a sign can exist while signifying absolutely nothing. Limitation of signification contains nothing absurd; thus in this expression, "Every learned man," the sign "Every" is limited to signify a smaller multitude than in "Every man." But destruction of the whole signification destroys the mental sign, as is self-evident. Yet if such a sign did not signify the multiplicity of the subject or object upon which it immediately falls, it would signify absolutely nothing but would lack all signification. Therefore it can never happen that the sign "every" exists without signifying, either truly or falsely, the multiplicity of that object, whatever it may be and however it may be expressed.

21. To the fourth, I deny the antecedent if it speaks of a virtual distinction sufficient for real identity of one with many. For exclusion of such a distinction is formally included in the concept of any finite nature; nor is there any Virtualist or Scotist who conceives a really one created nature as indifferent to being identified with really distinct extremes after the manner of the Divine nature. Therefore from that concept it is rightly gathered that animal is in this sense virtually indistinct from men, although this expression "virtually indistinct" is not given there. For just as it is rightly gathered that animal is a finite and limited being, opposed to a chimera, although these predicates do not appear there under their proper expressions, because these and other transcendental features are detected, upon reflection on the force of that concept, as included in every created nature; so must it be said in our matter. Certainly, one who reflects upon a concept clearly proposing animal really identified with many men immediately detects that animal is multiplied into many rational animals.

§ 2. Against the Second Assertion.

22. It is objected 1º: this act, "Peter is man," attains on the part of the object that nature which it predicates of Peter; but it predicates only Peter's nature. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved 1º from St. Thomas, Opusc. 56, saying: "The man who is predicated of Socrates is the same as Socrates; and the man predicated of Plato is the same as Plato, since the predicate is in the subject." 2º Because only that which is identified with a subject can be truly predicated of it; but Peter's nature alone is identified with Peter. Therefore, etc. 3º Because such an act mentally singularizes human nature by contracting it to one individual; therefore it removes the breadth proper to the Universal. And thus it is suitably explained how the nature of all,

previously confused through the apprehension "man," is afterward distributed through actual predications by assigning to each individual what was his own. 4º Because that judgment predicates the nature which the intellect knows to agree with Peter through the immediately preceding comparative apprehension. But through this apprehension the intellect knew that a singular nature agrees with Peter, for it knew Peter as such under the concept "Peter," which formally expresses the nature as joined with singularity, just as does the concept "this man." Therefore, etc.

23. I answer by denying the minor. To the first proof: St. Thomas in that place is rather opposed to the objectors. For he says: "Man can be considered without being particular, and thus he is in many and is predicated of many, yet not one man in number, but one in species." Then he adds the words objected against us, to which he adds that "man is not predicated of Socrates insofar as he is particular. The reason for this," he says, "is that a term predicates the same thing which it signifies; therefore, as it signifies, so it predicates. Now this term 'man' signifies human nature without any participation and particular account; therefore it will predicate it in this way. Yet it does not predicate it universally in this way, because the understanding of man insofar as man is other than his universality." If these things are well considered, they rather militate against our first Assertion and prove that the perfect Universal is preserved in actual predication. Yet, to note this incidentally, St. Thomas here and often elsewhere does not suppose the simplicity of judgment, but speaks on the supposition that the term "man" is not identified with the term "Peter." For the rest, we concede that the man predicated of Socrates is the same as Socrates, not by adequate but by inadequate identity, such as is given between subject and predicate when it is said, "Socrates is some man." For unless the predicate, formally or equivalently disjunctive, contained that which is the same as Socrates, it could not be truly predicated of Socrates. And this alone St. Thomas intends.

24. To the second, I distinguish the major: in determinate predication, I grant; in indeterminate predication, I deny the major; and granting the minor, I deny the consequence. The proof, indeed the whole objection, is countered by a formally disjunctive predication, such as "Peter is some man," and also by the judgment "Peter is man" if it be a composite quality, as in fact it is according to many. For in this hypothesis, which one would undeservedly call impossible, all human natures would be truly predicated of Peter, as even the Adversaries concede, and nevertheless not all would be identified with him. Therefore that predication, as is clear from what has been said, is equivalent in verification to "Peter participates human nature,"

or "is one of the men," which is true although it predicates more than what is identified with Peter.

25. To the third, I distinguish the antecedent: it singularizes human nature by denominating it a "singular subject," I grant; by denominating it a "singular predicate," I deny the antecedent and consequence. Consider the diversity in the mode of tending of these predications: "Peter is man," "Man is Peter." Each mentally singularizes human nature because each identifies with itself the expression "Peter"; but the first by its mode of tending essentially denominates human nature a "singular subject and universal predicate," with imperfect or qualified universality; the second conversely. The solution is likewise clear in this predication, "Peter is some man," in which whatever the Adversaries may wish to reply is plainly broken. The form of those denominations is indeed an indivisible act, but the subjects or objects are inadequately distinct; for the denomination "singular subject" falls upon Peter's nature alone, whereas the denomination "universal predicate" falls upon the natures of all. Thus also in physics the same union denominates matter and form "actual singular parts," but the same taken together "whole," or "composite." Distribution of the common nature into individuals by assigning to each what was his can be made either determinately through predications, "Peter is this man," "Paul is this man," and other predications of a singular predicate, or indeterminately through the predications of which we speak.

26. To the fourth, I turn back the argument. The apprehension "Peter" alone is not comparative, as is clear, but comparative apprehension must reflect upon human nature as already attained by the concept "man" and propose its agreement with Peter known as such. Therefore if the intellect predicates of Peter that nature which through comparative apprehension it previously knew to agree with Peter, it predicates the common nature as attained by the concept "man." Thus through the apprehension "Peter" the intellect indeed preknows human nature as singular, from which it follows only that it can then elicit this judgment, "Peter is this man." But since at the same time it previously possesses the apprehension "man" and in addition the comparative apprehension of the objects of each concept, it can also issue in a predication of the common nature of Peter as such, which we say is the predication "Peter is man"; just as it can issue in this, "Peter is some man," although the difficulty of the objection applies to it by an equal title.

27. It is objected 2º: therefore also in the judgment "Peter is this man" the objective breadth of the Universal will be preserved. Proof: because in it is found the expression "man," which will be bound to imitate the indefinite apprehension at least as regards the object. Likewise: therefore this

definition, "Rational animal," will attain on the part of the object all animals. I deny the first consequence together with its proof, because although, from poverty of words, we verbally explain the tendency of that judgment by the term "man" joined to the syncategorematic term "this," nevertheless in the mental judgment itself there is no expression "man," but the expression of one individual as such. Say the same of the simple apprehension "this man." Or, if preferred, distinguish the proof: there is found in it the expression "man" which of itself presupposes the indefinite apprehension "man," I deny; for this reason not even the Adversaries say that it is a predication of superior of inferior even presuppositively, nor do the proofs of our opinion apply to it. That it contains an expression which does not of itself presuppose such an apprehension, let it pass; for it does not follow that it must imitate it.

28. Everyone concedes the second consequence if the definition is composed of distinct apprehensions. But if it is supposed to be a simple quality, many still concede the consequence; indeed from this they prove that the Universal is preserved when predicated of an inferior, just as the generic Universal is preserved in a definitive act identifying with itself the expression of the difference. For a definition must consist of genus and difference; genus, I say, if not simply Universal, at least equivalently so as regards objective breadth. But even if the consequence is denied, there is no difficulty, because the indivisible apprehension "rational animal" does not of itself presuppose the prior apprehension "animal," nor do the other reasons of our opinion apply to it. In general, note that a term common of itself is not restricted in the same way by an inferior term when one is predicated of the other as when both coalesce into one complex term. When it is said, "Man is rational animal," animal is judged to be restricted to rational animals alone; but when it is said, "Animal is rational," it is not thus restricted but remains something objectively superior; otherwise the proposition would not be indirect. Likewise, therefore, it will remain superior when it is said, "Rational is animal."

29. It is objected 3º: it is repugnant that Peter be identified in reality except with his determinate humanity. Therefore it is also repugnant that Peter be mentally identified except with his determinate humanity. But through the judgment "Peter is man" Peter appears mentally identified with humanity. Therefore only with his own. But is not the evident rejoinder seen in the hypothesis in which such a judgment would be a composite quality, and also in fact in the judgment "Peter is some man"? Therefore I deny the first consequence, because identity in reality cannot be indeterminate, or have indeterminate extremes, since nothing exists in things except what is

determinate. But identity mentally taken, that is, as signified through cognition, can certainly be extrinsically denominated indeterminate from the mode of tending of the cognition with respect to one extreme, or even both, as when it is said, "Some man is some animal." If a vague individual is repugnant in reality, it is not therefore repugnant in the intellect.

30. It is objected 4º: for the Universal to be predicable of inferiors is for it to be divisible into inferiors as into members or parts. But when a whole is actually divided into parts, it does not retain the breadth which it previously had. Therefore, etc. I answer 1º by denying the major. For to be predicable is to be affirmable or verifiable; but to be verified or affirmed is not to be cut into members, as is clear in the vague individual, for example "some animal," which is likewise predicable of inferiors. I answer 2º by distinguishing the major: it is to be divisible by a division opposed to perfect precision and unity of reason, I grant; by a division opposed to objective breadth, I deny the major; and with the minor similarly distinguished, the consequence. The solution is clear from everything said thus far. Finally, when the Adversaries say that the common nature, when predicated of an inferior, is contracted, applied, determined, or discriminated, this must be conceded of a contraction, application, etc., which impedes perfect abstraction, unity of reason, and univocity, according to our first Assertion; but denied of a contraction, etc., which impedes the objective breadth proper to the Universal, according to our second Assertion. The sum of our opinion is this: whenever a predicate otherwise Universal is affirmed of an inferior, multiple, or singular subject, it does not retain the exact and complete universality which it previously had in indefinite apprehension; nevertheless it retains a mode and breadth equivalent to universality in order to the rules of Dialectic and the use of the Sciences. Reread especially n. 23 of the preceding chapter.

CHAPTER IX.
The Remaining Matters Concerning Universals in General Are Briefly Reviewed.

1. To complete the Treatise, we shall briefly decide several minor questions. Question 1: can an external material power, e.g. the visual power, make a Universal? It is certain, as experience attests, that a color, either because of distance or because of the faintness of the light, is often seen so confusedly and imperfectly that it cannot be discerned to which species it belongs. In such an event sight in a manner prescinds color from the differences, especially if various species of colors really exist in a distant object or under obscure conditions. Nevertheless, it must be denied, with

the common opinion, that sight then makes a Universal, or even that it attains the common notion of Color indefinitely.

2. This is proved: because sense, as Aristotle and St. Thomas often teach, attains a sensible object only sensibly, that is, as affected by individuating circumstances, nor can it prescind from the "here and now." Therefore it always fixes its intuition upon determinate individuals, although perhaps it prescinds from specific differences; just as the concept "this animal," although it does not discern between rational and irrational, nevertheless tends toward a determinate individual, and therefore does not make a Universal. But when vision attains several colors confused and intermixed, it attains them all collectively, after the manner of a certain aggregate or collection. This mode of attaining is neither indefinite nor suitable for a Universal, as is clear in these intentions, "army," "people."

3. Question 2: does internal sense, or the imaginative power, make a Universal? I answer: the common doctrine is that the imaginative power, although it can attain an absent object, always attains it in the singular. Hence the same reason applies to internal and external sense. Therefore St. Thomas (I, p. q. 12, a. 4, c.) teaches generally that "Sense knows only singulars," and that "according to the Intellect we can know things universally, which is beyond the faculty of sense." But even if the imaginative power might perhaps prescind the common notion from all differences, it would not thereby make the logical Universal of which we are now treating, namely, one that is predicable of many through acts of the same power; for a material power cannot elicit enunciative or predicative acts.

4. Question 3: is a Universal made through the operation of the agent Intellect? The Intellect is twofold, at least in function and office, and is divided into agent and possible, or passive. It is called the agent Intellect insofar as it produces impressed species, that is, certain spiritual powers by which it is thereafter assisted in producing cognitions. It is called possible, or passive, insofar as it produces and receives cognitions of objects. Hence the meaning of the question is whether an impressed species virtually containing a precisive and indefinite cognition makes a Universal. The common opinion of our authors, with the Angelic Doctor and the Excellent Doctor, denies this; the Most Illustrious Palanco and the College of St. Thomas adhere to them against the common opinion of the Thomists.

5. The resolution depends upon other questions which belong not here but to the treatise *De anima*. If the agent Intellect produces species that are not representative of singulars as such, and if, moreover, species are formal representations of objects, as many hold, I think that through them a certain Universal is made, at least a specific one. For why should a formal

representation of human nature, for example, with precision from all singularity, not extrinsically denominate it one and indifferent to many, just as a precisive cognition does? And under those conditions the Excellent Doctor concedes this. Yet that Universal will be predicable only remotely. But since among our authors it is commonly held false that an impressed species, even if perhaps in its own manner it prescinds from singulars, is a formal image or formal representation of objects, and since it is regarded only as a virtual and effective representation insofar as it is a power assisting in eliciting cognition, it must therefore be denied absolutely that a Universal is made through it, except with the qualifying addition "virtually," or "in first act."

6. The reason is that a Universal must be "one in apparent or represented being," as is acknowledged among the Peripatetics. Therefore, since the object through the impressed species does not yet possess represented being formally, but only virtually and in first act, it is not yet rendered formally Universal until cognition, or Intellection, supervenes, which is a formal representation. And thus St. Thomas openly teaches, first in Opusc. 56, saying: "A Universal is one in cognition; … and because a thing is being and one through the same, and conversely, a Universal must be Universal through the aforesaid Unity, so that the cognition of such a nature makes the Universal actually Universal, and is something formal in the Universal." Further on: "Therefore the Universal is one by the unity of cognition, … and for this reason Aristotle says that it is one in many, namely, as cognized." Likewise q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 6 and 9, where he teaches that the object of these conceptions, "Genus," "Species," and others signifying a Universal, is only "the thing understood"; and he repeats the same elsewhere frequently. The point is pressed: according to the Thomists, a Universal is constituted by a rational unity fashioned in the object. But an impressed species does not fashion anything, nor can a being of reason exist otherwise than in cognition, since its whole being is to be cognized. Therefore, etc.

7. One may object 1º: St. Thomas more than once indicates that through the operation of the agent Intellect a nature is abstracted and purified from individuating conditions. I answer: St. Thomas is speaking of mediate, virtual abstraction in first act, insofar as the species is a medium and power for a cognition that formally abstracts. One may object 2º: animal nature, as it is in the impressed species, is not singular nor appropriated to any individual; therefore it is a common and Universal nature. Granting the antecedent, I distinguish the consequence: it is a common and Universal nature virtually and in first act, I grant; formally and in second act, I deny the consequence. Thus there is a middle state in which a nature is neither

formally singular nor formally universal, namely, the state in which it is formally represented in neither way, but is, as it were, on the way and in proximate potency toward a precisive and indefinite representation. See Excellent Doctor, disp. 6 *Metaph.*, sect. 6, n. 6, 7.

8. Question 4: does the Will make a Universal? That the Will can affectively prescind a common notion from differences, by loving, for example, virtue or honor as such, and not loving the differences as such, is beyond doubt. But some deny that the Will then makes a Universal, on the ground that this love presupposes a Universal already made by the Intellect; and what is presupposed as already made cannot be made again. But this reason is of no force. First, because in the opinion of many, judgment makes a Universal, although it presupposes it as made through apprehension. Second, because in the opinion of all, judgment denominates as cognized and represented the same object that is presupposed as cognized by apprehension; love denominates as prescinded what has already been prescinded by cognition; and efficacious affection renders willed what is already presupposed as willed by simple complacency. Therefore an extrinsic denomination already presupposed in the object can be attributed again and again through other forms, and consequently so can the denomination of Universal. It must therefore be said that through an act of the Will a certain affective Universal can be made, insofar as an object that is really multiple can, on the part of affection, be prescinded from multiplicity and thus extrinsically constituted one by an affective unity. Yet it will not be the scientific Universal of which we are speaking, both because it is not something one in apparent or represented being, and because it does not express an order to predications and sciences.

9. Question 5: does the Divine or Angelic Intellect make a Universal? I answer: the Divine Intellect does not make one at all, because imperfect cognition is repugnant to it, namely, cognition having an inadequate, confused, indefinite mode of tending that does not comprehend all the formalities of the object, such as is necessary for constituting a Universal. Nor is it an objection that God cognizes the Universal made by us, for He also cognizes our fictions without Himself fashioning them. Therefore, while He cognizes our precisions, He is at the same time determined by the infinite perspicacity of His mind not to prescind, but by the same intuition to see through whatever has been omitted by us in the object. The Angelic Intellect will be able to make a Universal concerning supernatural objects, which it cognizes only abstractively. But concerning natural objects, for which it uses proper and intuitive species, it cannot, unless perhaps at the

command of the Will it is able to use its species only inadequately; but this does not belong here.

10. Question 6: whether a nature, if abstracted from only one individual, is Universal? The meaning of the question is not whether a Universal can be made through a concept which on the part of the object attains only the nature of one individual and in no way extends to the natures of others, at least possible ones; for this would have to be denied without hesitation, since a nature so conceived could not be rendered common to many or predicable of many. The meaning, therefore, is whether, through a species received from only one individual, a cognition can be elicited that makes a Universal, that is, indefinitely represents the nature of all those similar in that notion. In this sense I answer with a distinction. If a nature is abstracted from some predicate of an individual, yet in such a way that it remains contracted by thisness, it is not rendered Universal. For example, I see from afar a moving man in whom I discern nothing beyond animality, and immediately elicit the concept "this animal," determinately fixing my mind upon the object placed before it under that aspect. Then, although I prescind from rationality, I do not make a Universal, but an incomplete individual, because I contract the notion of animal through a determinate thisness.

11. But if, in the stated case, I elicit the bare concept "animal," and attend to nothing concerning the circumstances of that individual, I then constitute a Universal, even though I use a species impressed by only one individual. This is proved because that concept in representing is altogether similar to those cognitions by which a Universal is otherwise ordinarily made; nor by virtue of it does the object appear either as multiple or as really one, nor can anything else be said of it as thus conceived except that it is "a sensible living thing," which is a definition uniformly applicable to all animals. Therefore such a concept attains an objective notion common to all individuals with precision from every difference and multitude; and this is to make a Universal. One may object: that concept is produced by the species of only one individual; therefore on the part of the object it does not attain all individuals, as is required for a Universal. I distinguish the antecedent: by a diminished and faint species, supplied through an operation in which that individual is assimilated to the others, namely through sensation, and moreover applied to operating inadequately, I grant; by a species of a different character, or one applied otherwise, I deny the antecedent; and the consequence. See above, chap. 5, n. 13. Certainly no one denies that the nature of the Sun or of the World can be made Universal, and yet of the individuals of that nature we possess the species of only one.

12. Question 7: whether, and in what sense, Universals are eternal, immutable, ingenerable, incorporeal, real, and substantial? I answer by particulars. Universals are called eternal, immutable, and ingenerable: first, in verifying scientific propositions, as was explained above, chap. 2, n. 4; second, in a precisive sense, insofar as an object conceived universally is prescinded, at least for the most part, from the circumstances of time and place and from the state of existence, generation, or corruption. Hence St. Thomas, I, p. q. 16, a. 7, ad 2: "A Universal," he says, "is said to be everywhere and always insofar as Universals are abstracted from the here and now; but from this it does not follow that they are eternal, except in an Intellect, if there is one that is eternal." I said, "at least for the most part," because sometimes a certain Universal restricted to some place or time can be made, as through these concepts, "A man existing in the street," "A man enduring today," which indefinitely propose an objective notion verifiable of many.

13. Next, Universals according to form are incorporeal, because the form, namely cognition, is spiritual. They are also according to form real beings, insofar as real is opposed to fictitious; yet not insofar as real being is the same as a being of nature existing outside the soul or independently of the Intellect. Rather, as contrasted with real being in this latter sense, they are called, and are, beings of reason, namely subjective or denominative ones. Likewise, according to form they are not substantial but accidental, since their form, which is cognition, is an accident, not indeed intrinsic to the subject or object which it denominates Universal, but extrinsic to the object and intrinsic to the soul in which it is received. St. Thomas manifestly teaches all these things in Opusc. 55 and 56, some of whose testimonies by way of example are given in the Proemial Disputation, disp. 2, chap. 4, § 4. But if Universals are considered according to the subject, substratum, or denominated thing, they will be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental, real or fictitious, according as the individuals from which the common notion is abstracted are such; for the notion of a stone, an Angel, a color, or even a chimera can be abstracted.

14. It should be noted here from St. Thomas in the cited Opusc. 56 that a Universal, insofar as it is composed of the object and the form extrinsically denominating it, is neither one essentially, or in substance, nor properly one accidentally, but claims for itself a special class of unity. Hence, after the Angelic Doctor had said that the second intention, which is the form of the Universal, is not received in the denominated thing but in the soul, he adds: "From this it is clear how the Universal is one and how it is not one. For it is not one in substance, since it aggregates in itself an accident, namely the second intention, and a thing outside the soul, which is sometimes an

accident, as whiteness, and sometimes a substance, as man. Nor is it one accidentally, since an accident is in a subject. Therefore the Universal is one by the unity of cognition, so that nothing is required for the notion of the Universal except that rational unity."

15. From what has been said, one may infer what causes a Universal has. The efficient cause is a created Intellect; the formal cause is an indefinite cognition prescinding, on the part of the act, from every multitude, difference, and numerical unity of the really multiple object; the material cause is the object which is thus prescinded; the final cause may be called the attainment of the sciences.

16. Finally it is asked in what sense certain properties which the Philosopher attributes to the Universal as contrasted with singulars are to be understood. I answer: the Universal, in preference to singulars, is called 1º "scientifically knowable and intelligible." Scientifically knowable, because the sciences commonly do not concern themselves with singulars under the notion of such, but consider their objects universally. Intelligible, because the Universal is not perceived by the senses, as the singular is, but is the proper object of the Intellect. It is called 2º "a principle of singulars," not indeed an effective principle, but an intrinsic and constitutive one according to our reason; for a singular is constituted from common predicates and thisness, as from a kind of form.

17. It is called 3º "prior to singulars," first by the priority which they call "in the consequence of subsisting," insofar as the universal follows from a singular predicate, and not conversely; for the inference is valid, "Peter exists, therefore a man exists," but not conversely. Second, by a certain priority of nature, insofar as Universals are simpler with respect to expression than singulars and are, as it were, constitutive of them, as we have just said. Hence Universals are also said to be prior in the order of cognition. Yet this is to be understood when the Intellect in cognizing follows the order of composition and proceeds from parts to the whole, from simple things to composites. If, however, it follows the analytical order, or order of resolution, the Universal rather has posteriority in cognition. But Aristotle's statement, "The Universal either is nothing, or is posterior," is usually explained with respect to existence: both physical existence on the part of the thing, which the Universal possesses only by reason of singulars; and intentional existence, because for the Intellect to make a Universal, knowledge of singulars as similar commonly precedes. These things apply to the absolute Universal; for the relative Universal, as was explained in chap. 6, n. 29 from the Excellent Doctor, is simultaneous in cognition with singulars as capable of being subjected under it.

18. It is called 4º "more perfect than singulars"; understand this of extensive perfection, for singulars are more perfect intensively. Finally, it is said to be proper to the Universal to have several inferiors, at least possible ones, to which it can be compared both by simple and by composite comparison, as truly belonging to them. These and other matters will become clearer in the following Treatise. What has now been said is sufficient concerning Universals taken in general.

TREATISE III.

ON UNIVERSALS INDIVIDUALLY, OR
ON THE FIVE PREDICABLES.

The author, or compiler, of this Treatise was Malchus, surnamed Porphyry, a Phoenician by nation, or, as others think, a Jew by nation, born at Batanaea, who lived under Aurelian and Diocletian, and afterward under Emperor Constantine. A follower of Platonic Philosophy, he was at first indeed a Christian; but afterward, having devoted himself to magical arts, he became an impious deserter and opponent of the Christian Religion. Nevertheless, in this Work he handed down a harmless and useful doctrine, since it was not so much his own as drawn from the sources of Plato and Aristotle. He entitled this work *Isagoge*, that is, an Introduction to Aristotle's Predicaments, or Categories. In it he treats of the five terms, or of the five Predicables, which are signified by these terms: "Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident." These are the same Universals in particular which we now undertake to explain individually, and into which the Universal in common is divided as into specific members.

DISPUTATION I.
ON GENUS AND SPECIES.

CHAPTER I.
Genus Is Defined, and Certain Minor Doubts Are Resolved.

Genus, taken logically or philosophically, without lingering over grammatical acceptations, is defined from Porphyry and Aristotle as "that which is predicable of many things differing in species as what they are." The words "predicable of many" explain the agreement of Genus with the other Predicables, all of which are apt to be predicated of many. The remaining words exhibit the difference of this Predicable from the others. First, Genus differs from Species because the latter is predicated of many things distinct only in number, whereas Genus is predicated of many things diverse in species. Things are said to be diverse in species when they are notably dissimilar in essence and therefore have diverse essential definitions, as man, horse, lion, and dog. Things are said to be distinct only in number when they are so similar in essence that they are distinguished solely because they constitute number, or multitude, as this man and that man. Consequently, Genus also differs from Species because Genus is predicated incompletely, or as a part of metaphysical essence; animal, for example, is predicated of man, not as explaining the whole essence of man, but something of it. Species, however, is predicated completely, or as the whole essence of the individual; for when it is said, "Peter is a man," there is formally predicated whatever Peter is, apart from haecceity, which does not

pertain to metaphysical essence, as we explained elsewhere (Tract. 2, disp. 1, cap. 3, nn. 18, 22).

2. Next, Genus differs from Difference because the latter is predicated, not "as what it is," but "as a qualified what." Finally, it differs from Property and Accident because these two are predicated "as a quality simply." Those things are predicated as "what" which are essential and quidditative predicates of the subject; for by them we answer one who asks, What is the thing? Of these, some are predicated "as what it is," that is, purely as "what"; others "as a qualified what." Those which are signified after the manner of "something standing by itself," or by substantive terms, such as "animal, man," are predicated purely as "what." Those, however, which are signified after the manner of "something adjacent," or by adjectival terms, are predicated as "quality." But if the predicates signified adjectivally are essential, they then pertain to "what and quality," and are predicated "as a qualified what"; such are "rational, sensitive," and others which come under the name Difference. But if those signified adjectivally are accidental, or outside the essence, they are then predicated "as a quality simply"; such are "risible, hot, white," and all those contained under Property and Accident.

3. The definition of Genus approved by more recent authors has the same sense, namely: "that which is predicable of many things differing in species as the material part of their metaphysical essence." Genus is called the "material part," and Difference the "formal part," by analogy with physical matter and form. For just as prime matter "stands by itself" (that is, it does not stand in another subject), and is indifferent to composites diverse in species, and is determined by supervening forms to one species of composite rather than another, so in the metaphysical order Genus is conceived as though "standing by itself," and is indifferent to various species until it is contracted to some definite one by superadded Differences. Therefore, the common saying, "Genus is taken from matter, Difference from form," is not to be understood as though Genus, for example "animal," signified prime matter alone, and Difference, for example "rational," the form alone, namely the human soul; for each signifies, on the side of the object, the whole physical composite. Rather, understand it by analogy, or imitation. See St. Thomas (In V *Metaph*., lect. 7, litt. e; In VII *Metaph*., lect. 9, litt. d).

4. But objection 1: Genus cannot be defined. Proof 1º: because, since a definition must consist of genus and difference, Genus would be defined through Genus, and consequently the thing defined would enter into its own definition, contrary to the laws of correct definition. There would likewise be a genus of Genus, which is repugnant, just as an action of an action. Proof

2º: because it would follow that Genus consists of genus and difference, and consequently would no longer be Genus but Species. Hence St. Thomas, In V Metaph., lect. 4, litt. b, speaking of Genera, says: "There is no account and definition of them which must be composed of genus and difference; rather, proper definitions are given of species."

5. I deny the assumption. To proof 1º: Genus is indeed defined through genus, namely through the common notion "predicable of many," in which it generically agrees with the other Predicables. But it does not thereby follow that the thing defined enters into its own definition in the manner forbidden by the laws of definition, namely under the proper concept of the thing formally defined. For only this is prohibited by those laws: that the term under which the thing to be defined is proposed should again be placed in the definition, so that man, for example, should not be defined thus: "An animal which is a man." Apart from this, it is altogether necessary that each thing be defined through itself under a different expression, because the objective thing defined and the objective definition are the same. Since, therefore, the given definition of Genus does not contain the expression "genus," which is the thing formally defined, it does not violate the rule of definition. The objection can likewise be pressed against the definition of Definition, and also against the definition of Name, namely "a significant vocal expression," etc., where a name is placed in its own definition because "vocal expression" is a name. For there to be a genus of Genus is nothing other than for Genus to be capable of agreeing with the other Predicables in some common notion; and in this there is none of the absurdity by which, in Physics, an action of an action is rejected.

6. To proof 2º: that a Genus is constituted from another simpler genus and a difference proves only that it can simultaneously be a subalternate and subjectible Species, which is repugnant on no account. Thus the genus "animal" is constituted from the genus "living thing" and the difference "sensitive"; and again the genus "living thing" from the genus "body" and the difference "animate." Nor is St. Thomas opposed, for in the place cited he adds: "If some genus is defined, it is not defined insofar as it is a genus, but insofar as it is a species." That is, when some genus is defined by a definition properly so called, namely one consisting strictly of genus and difference, it does not have this precisely from being a genus, for the supreme genus cannot strictly be defined, although it is truly a genus, but from simultaneously being a subjectible Species. Add that St. Thomas is speaking of a direct definition of genus taken in first intention; whereas we are now speaking of a reflexive definition, which explains Genus taken in second intention. The solution given suffices for the force of the objection.

Whatever troublesome rejoinder may be made will be resolved in the following disputation, where we shall discuss the agreement of the five Predicables in the common notion of Predicable.

7. Objection 2: Genus is a part of specific essence; but a part cannot be predicated absolutely of the whole; therefore Genus is not absolutely predicable of Species. I answer: a physical part is not predicated absolutely of the whole; therefore it is false to say, "Man is animal," unless "inadequately" is added. But a metaphysical part can be predicated absolutely of the whole, both because of adequate real identity and because, on the side of the object, under the concept of a part there is attained whatever is in the whole. See the passage of St. Thomas cited above (Tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 4, n. 8).

8. Objection 3: the given definition does not include the supreme and subalternate Genera; therefore it is deficient. Proof of the antecedent: because a supreme Genus, and also a subalternate one, is predicable of many things differing in genus; but this predicability is not explained in the given definition. Add that Genus is also predicable of many things distinct in number, a predicability of which the definition makes no mention. For the solution, know that one Genus is supreme, another subalternate, another lowest. The supreme is that which has no other genus above it, such as "Substance as such," or rather "Being," if perhaps the notion of Being can be a genus, as many hold. The subalternate is that which has other genera both below and above it, as "Living thing," which contains beneath itself the genus "animal" and has above itself the genera "body" and "substance." The lowest is that which has beneath itself only species, such as "bird" or "fish." Know furthermore that lowest and subalternate Genera are called and are subalternate subjectible Species in relation to higher genera. For example, "animal" is indeed a genus with respect to man, horse, lion, etc.; but it is a subalternate subjectible Species in relation to the genus "living thing," to which it is subjected as a certain complete metaphysical essence constituted from the genus "living thing" and the difference "sensitive."

9. Now to the objection, I deny the antecedent. To the proof: the supreme and subalternate Genera are indeed predicated of things differing in genus, but in such a way that this genus truly is a subjectible Species and, in relation to higher genera, is considered not as Genus but as Species. Therefore that predication, or predicability, is sufficiently comprehended and explained under the name of predicability of things differing in species. Predicability of many things distinct in number, however, either is common to and transcends all the Predicables, and therefore ought not to have been specially expressed in connection with Genus; or it is included in

predicability of things differing in species, for whatever is predicated of a species can thereby be predicated of its individuals. It may be said: nevertheless, the predicability of supreme and lowest Genera remains diverse, since one is predicated of things differing in subalternate species and the other of things differing in lowest species. I answer: this diversity is purely material in the consideration of Logic insofar as it distinguishes and examines the mode of predicating. For whether the inferiors differ in subalternate species or only in lowest species, the mode of predicating on the side of Genus is the same; for it is always predicated as the material part of the specific essence of the subjects.

10. It may again be said: Species is therefore a Predicable logically diverse from Genus because it regards inferiors differing in a different way, namely as distinct only in number, whereas Genus regards inferiors differing in species. But the supreme and lowest Genera also regard inferiors differing in different ways, namely the former things differing in genus, the latter things differing in species. Therefore they are logically diverse Predicables. I answer: Species is a Predicable logically diverse from Genus, not precisely because the inferiors differ in just any diverse way, but because their diversity introduces a diverse mode of predicating on the side of the common notion. For when the inferiors differ only in number, the common quidditative notion is predicated completely, or as the whole essence, or at least not as a material part. But when they differ in species, the common notion is predicated only incompletely, or as the material part of metaphysical essence. This does not occur in the same way with the inferiors of supreme and lowest Genera; for their diversity leaves unchanged the mode of predication on the side of the common notion, as we have just noted. Therefore it does not suffice to constitute logically diverse Predicables.

11. Objection 4: Being as such is not a genus; and yet it is predicated "as what it is" of many things differing in species. I answer: according to many, Being is the supreme genus. According to others, it is not a genus, either because it is not univocal but analogical, and therefore does not have the unity proper to a Universal which the definition of Genus and of every Predicable presupposes; or because it formally transcends the differences, and consequently is not predicated as a metaphysical part, since no other mutually distinct counterpart corresponds to it. It may be said: neither is Genus predicated as a material metaphysical part, both because, when animal, for example, is actually predicated of man, it is not prescinded from nor rationally distinguished from man or from rational; and because by predication it is contracted and determined to the human species, and

therefore does not remain indifferent to other species, as a material part ought to remain.

12. I answer: in the opinion denying that the Universal is preserved in actual predication, just as there is not predicated of Species a genus which is then actually and formally such, but one which is or was such presuppositively through a prior indefinite apprehension, so too it is predicated as a material metaphysical part in no other sense. In the opposite opinion, animal indeed remains formally distinct from rational, and therefore indifferent to other species. In the intermediate opinion, which we maintained in the preceding treatise, animal actually predicated of man remains a material metaphysical part, not formally or simply, but virtually and equivalently. Understand these things on the supposition of the simplicity of judgment; for if that is denied, whatever the objection asserts is false.

13. Objection 5: Color as such is predicated "as what it is" of colors differing in species; and yet it is not a genus but an accident, which pertains to the fifth Predicable. I answer: Color as such is indeed an accident with respect to the subject which it accidentally affects, for example wood, stone, etc. But if it is compared with the various species of colors, such as whiteness, blackness, etc., it is not Accident but Genus, the first Predicable.

Certain Minor Doubts Concerning Genus.

14. Doubt 1: whether Genus essentially requires several possible Species, or may be contained under only one? I answer: it essentially requires several, whatever certain Thomists may object. Proof 1º, from Aristotle, Topics IV, cap. 3, who says: "Since every Genus has several Species, one must examine whether there can be another Species of the stated Genus; for if there cannot, it is manifest that what has been stated will not be a Genus at all." St. Thomas agrees in In I Poster., lect. 12, litt. b, saying: "It is not possible to find any Genus of which there is only one Species."

15. Proof 2º: because Genus is commonly defined as "predicable," that is, truly affirmable, "of many things differing in species." Therefore it belongs to the essence of Genus to have the capacity to be truly said to agree with several Species, no less than to be truly said to agree with at least one Species; for it is not defined through an order to one rather than through an order to many. But the capacity of a real predicate, such as we now suppose Genus to be in its substrate, to be truly said to agree with several species essentially requires their possibility; otherwise it could be said to agree truly with chimerical species. Therefore, etc. Add that Genus, according to all,

must be predicable as a material part, that is, indifferent, contractible, and determinable through a specific difference. But if the remaining Species were repugnant, no indifference or contractibility of Genus would remain.

16. Objection: even if all species of animals except the human were repugnant, animal would still be a genus. Proof: because man would then have the same essence which he now has, and therefore one constituted from the genus "animal" and the difference "rational." Confirmation: because if animal were not then a genus, man would have to be defined otherwise in that hypothesis, namely through another genus. Therefore he would have a diverse essence, for a diverse definition indicates a diverse essence. Fr. Lynch adduces various solutions to this argument and attacks them at length, lib. 9, Dial., tract. 2, cap. 2. I say briefly that animal in the stated hypothesis would not be a genus, because it would not be a material part indifferent to other species. The animality of man would indeed be the same as it now is intrinsically and physically, attention being given namely to the primary perfection of the "principle of sensing," which at least in its intrinsic place would not be lacking; but it would not be the same logically and extrinsically, because it would not have those extrinsic denominations which Logic now considers in it, namely the denominations of "material part," "superior," and "indifferent" to several species. For the animality of man now receives these denominations extrinsically from the act by which it is indefinitely confused with other species; and that act would then be impossible.

17. Man likewise would then have the same essence physically, but not the same essence metaphysically and logically, because metaphysical essence involves extrinsic denominations from acts of reason, which would then vary because of variation in the object. Man would therefore have to be defined differently, namely: "A living, sensitive, rational thing," so that the adequate specific difference would be constituted from sensitive and rational. Nor does it follow from this that man would have a physically diverse essence, but only a diverse metaphysical, logical, and extrinsic essence. If it is asked what Predicable "animal," substantively expressed as such, would then be, I answer: it would be a Predicable diverse from those which we now know. For it would not be Genus, because it would not be a material part; not Species, because it would not be predicated completely; not Difference, because it would include the genus "living thing" and would not be predicated "as a qualified what"; not Property or Accident, because it would be predicated as "what." It would therefore be a Predicable diverse from all these; invent whatever name for it you please. What does it matter that, in an impossible hypothesis, the number of Predicables would increase? It could nevertheless

in some way be reduced to Species, which it would most closely approach, except that it would omit a partial difference.

18. Rejoinder: prime matter not indifferent to several species of forms is possible, as many hold concerning celestial matter; therefore the same should be judged of Genus, since it imitates matter. I deny the consequence, because Genus does not imitate every matter, or matter in every respect, but precisely the matter actually known in sublunary things, uniquely or principally according to indifference to several species of forms. For Genus is called a "material part" in no other sense than insofar as it is conceived after the manner of a subject contractible and determinable through various differences.

19. Doubt 2: whether Genus is predicated of Species as a whole or as a part? A whole is either "actual," namely one which actually contains parts, or "potential," by which name is understood any abstract notion contractible and divisible through other inferior notions which it does not formally include but of which it can nevertheless be predicated; and therefore these are called "subjective," or "potestative," parts. I say 1º: Genus is predicated of Species as a whole insofar as it is signified concretely and, on the side of the object, imports whatever is in the Species. In this sense St. Thomas teaches, cap. 3, 4, *De ente et essentia*, that every Universal is predicated of its inferiors not as a part but as a whole. And in the same sense it may be said to be predicated as an actual whole, since on the side of the object it actually includes the Species.

20. But because Logic principally considers Genus according to that which it has on the side of the act, I say 2º: Genus is predicated of Species as a potential whole either formally or equivalently. Formally, indeed, if judgment is a composite quality, because then animal in this predication, "Man is animal," remains simply Universal, and therefore indifferent to other Species, in which indifference and extension consists the notion of a potential whole. Equivalently, however, if judgment is a simple quality, because then, in actual predication, animal retains an amplitude equivalent to the Universal.

21. I say 3º: a Genus which is not supreme is also predicated as an actual whole, not with respect to its inferiors, but with respect to a difference equal to itself and another higher genus. This is clear in animal, for example, which is predicated of man as actually including the difference "sensitive" and the genus "living thing," with respect to which it is a subalternate Species. I say 4º: Genus, even on the side of the act, is predicated of Species as a part, that is, as not formally expressing the whole essence of the Species. It is predicated, I say, as a material part indifferent to other species either

formally or equivalently, according to what has just been said concerning the potential whole. Nor is it repugnant that animal be predicated of man simultaneously as a part and as a potential whole, because these denominations are taken from diverse grounds: the denomination of "whole" from amplitude or extension; the denomination of "part" from intension, or the perfection exhibited on the side of the act.

22. Doubt 3: whether Genus is predicated of individuals as a material part, or in the manner of Genus? An individual, insofar as conceived or signified by us, is either "complete," namely one which formally contains the whole specific essence which exists on the side of the thing as affected by singularity, such as "Peter, this man"; or "incomplete," which formally expresses only a part of the real essence, that is, some essential predicate as affected by haecceity, such as "this animal, this living thing, this substance." Experience shows that such individuals can be conceived by us with precision from the remaining predicates of the complete individual, especially when we see a man from afar. These things being posited, I say 1º: Genus is predicated incompletely of complete individuals and as a material part. Proof: because in this predication, "Peter is animal," the whole essence of Peter is not formally predicated; for this is not only animal but rational animal. Therefore a part of the essence is predicated; not a formal part, as is evident; therefore a material part.

23. It may be said: Genus as such expresses a relation only to Species. I answer: Genus expresses a relation immediately only to Species, but mediately also to individuals, since they truly contain the specific essence. It may again be said: where the terms of a relation are diverse, the relation is diverse; but Species and individuals are diverse terms; therefore the relation of Genus to both cannot be the same. I answer: grant that a quasi-double diverse relation can be considered in Genus, one to Species and another to individuals. But whence is it proved that both are not proper to Genus as such, since one follows from the other, and that which regards individuals arises from that which regards Species? Add that diversity of terms is material when all are regarded by the same or a similar mode of predicability proper to Genus as such. And so it happens here, for Genus regards both individuals and Species as Predicable in the manner of a material metaphysical part.

24. I say 2º: Genus is predicated of incomplete individuals, not as Genus but as Species. Proof: because in this predication, "This animal is animal," animal is predicated completely as "what," and as the whole essence of the subject. For the subject as thus expressed, "this animal," is not formally rational or irrational, but prescinds from both, since by the force and

efficacy of that expression neither appears, nor can appear through definition. Its metaphysical essence, therefore, is precisely animal. Hence, when animal is predicated of it, its entire essence is predicated, just as when it is said, "This man is man." But this mode of predicating is proper, not to Genus, but to Species.

25. It may be said: this animal and that animal, if they happen to be Peter and Bucephalus, differ in species; therefore animal ought to be predicated of them as Genus. I answer: they do indeed differ in species on the side of the thing and insofar as they are expressed by the complete concepts "Peter, Bucephalus," by which they become complete individuals. But insofar as expressed by incomplete concepts, by reason of which they become incomplete individuals, they are distinguished logically and formally only in number. For no greater diversity appears between this animal and that animal, insofar as thus conceived, than between this man and that man. It may further be said: therefore, when it is said, "This substance is substance," substance will be predicated as Species. But this is impossible, for substance, since it is a supreme Genus, cannot be subjected to a higher Genus; yet it would be subjected if it were a Species. I answer: I deny this last consequence, because it cannot be proved that every predicable Species, even an incomplete one, must be a subjectible Species.

26. Doubt 4: whether Genus is predicated immediately of individuals? I answer: it is predicated immediately of incomplete individuals. First, because with respect to them it is not Genus but Species; but Species is immediately predicated of its individuals, as man of Peter and Paul. Secondly, because between "this animal" and the Genus "animal" no specific notion intervenes. For if some notion intervened, it would be formally included in the incomplete individual and would be inferred from it more immediately than the notion of animal. But that this is false is clear because this inference is by no means valid: "It is this animal, therefore it is man"; whereas this is immediately valid: "It is this animal, therefore it is animal." Nor will the Intellect fittingly use any other middle term in assenting to such a consequent.

27. As regards complete individuals, Genus is predicated of them mediately: both according to the order of the Predicamental tree, in which Species intervenes between Genus and individual; and insofar as the specific notion can fittingly be assumed as a middle term for proving or verifying Genus of the individual, for example animal of Peter, thus: "Peter, because he is a man, is an animal"; or thus: "Every man is an animal; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is an animal." In this twofold sense the predication of Genus of a complete individual is mediate. Nothing, however, prevents it from

being called immediate in another sense, for example by immediacy of assent. For it can happen that the Intellect immediately assents to this truth, "Peter is an animal," before it expressly judges that Peter is a man; although even then the fact that Peter is a man can fittingly be assumed as a middle term so that the assent may become firmer, and therefore such assent is usually called fundamentally mediate.

28. It may be said: these predications are altogether immediate: "Peter is a man; this man is a rational animal"; but in each animal is predicated of a complete individual; therefore, etc. I distinguish the minor premise: animal is predicated as included in the specific concept, whether simple, as "man," or definitive, as "rational animal," I grant; animal taken separately in the manner of Genus, I deny the minor premise; and under the same distinction I distinguish the consequence. Here the question is not of the generic predicate insofar as included in Species or joined to the specific difference, but only insofar as it alone is predicated as pure Genus.

CHAPTER II.
What Is the Thing Defined in the Definition of Genus?

1. It is certain that by the definition of Genus, Genus is defined, just as man is defined by the definition of man. But because the name "Genus" signifies an accidental concrete expressing two constitutive elements, namely a nature, for example animal, as subject or substrate, and a second intention, which is called "genericity," as form, whether this second intention be a being of reason or rather an act of the Intellect, there is a question as to how these constitutive elements are defined by the definition of Genus. Is only one of them defined? Or both together? Or one directly and the other obliquely? The question is common to all Predicables, indeed to all accidental concretes, such as "white, hot, holy," etc. Some, with Fr. Rubio, hold that by the definition of Genus there is defined a concrete expressing directly, or equally first and principally, both the nature and the second intention. Thomists and Scotists commonly teach that the second intention is defined "as that which," directly and principally, with the nature connoted and imported obliquely. Our authors, with whom many outsiders agree, maintain that the concrete is defined as expressing the nature directly and the second intention obliquely.

2. The dispute seems merely verbal. The Thomists, as may be seen in the College of St. Thomas, admit that the nature, and not the second intention, is that for which the name "Genus" supposes, and that of which the definition of Genus is verified. Our authors, however, as is clear from Fr.

Peynado, also admit that the second intention, and not the nature, is that which is principally and formally signified by the name "Genus," and therefore that which is principally and formally explained by the definition of Genus. Hence the whole disagreement seems to consist in this: that our authors call the "thing defined as that which and directly" in accidental concretes, not that which is formally signified, but that of which the definition is verified; whereas the Thomists speak in the opposite way. The opinion, or manner of speaking, of our authors appears more correct. Therefore we assert:

§ 1.[1] The Thing Defined in the Definition of Genus Is the Concrete Constitutively Importing the Nature Directly and the Second Intention Obliquely.

3.[2] Proof: that is the thing defined in the definition of Genus of which the definition itself is verified. But it is verified directly of the nature "as that which," with the second intention imported obliquely. Therefore the thing defined in the definition of Genus is something importing the nature directly and the intention obliquely. The consequence is legitimate, and the minor premise certain, because the nature is the sole subject of which it is truly said that it is "predicable of many things differing in species as what they are," so that this is not even partially verified of the second intention, since the latter is not even partially identified with the inferiors of Genus, nor can it be affirmed of them directly, either alone or together with the nature. For one would falsely say, "Man is the second intention of Genus," or "Man is animal and a second intention." We call "direct and that which" in concretes that subject to which we truly attribute the denominations proper to the concrete.

4. Yet because the nature, in the being of something capable of verifying the definition of Genus, is constituted through the second intention, for animal, for example, apart from precisive cognition is neither Genus nor predicable, therefore the nature, insofar as verifying the definition of Genus, constitutively imports the second intention, but obliquely, or "as that by which." For in concretes we call "oblique and that by which" that to which the denominations proper to the concrete do not belong, although by reason of it the other part is denominated. Hence it is truly said, "The nature alone is predicable," etc., with an exclusivity excluding the second intention from

[1] So numbered '§ II.' in Latin.

[2] So numbered 'no. 2.' in Latin.

the office of the subject denominated "predicable," but not with an exclusivity excluding the second intention from the office of the form constituting the very "being predicable." This whole doctrine is clear in the concretes "seen, known, white," and also in the denominations "just, adoptive son of God, heir of Glory," which are verified directly and "as that which" only of rational nature, yet in such a way that Grace is constitutively imported obliquely and "as that by which."

5. The major premise, therefore, of n. 3 is proved 1º: because the thing defined is that which is convertible with the definition; but conversion requires that whatever verifies the definition also verifies that it is the thing defined. 2º: because that of which the definition is verified is that to which, through identity, belongs the essence explained by the definition. But that to which such an essence thus belongs is the thing defined, since the thing defined is that whose essence is explained. Therefore, etc. 3º, by induction: for that of which the definition of man is verified is man; and similarly in other cases. What the Adversaries reply to these arguments will be rejected in the following section. Confirmation 1º: these definitions, "A form rendering a nature predicable," "A nature made predicable of many," etc., are very diverse, and therefore regard diverse things defined. But the first regards as its thing defined the second intention directly, with the nature connoted obliquely. Therefore the second regards as its thing defined the nature directly, with the second intention imported obliquely.

6. Confirmation 2º, by retorting the principal foundation of the contrary opinion: that is the thing defined whose proper essence is explained by the definition. But the essence explained by the definition of Genus is proper, not to the second intention, but to the nature. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: the essence explained by the definition of Genus is the denomination "predicable" concretely, or "being predicable of many," etc.; but this essence is proper, not to the second intention, but to the nature. This is clear, for every essence is proper to that to which it truly belongs and is truly attributed. But the denomination "predicable" concretely, or "being predicable of many," does not belong to the second intention nor is it attributed to it, but only to the nature, as is certain. Hence one may gather that a generic nature, for example animal as such, has, as it were, a threefold essence: physical, metaphysical, and logical, to which there appropriately corresponds a threefold definition belonging to three faculties. For this definition of animal belongs to Physics: "A composite consisting of body and a sensitive soul"; this belongs to Metaphysics: "A sensitive living thing"; and this belongs to Logic: "Predicable of many," etc. Therefore, when we say that the nature of animal is defined by the definition of Genus, we do not say that

it is defined as physically or metaphysically taken, but only as logically taken, or according to logical being.

§ 2. Objections Are Solved.

7. Objection 1: that is the thing defined in the definition of Genus whose essence that definition explains. But it does not explain the essence of the nature, for example animal, but rather the essence of the second intention. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise 1º: because the definition of Genus does not explain what animal is. 2º: because that definition explains an essence common to all Genera; but the natures subjected to genericity cannot have a common essence, since some are substances, others accidents, others beings of reason. 3º: because by such a definition predicability alone is explained; but this is not of the essence of animal, but only of the second intention, whose formal effect it is. 4º: because by the definition of Genus there is explained that which the name "Genus" principally and formally signifies. But this name principally and formally signifies the form of Genus, which is the second intention, while it signifies the nature materially and obliquely. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: first, because by the abstract and accidental concrete name the same thing is formally signified; but by the abstract "genericity," the form of Genus is formally signified. Therefore the same is true by the concrete name "Genus." Secondly, because it is common to the names of accidental concretes to signify the form formally and principally, but the substrate materially.

8. I answer to the objection by denying the minor premise, for the reasons stated in n. 6. To proof 1º: the definition of Genus does not explain what animal is physically or metaphysically taken; but it does explain what animal is logically considered. Thus, when an adoptive son of God is defined, it is explained what a rational creature is, not according to physical or metaphysical being, but according to theological or supernatural being, which is had through Grace. To proof 2º: whatever natures are subjected to genericity, that is, to the second intention which is the form of Genus, have a common essence, not physical or metaphysical, but logical. For all, although supremely diverse in physical being, agree in "being predicable of many," etc., which is logical being and is that alone which Logic considers in them. Thus, although Angel and man differ greatly physically, they agree theologically in "being just, sons of God, capable of seeing God through the light of Glory."

9. To proof 3º: by the definition of Genus predicability alone is explained, not abstractly and after the manner of a form, but concretely and after the manner of a denomination or formal effect already produced. For there is not explained "a form constituting something predicable," but "being predicable" itself. Yet this "being" is not proper to the second intention; "constituting something predicable" is proper to it. Likewise, it is not proper to the light of Glory "to be elevated to seeing God," but "to elevate"; nor is it proper to Grace "to be a friend" or "daughter of God," but "to constitute a son and friend." Hence "being predicable" is of the essence of animal logically constituted and considered, just as "being a friend of God" is of the essence of man supernaturally constituted and theologically considered.

10. But, it is asked, does the second intention essentially contain the denomination "predicable"? It does indeed, but purely "as that by which," in no way "as that which"; that is, not as a denomination to be attributed to or received by itself, since the second intention is intrinsically incapable of that denomination, but as one necessarily to be produced and communicated to the nature. Repeat the examples of Grace and Light. It will be insisted: there is no doubt that the denomination, or formal effect, is identified with the form. How then is it not the proper essence of the form? First, it is not adequately identified with it, for the formal effect constitutively imports, besides the form, the capacity of the subject. Therefore, if Grace or cognition were divinely placed in a stone, there would not result there the formal effect of "holy" or "knowing." Secondly, insofar as it is inadequately identified with the essence of the form, it is not identified with it as with a denominable subject, but as with a denominating form purely "as that by which," reserving nothing to itself for even partial reception of the denomination. Therefore the very essence of the form, insofar as it enters into the concrete denomination, is not something proper to the form, because the denomination is proper only to that by which it is had, or by which it is received.

11. To proof 4º: the major premise is true; but in the minor premise the adverbs "principally, formally" are ambiguous. The name "Genus" signifies the nature "principally" by principality of attribution and verification, since it is attributed only to the nature and verified of it as its sole subject. It signifies the form "principally" by principality of clarity, since in accidental concretes the form is expressed more clearly than the subject. It also signifies the form of Genus "formally," and the nature "materially," if by these terms it is denoted that one is signified after the manner of form and the other after the manner of subject, or denominated matter. But what

follows from this? Two things, it is said: 1º, that the second intention is the principal thing defined by principality of clarity; 2º, that the same intention is the formal thing defined, whereas the nature is only the material thing defined. I distinguish the first: by principality of clarity manifesting the second intention purely "as that by which" and as included in the "logical being" proper to the nature alone, I grant; by principality of clarity manifesting the second intention otherwise, I deny. Then I distinguish the second: the same intention is the formal thing defined, signified purely "as that by which and obliquely," I grant; signified "directly and as that which," I deny.

12. In substantial concretes, such as "man, fire," that which is the formal thing defined and is manifested more principally, that is, more clearly, is simultaneously the thing defined "directly and as that which," because it is signified as the subject to which, together with matter, the defined essence belongs. Not so in accidental concretes, such as "white, holy, genus." For in these, the part which is formally and more clearly manifested is not the thing defined "directly and as that which," but purely "as that by which" and obliquely, because it is not manifested as that "which" has the defined essence, but as that "by which" the material part is rendered as having it. Hence in such concretes to be signified "materially," that is, after the manner of matter or subject, is not to be signified obliquely, but rather directly and "as that which," since the subject is always signified as that to which the entire denomination belongs wholly.

13. Nor do the proofs of the minor premise stand. By an abstract and accidental concrete name the same thing is formally signified, that is, the same form, but not in the same manner. For by the abstract name the form is signified "directly and as that which"; but by the concrete name purely "as that by which" and obliquely. Hence the one rather than the other is verified of the form. For it is truly said, "The second intention is genericity"; but falsely, "The second intention is Genus," or "is something predicable of many," etc. The names of accidental concretes signify the form formally and the subject materially; but it does not therefore follow that they signify the form directly and the subject obliquely, but rather the reverse, as we have just seen.

14. Objection 2: the thing defined of any definition is that to which the definition belongs by itself. But "being predicable of many," etc., which is the definition of Genus, does not belong to the nature by itself, but through another, namely through the second intention. Therefore the nature is not the thing defined in the definition of Genus. Confirmation: dispersing sight does not belong to the wall by itself but accidentally, because it belongs to it

through another, namely through whiteness, which is the whole reason for dispersing. For the same reason water, when hot, does not heat by itself but accidentally and through another. Likewise, therefore, being predicable of many does not belong by itself to the nature of animal, since it belongs to it through the second intention, which is other than animal and is the whole reason for predicating.

15. I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: it does not belong by itself to the nature by the selfhood of a subject immediately denominated, I deny; by another kind of selfhood, I grant. Likewise: it belongs to the nature through another as through a subject more immediately predicable, I deny; as through a predicating form purely "as that by which," I grant the minor premise and deny the consequence. The sense of these distinctions will be clear from the following number. It can further be said that "being predicable" belongs to the nature by itself, not according to physical being, but according to logical being; in which sense the nature taken is the very concrete "Genus," to which it certainly belongs by itself to be predicable, just as to the concrete "holy man" it belongs by itself to be a friend of God. Nor is the second intention "other" than the logically constituted nature except by the otherness of a part from the whole, just as the soul is other than man, namely inadequately. For the nature, in the being of Genus, constitutively includes the second intention obliquely.

16. To the confirmation: first, there is no difficulty in saying that a wall, in the being of an accidental concrete constituted obliquely by whiteness, and similarly hot water, disperses sight by itself, although only accidentally in the being of pure substance. Next, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. The disparity consists in this: "dispersing sight and heating" are denominations or functions to which the subject does not contribute immediately and by itself, for even if whiteness and heat existed without a subject they would perform those same functions. Therefore they are neither denominations proper to the concrete alone nor do they belong to the subject immediately, but through heat or whiteness as a subject more immediately denominable; for they are verified first of the accident, and then, through it, of the subject of the accident. Everything is otherwise in the denomination "predicable." For the subject contributes to it immediately and by itself. If one were to posit the second intention of Genus apart from a subject Species, or imagine it placed in the nature of man alone, one would not find the denomination "predicable." It is also a denomination proper to the concrete alone, which can never be verified of the second intention as a denominable subject, but regards as its most immediate subject the generic

nature. The same can be seen in the denominations "seen, known, elevated to seeing God, friend and adoptive son of God," and countless others.

17. Objection 3: either the substrate is defined according to something which it has of itself as distinct from the form, or only insofar as it precisely underlies the form and solely according to the formal effect produced by it. The first is false, because the definition does not explain what the substrate is as distinct from the form. The second proves that the substrate is not the thing defined directly, for to be defined directly is to be defined by itself and by reason of itself; but to be defined precisely insofar as it underlies the form and according to the formal effect produced by it is to be defined purely by reason of the form, and therefore in no way by reason of itself. I answer: the substrate is defined according to the formal effect produced by the form, without thereby ceasing to be the thing defined directly; for the formal effect is the very denomination of Genus taken concretely, which expresses the subject directly and the form obliquely. It is also defined precisely "insofar as it underlies the form," if "insofar as" reduplicates the form, not as that to which the definition belongs, but as that "by which" the definition belongs to the nature. It is further defined inadequately according to something which it has of itself as distinct from the form. For it is defined according to the formal effect, or denomination of Genus; but every formal effect is constituted not only from the form, but also from the capacity of the subject, which capacity is something intrinsic to the substrate as distinct from the form.

18. Nor do those expressions "by itself, by reason of itself, by reason of the form" stand in the way. For the substrate is defined "purely by reason of the form" as the formal part, since there is no other formal part in the concrete defined; yet not as the whole defined essence, nor as a part to which "being predicable" partially belongs, and therefore not as a part imported directly and "as that which." The substrate is therefore defined "by itself" with the selfhood of a subject immediately denominated. It is also defined "by reason of itself" as the material part, and therefore it is defined directly, because in accidental concretes the material part is that to which alone immediately belongs the concrete being explained by the definition. Hence one may gather incidentally to what extent the proposition objected in n. 14 is true, namely "the second intention is the whole reason for predicating." For it is the whole formal reason, that is, after the manner of a form ultimately determining and completing the denomination "predicable"; yet it is not the whole constitutive reason of that denomination.

19. Objection 4: the aggregate of nature and second intention is an accidental whole, since it consists of parts belonging to diverse

Predicaments. But according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, an accidental whole cannot be defined by a single definition. Therefore, since the definition of Genus is one, its thing defined is not the aggregate of nature and intention, but the intention alone connoting the nature. The objection proves that the definition of Genus does not belong to the concrete in the being of such a thing, but only to the second intention abstractly, which is plainly false. It also proves that both parts of the aggregate cannot be defined directly by a single definition, which we admit. But it in no way proves that the intention is defined connoting the nature rather than the nature connoting the intention. Therefore the minor premise is true of one definition which is verified directly of both parts of an accidental whole; but not at all of one definition which is verified only of the material part according to that being which it has from the formal part "as that by which." For in this manner every accidental concrete is defined by one definition.

20. Objection 5: the definition of Genus, since it is an act of Logic, principally and directly defines that which Logic principally regards. But Logic principally regards the second intention, since this is the formal object of Logic. Therefore, etc. See above, tract. 1, disp. 2, cap. 6, nn. 9-13, for the twofold solution of this argument. Nothing need now be added.

21. To forestall other difficulties, note the following. 1º: when Genus is defined, it is not explained what the nature is according to itself, but what the nature is through the second intention; for the "being" which the second intention bestows is truly a "being" possessed by the nature. Thus, when an adoptive son of God is defined, it is explained what man is through Grace. 2º: although every accident, as being of a being, in the physical sense has its entity not so much for itself as for the substance in which it inheres, nevertheless in the logical sense, when an accident is defined abstractly and after the manner of something standing by itself, as under these terms "whiteness, grace, second intention," its essence is not explained as proper to the subject but as its own, that is, not as had and possessed by the subject, but as belonging to the accident itself, which is therefore the thing defined directly and "as that which." The reason is that Logic attends not so much to the physical mode of being as to the mode of predicating and of being subjected. But then an accident is subjected and predicated in the mode of substance. 3º: although the name "Genus," when we speak of animal as such, directly signifies that which is identified with man, just as the name "white," when we speak of a white man, it is not therefore truly said, "Man is Genus," as it is truly said, "Man is white." The difference must be taken from the diversity of predicates of first and second intention, which denominate the subject in diverse ways. See the preceding treatise, disp. 2, cap. 5, nn. 15-19.

CHAPTER III.
On Species, Both Subjectible and Predicable.

1. The name "Species," which elsewhere signifies many and diverse things, such as figure, image, beauty, pretext, and the power which under the name of the object assists a cognitive potency toward its acts, is now taken logically for a certain abstract notion which is sometimes subjected to Genus and is thus called "subjectible Species," and sometimes predicated of individuals and is thus called "predicable Species." Subjectible Species is defined from the doctrine of Porphyry as "an objective notion which is immediately subjected to Genus as such," or also "which is immediately placed under Genus."

2. This definition first explains the difference of Species from individuals. For complete individuals are subjected to Genus only mediately, in the sense explained in chapter 1. Likewise, incomplete individuals are not immediately subjected to Genus as such, namely insofar as it is Genus, but only insofar as it is Species, as we also noted there. Next, it distinguishes Species from Difference, since Difference is not subjected to Genus as such. For Genus is not predicated of Difference as "what," and consequently not according to the manner of Genus. Finally, it formally distinguishes Species from Genus. For although Genus, when it is not the supreme Genus, is materially a subjectible Species, nevertheless formally, insofar as it is Genus, it does not express a relation to another higher Genus, but is precisely constituted through an order to inferior Species. In what way subjectible Species differs from predicable Species will be evident below.

3. But against the given definition objection 1: since Genus is defined through Species, Species cannot be defined through Genus without a vicious circle. I answer 1º: when Genus is defined through Species, namely as through an extrinsic connotate, in which sense rational is defined through discourse and science through the knowable, Species are taken not under the function of subjectibility, under which Species is now defined, but physically and specifically, insofar as they signify essences notably diverse from one another. Therefore no vicious circle is committed. I answer 2º: Genus and Species are correlatives; but no correlative can be defined without mention of the other, nor is this a vicious circle. Thus a father, in the being of father, cannot be defined without a son, nor conversely. Therefore definitions do not err on this account, at least when they do not explain merely the bare order of one correlative to the other, but also expound the

peculiar essence and mode of the order. And this occurs here. For we do not crudely say that Genus is that which regards Species and Species that which regards Genus, but we disclose the mode and character of the relation.

4. Objection 2: when Species is defined through Genus, the unknown is explained through something more unknown, or at least equally unknown. I deny the assertion, because Genus is now already supposed known from its definition given above. It may be said: at least Genus was defined above through something unknown, namely through Species not yet known. I answer: Genus was defined through an order to Species taken under the function of a quiddity notably diverse from others. In this sense Species is commonly known, and better known than Genus insofar as logically definable. Objection 3: man is a subjectible Species under the Genus "living thing"; and yet it is not immediately subjected to it, but through the intermediate Genus "animal." I answer: it is not of the concept of subjectible Species to be immediately subjected to every Genus, but to some Genus. Perhaps these and other scruples will be better met if subjectible Species is defined thus: "A formally non-singular essence which is metaphysically composed of a common notion and a discriminating notion."

5. Now predicable Species is defined from the same Porphyry as "that which is predicable of many things differing in number as what they are completely." This other definition, common among more recent authors, agrees with it: "that which is predicable of many things differing in number as their entire metaphysical essence." Here you see the difference of Species from the other Predicables, for the others either are not predicated essentially, or as "what," or are not predicated as the whole essence, or as "what completely." Species is called the whole essence of the individual because, as we already noted above, although the individual further includes haecceity, this is nevertheless considered outside the essence in logical consideration. Hence Peter and Paul are not said to differ essentially, although they differ by haecceity.

6. It may be asked how subjectible and predicable Species are distinguished or identified. I answer 1º: if we speak in a real sense, not every predicable Species is subjectible, although every subjectible Species is predicable. The reason for the first part is that the supreme Genus is a predicable Species in relation to incomplete individuals, yet it is not a subjectible Species under another Genus. The reason for the second part is that every created nature, according to the true principles of our School, is numerically multipliable. Therefore every nature immediately subjected to a Genus can admit beneath itself several things distinct in number of which it is predicated. All generic notions which are subalternate subjectible Species

are also predicable of incomplete individuals "as what they are completely." I admit that, if the Thomistic principles concerning the numerical immultiplicability of Angels are admitted, there is a subjectible Species which is not predicable. But those principles, being false in our judgment, do not stand in the way of our answer.

7. I answer 2º: if we speak in a formal sense, subjectible Species is not predicable, nor conversely; but the formality of subjectibility can be rationally prescinded from the formality of predicability, and conversely, even where they are really identified. Proof: both because Species as subjectible and as predicable are defined by diverse definitions, just as animal and rational; and because they express a relation to diverse terms, namely the former to Genus, the latter to individuals.

8. But against answer 1º, objection: God is a subjectible and not a predicable Species; and at least the Divine Persons differ among themselves in species, but not in predicable species; therefore in purely subjectible species. I answer: God is not a subjectible Species, both because He differs from creatures by more than genus; because, according to many, no univocal notion common to God and creatures can be abstracted; and because, even if one could be abstracted, it would not be Genus nor predicable of God as a material metaphysical part, since no proper metaphysical composition is found in God. Therefore the Divine nature cannot be subjected to any Genus, but is a nature of the highest order, placed outside the sphere of our predicables and subjectibles. The Divine Persons do not properly differ in species because they do not have a diverse, indeed not even a distinct, essence. Taken, however, precisely according to the relations, each of them is essentially individual and does not contain a metaphysical essence from genus and difference. Hence they may be called certain individuations as though specifically diverse, beyond the common order; and the very notion of person, abstracted from the three Divine Persons, will be a certain Predicable full of mystery, which Aristotle did not know, and which can belong to Genus or Species only reductively.

9. Against answer 2º, objection: the notion of subjectible Species, abstracted from all subjectible Species as such, is predicable of all of them. Therefore the notion of subjectible Species cannot be conceived without being predicable. I answer: subjectible Species as such becomes, in exercise, predicable of this and that Species as subjectible, but it is not predicable in designation, because this name, "subjectible Species," does not formally signify the notion abstracted from Species as predicables. And this alone we intend, namely that the name does not signify predicability in designation, or that the inferiors from which the notion of subjectible Species is

abstracted prescind from predicability. The doctrine of this answer will become clearer in the following disputation concerning Predicable in common.

10. Here Species is usually divided into subalternate and lowest. A subalternate Species is one which has other Species beneath itself. A lowest Species, which is also called atomic, is one which contains beneath itself only individuals distinct in number. This division, however, belongs only to Species as subjectible, for Species as predicable is always atomic. Proof: because if Species as predicable contains other Species beneath itself, it will no longer be predicated of them as Species, since it will not be predicated as their whole essence, or as "what completely." Moreover, intermediate Genera, which alone could be called subalternate Species, are atomic insofar as they are predicable Species. For they have this name and function only in relation to incomplete individuals; but under this respect they are atomic, since they admit only individuals beneath themselves. Therefore only subjectible Species can be a subalternate Species, for example animal as such, because it is both immediately subjected to the Genus "living thing" and contains beneath itself other subjectible Species, for example man and horse.

11. It may be said: the notion of human union abstracted from the unions of all men is a predicable Species; but it is subalternate. Therefore predicable Species can be subalternate. Proof of the minor premise: that notion contains beneath itself other Species, namely the notion of Peter′s union abstracted from Peter′s possible unions, and the notion of Paul′s union similarly abstracted from his individual unions. For these notions are predicable Species, since they can be predicated of many things distinct only in number; and moreover they are Species diverse from each other, because their individuals differ by more than number. For two unions of Peter differ more from the unions of Paul than from each other; but from each other they differ in number. Therefore from the unions of Paul they differ by more than number, and consequently they differ in species. I answer 1º: does "being Peter′s union" add a specific predicate to the notion of human union, or not? If the first, then the notion of human union will no longer be predicable Species but Genus, because it will not be predicated as the whole essence of its inferiors. If the second, then the notions of Peter′s union and Paul′s union do not differ in species from one another, as the objection intends.

12. I answer 2º: the notion of human union is an atomic Species no less than the notion of man. For if there were specific diversity between the unions of Peter and Paul, there would likewise be such diversity between

Peter and Paul. Nor does it stand in the way that the unions of Peter and Paul differ more than Peter's unions differ among themselves, because that greater difference remains within the individual order, which can admit some latitude and inequality. The reason is both that it does not make the unions differ notably, and that being determinately Peter's union does not add, over the notion of human union, any considerable predicate worthy of scientific consideration, and consequently does not add any specific predicate, or one sufficient for specific diversity. Hence those abstract notions are not predicable Species, because, since they express an individual predicate, they are not predicated essentially. Whether they pertain to some Predicable, however, will be decided below.

13. Finally, three things are to be noted. 1º: the form constituting subjectible Species is simple abstraction, by which a nature contained under Genus is prescinded from its inferiors. For by that very fact it becomes present to the Intellect and intentionally one, and requires nothing further on its own side to be immediately subjected to Genus. Therefore neither comparative knowledge nor a fictive relation of reason is needed. See what was said in a similar matter in the preceding treatise, disp. 2, cap. 6, from which the objections that can now be raised are easily resolved. 2º: in the same common notion there can be really identified the notion of Genus, the notion of subalternate Species, and the notion of predicable Species. For although these notions do not coexist in the same subject in relation to the same term, they can certainly do so in relation to diverse terms, as love and hatred with respect to diverse things. For example, animal as such is Genus in relation to the human and equine Species; it is a subalternate subjectible Species in relation to the Genus "living thing"; it is a predicable Species in relation to incomplete individuals, namely this and that animal incompletely conceived.

14. 3º: it is commonly said from the Philosopher that "the whole perfection of Species is preserved in every individual; but the whole perfection of Genus is not preserved in every Species." This manner of speaking is not to be understood of the perfection of the generic and specific nature abstractly taken. For thus there is no difference between them, because the extensive perfection both of Species and of Genus, that is, indifference and aptitude for predication of many, is not wholly preserved in each inferior; whereas intensive perfection, that is, the quiddity which these concepts "man" and "animal," for example, exhibit on the side of the act, is wholly preserved with equal propriety in every individual and in every Species.

15. The statement, therefore, concerns the perfection which Genus and Species have insofar as they are in a state of contraction. For the Genus "animal," when it is contracted, that is, when it is considered as actually constituting a Species, is perfected by specific differences which are adjacent to it as forms. And because specific differences are of unequal perfection, they render Genus more perfect in one Species than in another; for a rational animal is more perfect than a roaring animal. But this does not occur in Species, both because haecceities are not considered as forms perfecting Species intensively, and because, even if they did perfect it, since they are not unequal in perfection, at least not notably, Species would always remain equally perfect in each individual.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether Predicable Species Necessarily Requires Several Possible Individuals.

1. The proposed question is also usually set forth under this title: "Whether an Angelic nature is a predicable Species?" At the threshold of this question, for the sake of disputation, the Thomistic doctrine concerning the principle or root of numerical multiplicity is permitted or supposed. For the Thomists teach that numerical multiplicity arises from matter, or an order to matter, as from its sole root. Hence they infer that an Angelic nature, since it is neither material nor has an order to matter, cannot be multiplied in number; and not only that all Angels in fact differ from one another in species, but also that two Angels of the same species, distinct only in number, are altogether repugnant. This being posited, it is asked whether the specific nature of Michael, for example, although it cannot be really multiplied into several individuals, can nevertheless be universal and a predicable Species of many.

2. Most Thomists among the Discalced Carmelites of Alcalá affirm this, among whom some of the stricter authors decree that one should not be considered a Thomist who holds the opposite. But Martínez de Prado, Cardinal Aguirre, the College of St. Thomas, the illustrious Palanco, Gabriel of the Conception, and others among the Thomists themselves will hardly bear to be erased from the list of Thomists, since they subscribe to the negative opinion, which our authors and the Scotists commonly defend with St. Thomas (see P. Hurtad., disp. 5, Logic., n. 31), the Subtle Doctor (see Mastrius, disp. 4, Logic., q. 4), and the Excellent Doctor (Disp. 5, Met., sect. 2, n. 28). Many prove this opinion, which is also true for us, from the fact that Michael's nature cannot be prescinded from formal singularity. But,

although this is true on the Thomistic opinion, even setting that aside, our opinion is proved by a common and unavoidable argument.

3. That nature is not a predicable Species which is not apt to be predicated of many, that is, truly affirmed of many; for the ability to be falsely predicated and affirmed of many belongs to any singular whatever. This is evident from the definition of Universal and of Species itself. But Michael's nature, even inadequately conceived, that is, conceived according to its specific predicates with precision from formal singularity, is not apt to be truly predicated of many. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: it is not apt to be really identified with many; therefore neither to be truly predicated of many. Proof of the antecedent: that nature in its specific concept expresses a positive repugnance to being multiplied into several individuals. Proof: in its specific concept it is a complete spiritual nature, positively excluding from itself matter and an order of receptibility in matter. But according to the principles we now suppose, matter, or receptibility in matter, is the necessary and sole root of individual multiplicity. Therefore that nature, in its specific concept, positively excludes this necessary and sole root. Therefore multiplicity of itself into several individuals is positively repugnant to it, just as sensation is positively repugnant to that which positively excludes the sole root of sensation, namely animality.

4. Confirmation 1º: that nature differs positively from human nature insofar as the latter is multipliable. Therefore it is positively immultipliable. Proof of the antecedent: because it differs positively from human nature insofar as material; but human nature is multipliable only insofar as material. Confirmation 2º: Michael's nature, from its specific concept, positively excludes the state in which it would become a chimerical nature. But it would become chimerical if it were multiplied into individuals. This is clear, because it would become simultaneously material and immaterial; for an Angelic nature multiplied in number would be material because multiplied, and at the same time immaterial because Angelic. Confirmation 3º: in a real subject, a fictive relation with a foundation to a chimerical term is repugnant. But Species, like every Predicable, is constituted through a relation to several inferiors fictively formed with a foundation, according to the Thomists. Therefore, when the inferiors are chimerical, it is repugnant that a real nature be constituted as a predicable Species with respect to them.

5. Indeed, although aptitude for predication of many is formally constituted and completed through an act of the Intellect or relation of reason, nevertheless, as its necessary foundation, it requires on the side of

the substrate real identity with many, either actual or possible. Otherwise the intention of Genus or Species could be placed at will in any singular, for example in Peter as such. Therefore, when such a foundation is not presupposed, whatever intention or relation is posited will be fictively formed without a suitable foundation and will not give the aptitude proper to logical Species. Confirmation 4º: the Divine nature, although prescinded from formal singularity, cannot be made logically universal or a predicable Species, as nearly all Thomists admit with St. Thomas (see Martínez de Prado, l. 1, Logic., q. 21, from n. 20). Therefore the same should be judged concerning Michael's nature; for all the arguments of the Thomists are clearly applicable to the Divine nature. But let us now attack the Thomistic solutions.

6. They answer 1º that Michael's nature is repugnant to multiplication solely under the title of singularity. Therefore, when it is prescinded from singularity, it is consequently, they say, prescinded from repugnance to multiplication, and thus remains according to its specific concept indifferent to many. But against this, 1º: Michael's nature in its specific concept is a spiritual nature, as is evident. Therefore from its specific concept it is incapable of being identified with material individuals, such as we suppose all those to be which are distinguished only in number. Against this, 2º: because the same could be said of the Divine nature.

7. Against this, 3º: even if Michael's nature is prescinded from formal singularity, it is never prescinded from radical singularity, that is, from a predicate inferring one unique singularity. For it cannot be prescinded from specific immateriality, and this, being altogether incapable of identification with several individuals, necessarily infers one unique formal singularity. Therefore it cannot remain indifferent and capable of being truly predicated of many. The consequence is clear because a predicate intrinsically connected with some definite term cannot be indifferent to the opposite. But one unique singular and several singulars are opposed terms. Therefore, etc. Thus rational, although prescinded from risible, nevertheless because it intrinsically grounds and is determinately connected with it, cannot be indifferent to risible and non-risible or capable of being predicated of either. In the same way the Divine essence, although prescinded from formal singularity or from immensity, does not remain predicable of a multiple individual, or of what is immense and measured.

8. They answer 2º that Angelic nature in its specific concept is multipliable insofar as depends upon itself, and as it were conditionally, because although the individuals are repugnant from another source, nevertheless the nature of itself can or could belong to them if they were not

repugnant. Thus God is said of Himself to be capable of producing a chimera if the latter were not repugnant, and the visual power of itself is apt to see an Angel if he were colored. But this solution coincides with the preceding one. For it supposes that repugnance to multiplication does not arise from the specific predicates of Angelic nature, but from formal singularity alone. Therefore it must be refuted by the same arguments.

9. Moreover, it is attacked 1º: if God of Himself lacked the sole principle of producing a chimera, in no opinion would He be said of Himself to be capable of producing a chimera. But Angelic nature lacks the sole principle of numerical multiplication, namely materiality. Therefore it is not of itself capable of being numerically multiplied, even conditionally. The objection is urged: if Omnipotence is connected with possibles, as the Thomists hold with the common opinion, it is said by no one to be of itself capable of producing impossibles. But Angelic nature is of itself connected with an individual as immaterial, and therefore as unique. Consequently it is not of itself capable of plurality. Certainly, those who with Fr. Vázquez deny the connection of Omnipotence with possibles therefore think that God of Himself could produce even impossibles if they were not repugnant, because they judge Omnipotence to be something altogether absolute and devoid of every relation, even transcendental, to possibles. But predicable Species, especially according to the Thomists, is not something absolute, but is formally constituted through a relation to inferiors.

10. It is attacked 2º: if several Angelic individuals were not repugnant, several material Angelic individuals would be possible. But Angelic nature as it now exists is of itself repugnant to being identified with material individuals, even if they were possible. This is clear because it is of itself repugnant to being identified with individuals which would destroy its essence and render it essentially another. But material Angelic individuals, if they were possible, by contracting the specific nature to themselves would render it essentially material, and consequently essentially other than that which it now is. To say, however, that Angelic nature is predicable of many on condition that it were not the same nature which it now is but another essentially diverse nature, is mere trifling. For the same can be said of the Divine nature on condition that it were created, and also of Peterhood on condition that it were a specific nature. The examples in n. 8 are worthless. For the first is rather retorted from n. 9. The second is altogether false if a colored Angel is repugnant, because a created potency essentially expresses a transcendental relation to its term; but a relation to an impossible term is repugnant.

11. They answer 3º that Angelic nature is indeed of itself repugnant to multiplication through material individuals, but not through spiritual individuals. For although it of itself excludes matter, which is the principle of material numerical multiplication, it does not exclude a principle of spiritual numerical multiplication. That principle is indeed repugnant from another source, but not on the side of the nature, which therefore remains of itself spiritually multipliable. But against this, 1º: a principle of spiritual numerical multiplication, according to you, is a conspicuous chimera. But a real nature positively excludes from itself a chimerical principle. Therefore, etc. Against this, 2º: Angelic nature excludes a principle of material multiplication because it is positively conceived as a non-material nature. But it is also positively conceived as a non-chimerical nature. Therefore it positively excludes from itself a principle of chimerical multiplication, such as spiritual numerical multiplication is. Indeed, who would doubt that every real being of itself positively repugns identity with any chimera, from whatever source the chimera arises? Yet spiritual individuals distinct only in number are, according to the Thomists, so chimerical that they expressly imply a contradiction in terms.

12. They answer 4º that Angelic nature is at least predicable of several things objectively existing with a foundation. For the Intellect can conceive several Angelic individuals as possible, with a foundation taken from the non-repugnance of the nature, insofar as depends upon itself, to predication of many. Therefore the nature can be predicated of those individuals insofar as objectively existing. But against this, 1º: Angelic nature, as we have shown, of itself and from its specific concept positively repugns several individuals, both material and spiritual. Therefore it supplies no foundation to the Intellect for imagining a plurality of individuals for it. St. Thomas expressed this, q. un. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 8, in these words: "If an Angel is a simple form abstracted from matter, it is impossible even to imagine," with a foundation, namely, "that there are several Angels of one Species."

13. Against this, 2º: even if we grant that several individuals can be conceived with a foundation, those individuals are nevertheless mere beings of reason, since they are intrinsically incapable of existing except purely objectively in the Intellect. But it is repugnant that a real nature can be truly predicated of a being of reason; otherwise it could be identified with it. Against this, 3º: predicable Species according to all must be a notion univocal to all its individuals. But it is repugnant that Angelic nature should belong univocally to the real individual Michael and to those others objectively existing in the Intellect; for Michael differs from them more than a true man differs from a painted one. Therefore, etc.

14. Finally, certain modern authors answer that Michael's nature is predicable of many not according to the thing, but according to reason, because although several actual individuals are repugnant to it, several virtual individuals are not. Michael, they say, is virtually and equivalently a multiple individual insofar as he is equivalent to several, indeed to all human individuals, in circumscribing the whole amplitude of the Species. For Michael exhausts and equals the extension of his Angelic Species just as all men exhaust the extension of the human Species. Therefore, since Michael is equivalently several individuals, his nature is universal according to reason, because just as real plurality of individuals suffices for a Universal according to the thing, so virtual plurality of individuals suffices for a Universal according to reason.

15. But against this, 1º: the same virtual plurality of individuals corresponds to the Divine nature, since the one God wholly exhausts its amplitude no less than an Angelic individual, and all human individuals exhaust the whole extension of their nature; and yet the Divine nature is not Universal according to reason. Against this, 2º: community "according to the thing and according to reason alone" are distinguished in this, that the first belongs to a nature multiplied in fact, for example human nature; the second belongs to a nature of which, although only one individual exists, several are nevertheless possible, as occurs with the nature of the Sun. Thus St. Thomas expressly teaches, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 12, a. 9. Therefore, when several individuals are impossible, community or universality even according to reason is impossible. Against this, 3º: if Michael is equivalent to all human individuals, Michael will be infinitely many virtually distinct individuals. Since virtual distinction can be made actual by reason, as no one doubts, the Intellect will be able rationally to divide Michael into infinitely many individuals of the same species.

16. But that this is false is proved: first, because, as St. Thomas said above, "it is impossible even to imagine that there are several Angels of one species." Secondly, because it is intrinsically discordant that Michael can with a foundation be divided into infinitely many Michaels actually and formally distinct. Certainly no sufficient foundation appears for such a distinction of reason. For although an object really indivisible can be divided by reason into several dissimilar formalities, it cannot be divided into several complete and altogether similar objects. Otherwise Peter could be divided by reason into several Peters, or Peter's rationality into multiple rationalities, or God into several Gods. Indeed, those several individuals fabricated from one Michael would be conceived neither as principles of diverse operations nor as definable in diverse ways. Whence, then, would

they be rationally distinct? Finally, such individuals would be conceived as distinct only in number, and therefore as having the one principle of numerical distinction, namely matter. Therefore they would be conceived as material, and consequently as chimerical; for material individuals which at the same time contract a purely spiritual species are chimerical from the outset. But Angelic nature cannot become truly predicable of chimerical individuals.

CHAPTER V.
Objections Are Unraveled.

1. Objection 1: according to St. Thomas (q. un. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 8, ad 4º), "The nature of this Angel is not prevented from being in many by the fact that it is a nature in such an order of things, which pertains to the notion of species, but by the fact that it is not naturally apt to be received in some subject, which pertains to the notion of an individual." Therefore Angelic nature is not prevented by its specific concept from being in many, and consequently neither from being predicated of many. I answer 1º: according to the mind of St. Thomas, Angelic nature is not prevented from being in many explicitly, insofar as it is not conceived under this expression, "repugnant to being in many"; but it is so prevented implicitly, insofar as it formally includes an essential repugnance to existing in many. I answer 2º: it is not prevented from being in many formally, insofar as it is prescinded from formal singularity; but it is prevented radically and mediately, insofar as it essentially infers one unique singularity, through which it is repugnant to many.

2. Objection 2: Michael's nature can be prescinded from singularity; but thus prescinded it is rendered a universal nature. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise 1º: because the nature thus prescinded does not remain singular; therefore it becomes universal, since there is no middle. 2º: because it is now prescinded from the form by which it is rendered determined to one individual; therefore it remains undetermined, and consequently indifferent to several. 3º: because it remains without the sole impediment to being in many. 4º: because if some nature is prescinded from multiplicity, it is rendered positively one by reason; therefore if some nature is prescinded from singularity, it is rendered positively universal by reason, since Universal and singular are no less opposed than one and many. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: it can be prescinded from formal singularity, let this pass; from radical singularity, I deny the major and the minor premise. Granted that the nature of an Angel is prescinded from the

ultimate actuality by which it is rendered formally singular and individual, it is not therefore ever prescinded from complete spirituality or from repugnance to identity with a chimera. But in these predicates consists radical singularity, or the root necessarily inferring one unique singularity; inferring, I say, not by a physical and real radication, but by a formal or metaphysical radication, just as rational grounds risible and the Divine essence grounds the attributes.

3. To proof 1º: between Universal and singular formally there is a middle, namely singular radically, as is clear in the Divine nature when it is prescinded from formal singularity, and likewise when it is prescinded from the attributes of eternity and immensity. For it is not thereby rendered temporal and measured, because there is a middle according to reason between eternal and temporal, namely radical eternity. To proof 2º: it is indeed prescinded from the form by which the nature is ultimately and formally rendered determined to one individual, but not from the form by which it is rendered radically determined. Hence it does not remain undetermined and indifferent absolutely, but only in a certain respect, because it does not remain without every determination, but only without the ultimate determination. Repeat the example of the Divine nature.

4. To proof 3º: I deny the assertion, because formal singularity is not the sole impediment to existence in many, just as formal eternity is not the sole impediment to existing temporally. Hence the essence of God, when prescinded from eternity, does not remain indifferent to temporal existence. To proof 4º, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. First, because from the very terms, one and many are more and more immediately opposed than Universal and singular. For one is defined through indivision, or through negation of multitude, with positive being presupposed; but Universal is not defined through negation of singular. Secondly, because for positive unity of reason nothing more is required than cognition by force of which multitude as such does not appear. But for Universal there is required a positive aptitude for being in many, since it is defined through it. Yet aptitude for a chimerical term is chimerical. Therefore precision from singularity is of no avail so long as a multitude of individuals remains chimerical.

5. But still, for the sake of the Thomists, it can be replied 1º: human nature, although it cannot be prescinded from radical multitude, can be rendered one by reason. Therefore Angelic nature, although incapable of being prescinded from radical singularity, can be made common by reason. Proof of the consequence: because unity is no less, indeed more, opposed to multitude than community is to singularity, as we just said. Therefore every

multitude, even confused or vaguely known, destroys unity of reason, as is clear in these concepts, "Salamanca, some man." If, therefore, purely radical multitude does not hinder unity of reason, why should purely radical singularity hinder universality or community of reason? In another way it can be replied 2º: human nature can be prescinded from radical multiplicity. Therefore the nature of an Angel can also be prescinded from radical singularity. Proof of the antecedent: multiplicability, or the root of multiplication, is not an essential specific or generic predicate of human nature. Therefore human nature can be prescinded from that root. Proof of the antecedent: because otherwise, since all essential predicates of human nature are found in Peter and are verified of him, it would follow that Peter truly is multipliable into several men distinct in number, which is absurd. The preceding case of the Divine nature remains as an objection.

6. I answer to 1º by denying the consequence. To the proof I answer: unity, according to the common opinion, is opposed not to divisibility but to actual division of itself, since one is defined as "undivided in itself." At least this cannot be denied of unity of reason, for no one requires more for it than actual indivision in the mind. But actual division is the same as formal multitude, and divisibility is the same as multiplicability, or radical or potential multitude. Hence unity of reason coheres well with radical multitude, although it is immediately and supremely opposed to formal multitude, even confused or vague. But community, since it requires a positive aptitude toward many, is opposed to everything which renders that aptitude impossible, and therefore to singularity both formal and radical, although this opposition is not so immediate and intrinsic to the terms as that between one and many.

7. To 2º: I deny the first and second antecedents, because fundamental multiplicability, or radical multitude, which is said to be the foundation of universality required on the side of the nature, is nothing other than the intrinsic character of human nature, for example, in no respect repugnant to the truth of this assertion: "There are, or there can be, several men distinct only in number." From this foundation the Intellect can prescind the nature of each man from haecceity, conceive it indefinitely, and confuse it with the natures of all possible men. This it can in no way do where such a foundation is absent, as in the Divine nature, which is therefore essentially unique and immultipliable because intrinsically it falsifies this assertion: "There are, or there can be, several Gods." But that character is wholly essential to human nature, because either it is materiality, as the Thomists hold, or, as others perhaps better judge, it is the limitation and finitude

proper to created nature. In either case human nature cannot be prescinded from it.

8. Hence it must be granted that such fundamental or radical multiplicity is found in Peter and, rightly understood, is verified of him. And this proposition, "Peter's nature is radically multiple," or "Peter is multipliable into several men," must be distinguished thus: multiple or multipliable by division of himself, I deny; by coexistence with others altogether similar, I grant. For that multiplicability is nothing other than a true potency, or real non-repugnance, to constituting a multitude with others distinct only in number. Here it should be noted that aptitude for being in many, which is proper to metaphysical and logical Universal, does not consist precisely in the aforesaid fundamental multiplicity, otherwise it would be found in every individual; but it supposes it on the side of the object as a necessary foundation and superadds the extrinsic denomination "indefinitely known," without which it cannot be verified that human nature is "one thing apt to be in many and to be predicated of many." The whole doctrine of this solution belongs to the Excellent Doctor, disp. 6, Metaph., sect. 4, especially n. 12.

9. Objection 3: Michael's nature is conceived by us in this state after the manner of a material nature. Therefore it is conceived after the manner of a multipliable nature. Therefore it is rendered Universal at least from the mode of conceiving, or, if not according to the thing, at least according to reason. The objection is evidently applicable to the Divine nature, which we also in this state conceive after the manner of material things. Furthermore, if "after the manner of a material and multipliable nature" denotes precisely a mode of conceiving through alien species, I grant the antecedent and the first consequence, but deny the second. But if it denotes that some intrinsic materiality is conceived in Michael's nature, I deny the antecedent. For although in this state we conceive spiritual natures through species not proper but alien, namely drawn from material things, as when we conceive an Angel through the species of a winged youth, we do not therefore conceive them as material in themselves, nor the Angel as intrinsically corporeal; otherwise we would not conceive a true Angel. Hence an Angel is said by us to be conceived as "material," or "after the manner of something material," not constitutively but connotatively, namely through a concept connoting material things. Therefore the denomination "Universal" cannot result in his nature, since, if the Thomistic doctrine is true, it requires materiality intrinsic to the object.

10. But if Angelic nature is conceived as intrinsically material, it will no longer be truly Angelic nature but a fictive one. If one wishes that to be

universal, I grant it. What has been said of Universal "according to reason," insofar as it can have a place, was taught to us above by St. Thomas (preceding cap., n. 16). Moreover, either it signifies that Angelic nature, although it is not Universal on the side of the thing, nevertheless is so through the Intellect, as human nature and every other material nature are, and this has been attacked thus far and is not proved by you; or it signifies that it is Universal only through a reason imagining without foundation, and this is irrelevant, since through a gratuitously fictive relation to chimerical inferiors, any individual as such can possess universality.

11. Objection 4: the predication of the specific nature of Michael is a predication of a superior of an inferior: first, because it is a predication of Species of an individual; secondly, because if it were a predication of an equal of an equal, it would be identical. Therefore it is a predication of a universal nature. Confirmation: an Angelic individual is placed in the Predicament of Substance, and not immediately under Genus, since no individual is immediately subjected to Genus as such. Therefore between it and Genus there intervenes Species, which is consequently superior and Universal. I answer by denying the antecedent, because Michael's specific nature and Michael himself are convertible terms, neither extending more widely than the other, just as the nature of God and this God. Nor do the appended proofs stand in the way. For that is a predication of physical Species, not logical, because in the opinion which we suppose it cannot become predicable of many, nor can it be prescinded from the individual by a precision sufficient for universality. Or say that it is a predication of a purely subjectible Species. Nor does it follow from the fact that it predicates an equal of an equal that it is identical, for subject and predicate are not expressed by synonymous terms; otherwise this too would be identical: "God is omnipotent."

12. To the confirmation: an Angelic individual is not immediately subjected to Genus but through Species, not indeed predicable but purely subjectible. Although this Species does not extend more widely than the individual, it can still intervene between the individual and Genus insofar as it can be assumed as a middle term and reason why Genus belongs to the individual. Moreover, that there is a subjectible Species which is not predicable, and that an Angelic individual is immediately subjected to Genus and immediately placed under it in the Predicament of Substance, are inconveniences which follow from the hypothesis of the numerical immultiplicability of Angels. But we, who permit such a hypothesis only for the sake of disputation, are not bound to reconcile every absurdity deduced from it. Hence also, if anyone contends that Michael's Nature in its specific

concept is simultaneously prescinded and not prescinded from formal individuation, since it still remains predicable of only one and altogether indivisible into several, he will argue not so much against us as against the stated hypothesis. For from that hypothesis it necessarily follows that this nature either cannot be prescinded from formal individuation, or, if it is prescinded, still remains as incapable of multiplication as if it were formally individual.

13. Certain objections from one of our acute recent authors remain. 1º: the aptitude of a Universal nature toward many is not true and real but only apparent. But this aptitude belongs to Michael's nature when prescinded from singularity, because it then appears appropriated to no individual and consequently appears indifferent to many. 2º: that a nature should appear apt to be in many depends wholly upon the mode of conceiving. But Angelic nature can be conceived in the same manner as human nature is conceived when universal, because it can be conceived confusedly and indeterminately, or indefinitely, that is, without any note of singularity or plurality. For example, let us suppose that this concept, "An Angelic intellective nature as eight," is proper to Michael's nature specifically taken. Confirmation: a nature is not denominated "apt to be in many" from any predicate intrinsic to it, otherwise it would have that denomination on the side of the thing, but from the mode of tending of cognition alone. Therefore, although it is not intrinsically multipliable, provided it is conceived in a precisive and indefinite mode, it will be denominated "apt to be in many." 3º: these concepts, "one, individual, singular," represent an object intrinsically immultipliable; and yet in exercise they render it Universal and predicable of many. Therefore likewise, etc.

14. These matters, however, have for the most part been solved above. To 1º: that aptitude, although apparent as regards the unity of the object which it supposes or involves, for unity of reason compared with real unity is apparent, that is, improper and metaphorical, is not so as regards verification of many, to which it is ordered; for it renders the nature apt to be truly affirmed and properly verified of many. But let it be apparent: not every apparent aptitude suffices for Universal, but only that which presupposes a foundation in the thing sufficient for predication of many to become true. Such a foundation is altogether absent from Angelic nature, just as it is absent from the Divine nature, against which everything objected by the recent author is plainly applicable. Moreover, Angelic nature prescinded from formal individuation remains radically appropriated to one individual, nor does it remain indifferent except in a certain respect, according to n. 3.

15. To 2º: this indeed depends formally upon the mode of conceiving, but fundamentally upon the character of the object which we explained in n. 7. Without that character a mode of conceiving apt to constitute a Universal is impossible. Therefore cognition forming a Universal must be "confused," that is, confusing several things after the manner of one; it must be "indeterminate," that is, not determining one among several rather than another, but verifiable in predication of all and each; it must likewise be "indefinite," that is, attaining several things without signs of multitude or singularity, such as "this, something, every." Hence it does not suffice that the nature be conceived without these signs, as is clear in this concept, "God"; rather, it is required that cognition attain several things on the side of the object and represent them in the manner explained. Therefore it is false that Angelic nature can be conceived indefinitely, confusedly, and indeterminately as human nature can.

16. Here note that these terms, "Angelic nature, this Angelic nature," do not differ as indefinite and definite, in the manner in which these differ: "man" and "this man." For the term "Angelic nature," taken not generically but specifically, is not properly indefinite, for the reasons just stated. They differ, therefore, as formally definite and radically definite, just as the terms "God" and "this God." To the confirmation: that denomination does not arise from some intrinsic predicate as from a form, but it does arise from it as constituting a subject capable of the denomination, and therefore as constituting the denomination itself; for every denomination and formal effect is constituted from the capacity of the subject. It also arises from it as from a foundation without which a form suited to such a denomination cannot exist.

17. To 3º: a difficulty is touched upon here which is to be resolved later concerning the common notion of Individual as such. For now I say briefly that this term "individual," and the same should be understood of the others, when it constitutes a Universal, does not attain on the side of the object one unique individual but several, indeed all; and in them there precedes a sufficient foundation for the indefinite concept and the denomination "predicable." For although each is immultipliable in the being of this individual, it is not so in the being of individual. Peter, for example, has nothing by which he repugns this truth: "There are, or can be, several individuals." Therefore in this sense he is truly multipliable, not by division but by coexistence, concerning which see above, n. 8. But the specific concept of Michael's nature neither attains several on the side of the object nor anything in any way multipliable in the being of Angelic species.

18. Rejoinder 1º: this concept "one" excludes multiplicability no less than this concept "a spiritual intellective nature as eight"; and yet the concept "one" constitutes its object in the being of a Universal. Therefore, etc. 2º: the concept "man" constitutes its object rationally one, although there corresponds to it on the side of the object a multiple nature. Therefore the concept "an Angelic intellective nature as eight" will constitute its object rationally multipliable, although there corresponds to it on the side of the object a unique nature. 3º: plurality of individuals, even possible ones, is required under no title for a nature to become Universal. Proof: first, it is not required after the manner of an object terminating the cognition productive of the Universal, since rather such cognition ought to prescind from all multiplicity. Secondly, neither is it required after the manner of a condition for a Universal to be made with a foundation in the thing; for according to the common opinion a material nature abstracted from one individual becomes Universal with a foundation in the thing, without any multiplicity being there presupposed. Again, if real multiplicity does not stand in the way of unity of reason with a foundation, why should real immultiplicability stand in the way of universality of reason with a foundation?

19. I answer to 1º by denying the major premise, because the prior concept, although it excludes multiplicability by division of a really one subject into several such subjects, does not exclude multiplicability by coexistence of several properly similar things in the notion of "one." For nothing in it involves anything repugnant to this truth: "Several things exist, each of which is really one." But the latter concept excludes even this multiplicability if it is specific. To 2º, I deny the consequence, because multiplicity on the side of the object is not opposed to unity of reason on the side of the act, since it is prescinded from by that act. But uniqueness of the object wholly excluding the possibility of other similar things conflicts with rational multiplicability, since the latter must be an aptitude for the nature to be truly consignified as identified with many.

20. To 3º, I deny the assumption. To the proof, each part is denied. For cognition productive of a Universal must terminate on the side of the object at many things, although on the side of the act it prescinds from multitude, as is clear from the preceding treatise (Disp. 2, capp. 4, 5). Hence no cognition is productive of a Universal unless it confuses several things into one, or attains several things after the manner of one. Likewise multiplicity, at least possible, is required as a condition without which an object cannot be denominated "predicable of many." For this predicability, since it is a relation to many, must presuppose its term as possible. Nor does the point

concerning a nature abstracted from one individual stand in the way. For then possible multiplicity is presupposed; indeed a multiple nature is attained on the side of the object, as we noted in its place (Tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 9, n. 10). Real multiplicity, however, does not stand in the way of unity of reason because it coheres with real similarity and agreement of many, which is the foundation of intentional unity. But real immultiplicability destroys the foundation of Universality which we explained in nn. 7, 8.

21. Finally, observe that our authors commonly permit the Thomists to hold that Michael's nature is prescinded even from radical singularity, and still deny that it becomes a predicable Species. The reason, they say, is that universality, or predicability, expresses a positive aptitude toward many. But the nature of an Angel under that precision would indeed prescind from positive ineptitude toward many, yet would not thereby acquire positive aptitude, because it would not acquire materiality, in which fundamental multiplicability is supposed to consist, without which no object is capable of being extrinsically denominated "apt to be in many and to be predicated of many." Therefore the nature thus prescinded would be neither positively apt nor positively inept toward many, neither singular nor universal, neither positively determined nor positively indeterminate; but it would have all these only precisively, just as animal prescinded from rational and irrational can be called both precisively but neither positively, and just as man according to himself is neither white nor non-white except in a merely precisive sense. And let this alone be what some Thomists who agree with us intend when they call Angelic nature Universal "negatively," namely non-singular or prescinded from every singularity, without nevertheless positively founding a relation to many.

22. It may be said: at least in Angelic nature thus prescinded there is precisive multiplicability; but this suffices for a Universal just as precisive unity suffices. I answer: for Universal there is required positive multiplicability, both the fundamental multiplicability explained in n. 7 and the formal and logical multiplicability which is the very denomination "predicable." Positive unity is likewise required, not intrinsic to the object, but extrinsic and intentional, as was explained in the preceding treatise. These things are probably said. Yet to me precision from radical singularity is unintelligible so long as a plurality of individuals, whether material or spiritual, is supposed chimerical; for since Angelic nature can in no way be prescinded from repugnance to identity with chimerical individuals, it cannot but be conceived with an essential necessity toward one. At most I would admit precision "as to what is explicit," insofar as it is not necessary

that the nature of an Angel be expressly conceived as the root of one unique individuation.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Individual. Where It Is Asked Whether a Common and Univocal Account Can Be Abstracted from the Individual.

1. Since the Individual is correlative to Species, it must now, after Species, be briefly explained. An Individual is the same as a determinate and singular thing. It can be taken either according to first intention, that is, according to those things that belong to it on the part of the thing; or according to second intention, that is, according to the extrinsic denominations that it receives from an act of the Intellect. Taken in the former way, it is defined by Porphyry as: "That whose collection of properties will never be the same in another." The properties of an Individual are comprised in these verses:

Form, Figure, Place, Time,
with Name and Blood,
Country: these are seven things that
one and another do not have alike.

2. The meaning of the definition, therefore, is that an Individual is that which never agrees with another in these seven properties taken collectively, namely temperament, figure, existence in the same place and at the same time, name, lineage, and country. Yet this is not a strict definition, but a certain description relative to us, insofar as we perceive by sense and distinguish corporeal individuals. For one thing, it does not apply to spiritual individuals. For another, even two corporeal individuals can, at least by divine power, agree in all those properties.

3. An Individual, therefore, is more suitably defined in general from St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 4): "Undistinguished in itself and distinguished from every other"; or, what amounts to the same thing, "Undivided in itself and divided from every other." From this definition, an Individual is that which is repugnant to being identified with others and is incapable of division into several things of the same name and essence; and in this it differs from the Universal. Hence you will infer that an Individual is the same as something really one, since both are defined in the same way; and that these terms are almost synonymous: "individual," "singular," "really one," "this," namely when "this" is taken substantivally.

4. But one may object, 1º: According to Aristotle, the Singular cannot be defined. I answer: the Singular cannot be defined under its proper and determinate expression, for example, under the concept "Peter" or "Peterhood"; but it can indeed be defined under the common account of singular or Individual, in which all singulars agree. Thus St. Thomas (ibid., a. 1, ad 1), who cites Aristotle. One may object, 2º: to be undivided in itself and divided from every other also belongs to Genus and Species; yet these are not Individuals but Universals. I answer: Universals taken according to second intention, or in the being of an intentional concrete, are also logical Individuals, as we shall explain in the following disputation when we treat the common account of Predicable. They are therefore Universals only when taken according to first intention; and in this sense they are indeed divisible into several things of the same name and essence.

5. Now an individual taken according to second intention can be defined both as subjectible and as Predicable. As subjectible, thus: "That which can be immediately subjected to Species"; as Predicable, thus: "That which can be predicated of one thing only." These definitions explain two functions of the same thing, or two denominations proceeding from the same form into the same subject in relation to diverse, as it were, terms. For the same Peter, for example, by the act of the Intellect whereby he is apprehended as singular, is rendered proximately subjectible with respect to the human Species, and proximately predicable only of his own entity. An Individual can, however, be predicated in five ways, according to the number and norm of the five Predicables, namely by affecting their matter with a demonstrative sign; for example: "Peter is this man, this animal, this rational thing, this risible thing, this white thing."

6. An Individual under metaphysical consideration is either complete or incomplete. Concerning this division, beyond what was said in Chapter 1, it is enough now to add that metaphysically incomplete Individuals are admitted by almost everyone and confirmed by experience. For while you see a man from afar, according to the various signs that you gradually perceive as he comes nearer, you successively form these concepts: "this body, this living thing, this animal"; by these you certainly prescind from the differences and conceive only the generic grades affected by haecceity. You then conceive some Singular according to an incomplete, or inadequate, essence; and this we call an incomplete individual.

7. One may object, 1º: the haecceity in each individual is one for all the higher predicates; therefore, when the haecceity of Peter, for example, is conceived, all the predicates of the complete Individual, whose contraction it is, are conceived at least implicitly. One may object, 2º: haecceity does not

immediately affect generic predicates, but does so through the Species; therefore it cannot be conceived as affecting a generic predicate unless it is first conceived as affecting the essence of the Species.

8. I answer to 1º: the haecceity of one complete Individual is really one. Nothing, however, prevents it from being formally and precisively divided into several incomplete haecceities, distinct at least non-mutually, so that the haecceity of man includes the haecceity of animal, the latter the haecceity of living thing, and the latter the haecceity of body, without their being mutually included in one another; just as happens in the specific and generic grades themselves once extension is removed. Therefore, when Peter's haecceity is conceived as affecting man, the higher predicates are indeed conceived implicitly; but the lower differences are not conceived in this way when haecceity is conceived as affecting body, living thing, or animal. To 2º: I grant the whole argument concerning haecceity taken completely, or insofar as it constitutes a complete Individual, for example when it is conceived under the name "Peterhood"; but I deny it concerning incomplete haecceity, which we have just explained. For this can be conceived as immediately affecting a generic predicate. For this reason we said in Chapter 1 that only the complete Individual is mediately subjected to Genus; for Genus is predicated immediately of the incomplete individual and in the manner of Species.

9. Furthermore, an Individual is customarily divided into determinate, such as "Peter," and indeterminate, or vague, such as "some man." A vague Individual as such is not given on the part of the thing; for nothing exists among things except what is determinate. Therefore it is given on the part of the thing only materially, that is, according to the plurality of Individuals reached on the part of the object; but according to the form whereby it is rendered vague, it exists only in the Intellect and consists in the mode of tending proper to cognition. Moreover, since a vague Individual is predicable of several things, it is not properly an Individual; although it is so called because, on the part of the act, it expresses haecceity, though indeterminately. On this account it falls short of the strictness and propriety of the Universal. It is therefore something intermediate between the Universal and the Individual.

10. There remains a rather simple question, namely, whether a common and univocal account of the Individual can be abstracted; or whether these names, "Individual," "singular," etc., signify an account univocal to all Individuals. The affirmative is held, according to Fr. Peynado, disp. 2, n. 28, and Servera, disp. 8, n. 52, by the Angelic Doctor, the Subtle Doctor, and the Excellent Doctor, whom most of our authors and the Thomists follow,

together with many Scotists whom Mastrius cites and follows. The negative is held by several Thomists, to whom the College of St. Thomas adheres, by Pontius the Scotist, and by some of our authors, whom Fr. Lynceus follows. The principal dispute concerns the Individual taken according to first intention; for if it is taken according to second intention, scarcely anyone holds the negative position. Indeed, the College of St. Thomas supposes the affirmative to be "entirely certain." If, however, there is any difficulty in it, that too will incidentally be resolved.

§. Our Conclusion.

A Common and Univocal Account Can Be Abstracted from All Individuals.

11. Proof: Peter and Paul, and the same holds for the rest, are similar in the being of an individual; therefore a common and univocal account of the Individual can be abstracted from them. The consequence is clear from the parity with any univocal account, for example that of animal or living thing. Proof of the antecedent: they are similar in being undivided in themselves and divided from every other; therefore also in the being of an Individual. Proof of the antecedent: first, because to be similar is for one to stand as another does; but it is truly said: "As Peter is undivided in himself and divided from every other, so also is Paul." Second, because in that indivision they are not purely dissimilar. This is clear: for if Peter were divided in himself and Paul undivided, they would without doubt be purely dissimilar in respect of indivision. Therefore, when each is equally undivided, they stand in a different way than they would if they were purely dissimilar.

12. One may object: they are indeed similar, but not purely so, because at the same time they are dissimilar under the same account; and therefore the account of Individual is analogical, because, since it is simultaneously an account of agreement and difference, it becomes partly the same and partly diverse. But this amounts to nothing. For we are now speaking of the similarity that provides a foundation for abstraction; and such similarity, as existing prior to the operation of the Intellect, is nowhere pure, even in the being of man or animal, since it always has dissimilarity mixed with it. If, therefore, a univocal account of animal can nevertheless be abstracted from man and horse because they are truly similar on the part of the thing, although not purely so, why should the same not occur in the account of Individual?

13. Confirmation 1º: all Individuals under the name "Individual" are defined by one definition, which belongs as properly to these as to those, as the Adversaries admit. But things properly defined by one definition fall under a perfect unity of account, as we showed elsewhere (Previous Treatise, disp. 2, c. 3, n. 2) from Aristotle and St. Thomas; and an objective concept perfectly one cannot fail to be univocal, as is evident. Therefore, etc.

14. Confirmation 2º: the name "Individual" is not equivocal; moreover, it is not analogical; therefore it is univocal. Among the Adversaries, some deny the major premise and others the minor, among whom is the College of St. Thomas. Therefore each premise must be proved. Proof of the major: a name that belongs to diverse things by the same property and title is not equivocal. Thus the name "animal" is not equivocal with respect to man and horse, because it applies equally properly to them by reason of sensation; nor is the name "dog" equivocal with respect to terrestrial dogs, because it properly belongs to each on account of the true power of barking. But the name "Individual" belongs truly and properly to Peter, Paul, and Bucephalus by reason of indivision. Therefore, etc. Add that equivocal terms cannot be defined by one definition, as all concede with Aristotle.

15. Next, proof of the minor: the account signified by the name "Individual" is not partly the same and partly diverse; therefore that name is not analogical. Proof of the antecedent: first, because an account partly the same and partly diverse cannot be defined by one definition that is verified equally properly of all its inferiors. This is clear in the account of "healthy" abstracted from animal and medicine, in the account of "man" abstracted from the living and painted man, in the account of "laughter" abstracted from oral laughter and the laughter of man, and, according to the Thomists, in the account of "being" abstracted from God and creatures, or from substance and accident. But who could doubt that the definition of Individual is verified equally properly of Peter and Bucephalus? Second, because at least among created substantial individuals there is no principal analogate, as will be clear to one who examines the matter; nor is there any relation, order, or dependence of one upon another. There is therefore nothing that could found analogy.

16. Some further arguments of no slight force support our conclusion. 1º According to St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 30, a. 4, a common and univocal account of "person" can be abstracted; but person is the same as "rational Individual," for according to Boethius's celebrated definition it is "an individual substance of a rational nature." Therefore, etc. 2º A term capable of distributive supposition as a Middle in a valid syllogism is capable of univocity. Such is the term "Individual," as is clear in this syllogism:

"Every Individual is incommunicable; but Peter is an Individual; therefore Peter is incommunicable." 3º A univocal account of "Difference" can be abstracted from all specific differences, as the common opinion holds; therefore likewise, etc., for scarcely any difficulty can be raised that does not apply equally in both cases. 4º A univocal account of "dissimilarity," or of "distinction as such," can likewise be abstracted, although this appears no less difficult than a univocal account of "Individual." What we have said of the individual applies equally to individuation in the abstract, signified namely by these names, "individuation, singularity, haecceity," which can likewise be a common and univocal account of Peterhood, Bucephalus-hood, etc.

CHAPTER VII.
Objections Are Answered.

1. Objection 1º: the individual difference is the account by which Peter and Paul differ and are rendered dissimilar; therefore it cannot found the agreement and similarity of both. Moreover, individual differences are "primarily diverse," and consequently agree in nothing. The objection is pressed by parity with the account of "specific difference," in which the capacity to roar and rationality agree, although they differ from one another precisely because they are differences. Furthermore, either the individual difference is being considered as it appears in our concepts, or as it is on the part of the thing. If the first is intended, it will be an account of difference under these concepts, "Peterhood, Paulhood"; but under this indefinite concept, "individuation," it will be an account of pure agreement, under which no distinction between Peter and Paul appears, but rather univocal agreement. If the second is intended, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence; for Peter and Paul on the part of the thing are simultaneously dissimilar and similar in the being of an Individual: similar insofar as each is an Individual, and dissimilar insofar as they are not both Peter nor both Paul. See what was said in a similar case, Previous Treatise, disp. 1, c. 3. For individual differences to be called "primarily diverse," it is enough that they agree in none of the predicates placed in the Predicamental Tree. Otherwise it is repugnant for positive formalities to be primarily diverse in such a way that they can agree in no predicate whatsoever.

2. Objection 2º: the abstracted account of Individual will truly be an Individual, just as the account of man truly is man; yet it will not truly be an Individual. This is proved: 1º because an Individual is singular, whereas that account is not singular but Universal. 2º Because that account is divisible

into several things of the same name and essence, which is contrary to the concept of Individual. 3º Because an Individual is "Predicable of one only," whereas that account is predicable of several. I press the objection by parity with the account of specific difference, or of dissimilarity as such, which truly is a difference or dissimilarity; yet on the other hand it is not, since it is not an account of differing but of agreeing.

3. I press it further by the account of "producible," or "generable," as such; this will truly be producible, just as man as such truly is man, and at the same time it will not be producible, since it is repugnant for producible as such to be produced. Certainly nothing is produced except what is singular and determinate; but that account is not singular but universal. Otherwise the Universal could be produced on the part of the thing. The same difficulty is pressed in the account of "existing on the part of the thing," or of "running" as such, or "eating" as such; since it is certain that "existent" as such does not exist, nor does "running" or "eating" as such run or eat. Indeed, the difficulty is the same in every common account: for man as such is essentially capable of reasoning, yet on the other hand is not so capable, since it is repugnant for man as such to reason. Accordingly, although the objection is entangled in terminology, it is common to all cases; and in the present matter it must be solved by most of the Adversaries, since they admit that a common account of Individual can at least be abstracted analogically. For whether it is univocal or analogical, it is subject to the same difficulties, as one who considers the matter will see, especially since it is a simple objective concept, as the College of St. Thomas admits.

4. The direct solution commonly given is this. The account of Individual as such is an Individual signatively, that is, according to the object signified by these terms, "individual," "individual difference"; for such an object is nothing other than Peter, Paul, Bucephalus, etc., each of whom is singular, indivisible, and predicable of one only. But that same account is not an Individual exercitively, that is, according to the denominations that the object exercitively receives from indefinite cognition, for example from the concept "Individual"; for by this cognition the object, which in itself and intrinsically is individual, is extrinsically denominated Universal, divisible, and predicable of several.

5. Hence the denominations "universal" and "singular," and the same is to be understood of the others emphasized by the objection, are not opposed in the same common account, because they proceed from diverse forms: the first from an extrinsic intentional form, the second from the intrinsic entity of the object. It is also customary to say that Individual as such is an individual in personal supposition, and is not an individual in

simple supposition; which gives the same meaning. For to be taken in personal supposition is the same as to be taken according to predicates intrinsic to the object and identified with the inferiors; and to be taken in simple supposition is the same as to be taken according to denominations bestowed by indefinite cognition, which do not descend to the inferiors. Nor is it novel that something belongs to a common account which belongs to none of its inferiors, provided it is something extrinsic and intentional; for to animal as such it belongs to be a Genus, although this belongs neither to man, nor horse, nor the others.

6. Or, somewhat differently: every common account indeed contains the metaphysical essence of its inferiors, but not as something to be exercised in the state of abstraction, but solely in the state of contraction, in which alone it can, so to speak, explicate or exercise its formal effect. Man as such, for example, contains the power of reasoning by which he is defined; not in such a way as to render him capable of reasoning in the state of abstraction, since it is altogether repugnant for man as such to reason, but so as to render him capable of reasoning only in the state of contraction to individual instances. Likewise real Being as such is essentially "apt to exist on the part of the thing"; not by an aptitude regarding the state of abstraction, for in that state it is rather unfit to exist on the part of the thing, but by an aptitude regarding the state of contraction. The same can be seen in the examples of n. 3. Thus opposed denominations can belong to the same common account in relation to diverse states, namely to be apt and unfit to exist, capable and incapable of reasoning, producible and unproducible, etc. Hence Individual as such expresses a repugnance to division, etc., in the state of abstraction, but not for that state nor to be exercised for that state, but for the state of contraction alone; just as running as such expresses the exercise of running in that state, but not for that state; and similarly in the others.

7. Objection 3º: individuation as such is an ultimate difference; yet it is not ultimate, since it is contractible to Peter and Paul through further differences. Confirmation: if Individuation is prescinded from Peterhood, then Peterhood will no longer formally be individuation, or at least will include some suchness formally distinct from individuation; just as, because animal is prescinded from man, man includes something that is not formally animal. But if Peterhood includes such a suchness, a new univocal account of ultimate difference could be abstracted from that suchness and others, and this would again be contracted by further suchnesses, from which another abstraction could be made, and so on to infinity; which is absurd.

8. The objection is solved like the preceding one. Individuation as such is an ultimate difference signatively and in personal supposition; but

exercitively and in simple supposition it is not ultimate, but further contractible. Or otherwise: it is an ultimate difference in relation to the state of contraction, but not in relation to the state of abstraction. The confirmation contains the difficulty commonly discussed where the transcendence of Being is treated. For the present, I answer 1º: if transcendence is supposed, Peterhood includes nothing that is not formally individuation. Yet because it can be conceived through the concepts "Peterhood" and "Individuation," by the first of which it is expressed as determined to Peter and dissimilar to Paulhood, while by the second it does not appear contracted to Peter or different from Paulhood, it is therefore prescinded from itself by the second concept and, confused with the others, becomes a common univocal account; but by the first it is distinguished from the others and appears as contracting and determining Individuation as such.

9. Therefore between Peterhood and Individuation as such there is a formal non-mutual distinction, as between aseity and being as such. Indeed, the account of Individuation as such can be abstracted again and again from Peterhood as such; but not a new account, only the very same one that was first abstracted. Hence no infinity of objective formalities follows, but only the power of the Intellect, which no one denies, to repeat similar concepts syncategorematically without end. This is evident in the account of Being, which can be abstracted infinitely from aseity as such. I answer 2º: if transcendence is not admitted, Peterhood is resolvable into two concepts formally distinct from one another, one of Individuation and the other of its suchness. That a new account of suchness can be abstracted from the suchnesses of Individuation, and so on syncategorematically without end, is not judged absurd by authors who deny transcendence, among whom is Fr. Peynado, who cites the Excellent Doctor in his favor.

10. It is replied: the account of Individual includes the diversity of its inferiors; therefore it is not univocal but analogical. Proof of the antecedent: it includes individual differences; but in these consists the entire diversity of individuals, for example Peter and Paul. Therefore, etc. I deny the antecedent, understood of formal inclusion and on the part of the act. To the proof, I distinguish the major premise: it includes individual differences on the part of the object, I grant; on the part of the act, I subdistinguish: as explicated or explicable by proper and discriminative concepts, for example "Peterhood, Paulhood," I deny; as explicable indefinitely by concepts applying indiscriminately to any individual, for example "singularity, haecceity," I grant the major. Then I distinguish the minor: in these consists all the diversity, etc., really, I grant; formally, I subdistinguish: in them as

expressed by discriminative concepts, I grant; as expressed by indefinite concepts, I deny the minor and the consequence.

11. Objection 4º: the common account of Individual itself is a logical individual in the being of a Universal, since it cannot be divided into several Universals; therefore a new account of Individual can be abstracted from it and the remaining Individuals. And since this too will be a logical individual, another new abstraction will again arise, and so the process will continue without end. I press the objection in the opinion of Fr. Lynceus, whose argument this is: the account of Predicable as such is also a certain Predicable; therefore a new account of Predicable can be abstracted from it and the others, and we shall proceed to infinity. Likewise, the account of Species can be abstracted from all Species; and since this account is itself also a certain particular Species, it is subject to the same difficulty. I answer directly: an infinite process does not follow, because the account of Individual also prescinds from itself insofar as it is a certain logical individual. For the concept "Individual" reaches on the part of the object also the concrete thing that it itself constitutes, together with the other individuals confusedly and indefinitely, so that it does not distinguish it from the others. Therefore no new account of Individual remains to be abstracted, although the same one can be abstracted a thousand times, from n. 9. See what we shall say in a similar case concerning the common account of Predicable in the following disputation.

12. Objection 5º: a common univocal account must prescind from real unity; but the account of Individual does not so prescind, since it is itself the account of "real One." Therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º: the term "One" is not universal, since it cannot be affirmed of all the inferiors collectively; therefore neither is the term "Individual," which means the same. Confirmation 2º: "Individual" means "this"; but "this" is not a common term but a demonstrative. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 3º: otherwise it would truly be said, "The Singular is Universal," just as it is truly said, "Man is Universal." I answer: whatever may be said of other common accounts, the account of "real One" itself need only prescind from real unity insofar as the latter is conceived through a determinate and discriminative expression, not insofar as it is conceived indefinitely. The reason is that real unity obstructs univocity and universality only insofar as it determines the common account to some inferior; but it does not so determine it when it is expressed by an indefinite concept, as anyone can see.

13. To Confirmation 1º, I deny the antecedent together with its proof; for the term "One," taken indefinitely, is verified of all individuals simultaneously, not collectively but distributively. For in the same sense in

which it is truly said, "Every man is man," it is also truly said, "Every individual is one." To 2º: the term "this," when taken substantivally, is a common term and indefinitely signifies all haecceities in the concrete. Therefore it is a demonstrative term only when taken syncategorematically, or adjectivally. To 3º: that proposition is true when "Singular" is taken indefinitely and in simple supposition; and thus Scotus grants it according to Mastrius (disp. 5, Log., n. 98).

14. Objection 6º: if a univocal account of Individual can be abstracted, it will be predicated of individuals more immediately than Species; hence the individual will not be immediately subjectible to Species. I deny the consequence: first, because individual as such extends more widely than a Species, for example the human Species; and therefore it cannot mediate between that Species and its individuals. Next, if only the account of "human Individual" is abstracted, it extends just as widely as the Species, and there is no ground on which it can be taken as a middle or as the account by reason of which the Species belongs to individuals. But one may ask to which Predicable Individual as such belongs. I answer: the same must be said as of Being as such and One as such, namely that it is predicated by transcending ultimate suchnesses, and therefore properly belongs to no Predicable, because transcendental predicates are outside the class of Predicables; or, if it is not transcendental, it is reduced to Genus, because it is predicated of individuals proposed under their proper name as what they are incompletely and in the manner of a material part. Nor would it be a great scandal even if it were said to be a Predicable distinct from the five commonly received. Whether this concept also, "distinct," or "really divided from every other," is common and univocal, consult Fr. Peynado, disp. 2, sect. 3, § 2.

DISPUTATION II.

ON THE REMAINING PORPHYRIAN PREDICABLES: WHERE ALSO THE NUMBER AND AGREEMENT OF THE PREDICABLES ARE TREATED.

CHAPTER I.

On Difference.

1. Difference taken most broadly is "a form diversifying extremes that agree in some predicate," as is taken from Aristotle, *Metaphysica* V, c. 9. It is threefold: common, proper, and most proper. Common Difference is that by which extremes differ contingently, namely by reason of an accident contingently added. Thus a white man differs from a black man. This Difference coincides with "Accident," the fifth Predicable. Proper Difference, which nearly coincides with "Property," the fourth Predicable, is that by which extremes differ necessarily, but not essentially, or not by something pertaining to their essence. Thus fire differs from water by heat in the highest degree. Most proper Difference, which alone is treated in the present Chapter, is that by which extremes differ essentially, namely by reason of an essential predicate. Thus rationality makes man differ from brutes.

2. This same Difference is the third Predicable, which as such is defined from Porphyry as: "Predicable of several things differing in Species, as what sort of thing they are." Yet this definition is commonly rejected as deficient, since it does not comprehend the ultimate specific Difference, which belongs to this Predicable. Better, and commonly approved, is this other

definition: "Predicable of several as what sort of thing they are," or "as their metaphysical formal part." This belongs to every Difference, as will be clear; and moreover belongs to it alone. For Genus is not predicated as a formal part, Species is not predicated as a part, and Property and Accident are not predicated as what a thing is.

3. Difference is said to be predicated "as of what sort" because it is predicated, as it were, adjectivally, namely as adjoined to Genus, or in the manner of a form qualifying the generic predicate; for if one asks, "What sort of animal is man?" the answer is "rational." But since at the same time it is itself a quidditative predicate of the Species, it is not predicated purely "as of what sort," but "as what sort of thing it is." It is also said to be predicated "as the formal part of the essence," by analogy with physical form; because, just as physical form essentially distinguishes the composite from others differing in Species and determines the indifference of matter, so Difference essentially distinguishes one Species from others and determines the indifference of Genus.

4. But one may object against the definition. Difference is predicated of Species and Individuals, and is not predicated "as of what sort," because it is not adjoined to them. I answer: the meaning of the definition is, "Predicable of several as a part qualifying another part of their essence." Therefore "as of what sort" is referred, not to the whole essence of the Species or Individual, but to some predicate of it, namely the generic predicate. It is again objected: Genus is predicated "as what it is," and Difference "as of what sort"; therefore Species, which includes Genus and Difference, will be predicated "as what sort of thing it is." I answer: the whole may be granted if Species is taken for the definition, as when the essence of man is predicated not under the term "man," but under the term "rational animal." But in this treatise Species is taken insofar as it is signified by a simple term, for example "man," in which sense it includes Genus and Difference implicitly and indistinctly. Difference, however, is not predicated "as of what sort" unless distinctly expressed.

5. Difference is divided into subalternate and ultimate, or atomic. A subalternate Difference is one that contains Species under itself, such as "sensible," which is the difference of the Genus "Living thing." An ultimate Difference is one that contains under itself only individuals distinct in number, such as "Rational." Individual difference, which otherwise is truly ultimate, is not taken into account here: first, because it is disregarded by the Sciences as almost nothing, or at least as worthy of no examination, except when taken in common as a transcendental predicate; second, because we are now treating only those differences that immediately divide

Genera directly placed in the Predicamental Tree. In this sense the Difference of an atomic Species is called ultimate.

6. And this same Difference is what is called the "intrinsic Specificative, Ultimate and formal constitutive principle of the Species, Primary Distinctive, First root of specific properties." All these must be understood in a metaphysical and logical sense; for in the physical order they are verified only of physical form really distinct from the subject. Hence "rational," for example, is said metaphysically to root the properties of man insofar as through that predicate they are proved as though *a posteriori*. For from the fact that man participates in reason, we infer argumentatively that he is volitional, capable of free choice, discipline, laughter, admiration, etc. Hence it follows that rationality is apprehended by us in the manner of a certain root of such predicates, the foundation being taken from the order that the operations maintain among themselves; although on the part of the object there is no distinction between rational, volitional, etc., and consequently no rooting or emanation.

7. Four functions are commonly attributed to Difference: 1º to divide, or contract, Genus; 2º to constitute Species; 3º to distinguish the essence of the Species from others; 4º to be predicated of inferiors. All these are works of reason. For on the part of the thing there is no indifference of Genus, nor is Genus given except fundamentally; nor is Species constituted from metaphysical parts; nor is it distinguished from others by a part of itself, but by itself as a whole; nor is there anything superior that is predicated of inferiors. Therefore all these are verified only in a reflexive sense presupposing a distinction of reason among the predicates of the Species.

8. If one asks what form of reason constitutes Difference as performing such functions, I answer 1º: Difference is constituted as actually dividing or contracting Genus by a judgment expressing the real identity of both, whether it be direct, as "Rational is animal," or indirect, as "Animal is rational." Proof: Genus is divided or contracted insofar as it appears determined to one Species rather than others; while, conversely, it is undivided and abstract insofar as it is so conceived that it appears determined to no Species. But through that judgment the Genus "animal," for example, appears determined to the human Species. This is clear: for just as animal appears indeterminate and indifferent to various Species while its real identity with rational or irrational does not appear, so it appears determined to the human Species when its identity with rational appears. For then the whole account of indetermination and indifference is removed. But such identity undoubtedly appears in that judgment.

9. One may object: if judgment is a composite quality, animal remains perfectly Universal in those predications; therefore it remains indeterminate and indifferent; therefore it is not contracted. Indeed, in our opinion, even if judgment is a simple quality, animal remains with the objective extension proper to the Universal; but it is repugnant for a Whole, while actually divided, to retain the extension it had beforehand. I answer: if judgment is composite, animal remains indeterminate by virtue of the cognition "animal," and at the same time determined by virtue of the concept "is" as affixed to the concept "rational." Hence those denominations are not opposed because they are attributed by really distinct forms. Moreover, that mental word "is" denominates animal as contracted and rational as contracting, as the thing which is such; because, while it connects extremes of unequal extension, it of itself attributes to the narrower the denomination "contracting" and to the wider the denomination "contracted."

10. But if the simplicity of judgment is posited, through the act of judgment animal does not remain simply indeterminate or indifferent, since it appears to belong to a determinate Species. Nor is it absurd that, while divided, it retain the objective extension of the Universal. First, because the division of a potential Whole does not imitate in every respect the division of an actual Whole, as is known. Therefore it is enough that it diminish or impede the formal indifference previously possessed by the Whole, for example in the prior apprehension "animal." Second, because although real division destroys the extension of a Whole, mental division does not do so, as is clear even in an actual Whole itself, which is mentally divided through this indivisible act, "One part of man is soul and another body," without therefore ceasing to be known as a Whole through the expression "of man," with which the entire act is identified. For mental division, therefore, it is enough that some or every part be distinctly known as included in the Whole or under the Whole, although by the same act the Whole itself as such is simultaneously known.

11. I answer 2º: Difference is rendered actually constitutive of Species explicitly both through the judgment discussed in n. 8 and also through the complex apprehension that is the definition of the Species. Proof: a part constitutes a Whole when it is actually joined or united to another corresponding part. But through the judgment "Rational is animal," rational is mentally joined to animal, since their real identity expressly appears; just as, conversely, they are mentally disjoined when that identity is prescinded from. Hence, if judgment is really composite, the expression corresponding to the verb "is" performs the function of metaphysical union. But if judgment is a simple act, the matter is more difficult; because every

composition is a "union of distinct things" in the line in which the composition exists, whereas animal and rational are not extremes distinct by reason through that act. Yet it must be said that metaphysical composition, being improper and metaphorical, is not bound by all the laws of physical composition, and consequently is not a union of things actually and formally distinct, but of things presuppositively distinct, insofar as it is an act presupposing of itself the simple apprehensions "animal" and "rational," through which the extremes are distinguished by reason.

12. As regards definitive apprehension, for example "Rational animal," through it too the real identity of both predicates appears, although less expressly than through judgment; for, to be definitive, it must convey this sense: "Animal which is rational." Therefore it already mentally unites both predicates. If that definition is a really composite act, the concept "rational" is of itself connected to the concept "animal," as we noted elsewhere (Tract. 1, disp. 2, c. 7, n. 22); and therefore that concept itself will be both the form of one part and the form of the composite in the abstract, or the union of the two. But if a simple act is posited, the same must be said of it as of a simple judgment. I said in the answer of n. 11, "explicitly," because Difference is rendered implicitly constitutive of Species through the simple expression of the Species as such, for example through the concept "man," by which the Species is constituted as taken in this treatise, namely not as defined but as proximately definable, and thus as containing Genus and Difference implicitly and indistinctly.

13. From what has been said you can see what metaphysical composition is and in what it consists, concerning which discussion so often arises. It is "Cognition through which the generic and differential predicates, which taken separately are formally distinguished from one another mutually, are rendered as though conjoined and united by the appearance of their real identity." Hence two things are prerequired for metaphysical composition: that there be a mutual distinction of reason between the extremes, and that one be Genus and the other Difference, so that the one is conceived as indifferent and as though determinable, potential, and perfectible by the other. For this composition took its name analogically from the physical composition of matter and form, especially according to the indifference of one part and the determination of the other. Hence, to note this incidentally, metaphysical composition is not admitted in God; because neither the Divine attributes, even though distinguished by reason, nor predicates common to God and creatures either analogically or univocally, have the character of logical Genus or Difference, as, God granting, you will learn elsewhere.

14. I answer 3º: Difference is rendered actually distinguishing the essence of a Species from others through the same acts by which it is rendered explicitly constitutive of the Species. The matter is clear, because Difference, given its own distinctive or discriminative character, requires nothing in order actually to distinguish the essence beyond what is required for it actually to constitute that essence, as is clear in physical form. I answer 4º: Difference is actually predicated of inferiors through a judgment in which there are subjected to it either inferiors distinct only in number, if the Difference is ultimate, or also inferiors distinct in Species, if the Difference is subalternate. This too is evident of itself. Thus far we have treated Difference as actually performing the four functions of n. 7. But if one asks through what form it is constituted proximately able to perform them, I answer: through a simple differential concept, for example "rational"; for through this it is rendered proximately apt on its own part to be subjected to Genus, or for Genus to be predicated of it, and for it to be predicated of its inferiors; and consequently it is rendered proximately contractive of Genus, constitutive and distinctive of Species, and predicable of inferiors. Therefore comparative knowledge is not necessary, as we showed concerning the logical Universal in the preceding Treatise.

CHAPTER II.

Certain Questions Concerning Difference Are Decided.

1. Question 1º: whether Difference is Universal with respect to the Species that it constitutes. Master Prado affirms this with other Thomists. But the common and true opinion denies it, because Difference is not superior to the Species that it constitutes, since it does not extend more widely but is convertible with it, for example the capacity to roar with lion, or sensible with animal. But every Universal is superior to that which it regards insofar as it is Universal, as is known. One may object, 1º: Difference "rational," for example, is predicated only of the Species as Difference, namely "as what sort of thing it is," or as a formal part, but not of individuals; for these differ among themselves not through rationality but through haecceities. But Difference is Universal with respect to that of which it is predicated as Difference. Therefore, etc. I answer 1º by denying the minor: for although every Difference is Universal, it is not Universal under the same formal respect under which it is Difference. Hence it is customarily said that not one but two functions of Difference are "to distinguish" and "to be predicated" in the manner of a Universal. Yet because predicability of several is founded in the function of constituting

and distinguishing the Species, it is proper to Difference as such and constitutes the third Predicable. I answer 2º by denying the major: because rational is also predicated of individuals as Difference, not as that by which Peter and Paul differ from one another, but as that by which they differ from brutes. For it causes not only man to differ from horse, but also Peter from Bucephalus.

2. One may object, 2º: Difference is predicated of individuals through the Species; therefore as Universal it regards Species more immediately than Individuals. The consequence is clear from the parity of Genus, which as Universal regards Species more immediately than complete individuals, because it is predicated of the latter through Species. I distinguish the antecedent: through Species as something equal, I grant; as something inferior, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Nor does the proof obstruct this. For Genus as Universal regards Species, not because Species mediates in any way whatever between Genus and individuals, but because it mediates as an account inferior to Genus. Hence the relation of Difference as Universal to individuals is immediate, because it is not first terminated at another term. It is replied: in the same way in which a predicate is said of a subject, it is said of everything contained under that subject; therefore in the same way in which Difference is predicated of Species, it is predicated of the individuals contained under it. I distinguish the antecedent: in the same way as regards essential or accidental predication, I grant; as regards predication of superior concerning inferior, or equal concerning equal, I deny the antecedent; and under the same distinction I deny the consequence.

3. One may object, 3º: this is a formal predication, "Man is rational"; therefore it belongs to some Predicable; but to no other than the third. Therefore, etc. Confirmation: Difference is not predicated of Species as singular; therefore it is predicated as Universal. I answer by denying the first consequence; for since this is not a predication of superior concerning inferior, it belongs to no Predicable. For a predication to be formal it is enough that the predicate formally pertain to the essence of the subject, although it is equal predicated of equal, provided it is not identical; as is clear in these: "God is infinite Substance," or "is Being from Himself." To the Confirmation, I deny the consequence: for although every predicate must itself be either singular or universal, it need not perform one or the other function with respect to every subject; it can prescind from both when it regards a subject that is neither superior nor inferior but purely equal.

4. It is replied: Difference is predicated of more things by formal predication than Species; for it is predicated both of individuals and of the Species itself, whereas Species is not predicated of itself except identically.

Therefore Difference extends more widely in predication and consequently is superior to Species. I distinguish the antecedent: by formal predication which is equal concerning equal, I grant; which is superior concerning inferior, I deny the antecedent and consequence. For the greater extension in predication that is proper to a Universal is taken from relation to several inferiors. Add that Species is also predicated of Difference by a non-identical predication, although Difference is predicated of itself only identically. There is therefore compensation in the extension of predicating, and consequently equality remains intact. It should be noted here that Difference is predicated as Species of its incomplete individuals insofar as they are conceived in this way, for example "this rational thing, that rational thing," just as we noted concerning Genus in disp. 1, c. 1.

5. Question 2º: whether Difference is given on the part of the thing. I answer: Difference, taken for dissimilarity or diversity between extremes that simultaneously agree by an agreement taken for similarity, is given on the part of the thing, that is, independently of the Intellect. In this sense the definition of Difference given in Chapter 1, n. 1, is properly verified on the part of the thing. But if Difference, at least most proper Difference, is taken logically or metaphysically, it is not given formally on the part of the thing, but only fundamentally. For so taken it is the formal part of the specific essence, contractive of Genus, distinctive of things that agree in something by an agreement signifying unity in a generic predicate, and finally predicable of several as what sort of thing they are. All these presuppose an actual distinction between predicates really identified; and since this distinction is a work of reason, it is not given on the part of the thing.

6. Question 3º: whether the ultimate Difference is a simple formality, or indivisible into several direct formalities mutually distinct by reason. Several of the Ancients universally denied this, holding every ultimate Difference to be constituted from two or more differences. Hence they defined man, for example, as "rational mortal animal," so that by "mortal" he would differ from Angels and by "rational" from brutes, and thus the complete difference of man would coalesce from both. The common opinion, however, asserts that in most substances and accidents, especially physical and absolute ones, the ultimate Difference is a simple predicate. Proof: because, for example, the capacity to roar cannot with any foundation be divided into several such formalities. For although in the lion you consider properties or operations diverse among themselves and not common to other animals, you will always find one principal operation which, as it were, founds and roots the rest, and which we call "roaring." Therefore, if you conceive the principle of that operation by the concept "capable of roaring," you will have a simple

predicate that distinguishes the lion from others and is the first root of all its properties.

7. Experience teaches the same in other substances, and likewise in accidents. For on what foundation will you divide the Difference of color in the Species of whiteness, for example, into several formalities? We do indeed often explain the distinction of one Species from others not by one but by several terms; but then we do not use an essential definition, but a merely descriptive one, usually made necessary by our ignorance of the essential difference. But note that the question concerns direct formalities, namely those denoting predicates of first intention, such as "rational," "mortal." If, however, we speak reflexively, from any already prescinded Difference the common account of "difference" can be abstracted; and if this does not formally transcend the suchness by which it is contracted to the capacity to roar, it will be formally and mutually distinct from that suchness. But we are not speaking in this sense.

8. Nevertheless Arriaga, Quirós, Aversa, and others think it highly probable that the ultimate Difference not rarely coalesces from several differences, especially in accidents or acts of the soul. This appears in several mixed Species that identify in themselves the perfection of two: for example, in a habit or act that is simultaneously practical and speculative, in an act belonging simultaneously to two virtues, justice and temperance, and in an act that is simultaneously science and faith. Indeed, a Species of which two diverse and unsubordinated Genera are predicated seems to require a twofold differential formality, each corresponding to its own Genus. But justice and temperance, or science and faith, are diverse and unconnected Genera. Nor does the parity with physical form, which is one in every composite, obstruct this. First, because physical matter too is one; and yet Genus, which is metaphysical matter, can be multiple in one Species, as we have just noted. Second, because Difference, being an analogical and metaphorical form, need not be similar in all things to physical form. Hence in every atomic Species, besides the ultimate Difference, there are several other subalternate Differences, although nothing similar is therefore found in physical forms.

9. One may object: therefore the ultimate Difference of man will not be simple. I answer: Rational is the adequate Difference of man, not insofar as it precisely signifies "Intellective," for thus it is a Genus to man and Angel, nor insofar as it belongs to the soul separated from the body; but insofar as it signifies "Discursive, connaturally dependent in understanding upon the sensation of the imagination." In this sense it seems probable from what has been said that Rational is not an altogether simple difference; for it contracts

to man two altogether unconnected and unsubordinated Genera, namely "Animal" and "Intellective"; and this is peculiar to man beyond the other substantial Species. Yet anyone who wishes to say that each Genus is contracted by an indivisible formality, which in other mixed Species, for example in an act of science and faith, is unnamed, but in man is named "rational," will not easily be refuted.

10. Question 4º, and principally: whether Genus formally transcends the ultimate Differences; or whether the ultimate Difference formally includes Genus. Predicate A "formally transcends" predicate B, or is "formally included" in it, when it belongs to the definition or quidditative explanation of B, so that B under its proper concept cannot be fully explained without being said to be A; and therefore A is then said to be "formally identified" with B. Thus the predicates "animal" and "rational" are formally included in man, as are all those by which either animal or rational is defined. It is certain that all higher Genera and Differences are formally included in inferior Species, for example in man the Genera "body, living thing, animal," and the Differences "animate, sensible." It is likewise certain that inferior predicates, whether Species or Differences, are not formally included in superior predicates; for animal is not defined through man or rational, nor living thing through animal or sensible. The sole question, therefore, is whether higher Genera and Differences formally transcend the Differences constitutive of inferior Species. For brevity we shall speak of ultimate Differences, such as rational, capable of roaring, capable of neighing, from which the consequence to subalternate Differences in relation to the Genera that they contract will be easy.

11. For the affirmative side are cited the Nominalists, as well as Soncinas and Aversa, to whom some of our authors adhere. The negative is common throughout the Schools, with Aristotle and St. Thomas cited by Fr. Peynado (Tract. 2, disp. 3, n. 2). This appears true to me; and omitting proofs that equally attack the transcendence of being, concerning which we decide nothing here, it is proved briefly. Genus and Difference compose Species in the formal line, or as metaphysical parts. But parts in the line in which they compose a Whole must be mutually distinct, nor may one include the other. This is proved first by the example of parts composing in the physical line; second, because if one part includes the other, it is equal to the Whole. Hence either it will not be a part, or it will falsify the self-evident principle, "Every Whole is greater than its part." The same is further pressed: if Difference formally includes Genus, there is formally nothing in Species that is not also in Difference, as will be clear upon close examination. Therefore ultimate Difference will not be a Predicable diverse from Species, since

"rational," no less than "man," will be predicated of individuals as what they are completely, or as their whole essence. Confirmation: it seems certain that neither Species nor Genus formally transcends a metaphysical Property, for example "risible"; yet the arguments of the opposing side have equal force there.

12. Objection 1º: the capacity to roar, for example, which is the difference of the lion, is formally a principle of sensation and life; therefore it is formally animal and living. Proof of the antecedent: because the capacity to roar is formally the principle of roaring, and roaring is formally sensation and life. Similarly, reasoning, although it is not sensation, is formally life; therefore its principle, which is rationality, must formally include the Genus "living thing." First, the objection is met by parity with risibility, which is formally the principle of laughter, which is formally sensation and life. Next I note that "capable of roaring," "rational," and other names of Differences are often taken for the whole Species and signified substantivally in this or a similar sense: "That which is capable of roaring," "That which is rational." In this way these predicates include Genus and are the principle of roaring or reasoning adequately taken. But we are not speaking in that sense here. We therefore take these names or predicates purely adjectivally, insofar as they are conceived in the manner of an adjoining form modifying another. In this sense, for example, the capacity to roar can be defined in two ways: either under the function of Difference, or through the connotate of the operation inadequately taken.

13. The capacity to roar under the function of Difference is defined as "A suchness determining animal to lion"; this definition is not through animal directly but obliquely, or as connoted, just as location is not defined directly through body when it is defined thus: "A mode ultimately determining body to place." Through the connotate of the operation it is defined as "Principle of roaring." But since roaring is also a certain complete Species of operation, including its generic predicates, which are sensation and life, and moreover its specific difference by which it is distinguished from every other sensation, it follows that roaring adequately taken corresponds to the predicates of lion by an accommodated distribution. For insofar as it is life, it corresponds to the predicate "living"; insofar as it is sensation, to the predicate "animal"; insofar as it is a suchness or difference distinguishing this Species of operation from others, to the predicate "capable of roaring." Hence the capacity to roar, conceived purely adjectivally, is not formally the principle of roaring adequately taken, but only of roaring taken purely differentially; and in this sense roaring is not formally sensation or life. The same must be said of reasoning. Yet reasoning, even adequately taken, is not

life of that Genus which contains animal under itself and descends to inferiors only through animal; for reasoning is not sensation. It is therefore life only of the Intellective Genus, which is also contracted by man's rationality without formal transcendence.

14. Objection 2º: the Difference of cognition terminated at Peter formally includes the generic predicate "cognition," or "cognitive tendency"; therefore some Difference formally includes Genus. Proof of the antecedent: because that Difference is not precisely an intentional tendency toward Peter; otherwise it would not differ from the tendency of love terminated at Peter. Therefore it is a formally cognitive tendency. I deny the antecedent; and in the proof I deny the consequence. For although that Difference is not formally cognition or cognitive tendency, it differs sufficiently from the tendency proper to love by the fact that it is the suchness of a cognitive tendency, namely connoting the Genus "cognition," of which it is the determination. We do indeed explain many Differences through terms signifying the whole Species; but this proceeds not from formal inclusion but from poverty of words.

15. Objection 3º: the familiar syllogism in Darapti, namely: "Every man is formally animal; every man is formally rational; therefore some rational thing is formally animal," in which the formal identity of rational with animal is concluded from true and properly disposed premises. But this objection must be solved by everyone; for by the same form one could, contrary to everyone's opinion, conclude the formal inclusion of rational in animal, thus: "Every man is formally rational; every man is formally animal; therefore some animal is formally rational." Moreover, the syllogistic form does not hold, because formal identity can be non-mutual, according to the common opinion to be proved elsewhere; and so it is in the present case. For although man is formally animal, it does not follow that animal, nor rational taken separately, is formally man. But when the Extremes are not identified with the Middle, although the Middle is identified with them, their identity with one another is not concluded, because the principle "Things that are the same as a third are the same as one another," has no place. Hence non-mutual formal identity distributes the Middle no more than inadequate real identity does. Therefore that syllogism is similar to this one: "Every man is inadequately rational soul; every man is inadequately body; therefore some body is inadequately rational soul."

16. Objection 4º: Difference as such cannot be conceived without Genus; therefore it formally includes Genus. I distinguish the antecedent: without Genus as connoted, I grant; without Genus as a quidditative predicate of itself, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Difference as such connotes

Genus obliquely, or as a term of connection; and therefore it cannot be conceived without mention of it. But formal inclusion, indeed even real inclusion, does not follow from this, as is clear in a creature, which as such is not conceived without God; nor union without its extremes; nor a mode without the thing it determines. One may object: if animal appears on the part of the act in the definition of rational, how is rational prescinded from animal? I answer: it is prescinded, not indeed by a "precision of indifference," but by a "precision of non-inclusion," which is not obstructed by the appearance of animal in an oblique or connotative manner. For this is compatible with the fact that the real identity of the two does not appear, and that from the force of such an act alone one cannot say, "Rational is animal." The whole solution is clear in risibility, which, as a property, cannot be conceived or defined without the essence of man, of which it is a property; and yet it does not formally include that essence.

17. Objection 5º: Difference is definable; therefore through Genus; therefore it formally includes Genus. First, Difference, according to the common opinion, is not strictly definable through Genus and Difference, since it has no metaphysical composition; as is also customarily said of the supreme Genus. Next, even granted that it is defined through some Genus, it is not defined through the Genus concerning which we dispute, namely that which is contracted to the Species of which the Difference is a part. It will therefore be defined through other transcendental Genera, or Genera that do not belong to the Predicamental line, for example through "principle," as when rational is defined as "Principle of reasoning"; or even through the Genera "suchness," "formality," "difference as such"; and in the being of a logical Universal, through the reflexive Genus "Predicable." But we are now disputing only about Genera directly placed in the Category, in whose transverse line Differences are placed; for in relation to those other Genera, Difference is not a difference but a certain species.

18. Finally, note two things. 1º The Genus "substance," insofar as it signifies complete substance as placed in the Category, is not formally included in rationality. Hence rational formally is neither substance nor accident, but is a suchness of substance. For in the formal sense something intermediate between substance and accident can be given, although not in the real sense. If, however, the account of substance in some abstraction is a transcendental predicate, it will indeed be included in rationality, but then it will not be a Genus. 2º What we have said of Genus with respect to specific Difference, whether subalternate or lowest, must equally be understood of Species with respect to individual difference, for example of man with respect to Peterhood.

CHAPTER III.
On Property.

1. The fourth Porphyrian Predicable is "Property," or "proper Difference." Taken according to first intention, it is "That which necessarily and of itself follows upon an essence which it presupposes as constituted"; but taken according to second intention, or in the being of a Universal, it is "Predicable of several as of what sort, of itself and necessarily"; or, what amounts to the same thing, "Predicable of several of itself and necessarily, but outside the essence." By "outside the essence" it differs from Genus, Species, and Difference; by "of itself and necessarily" it differs from Accident, which will shortly be explained. Property is either physical or metaphysical, or logical. A physical Property is that which of itself and necessarily follows upon an essence from which it is really distinct. Thus light is a property of the Sun, and heat of fire. A metaphysical Property is that which, although really the same as the essence, is nevertheless formally distinguished from it and, from our mode of conceiving, is as though rooted in it; which kind of rooting we explained above in Chapter 1, n. 6. Thus risibility and admirativity are called properties of man.

2. Porphyry distinguished four kinds of properties, or four modes of Property. Property "in the first mode" is "that which belongs to the Species alone, but not to every individual of it," such as being a Physician, which belongs to man alone but not to every man. Property "in the second mode" is "that which belongs to every individual of the Species, but not to it alone," such as being bipedal, which belongs both to every man and also to birds. Property "in the third mode" is "that which belongs to every and only an individual of the Species, but not always," such as becoming gray-haired, which belongs to every man and only to man, but not at every time, only in old age. Property "in the fourth mode" is "that which belongs to every and only an individual of the Species, and always"; and thus being risible belongs to man. Perhaps, following Caramuel, one may wish to reject these examples that Porphyry adduces for the four modes of Property.

3. For first, being a Physician also belongs to Angels, and even to brute animals, which by natural instinct commonly apply remedies suitable to themselves. Next, being bipedal does not belong to every man; for if any credit is due to Pliny, not far from the Troglodytes there are men of astonishing swiftness called "Sciapods," furnished with one foot, and that so large that, lying on their backs, they protect themselves from the heat by its

shadow. Moreover, becoming gray-haired also belongs to ravens and dogs, and according to Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* V, c. 5, belongs especially to horses. Finally, being risible also belongs to horses, elephants, and dogs. Servera rejects the same examples at length, disp. 10, Log., c. 1, and especially attacks risibility. First he criticizes the very word as unsuitable; for "risible" signifies not so much "capable of laughing" as "worthy of laughter," just as "lovable" and "admirable" signify "worthy of love and admiration." Hence man would more suitably be called "laughing-capable," just as he is called "capable of admiration." He then proves at length that this property belongs to other animals besides man. Finally he also proves, especially in c. 3, n. 35, that not every man is necessarily risible, or capable of laughter.

4. These scruples can be met if it is said, to 1º, that medicine, insofar as it is an art acquired by study and labor, is proper to man alone and belongs neither to Angels nor brutes. To 2º, that Pliny's testimony can be rejected; or, even if admitted, that such men of themselves and by their own nature require two feet, although accidentally they are born with one foot, just as among us two-headed children are not rarely born. To 3º, that becoming gray-haired manifestly and completely belongs to man alone, although certain animals become gray imperfectly, as Aristotle warns in the same work, cc. 3 and 5. To 4º, that dogs, and let the same be granted of other brutes, indeed fawn, exult, and display certain signs of joy, but do not properly laugh; just as they do not properly reason, although by natural sagacity they seem to imitate reasoning. Laughter, therefore, if it is truly such and not merely apparent, of itself presupposes some admiration and consequently an act of reason; concerning which in the treatise on the soul. Nor will it easily be proved that men can be given who by their own nature are incapable of laughter and yet are of the same Species as those whom we actually know. The active signification of the word "risible" can be sustained by the custom of the Schools, to which the power over words that belongs even to common usage will not rightly be denied.

5. Yet other examples can easily be assigned for each of the four modes of Property, remaining within the human Species. For example, for the first, being baptized or being a Priest; for the second, being capable of taking food, or being capable of locomotion, or of sensible appetite; for the third, being divided into body and a persisting soul, as occurs at the time of death; for the fourth, being capable of admiration. Here it should be noted that several other combinations of Property can be made besides the four enumerated by Porphyry, concerning which Servera should be consulted, disp. 10, n. 2.

6. Now it is asked, 1º, to which of those four modes Property belongs as the fourth Predicable. It is commonly said that only Property in the fourth

mode belongs here, because the others either contingently befall the subject or are common to other things; whereas "proper" is opposed to "common." Hence Aristotle says, *Topica* I, c. 4: "No one will call that proper to a thing which can belong to others." Yet it must be said that Property in the second mode also belongs to this Predicable; because there are many accidents that are predicated of themselves and necessarily follow upon the essence, yet are Properties in the second mode, since they do not belong to the Species alone. But these cannot belong to the fifth Predicable; therefore they belong to the fourth.

7. Thus those three properties that we assigned to the second mode in n. 5 accompany the essence of man of themselves and are not predicated contingently; and yet they also belong to brutes, because they are founded in the generic predicate animal. Indeed, there are some properties founded in the supreme Genus of substance, for example being receptive of accidents, or being perfectible by an accident, which is a property accompanying of itself and necessarily every complete created substance. Nor does the strict meaning of the name "property" obstruct this; for, as the Conimbricenses note, it is not now taken according to strict grammatical usage, as Aristotle took it in the passage objected to us, but only insofar as it signifies an accident arising of itself from the essence of the subject.

8. Question 2º: whether predications concerning Property are of necessary truth. I answer 1º: predications concerning metaphysical Property are of eternal truth, because risibility, for example, or admirativity, is essentially inseparable from man, as being really identified with him. Nor should you be moved by Servera's subtlety, loc. cit. from n. 27, where against the opinion of everyone he denies that there is any metaphysical Property. For, he says, nothing is a Property, at least "in the fourth mode," unless it necessarily follows upon the essence and necessarily emanates from it; but this belongs to no predicate really identified with the essence. Proof: succession and emanation among really identified predicates necessarily involve or presuppose a distinction of reason; but a distinction of reason is contingent and contingently supervenes upon the object; therefore succession and emanation must likewise be contingent and in no way necessary.

9. Do not, I say, be moved by this argument; for it equally proves that Difference is not necessarily contractive of Genus, nor necessarily constitutive or distinctive of Species; nor likewise that the metaphysical essence of man is necessarily constituted from animal and rational; for all these presuppose or involve a distinction of reason. It also proves that no Property is "Predicable of itself and necessarily," since it is not constituted

as predicable except through a contingent act of reason. Finally, it proves that not even a physical Property necessarily emanates from the essence; for the emanation of heat from fire, for example, necessarily presupposes the physical existence of fire, but that existence is contingent; therefore the emanation too will be contingent.

10. Say, therefore, that for the succession of a metaphysical Property to be called necessary, it is enough that the distinction of reason be fundamentally necessary, insofar as its foundation is indefectible, although it does not necessarily found it in second act. Or, better, it can be said that the emanation is necessary not independently of every supposition, but given the metaphysical existence of such an essence, which existence is constituted through a distinction of reason; just as physical emanation is not necessary except given the physical existence of the essence, as may be seen in the recent example of heat. Yet the predication of metaphysical Property is of eternal truth, because its truth rests upon real identity; just as for the same reason the predication of Genus concerning Species is of eternal truth, although the actual denomination of Genus is contingent.

11. I answer 2º: predications concerning physical Property are of naturally necessary truth, or altogether absolute, so that they can fail only by the absolute power of God; for example, "The Sun is luminous in the highest degree"; or at least with this addition, "unless the violence of contraries obstructs," in which way this predication is necessary: "Water is cold in the highest degree." For extreme cold is so connatural a property of water that it can nevertheless be removed by the violence of contrary agents, and commonly is removed without a miracle. Therefore the adverb "necessarily," placed in the definition of Property, must be understood with the addition "unless something obstructs," or "according to the exigency of the thing left to itself," or "when free from contraries." In this sense every predication concerning a physical Property has a truth that can fail only by divine power.

12. Question 3º: of what things is Property predicated as Universal? I answer: it is not predicated as Universal of the Species or Genus of which it is a property, but only of inferior individuals or Species, and this for the reason we gave in the similar case concerning Difference, c. 2, n. 1. It should be noted, however, that Property is predicated as Species of its own individuals formed from the common name of the Property and a demonstrative sign, as when it is said: "This thing capable of admiration is capable of admiration." We shall return to this point again concerning Accident.

13. Question 4º: whether Property is given on the part of the thing. I answer: metaphysical Property indeed exists on the part of the thing

according to the underlying reality, but it does not have the account of a property on the part of the thing, since it is not really distinguished from the essence. Physical Property, however, for the opposite reason, performs the function of a property on the part of the thing, but does not have universal or predicable being except fundamentally.

CHAPTER IV.
On Accident.

1. Accident in the present discussion is not taken insofar as it is opposed to Substance, in which sense it is called a "categorical Accident." Rather, it is taken for that which contingently comes to something, whether it is entitatively a substance, as clothing and weapons when a man is called "clothed" and "armed"; or is entitatively an accident, as whiteness when a man is called "white." In this way it is called a "predicable Accident"; and insofar as it is contradistinguished from Property, it is called "common Accident." Taken according to first intention, Porphyry defines it thus: "That which can be present and absent without the corruption of the subject"; that is, that which so contingently comes to a subject that it can either exist in it or be separated from it without the subject being destroyed by this variation.

2. But several objections are raised against this definition. 1º Blackness is an accident of the raven and Ethiopian, as whiteness is of the swan and snow, although it cannot be separated without harm to the subject. 2º These are predications of Accident: "Man is existent, is mortally wounded," or "is beheaded"; and yet these accidents are not present and absent without the corruption of the subject. 3º By such a definition Accident does not differ from Property; for extreme cold, which is a property of water, can be present or absent without water being corrupted. The common answer is this. Porphyry does not deny really inseparable accidents, since he himself divides Accident into separable and inseparable. Therefore he intends only that Accident can mentally be present or absent through positive negation, even when connatural agreement is denied, without the subject thereby being destroyed in the mind.

3. Hence to 1º: the blackness of the raven or Ethiopian, for the whiteness of swan and snow is not held to be an Accident but a Property "in the second mode," and therefore belongs to the fourth Predicable according to what was said in the preceding Chapter, can mentally be separated by positive negation while the subject remains intact in the mind; for nothing is taken away from the essence of an Ethiopian even if one says, "An Ethiopian is not black by the exigency of his own nature." To 2º: those accidents physically

corrupt the subject, but not mentally; for one can conceive the whole essence of man whether one asserts him to be dead or existent. To 3º: if extreme cold is denied of water according to connatural agreement, thus: "Water by its own nature is not cold in the highest degree," the true essence of water will not remain in the mind, but will at least be destroyed inferentially, since from it is removed not only coldness but also its connatural exigency, which it identifies with itself and retains even while deprived of cold through the violence of a contrary agent or through a miracle.

4. Yet this doctrine faces the difficulty that, although it somehow satisfies the other objections, it does not satisfy the third. For extreme cold, insofar as it is a physical property of water, is really and adequately distinguished from water, and consequently should not be taken together with the connatural exigency, which is really identified with water and at most is a metaphysical property of it. But extreme cold, insofar as it is really distinguished from water and considered apart from the connatural exigency, can absolutely and positively be denied of water without water being destroyed in the mind. Therefore insofar as it is a physical property it is comprehended by the definition of Accident. Whatever Porphyry's intention may have been, Accident is perhaps better and more clearly defined in this way: "That which comes to a subject without being permanently required by its essence"; which definition does not prevent Accident from being inseparable for some other reason.

5. Now Accident taken according to second intention in the being of a logical Universal is commonly defined as "Predicable of several as of what sort contingently." Here "contingently" must be understood with regard to the natural exigency of the subject, unviolated by the action of a contrary agent, so that the definition yields this sense: "Predicable of several outside the essence and natural exigency, at least an exigency requiring it permanently." Thus these are predications of Accident constituting the fifth Predicable: "Man is white, is armed, is sleeping, is laughing." Here it should be noted that metaphysical Accidents are also given, namely those that in metaphysical consideration contingently come to a subject, or are outside its essence and exigency. Thus rational is predicated of animal, and every other specific Difference is predicated of Genus as a metaphysical accident; because animal considered abstractly is indifferent to being or not being rational. Hence the distinction between metaphysical Property and metaphysical Accident is clear: the latter is not rooted in, nor required by, the nature to which it happens; the former is necessarily rooted in the nature of which it is the property, for example risibility in rationality.

6. Concerning Accident thus explained, it should be known, 1º, that insofar as it is the fifth Predicable, it is not predicated in the abstract or directly, but in a concrete term that expresses the subject directly and the accidental form obliquely. For it is not truly said, "Peter is whiteness," or "is whiteness and its subject," but "is white," which is explained thus: "is a subject having whiteness," or "affected by whiteness." One may object: how can Accident truly be said of Peter, with whom it is not identified? I answer: only that which is said directly must be identified with the subject of which it is said, not what is said only obliquely. Thus it is truly said, "A creature is an effect of God," although the oblique element of the predicate is not identified with the subject.

7. One may further object: therefore in this predication, "Peter is white," only the identity of the subject with the direct element of the predicate is affirmed; therefore the predication will not be contingent but necessarily true, for that identity is indefectible. I answer: that identity is not affirmed nakedly and alone; rather, the actual union of the accident with the direct element of the predicate is simultaneously affirmed or supposed, so that saying "Peter is white" is equivalent to saying "he is a subject having whiteness united to himself," or "to which whiteness is united." And since this union is contingent, it renders the truth of the proposition absolutely contingent.

8. It should be known, 2º, that Accident compared with inferiors of which it can be predicated in the abstract is not the fifth Predicable, but is Genus, Species, or Difference according to the grade and mode of abstraction. Hence color as such is predicated of whiteness and blackness as Genus, and whiteness as such of this and that whiteness as Species. It should be known, 3º, that Accident in the concrete is not predicated contingently, or in the manner of the fifth Predicable, except of a subject expressed simply. For of inferiors expressed by the name of the concrete itself, or of something contained under it, it is predicated essentially. Hence this is a predication of Genus: "White is colored"; and this of Species: "This white thing is white." Indeed this predication also, "A white man is white," and similar ones expressing on the part of the subject the whole being of the accidental concrete, are not contingent but necessary, as was said in the *Summulae*; and they can be called predications of Species, because "white" is predicated as the whole essence of the subject in the being of the concrete. For "white man" and "white wall" differ only numerically in the being of the accidental concrete; the intrinsic diversity of the subjects stands materially in relation to the constitution of that concrete.

9. It should be known, 4º, that for a true and absolute predication of a physical and intrinsic accident, when it is predicated in the manner of the fifth Predicable, the existence of the subject on the part of the thing is necessarily required. The reason is that the actual union of Accident with the subject is simultaneously asserted, as is evident from n. 7. But the actual union of a physical and intrinsic Accident with a non-existent subject is repugnant. Hence, against Fr. Lynceus, you will infer that this predication, "Peter is possibly white," is not of the fifth Predicable but of the fourth, namely a metaphysical Property "in the second mode." For it yields this sense: "Peter is capable of receiving whiteness"; and consequently it predicates only a receptive potency for whiteness, which is a metaphysical property of corporeal substance, at least in most Species. I said "for an absolute predication," because a conditional one, for example "If Peter exists, he will be white," can be true and contingent even if the subject does not actually exist; for it does not assert a union with whiteness that now exists, but one that would exist under the hypothesis in which the subject existed.

10. It should be known, 5º, that the real existence of the subject is not always required for a true predication of an extrinsic Accident, especially an intentional one. The reason is that, since an intentional Accident is not intrinsically united to the subject nor sustained in it, it does not need the subject's existence in order extrinsically to denominate it. Thus it is truly said, "Antichrist is known," and "Health, which does not exist, is desired." Indeed, not even the possibility of the subject is required; for it is truly said, "A Chimera is known." Some intentional accidents, however, from their peculiar nature require the existence of the object they denominate, for example material vision, or an act of Faith concerning the existence of some object.

CHAPTER V.

On the Number and Agreement of the Predicables.

1. Certain matters common to the five Predicables remain, which we shall discuss in this and the following Chapter. It is asked, 1º, whether there are other Predicables besides the five already explained. The common answer is negative. For what is predicated as a Universal is either of the essence of the subject or outside the essence. If the first, it will be predicated either as a material part, as a formal part, or as the whole essence, and consequently will be either Genus, Difference, or Species. If the second, it will be predicated either necessarily, or according to the exigency of the

subject, and will be Property; or contingently, or outside the exigency of the subject, and will be Accident.

2. Caramuel assigns forty-six Predicables and adds that perhaps more could be found if one searched carefully. Fr. Lynceus approves the number five, but adds that a greater or lesser number could not incongruously have been established. Servera learnedly recounts several other opinions of authors concerning the number of Predicables, disp. 11, c. 1. To me the matter is not of great importance; nor do I think Porphyry's doctrine must be fought for as though for hearth and altar. I think the number five was appropriately established. Yet it is highly probable that it can be increased, as may be seen in the cited authors. If you wish to defend the common opinion, keep before your eyes that in this treatise we are dealing only with Predicables that are universal, simple, univocal, non-transcendental terms, abstracted from things outside God, and insofar as they are truly affirmable of inferiors. Under these conditions a Predicable will not easily be assigned that cannot be reduced to one of the five commonly accepted, at least through a certain proportion.

3. One may still object: since there are ten Categories, and all are predicable, how are there not ten Predicables? I answer: the number of Predicables is taken not from a mode of being, as is the number of Categories, but only from a mode of predicating, "as what a thing is," "as of what sort," etc. And since this mode is the same in several Categories, it follows that, although all are predicable, each does not constitute a logically diverse Predicable, but several belong to one of the five Species of Predicables.

4. One may further object: if the account "hot" is abstracted from fire and heated water, or the account "luminous" from the Sun and air, a Predicable diverse from the five commonly accepted will result; for it will be predicated outside the essence without being predicated either contingently or necessarily, either according to or outside the exigency, and consequently neither as Property nor Accident, but as prescinding from both. I answer: that account is simultaneously Property and Accident with respect to diverse things. For it is predicated necessarily of this and that fire, or of this and that Sun; it must not be admitted that that account can be abstracted from one fire or Sun without equally being abstracted from the other possible individuals of the same Species, that is, without all being reached on the part of the object (Tract. 2, disp. 2, final c., n. 10); and the same must be judged concerning water and air. But it is predicated contingently of this and that water, or this and that air. Therefore, just as animal as such is Genus in relation to man and horse, and Species in relation to its incomplete

individuals, namely "this animal" and "that animal," so the matter stands here.

5. Question 2º: whether the division of the logical Universal into the five Predicables is immediate. I answer: it is not; because Predicable as such could have been divided more immediately into Predicable essentially and Predicable outside the essence; and then the first member could have been subdivided into Genus, Species, and Difference, and the second into Property and Accident. Question 3º: whether it is a division into ultimate Species of Predicable. I answer: it is not, at least with respect to all the members. For, omitting the subdivision of Genus into supreme, subalternate, and lowest, and likewise of Species and Difference into subalternate and atomic, Property can certainly be subdivided into reciprocal and non-reciprocal, or into Property "in the fourth and second modes," since both belong to the fourth Predicable, as we saw in the preceding Chapter; or also into metaphysical and physical Property, and the latter into naturally altogether indefectible, such as light in the Sun and heat in fire, and naturally defectible, such as cold in water.

6. Accident can likewise be subdivided into naturally separable and inseparable, as Porphyry himself divided it; or also into intrinsic and extrinsic; and in other ways besides. Nor say that these import a purely physical diversity, but not a logical diversity, or a diversity in the mode of predicating. For why, I ask, does being predicated "necessarily and contingently" import a logical diversity if being predicated "with metaphysical necessity and with physical necessity" does not? Or "with a necessity naturally capable of frustration and with one incapable of frustration"? Or "intrinsically and extrinsically"? You will be a man of great ingenuity if you provide a suitable distinction.

7. Question 4º: whether the common division is into necessarily distinct members, so that one and the same Predicable cannot identify in itself two or more members. I answer: it is into necessarily distinct members terminatively, or connotatively, but not subjectively. The answer is clear from what was said above. For first, all Predicables are Species in relation to their incomplete individuals, or those expressed by the common name contracted through haecceity, as we noted in their respective places. Next, the same common account can be Property and Accident, as is clear from n. 4. I omit other combinations. I understand these without any necessity, on the part of the Universal, of multiplying forms or intentions. Yet a diversity of terms connoted by each denomination is always necessary. For the same common account cannot, for example, be Genus and Species with respect to the same inferiors, but only with respect to diverse ones, as has also been

observed in the respective places. Nor is the division therefore defective, just as the division of an act of the Will into love and hatred is not defective, although both members can be identified in the same act with respect to diverse objects. It is therefore enough that the members can at least be distinguished by reason through extrinsic connotates.

8. Question 5º: whether the five Predicables univocally agree in the account of Predicable. Or, in other words, whether a common and univocal account of Predicable can be abstracted which is a Genus to the five Predicables. The common opinion throughout all the Schools affirms this against certain older authors, with whom one or another modern agrees. It is briefly proved. The five Predicables properly agree in the account of Universal, or of Predicable of many. Therefore a univocal account of Predicable can be abstracted from them all; and if it is such, nothing prevents it from being a Genus to them all. The antecedent, which alone is doubtful, is proved: they would fail properly to agree only because some are predicated essentially, others outside the essence, some completely, others incompletely, etc. But this does not obstruct their agreement. Therefore, etc.

9. Proof of the minor: that man is rational animal and horse a neighing animal does not remove their proper agreement in the account of animal; therefore likewise in our case. Proof of the consequence: just as that diversity of man and horse belongs to the specific differences, because it does not prevent it from being properly said of each, "It is a principle of sensation," so that distinction among the Predicables must be referred to their peculiar differences, since it is nevertheless most truly said of each, "It is predicable of many." But the common concept "Universal," or "Predicable," altogether prescinds from these differences, no less than the concept "animal" prescinds from the differences of man and horse. Therefore, etc.

10. Objection 1º: the five Predicables do not properly agree in the account of Predicable; for the fourth and fifth are predicated only accidentally and therefore not properly. I answer: to be predicated accidentally is to be predicated truly and properly. For who could doubt that these predications are properly verified: "Water is hot; Peter is sleeping, is sick, is predestined, is just"? Here note that the particles "outside the essence" and "contingently," which are placed in the definitions of the fourth and fifth Predicables, denote the mode by which the Predicables belong to their subjects; they must not be referred to the mode by which predicability belongs to Property and Accident taken according to second intention. For to both it belongs essentially "to be able to be predicated outside the essence," and to Accident it belongs necessarily and essentially

"to be able to be predicated contingently." This is no different from the physical sense in which it is essential to accidents "not to be of the essence of substance," and it belongs of itself and necessarily to heat "not to come to water except accidentally."

11. Objection 2º, the famous argument that opens the way to a thousand subtleties and captious difficulties. If Predicable as such is a Genus to the five Predicables, it will be an account superior to Genus as such, and consequently to all Genera, insofar as these are inferior to Genus as such. From this it follows, 1º, that "Predicable" as such under this same expression or intention is simultaneously superior and inferior to Genus as such: superior, because it is predicated of Genus as such as Genus; inferior, because it is itself some particular Genus and consequently is contained under Genus as such. Hence it also follows that some Genus is inferior to its Species, for Predicable is compared to Genus as such as to its Species. It also follows that some Species is inferior to one of its own individuals; for Predicable as such, since it is some particular Genus, is one individual of Genus as such, as of a logical Species. It follows, 2º, that Predicable as such is superior and inferior to itself, since it is superior to every Genus and at the same time is one of the Genera. It follows, 3º, that all five Predicables are Genus; for just as everything contained under the account of man is animal, because man is contained under animal, so everything contained under the account of Predicable is Genus if Predicable is contained under Genus.

12. For the solution I premise several notes. Note 1º: for one thing to be logically superior to another is for it to be capable of being verified of that other and, moreover, of others; as is clear in animal as such, which is therefore said to be superior to man. Note 2º: Predicable as such can be considered in two ways. In one way according to first intention, that is, according to that being which is reached and expressed through this cognition, "Predicable," which in relation to it is as though a first formal intention; just as animal as such is taken according to first intention when considered according to that being expressed by the concept "animal," namely according to the predicates living and sensible.

13. In another way, according to second intention, that is, according to that being which it receives through an extrinsic denomination from that same cognition "Predicable," and which is expressed only through a new reflexive cognition that is as though a second formal intention; just as animal as such is taken according to second intention when it is considered according to the denomination of Genus that it receives from the cognition "animal," and which is expressed only through this reflexive cognition, "Genus." Other common terms give the same meaning, namely signatively

and exercitively, in personal supposition and in simple supposition; for an explanation related to this see the preceding disputation, c. 7, nn. 4 and 5.

14. Note 3º: through direct cognitions, "man," "animal," etc., the Intellect constitutes direct Universals, which, taken according to second intention, are indivisible into several things and therefore are logical individuals. For example, animal as such can indeed be divided into several animals, but not into several Genera; and therefore in the being of the proximate Genus to man and brute it is something individual and singular. The same can be seen in other Genera, Species, Differences, etc. Next, from these there is reflexively abstracted the account of Genus as such, Species as such, Difference as such, etc., which are reflexive Species predicable of this and that direct Genus, of this and that direct Species, etc., as of individuals. Finally, from these reflexive Species, through a new reflection, there is abstracted the common account "Universal," or "Predicable," as such. This account is Genus with respect to the five Predicables, so that Genus as such, Difference as such, etc., correspond to it as Species, and the direct Universals, namely "animal" as such, "tree" as such, "man" as such, etc., correspond to it as individuals.

15. With these premises, I answer the objection. Predicable as such, taken signatively or according to first intention, is an account superior to Genus as such, because that being expressed by the cognition "Predicable" can be verified of Genus as such and, moreover, of others, namely Species as such, Difference as such, etc.; in this consists logical superiority, from n. 12. But taken exercitively or according to second intention, it is not a superior account, because the extrinsic denomination "Genus to the five Predicables," which it receives from this cognition "Predicable," is not verifiable of Genus as such or of the others, but only of Predicable as such itself, as of an individual of the Genus. In the same way, animal as such, taken signatively, is an account superior to man; but taken exercitively or according to second intention, it is not a superior account, since it is not verifiable of man or of others besides animal as such itself in the being of such a concrete. For one would falsely say, "Man is a Genus to man and brute."

16. Hence, to consequence 1º, I grant that Predicable as such, under this same intention, is superior and inferior to Genus as such in diverse senses. For it is superior according to signified being and first-intentional being, and inferior according to being acquired exercitively and according to second intention, because according to this Genus as such is verified of it as a specific account of its individual. Nor is this incongruous, because those two beings, first-intentional and second-intentional, are really distinguished,

since the latter reduplicates an intention of reason and the former does not. I similarly grant that some Genus is inferior to its Species in the sense in which it is not superior; and understand the same concerning some Species in relation to its individual.

17. To consequence 2º, I likewise grant what is intended according to diverse acceptions. For this amounts to nothing other than saying that Predicable as such, taken signatively, can be verified of itself taken exercitively and, moreover, of others; whereas taken exercitively it can be verified only of itself. The third consequence must be denied if the five Predicables are taken according to first intention; nor does the appended proof obstruct this. For it is false that Predicable, in the sense in which it contains the five Predicables under itself, is contained under Genus as such; rather, it contains Genus under itself. It is contained under Genus as such only insofar as it is taken according to second intention, or in simple supposition; but taken in that way it does not contain the five Predicables under itself, since it cannot be verified of them, from n. 15. If, however, the five Predicables, insofar as they are reflexively abstracted from direct Universals, are taken according to second intention, they are all Species, from n. 14.

18. It is replied: Predicable as such is taken according to second intention when it is taken in the being of Genus, or insofar as it is Genus; but in the being of Genus it contains the five Predicables under itself, since it belongs to the account of Genus as such to contain Species under itself. Therefore Predicable taken according to second intention, in which sense it is contained under Genus as such, contains the five Predicables under itself. I answer: when it is said to belong to the account of Genus as such to contain several Species under itself of which it can be predicated, the discussion does not concern the account of Genus as regards second-intentional being, namely as regards the denomination of Genus; for this denomination cannot be predicated of Species.

19. It concerns, therefore, the account of Genus as regards first-intentional being, which we explained in n. 12; not in such a way that this being contains Species under itself apart from the extrinsic denomination "Genus," or independently of it, but in such a way that through that denomination it is constituted as something superior to Species, not according to that denomination but according to its intrinsic predicates. Thus it is said to belong to the account of a seen object to terminate ocular vision, not according to the denomination "seen," which certainly is not seen, but according to the being of color. Yet this is not so understood as though the object actually terminated vision independently of the vision

itself, or of the denomination "seen," since through that denomination it is constituted as actually terminating; but rather that through it the object becomes terminating, not according to that denomination, but according to the color intrinsic to it. One could reply in infinitely many other ways, but in a thorny and rather useless matter we should not linger excessively.

20. Fr. John Ulloa (Disp. 2, *Logica Major*, from n. 151) solves this entangled objection differently, if not more truly, at least more expeditiously. He denies that Predicable as such is inferior to Genus as such or contained under it. For predicate A is contained under B and is logically inferior to it when B can be verified of A and moreover extends to other things to which A does not extend. This does not occur here. For Genus as such is indeed verified of Universal, or Predicable, as such; but it does not extend to anything to which Predicable does not extend, as will be clear to one who examines the matter. Indeed, Predicable as such both belongs to Genus and extends to more things that are not Genus, namely to the other four Predicables; consequently it is purely superior to Genus as such.

21. From this the whole hinge of the objection collapses. It is granted that every particular Genus must be contained under Genus as such, provided that exception is made for that most universal Genus which comprehends all Universals. It is denied that any Genus is inferior to its Species; that it is superior or inferior to itself; or that all Predicables are Genus. For all these are deduced from the false inferiority of Predicable with respect to Genus. It is nevertheless granted that some Species is inferior to one of its individuals only when there is in it a manifest reason for exception from the common law that makes Species superior to every individual. This perhaps occurs nowhere except in the present case, because of the nature of the many reflections discussed in n. 16.

22. Objection 3º, several inconveniences. 1º That Universal as such will prescind even from itself, since it is a certain Universal, or a certain Genus. 2º That some Genus formally transcends differences; for Universal as such transcends the differences of the five Predicables. 3º That Substance as such will not be the supreme Genus, since it is contained under Predicable as such as under a superior Genus. But these do not press. To 1º: that this cognition "universal" prescinds from itself insofar as it indefinitely reaches all Universals with their forms, and consequently also that Universal which it itself exercitively constitutes, without signatively distinguishing itself from the others, is no inconvenience. For in this way "second intention as such" prescinds from itself; and so does this indefinite apprehension "cognition," since it prescinds the common account of cognition from every particular

cognition. Nor will any contradiction in the matter be proved if those terms "signatively" and "exercitively" are used properly.

23. To 2º: Universal as such indeed transcends the direct Differences belonging to the third Predicable, namely "rational" as such, "capable of roaring" as such, etc., as regards second-intentional being; but it does not transcend the reflexive differences of the five Predicables which correspond to it as Genus, namely "as what it is," "as what sort of thing it is," etc. For these are not formally predicable, but are suchnesses contracting the common account of Predicable. Understand that they are not formally predicable of themselves and intrinsically, which satisfies the objection. If, however, they are signified by an accommodated name, they can extrinsically be rendered predicable through a new reflection; but this proves only that the reflections of the human Intellect can proceed without end. To 3º: Substance as such is only the supreme Genus in the direct and predicamental order, in which it is subject to no Genus; but in the reflexive and second-intentional order, it is not the supreme Genus but can be subject to a superior Genus.

CHAPTER VI.
On Various Modes of Predication.

1. Predication signifies the same as proposition or enunciation; and if it is affirmative, it is never true without the real identity of subject and predicate. We gave various modes of predication in the *Summulae*. Now, as the crown of the Treatise, two things must be explained. First, when a predication is formal. Second, how predications concerning abstracts and concretes are true. Concerning the first, take two rules. Let the first be: "A predication is formal whenever it is not identical," that is, whenever it is not resolved into synonymous terms signifying in the same way, as this one is resolved: "Man is man"; or this one: "A sword is a sword," which are therefore identical predications. Hence you will infer that all five Predicables are predicated of their inferiors by formal predication.

2. Let the second rule be: "A formal predication is not always true in the formal sense, but only when the predicate is formally identified with the subject," that is, when it not only has real identity with the subject but also belongs to its definition, according to what was said elsewhere concerning formal identity (Tract. 2, disp. 5, c. 6, n. 20). But when only real identity intervenes, the predication is then said to be verified "in the purely real sense," or "in the materially identical sense." Hence you will gather that predications of Genus, Species, and Difference concerning their inferiors are

true in the formal sense; but not predications of Property and Accident insofar as they constitute the fourth and fifth Predicables. You will likewise gather that this predication, "The justice of God is mercy," and others in which the predicate is not of the definitive concept of the subject although really identified with it, are true only in the real or materially identical sense. The same must be said of indirect predications in which an inferior is predicated of a superior.

3. Concerning the second point, given the doctrine on concretes and abstracts that we gave in the *Summulae*, I say 1º: all concretes, both accidental and substantial, conceived indefinitely, are truly predicated essentially and in the formal sense of inferior concretes to which they are compared as to Species or individuals; for example, "Peter is man," "White is colored." This is evident from what was said above, especially c. 4, n. 8. Conversely, inferior concretes are predicated of superiors only accidentally, indirectly, and materially. I say 2º: likewise all abstracts conceived indefinitely are truly predicated of inferior abstracts, for example "Humanity is animality," "Whiteness is color"; for they equally belong to the formal concept of the inferiors.

4. I say 3º: generic concretes and abstracts are verified of differential concretes and abstracts only in the materially identical sense, for example "Rational is animal," "Rationality is animality." Therefore predications of this kind are false in the formal sense, because Genus is not formally included in Difference. The same is to be held of specific abstract with respect to individual abstract, for example "Peterhood is humanity"; and all the more when, with the order reversed, indirect predications are made.

5. I say 4º: metaphysical substantial abstracts are truly predicated in the real sense of metaphysical substantial concretes, and conversely; but otherwise must be said of physical abstracts and concretes. Metaphysical concretes are those that coalesce from parts distinct only by reason or by mode of signifying; physical concretes are those consisting of really distinct parts. Therefore, if man is taken as a concrete from specific nature and individual difference, he is a metaphysical concrete, and then it is truly said in the real sense: "This man is humanity," or "is animality," or even "is rationality"; and conversely. For although the abstract is conceived in the manner of a part of the concrete, nevertheless, since there is an adequate real identity between them, there is no reason why the predication should cease to be true in the real sense. But if man is taken as a concrete from nature and subsistence, in which sense he is called a *suppositum*, or "person," he is a physical concrete; and then it is not truly said absolutely, even in the real sense, "This man is humanity," or "is rationality," nor conversely. For a

part, in the sense in which it is a part, is not truly predicated absolutely of the whole, nor conversely; and therefore it is falsely said absolutely, "Man is soul," or "Soul is man."

6. I say 5º: physical accidental abstracts are not truly predicated of their concretes taken absolutely. For one would falsely say, "White is whiteness," because true predication requires identity with the subject according to what is expressed directly (cf. above, c. 4, nn. 6-7); but "white" taken absolutely directly imports the denominated thing, with which whiteness is not identified. But what if the concrete is reduplicated, thus: "White insofar as white is whiteness"? I answer: if the reduplication takes both parts directly, the proposition is false, because the predicate stands to the direct element of the subject as a part to a whole. But if the reduplication places only the form directly, that predication will be true.

7. I say 6º: accidental concretes are truly predicated of substances in which an accidental form really *inesse*, although the form is not expressed on the part of the subject; yet the predication is accidental. It will at the same time be necessary if it belongs to the fourth Predicable, as "Fire is hot"; but contingent if it belongs to the fifth, as "Air is luminous." This entire doctrine is clear from what was said above in cc. 3 and 4. Moreover, neither accidental abstracts of substantial abstracts, nor substantial abstracts of accidental abstracts, are truly predicated, as anyone can see.

8. Finally I say: accidental concretes that present diverse, indeed unconnected, forms can truly be predicated of one another, provided they are not taken reduplicatively and both forms really *inesse* in the same subject. Hence it is truly said, "White is sweet; Sweet is white," because there is an adequate identity between the direct element of the subject and the direct element of the predicate, together with the actual union of the forms imported obliquely. What has been said of physical accidental abstracts and concretes should be understood also of intentional, or logical, ones, such as "Universal, Genus, Species, Universality, genus-hood, species-hood." I deliberately omit other rules and precepts, which are more conveniently discussed in Scholastic exercise. I have also thought it appropriate to omit for the present certain predications concerning Divine things and the mystery of the Incarnation, because they contain difficulties belonging to Theology.

TREATISE IV.
ON THE PREDICAMENTS IN SUMMARY.

Predicament in Latin, category in Greek, is an order or series of predicates which is led down step by step from some supreme genus as far as the individual. Aristotle, prince of philosophers, both in order to confine the wandering vision of the mind within definite limits and to supply matter for logical artifices, distributed all, or at least most, predicates that can be enunciated of any thing into ten classes, which he called "categories," or "predicaments," and distinguished by these names: "Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Where, Position, When, and Having." St. Isidore gives an example of all these (Lib. 2, *Etymologiae* cap. 26) in this sentence: "Augustine, a great orator, the son of that man, standing in the church today wearing a mitre, is wearied by disputing." Here the word "Augustine" designates Substance; "great," Quantity; "orator," Quality; "the son of that man," Relation; "standing," Position; "in the church," Where; "today," When; "wearing a mitre," Having; "by disputing," Action; "is wearied," Passion.

The first Predicament artfully arranges the grades of Substance. The remaining nine are accidents, at least in the logical sense. In each a descent can be made through genera and species, as through so many grades, down to individuals. These grades are customarily coordinated by two lines, one straight or direct, the other indirect or lateral. On the straight line, which is called the stock or trunk of the predicamental tree, genera and species are placed; the lateral line displays the differences that divide the genus and

constitute the species. Another collateral line is also added on the opposite side, to show the differences that divide the same genera from the other direction but are incompatible with the species placed on that trunk. All these things are set before the eye by the diagram or shadowy tree which, according to custom, we append below, and in which, by way of example, the Predicament of Substance is arranged.



SINGLE DISPUTATION.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PREDICAMENTS IS EXPLAINED INSOFAR AS IT PERTAINS TO LOGIC. WITH A FULLER TREATMENT OF RELATION.

Aristotle published the treatise on the Categories as though divided into three parts. First he premised certain matters concerning univocals, equivocals, analogicals, and denominatives, which are called Antepredicaments. Then he explained the ten Predicaments. Finally he added certain other matters which are commonly called Postpredicaments. Following this order, we shall now embrace the entire treatise in a single Disputation; nor shall we treat anything except what a logician ought to know, both that he may better understand logical doctrine and that he may not approach the other sciences as a complete stranger. We leave the rest to Physics and Metaphysics, in which the several Predicaments have their proper place.

CHAPTER I.

The Antepredicaments Are Explained.

1. Univocals, equivocals, analogicals, and denominatives are called, as I have already warned, Antepredicaments, because they shed light before those approaching the Categories. From the doctrine of the Philosopher, univocals are thus defined: "Those whose name is common and whose notion signified by the name is the same"; equivocals: "Those whose name is common, but whose notion signified by the name is different"; analogicals:

"Those whose name is common, but whose notion signified by the name is partly the same and partly different." In these definitions community of name is the genus; the rest take the place of differences. Here this must be noted: the common name is usually called "the univocating univocal," or also "the univocal in signifying"; the objective notion signified by the name, insofar as it is abstracted from the inferiors, is called "univocal in being," or "in agreement"; whereas the inferiors participating in such a notion are called "univocated univocals." The definition of univocals just given is verified of these as it stands; from it, however, the definition of the univocal, both "in signifying" and "in agreement," can easily be gathered. The same doctrine applies to equivocals and analogicals, due proportion being observed.

2. Univocation, therefore, requires that the name be common, that is, indefinite and distributively applicable to many, such as is required to constitute a universal. Hence the terms "men," "every man," "this man," and the like are not univocal. Here "name" is taken, not strictly for a spoken word alone, but broadly for an "expression," mental, spoken, or written; nor do I think it objectionable if someone substitutes "sign" for "name" in the foregoing definitions. It likewise requires that the notion signified by the name be the same, not indeed by real identity, for otherwise the name "God," common to the three Persons, would be univocal, whereas logicians recognize no univocal terms unless they are at the same time universal, but by identity or unity of notion, by reason of which all the inferiors, insofar as such a name belongs to them, can be defined by one definition properly applicable to each. "Notion" is the same as "definition," as we have often noted from Aristotle; therefore, where the "definition" is the same, the "notion" is the same. Hence St. Augustine says, *De principiis dialecticae* cap. 9: "Those things which one definition can contain are called univocal." For these reasons the name "man" is univocal to all men, and the name "animal" to men and beasts.

3. It may be stated otherwise that a name is univocal when it signifies several things in such a way that it belongs distributively to them all under the same title, and consequently, if one went through them all and asked why such a name is applied to each, one and the same uniform answer would suffice. Thus, because the name "animal" so signifies the various species of animals that, if someone asks individually why man, why lion, why eagle, and likewise the rest, is called "animal," he is fully satisfied by this one answer, "Because it can sense," it is therefore univocal. Hence the real diversity of the inferiors does not impede univocation, such as is seen between man and horse, when it does not impede perfect abstraction and formal unity, by

reason of which several things physically diverse are uniformly defined under a common name.

4. As for equivocals, which are also called "homonyms" by Greek and Latin authors, they too require a common name, that is, one applicable to each of the signified objects and capable of being taken or supposing for any one of them. But the signified notion must be multiple and diverse, both formally and really, because an equivocal name does not signify several things as one but as several, and denotes something in each that does not belong to the others. In this way the name "Taurus" signifies an animal of the bovine genus, a sign of the Zodiac, a mountain of Asia, the root of a tree, a small bird, and a man so named. Likewise the name "Gallus" signifies a man born in Gaul, the bird that heralds the sun, a river of Phrygia, and a priest of Cybele. By the same right proper names are considered equivocal insofar as the same names are imposed upon many individuals.

5. Consequently, equivocated equivocals, insofar as they fall under an equivocal name, have different definitions: "For those things," says St. Augustine (l.c.), "which must be defined differently under one name have an equivocal name." Hence the Philosopher said that equivocals must be divided before they are defined. For one asking, "What is Gallus?" cannot be satisfied by a single definition or answer; one must first see whether the discussion concerns a rooster, a Frenchman, and so forth. Nothing, however, prevents things equivocal under one name from becoming univocal under another name signifying several things, not insofar as they are diverse, but insofar as they agree in some common notion. Thus all the things signified by the name "Taurus" or "Gallus" are rendered univocal under the name "body" or "substance." Nor does anything prevent all equivocals, taken according to second intention, from being uniformly defined under this term "equivocal," which is a term of second intention, as they were defined in n. 1; for they agree in the notion of "equivocal," just as every difference agrees in the notion of "difference."

6. One may object: the name "Gallus" displays no diversity; how, then, does it signify several things as diverse? I answer: it does not display diversity in the sound of the spoken word; nevertheless, it does so in its function as a sign exciting a concept. For one who hears such a name does not elicit a uniform concept regarding the whole thing signified, but either several diverse concepts or, if preferred, a single concept apprehending several objects insofar as they are diverse. But from this it is asked whether a mental concept can also be equivocal. Some affirm this, because an indivisible concept can express several things as diverse from one another,

as in this apprehension, "Peter and Paul," or this, "being from itself and being from another," which can be really simple.

7. The common opinion, however, denies this, and is to be preferred in a verbal dispute. This is not because a simple concept cannot represent several things as several, as the Thomists maintain, for that is uncertain or false; rather, because a concept, as a natural sign, represents all its objects so indivisibly that it cannot suppose or be taken for one without simultaneously being taken for the others that appear formally and on the side of the act. Hence the concept "men" cannot be taken for one man alone, nor the concept "Peter and Paul" for Peter alone. But an equivocal sign, according to common usage, must be capable of being taken at will for any one of the diverse things signified; and those words in the definition of equivocals, "whose name is common," sufficiently indicate this. Add that otherwise almost every negative judgment, if posited as a simple quality, would be equivocal, for example, "Man is not a horse"; indeed, the knowledge of God, which certainly represents infinite objects according to every diversity they have among themselves, would have to be called equivocal, which seems absurd. Nor must every concept that is not univocal be equivocal, as is clear in these: "every man," "men," "some man."

8. Of equivocals, some are said to be "by design," others "by chance." Equivocals by chance are those which fortuitously have received the same name, as a Frenchman and a male chicken insofar as each is called "Gallus"; and these same are called "purely equivocal." Equivocals by design, however, are those which agree in name because of some proportion or likeness they have among themselves; and these same are analogicals, which occupy a middle place between univocals and purely equivocals, as is clear from their definition given in n. 1. Whenever, therefore, a common name signifies several things as diverse from one another while at the same time denoting some relation, proportion, or likeness among them, it is called analogical. For "analogy" means the same as "attribution, likeness, proportion," or "proportionality." Here it must be noted that among mathematicians proportion is a comparison of two quantities with one another, when one stands to the other either as equal or unequal, so that it exceeds or is exceeded, for example, by a half, third, or fourth part; whereas proportionality is a comparison or likeness of two or more proportions among themselves, as if it be said: As 5 is to 10, so 50 is to 100; for each is a proportion of half to double. Hence philosophers transfer the same names to agreement or likeness among substances, qualities, and other things.

9. From what has been said you will infer that analogicals are included under the name "equivocals" taken absolutely, at least when considered

logically. Hence Aristotle in the present place does not explain analogicals separately, but mentions only univocals and equivocals, giving as an example of equivocation the name "animal" insofar as it is said of a living animal and a painted animal; in that sense it is certainly an analogical of proportionality. St. Augustine uses the same example for equivocals, *Categoriae* cap. 2; and likewise in *De principiis dialecticae* cap. 10 he counts among equivocals the name "Tully" insofar as it is said of Cicero and of a book which he wrote, although without doubt it is an analogical of attribution. Analogicals, therefore, truly are equivocals because they signify several things insofar as definitionally diverse, as St. Augustine teaches with Aristotle in the examples adduced. And when they are said to hold a middle place between univocals and equivocals, understand this of things "purely" equivocal, namely those which so signify diverse things that they denote no relation among them, as analogicals do. Thus man, although truly corporeal, is said to occupy a middle place between spiritual and corporeal substances because he consists partly of a corporeal and partly of a spiritual principle.

10. Analogicals are further divided into analogicals "of attribution" and "of proportion," or "of proportionality." Analogicals of attribution are defined: "Those whose name is common and whose signified notion is the same according to the term, yet diverse according to the relation to that term." Thus the name "healthy" is analogical insofar as it is said of an animal, medicine, and urine; for it is said of all these because of their relation to the same term, namely formal health, while nevertheless signifying a diversity of relation, so that in urine it denotes the relation of a sign or effect, in medicine the relation of a cause, and in the animal the relation of a subject properly possessing health.

11. Analogicals of proportionality are defined: "Those whose name is common and whose signified notion is partly diverse and partly the same according to proportion." Thus "to laugh" is said analogically of a meadow and a man, because, just as a man's laughter gladdens those who behold it and manifests a joyful disposition of mind, so the pleasantness of a meadow refreshes those who see it and indicates a proper temperament of the soil. This analogy is called "improper" whenever a name is extended metaphorically or by transference to things beyond its proper signification; it is called "proper" when the name belongs properly to several things under different titles, yet not without some proportionality among them, as when the name "principle" is applied to dawn with respect to the day, to a cause with respect to an effect, and to a foundation with respect to a house. A common maxim says that "an analogical term taken by itself stands for the more eminent analogate," that is, an analogical name stated absolutely and

not determined by circumstances is taken for the thing which it signifies properly or principally, as "healthy" for an animal and "laughing" for a man.

12. A further threefold species of analogy is handed down by some. The first is called analogy "of inequality," which occurs when the notion signified by the name is indeed the same but is unequally participated by the inferiors, or is not found equally perfect in them. Thus the notion of "body" is not equally perfect in a corruptible and an incorruptible body, nor the notion of animal in a brute and in man, since man is a more perfect animal than a brute. But this is not analogy in the logical sense, because the whole inequality lies on the side of the differences and does not impede perfect abstraction and unity of the common predicate; otherwise no generic notion would be univocal, which no logician would tolerate. At most it can be called metaphysical or physical analogy; in this sense Aristotle taught that equivocations lie hidden under a genus. See St. Thomas, in 1, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1.

13. The second is analogy "of dependence," which occurs when the common notion belongs to several things in such a way that by its very force it requires the essential dependence of one upon another. For this reason the Excellent Doctor, disp. 28, *Metaphysica*, sect. 3, teaches that being as such is analogical to God and creatures. Yet it is sufficiently probable, as the Excellent Doctor himself indicates in n. 20, that this kind of analogy is metaphysical and does not preclude logical univocation, concerning which elsewhere. The third is analogy "of transcendence," which many recognize in every common predicate that formally transcends the differences. But the same must be said of this analogy as of the preceding one; nor is it readily apparent why transcendence should destroy logical univocation if it does not impede perfect abstraction of the common predicate from the differences. At this point it is customary to dispute whether the notion of being can be perfectly abstracted from every difference, whether it is univocal or analogical to God and creatures and to substance and accident, and whether it formally transcends all differences. But it is better to leave these questions to Metaphysics, which, God granting, we shall treat separately.

14. Denominatives remain; concerning these, beyond what was said in the Summulae, nothing appears worth knowing. Aristotle defines them thus: "Those which have their appellation of name from something else, differing only in case." Thus "just" has its appellation from "justice," from which word it differs "only in case," that is, in termination, because it begins similarly and ends differently. Some interpret the definition more subtly.

Some reject it as inept. The dispute is of almost no importance. The definition we gave in the Summulae seems more suitable.

CHAPTER II.
The Predicaments Are Briefly Surveyed.

1. We do not intend to give exact definitions now, but only to indicate certain descriptions consonant with common sense. The first Predicament is "Substance," which is usually defined as "a being in itself," that is, a being to which it belongs to exist in itself independently of a subject in which it inheres, such as an angel, a man, or a stone. By contrast, "Accident" is defined as "a being in another," that is, a being naturally incapable of existing unless it inheres in a subject, such as color, heat, or cognition. The name "Substance" is taken both from "standing beneath," because it denotes a subject standing beneath accidents and as it were serving as their lodging, and from "subsisting," because it subsists in itself without the support of another subject.

2. Substance is either "complete," which awaits no complement of its own genus, or "incomplete," which requires some complement of its own genus, such as the soul and prime matter. Complete substance is either "simple," as an angel, or "composite," as man, stone, and every other substantial composite. Of complete substance it is properly verified that it is "a being in itself," that is, "independent of a subject." Among incomplete substances, however, there are some of which this is not verified except "as that by which," insofar as they are parts constituting a complete substance. Such is the soul of a horse or tree, and every other material form, since it depends upon matter as upon a subject and is received in it. Finally, according to Aristotle, "first substance" is called "that which neither is in a subject nor is said of a subject," as is any substantial individual, for example Peter or Bucephalus; but "second substance" is called "that which is not in a subject, yet is said of a subject," as Man, Animal, and other genera or species.

3. The second Predicament is "Quantity," namely of bulk or dimension, and it is commonly defined as "an accident rendering a body proximately impenetrable with another of the same kind"; or also, "that which renders a body such as to require extension of its parts according to place." Quantity is said to be either "continuous" or "discrete." Continuous quantity is "that whose parts are joined by some common term," such as is found in a board, whose parts are joined by some point as a common term. Discrete quantity is "that whose parts are joined by no common term," such as is found in number. Continuous quantity is either "permanent," namely that whose

parts exist simultaneously, as in a board, or "successive," namely that whose parts cannot exist simultaneously but pass away in a continuous flow of existence, as the parts of time.

4. The third Predicament is "Quality," which many explain thus: "An absolute accident, distinct from quantity, by which a subject is well or badly disposed." Some qualities are primary or elemental, namely four: Heat, Cold, Moisture, and Dryness. Others are secondary qualities, namely those which result from the primary ones, such as Color, Taste, and Odor.

5. Aristotle distinguished four species of Quality. To the first belong "habit and disposition." Habit is "a quality difficult to remove from a subject," as knowledge, virtue, vice. Disposition is "a quality easily removed from a subject," as health and disease. To the second belong "potency and impotence." Potency is "a quality by which nature equips a subject for acting," as heat in fire or the power of walking in man. Impotence is "a quality impeding or retarding a subject from acting," as stupidity. To the third belong "passion and passible quality." Passion, as taken here, is "a quality causing alteration and passing quickly," as pallor from fear and blush from shame. Passible quality is said to be "one which, while causing alteration, remains for a long time," as pallor from sickness. To the fourth belong "form and figure." Form coincides with beauty and is taken for the proper disposition of parts according to distance, magnitude, and color. Figure is taken for the termination of quantity by which a body is rendered flat, round, square, and so forth.

6. The fourth Predicament is "Relation," concerning which more fully in the following chapter. The fifth is "Action," which is defined as "the ultimate and formal determination of a cause toward producing," and is considered a modal entity distinct from cause and effect. When Action depends upon a presupposed subject, it is called "Eduction" or "Generation," as when fire is generated from presupposed matter; when it does not depend in this way but produces the effect from nothing, it is called "Creation," as the production of an angel. The sixth is "Passion," which is defined as "the ultimate and formal determination of a subject toward receiving a form which is sustained in it." This too is believed to consist in a modal entity.

7. The seventh is "Where," or "Location," or "Presence," which is "the ultimate determination of a thing to be in a place." The eighth is "When," or "Duration," which is "the ultimate determination of a thing to some time." The ninth is "Position," which signifies a special placing of the parts of a body in a place, such as sitting or standing. The tenth is "Having," which is taken here for the exercise of having about oneself an ornament or

something similar acquired by art or industry, such as being armed, robed, crowned, and so forth.

8. Now, in order that the foregoing things be placed in a Predicament, seven conditions are commonly assigned in these verses:

One word and simple, fitting things to be placed:
Beings in themselves, finite, real, whole.

The first condition is that a word "one" in signification be chosen, namely one signifying an object either really one, as the word "Peter," or formally one, as the word "Man"; hence equivocal or analogical words are excluded. The second is that the word chosen be "simple"; hence complex terms are excluded. The third is that the word be "fitting," that is, that it signify concretely or abstractly according to the character of the objects; or also that it not be an oblique case or grammatically discordant.

9. The remaining conditions are required on the side of the things. For things placed in a Predicament must be "beings in themselves," whereby beings by aggregation, such as a heap of stones, are rejected. They must likewise be "finite" beings, and therefore God or the Divine Attributes are not commonly placed in the Predicaments; likewise "real" beings, whereby beings of reason are excluded; finally "whole" beings, that is, complete within their genus, whereby partial beings such as matter and substantial form are excluded, since separately or by reason of themselves they have no place in the Predicament of Substance, but only insofar as included in the composite; and likewise metaphysical parts, which are conceived adjectivally, namely Differences, which are placed not on the stock of the Tree but indirectly at the sides.

CHAPTER III.
What Relation Is and How Many Kinds There Are.

1. Since mention of Relation occurs everywhere, even in Logic itself, it ought not to be left unexplained any longer. The matter admits of a very lengthy discussion if everything that can be called into question is to be disputed. We shall call certain matters of greater importance to examination; the rest we shall merely indicate according to the more common doctrine and leave, as it were, on the authority of our predecessors, referring the curious investigator to the Excellent Doctor, who in the whole of disp. 47, *Metaphysica*, thoroughly exhausted this matter.

2. Relation means the same as respect, order, or relation of one thing to another. Hence relatives are defined by Aristotle in the present place as

"those whose being is to stand in relation to something," because the being of relatives consists in their expressing an order or relation toward some term. Thus the being of these denominations, "father, son, similar, equal, greater," or "less," consists in regarding another extreme or term to which the denominated thing is compared. Relation is therefore conceived as a certain form which gives such denominations to a subject in order to something else distinct from it. Hence in Relation there is considered the concept "In" and the concept "Toward." Insofar as Relation is regarded as inhering in a subject, it has the concept "In"; insofar as it is regarded as respecting a term, it has the concept "Toward." And because this latter concept is proper to Relation as distinguished from the other Predicaments, the Philosopher therefore calls this Predicament "Toward something."

3. Relation thus outlined is divided, 1º, into "real" and "of reason." A real relation is one which exists in things independently of the intellect, as that of a father to a son. A relation of reason is one which is either fashioned by the intellect or consists in the operation of the mind itself, as the relation of subject to predicate, if there is such a relation. It is divided, 2º, into Relation "according to being," which nearly coincides with real Relation, and Relation "according to being said," which is variously explained by philosophers. For many confuse it with a relation of reason, and very many with transcendental Relation, concerning which presently. The Excellent Doctor, l.c., sect. 3, from n. 6, teaches that it occurs when a thing absolute in itself is conceived by us after the manner of a relative thing and is explained, or spoken of, in comparative terms, without therefore attributing to it on the side of the object any relation, true or fictitious. Just as, he says, when a spiritual thing is conceived by us after the manner of a corporeal one, for example an angel after the manner of a winged youth, we attribute no real or fictitious corporeity to the object, but merely conceive one thing by imitation and analogy with another. Thus, therefore, we sometimes conceive an absolute thing after the manner of a relative one and speak of it as if it were relative, and it is therefore said to be relative only "according to being said."

4. It is divided, 3º, into "mutual and non-mutual." The first occurs when two extremes regard one another reciprocally, as father and son. The second occurs when the respect or order is not reciprocal. Thus creatures are intrinsically referred to God, who, according to the common opinion, is not referred to creatures. Whether there is a non-mutual Relation is disputed by various opinions. Mutual Relation is either called "equiparant," namely one which denominates both extremes in the same way, as a Relation of likeness or equality, or "disequiparant," which attributes diverse denominations to

subject and term, as the Relation of father and son, or greater and less. It is divided, 4º and principally, into "transcendental and predicamental," concerning the distinction between which there is great variety among authors.

5. Omitting other explanations, either because they are less true or less clear, I say that transcendental Relation is that which is really and adequately identified with the immediate subject said to be related; but predicamental Relation is that which is really distinguished, at least inadequately, from the immediate subject, and therefore denominates it as though accidentally when it is already constituted in its own being. This distinction between the two Relations is commonly handed down by our authors, such as Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Izquierdo, Peynado, Ulloa, and many outsiders; and the Excellent Doctor himself approves the same in substance, sect. 4, n. 15.

6. This is proved by induction. For there is no transcendental Relation that behaves otherwise. Examples are the respect of union to the extremes, of action to the effect, of cognition to the object, of potency as productive to its terms as producible, and generally those respects which consist in an aptitude ordered of itself to something. In all these the Relation is wholly identified with its proper and immediate subject; and therefore it is called "transcendental," because it intimately pervades the essence of the subject, although it may also be so called because it does not belong to any one definite Predicament but transcends them all under their proper concepts. For Location, Action, and Passion under their proper concepts manifest a transcendental Relation to body, agent, and patient; every Accident to substance; every incomplete entity to its complement; indeed every creature to the first cause.

7. Conversely, there is no predicamental Relation to which that character of at least inadequate distinction and quasi-accidental denomination does not belong. Examples are Relations of equality, likeness, created paternity, coexistence, greaterness, and so forth, whose character we shall explain below. From this arise two further differences. 1º, a transcendental Relation is never separable from its subject and, when the subject exists, cannot fail to exist; whereas a predicamental Relation is usually contingent and can be absent while the subject exists. 2º, a transcendental Relation does not always require the existence of its term, but often regards a merely possible term and sometimes, by way of object, even an impossible term, as is seen in cognition of a chimera; whereas a predicamental Relation always requires an actually existing term, according to the more common opinion.

8. Now predicamental Relation is that which properly belongs to the Predicament of Relation, and it is said "to have its whole being toward something," namely explicitly, because when a relative denomination is apprehended as such, for example the denomination "similar," nothing appears in it at first sight except a certain being connoting something distinct from the subject. Yet the word "whole" does not exclude other predicates formally contained in Relation, at least the concept "In," which is indeed essential to every Relation, according to the maxim, "An exclusive expression does not remove concomitants."

9. Aristotle, 5 *Metaphysica* cap. 15, distributes predicamental Relations into three genera. The first contains those which are founded upon unity and number, that is, upon agreement and disagreement. Such are the Relations of double or triple, and so forth; greater and less; equal and unequal; similar and dissimilar; same and diverse. Here note that the Aristotelian expression "identity" in the present matter means the agreement of two things in substance, whether substance is taken as distinguished from accident or more generally for the essence of any being; "likeness" properly means agreement in quality; "equality," agreement in quantity.

10. The second genus contains those founded upon action and passion, whether physical, as the Relation of producer and produced; intentional, as the Relation of knower and known; or moral, as the Relation of master and servant. The third contains those founded upon measure and measurable, as the Relation of knowledge to the knowable. Here the discussion is not about quantitative measure, for example an ell, since that founds a Relation of equality, but about an objective measure to which the perfection of the act is proportioned. For the object is called the measure of cognition because we regularly gather the perfection of cognition from its object. Here note that in knowledge a twofold relation to the object can be considered: one transcendental, which all recognize; another predicamental, which the Excellent Doctor, sect. 13, n. 9, recognizes with Aristotle as resulting as though accidentally when the object actually exists.

11. Finally, it must be diligently noted that in every relative denomination there are found "subject, term, and the ground of founding." The subject, which others call the remote foundation, is that which is related and is taken directly in a mental comparison. The term is that which is regarded by the other and is taken obliquely in the mental comparison. The ground of founding is that proximate and adequate foundation or motive which, on the side of the object, moves the intellect to conceive the subject with an order to the term or to compare it with the term. Thus, when we say, "Peter is similar to Paul in whiteness," Peter is the subject, Paul the term,

and whiteness of the same intensity existing in each is the proximate foundation or ground of founding.

12. In transcendental relatives the ground of founding, according to all, is the Relation itself and consequently consists in the essence of the subject, from nn. 5 and 6. But in predicamental relatives it differs according to the diverse genera of Relations discussed in nn. 9 and 10. For in the first genus the ground of founding consists in that twofold form or predicate by reason of which subject and term agree or disagree; and sometimes it is really indistinct from subject and term taken together. Thus, when Peter is referred to Paul by a relation of identity, that is, of specific likeness, the ground of founding is the rationality of each; and when two whitenesses are said to be similar, or two quantities equal, the ground of founding is each whiteness or each quantity. But it is still really inadequately distinguished from the subject, since it is constituted also by the term. Sometimes it is really distinguished from both, as when two walls are said to be similar in whiteness; for then the ground of founding is the whiteness of each.

13. In the second genus the ground of founding is action and passion. Some in this second genus of Relations distinguish the ground of founding from the proximate foundation and hold that, in the Relation of "father," "agent," or "producer," the ground of founding consists in action, whereas the proximate foundation consists in active potency or in the substance of the acting principle. The Excellent Doctor approves this latter point, lect. 7, n. 12, and sect. 12, n. 4, and sqq.; but he identifies the ground of founding with the proximate foundation and says that the action is a necessary condition. The disagreement seems to concern the manner of speaking, as the Excellent Doctor himself indicates. The matter itself is clear, namely that the form of the denomination "agent" or "producer" in second act, and consequently of "father" or "mother," which is related to the denomination "agent" as species to genus, is influx or action; but that form appears to be what proximately moves the intellect in this genus to compare one thing with another.

14. That in the second genus the ground of founding is action and passion is commonly taught by our authors with others. Their opinion pleases me, at least because it is clearer and more expeditious. Nor does it matter that Peter is said to be "actually the father" of John after the generative action has physically passed away, as long as both exist; for it is enough that the action perseveres morally. Thus from an act of sin physically past but morally persevering, a man is truly and properly called a sinner, worthy of hatred, and liable to wrath. Finally, in the third genus, if there is any predicamental Relation besides the transcendental, the ground of

founding consists in the character of the perfection of each extreme, from which we are moved to assert the perfection of Knowledge to be commensurate with the Knowable.

CHAPTER IV.
In What Predicamental Relation Consists.

1. Three celebrated opinions exist on this point. The first says that Relation consists in a certain accidental mode really distinct from the subject, term, and ground of founding, which mode inheres in the related subject and has no other function than purely to regard the term. Thus the Thomists and most Scotists. The second identifies the whole Relation, at least of the first genus, concerning which the chief dispute arises, with the foundation alone as it exists on the side of the related subject, so that the term and whatever lies on the side of the term in no way intrinsically constitutes the Relation but is a purely extrinsic connotate, although necessarily required for the Relation to exist. For example, the Relation by which whiteness A is said to be similar to whiteness B consists wholly in whiteness A; it nevertheless necessarily requires the existence of whiteness B as a purely extrinsic connotate. Thus some more recent authors, preceded by Father Mæratius, with many other Doctors favoring them whom Servera cites, disp. 18, *Logica*, cap. 5. From this doctrine concerning connotates, which they use elsewhere throughout, its authors are called "Connotators"; and the Thomists themselves frequently adopt it for explaining other difficulties. The third opinion adequately identifies Relation with the ground of founding insofar as this pertains to subject and term, in the manner explained at the end of the preceding chapter. Thus commonly our authors, whom others follow.

§ 1. The Thomistic Opinion Is Rejected.

2. Against the first opinion concerning a relative accident or mode of Relation instituted by nature solely to relate, Argument 1: the likeness of two white things, each white to the degree of four, is a predicamental Relation; but it does not consist in a mode superadded to each existing whiteness and enduring in subject and term. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved: once each whiteness is posited in the subjects, for example Peter and Paul, and the Thomistic mode is prescinded from or not understood, Peter and Paul are similar in whiteness; therefore the likeness of each does not consist, and so forth. The antecedent is proved from Aristotle (5

Metaphysica cap. 15): "Similar things are those whose quality is one." But in the stated case the quality of Peter and Paul is one, namely whiteness, even if that mode is not understood. The minor premise is clear, because for the quality of two things to be "one" is for it to be of the same species, or for each quality to antecedently possess the foundation whereby it is univocated by the intellect under a specific concept; for no other unity between the two can exist in reality. But the whitenesses of Peter and Paul being of the same species undoubtedly consists in their quiddity and intensity; nor can that superadded mode contribute to this, since, if it existed, it would rather be an indication of multiplication than of unity.

3. They answer that Peter and Paul, prescinding from the mode of Relation, are similar in whiteness "fundamentally," not "formally." But against this, 1º: to be formally similar is to have that form by reason of which the quality of each is "one" in reality, if Aristotle's definition of "similar things" has any force. But such a form is the whiteness of each intensified to the degree of four, as we have just shown; nor can it be the mode of Relation, since that mode does not make but presupposes each whiteness to be of the same species. Therefore, and so forth. Against this, 2º: to be formally similar in whiteness is for one to be formally white as the other is; and this is nothing other than Peter being formally white and Paul likewise formally white to the degree of four. But whiteness alone constitutes something "formally white," as no one fails to know. Certainly any intellect which, utterly unmindful of the Thomistic mode, sees whiteness to the degree of four in Peter and likewise in Paul, will seek or await nothing further in order to say that one is white as the other, and consequently fully to conceive them as similar in whiteness.

4. Argument 2: once foundation and term have been posited, it can happen, at least by the absolute power of God, that the mode of Relation does not result, as several Thomists concede; but then the heavens would remain formally greater than the earth, and every whole formally greater than its part; likewise two swans would remain formally similar in whiteness, and two quantities of two cubits formally equal. Therefore the Relation of "greaterness, likeness, equality" does not consist in the resulting mode. Perhaps the minor premise will be denied because of the word "formally." But first, this appears contrary to the very apprehension of the terms.

5. Then the argument is pressed thus: if the resulting of every mode were impeded, two swans would be similar in not having a mode of Relation; but this likeness would not consist in a resulting mode, as is evident. Therefore a Relation of likeness can exist without a mode. If it be said that this would be a merely fundamental likeness, I answer: according to you that likeness is

fundamental which can be made formal by a superadded mode. But likeness in not having a mode cannot be made formal by a superadded mode, since rather it would be wholly destroyed upon the advent of the mode. Therefore, and so forth.

6. Argument 3: in a sign prior to the resulting of the mode, two whitenesses have likeness in the notion of a cause, both efficient and material, proximately capable of and demanding to cause the mode of relation. But this likeness is not constituted by that mode, since it does not yet exist in the prior sign; nor by another preceding mode, for the same argument will be made concerning that, and there will be an infinite regress. Nor is that likeness merely fundamental, because it awaits no mode in order to become formal. For the mode which follows in the posterior sign will indeed make the whitenesses formally similar in having a mode or in intensity, but by no means in priority of nature, nor in the potency of causing the mode itself. Add that the denomination "fundamentally similar," which according to the Thomists precedes the mode, is a formally relative denomination, since it is contingent upon whiteness, separable from it, and incapable of being conceived by us except with an order to a term.

7. Argument 4: the absolute entity of the heavens is formally greater or more perfect than the mode of Relation by which it is in itself referred to the earth; it is also formally dissimilar and diverse from it, as is evident. But this Relation of "greaterness and diversity" does not consist in another mode; otherwise we shall proceed to infinity, since the entity of the heavens is also formally greater in relation to every further mode. Therefore neither does the greaterness of the heavens with respect to the earth consist in a superadded mode. The consequence is clear, both because contrary foundations apply equally in each case, and because the heavens are by reason of themselves greater than the mode and dissimilar from it because they identify in themselves an excess of perfection and a character other than that of the mode actually existing. But this reason applies equally with respect to the earth, as anyone sees. Nor say that the heavens are constituted formally greater than the mode by the very mode by which they are greater. For first, nothing is more displeasing to Thomists than that a Relation should be constituted by its term. Then why are not the heavens likewise constituted formally greater than their own location by the location itself? Why is not any thing constituted dissimilar by the term to which it is dissimilar?

8. Argument 5, from an absurdity: from the Thomistic opinion it follows that whenever any fly is newly produced or moves itself, innumerable changes immediately result throughout the entire universe, because new

modes of Relations to the fly must immediately be produced in all beings of the universe, namely "coexistence, distance, dissimilarity, inequality," and so forth; and all these modes must suddenly perish when the fly perishes, since they cannot be preserved without their term. But this seems both intrinsically discordant and incredible, and moreover contrary to great authority.

9. For first St. Thomas, 5 *Physica* lect. 3, says thus with Aristotle there: "Nothing comes to me anew through the fact that I begin to be equal to another through his change." And 3, p. q. 16, art. 6, ad 2: "Things which are said relatively can be predicated anew of something without its change, just as a man becomes right-hand relative to another without his own change, through the movement of him who becomes left-hand relative to him." See especially the Angelic Doctor in Opusc. 48, which Thomists commonly cite as genuinely St. Thomas's; for there, tract. 5, cap. 2, after other statements most explicit on this same matter, he concludes thus: "A man becomes similar to another without change in himself, as is clear; for if someone in India were now made white, he would become similar to me and I to him, with no change made in me. For likeness in me adds no thing beyond the whiteness which really is in me, as is clear."

10. Then St. Bonaventure, in 3, dist. 1, art. 1, q. 1, ad 3, says: "If I am white and another white man is generated, he immediately begins to be similar to me, with no change made in me but only in him." Finally St. Anselm in *Monologion* cap. 26 says: "A man is born after a year, to whom I am neither greater nor less nor equal. Yet when he has been born I shall be able to have all these Relations to him without any change in myself." To these you may say, 1°, that Relation is a most minute being and therefore produces a change that is almost nothing. Against this: the Relation posited by you, however minute a being it may be, is not no being; therefore the change it produces is not no change. You may say, 2°, that no change is made by Relation according to the concept "Toward," but one is made according to the concept "In." Against this: according to the cited Fathers no change is made when a real transition occurs from not having to having the whole relative denomination; but in that transition Relation according to the concept "In" undoubtedly supervenes anew.

11. Argument 6: whiteness is referred to Grace, to the beatific Vision, or to any other supernatural being, by a relation of dissimilarity, diversity, or inferiority in perfection. But that Relation, if it were a mode resulting from whiteness and inhering in it, would be and would not be intrinsically supernatural; therefore it would be chimerical. The minor premise is proved: it would be intrinsically supernatural because it would be essentially

connected with the existence of a supernatural being as such, for it would render whiteness formally inferior to Grace precisely as supernatural; and whatever is connected in this way is supernatural. Then it would not be supernatural, because it would be produced or actively result from whiteness as from its sole root, for according to the adversaries this is common to all Relations, that they spring from the power of the foundation alone in which they inhere; and by this very fact it would not be above the powers of nature, which is contrary to the concept of supernaturality.

12. Finally it is argued: one Relation is referred to other unconnected Relations without a new mode of relation; for example, one paternity is similar to the paternity of another man and is also, without a further mode, diverse and dissimilar from Relations of equality, greaterness, union, coexistence, and so forth. For if a further mode is required, since the same argument can be made about it, there will be an infinite process of modes. Therefore likewise one whiteness can be referred to another without a superadded mode. The consequence is proved, both because many arguments of the Thomists prove either both or neither, and because it is likewise contingent and accidental to paternity A that it become actually similar to, coexistent with, and so forth, paternity B. Moreover, two unconnected Relations of diverse genera are related to each other no differently from two wholly absolute things. Many other arguments may be seen in our authors.

§ 3. The Opinion of the Connotators Is Rejected.

13. For clarity let us speak of the Relation of Peter's coexistence with Paul, which the Connotators say is identified with Peter's existence alone, adding also the mode of duration if perhaps there is one, concerning which there is no question at present, although it so connotes the actual existence of Paul that it can in no way stand without it. It is therefore argued thus: if Peter exists and Paul does not, the stated Relation of coexistence does not exist, as is certain to all. Therefore the stated Relation is not adequately identified with Peter's existence alone. The consequence is clear, because if it is so identified, every possible case in which Peter's existence remains will be a case in which that Relation remains; just as in every case in which man exists, rational animal exists, because this is adequately identified with man. And in general it is evident that of two things adequately identified, one cannot exist in reality without the other. Stated somewhat differently: Peter's existence is really separable from the aforesaid Relation, since it can exist while that Relation does not exist, namely when Paul does not exist.

But separability is an evident sign of real distinction. Therefore there is a real distinction, at least inadequate, between existence and Relation.

14. The same doctrine is commonly attacked in other terms, namely: "That upon whose failure alone, while the other things adequately distinct from it remain, thing A fails, is either the whole essence of thing A or at least a part of its essence." But if Paul's existence alone fails while the other things adequately distinct from it remain, Peter's Relation of coexistence with Paul fails. Therefore Paul's existence is either the whole essence of such a Relation or at least a part intrinsically constituting it. The minor premise together with the consequence is clear. The major premise, which is frequently used in Philosophy and Theology, is considered false or ambiguous by some, and is even scorned and ridiculed by others; but by very many, especially of our School, it is held as an unshaken principle.

15. And rightly so, for its truth rests upon this self-evident principle: "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be." For if that which fails is neither the whole essence nor a constituent of the essence of thing A, then upon its failure alone nothing fails from the quiddity and essence of thing A; therefore neither does thing A itself fail, which is its own quiddity and nothing beyond it. Or if it does fail, it follows that it simultaneously is and is not. And to speak in the present matter, according to you the whole entity, quiddity, and essence of the aforesaid Relation adequately and uniquely consists in Peter's existence actually enduring. Therefore, while nothing of that existence fails, nothing of the Relation fails. But some Relation does fail, according to you, when Paul's existence fails, although nothing of Peter's existence fails. Therefore the Relation fails when not even the least thing of its essence fails, or when nothing of it fails. What is it to fail and not fail simultaneously, if this is not?

16. Nor do the adversaries appear to answer anything when they say generally that all the constituents of some composite can remain without the composite remaining because of the failure of an extrinsic connotate. They teach the same of a simple thing, namely that its whole entity can remain without the thing remaining. For then, they say, all the parts of the composite remain taken "entitatively" and "materially," but not "formally in the being of parts," or "as parts" and "constituents," because they are not parts except "as connoting" such an extrinsic term. They add that then all the constituents, or the thing itself under discussion, remain "as to entity," not "as to denomination"; likewise that it remains "implicitly, quidditatively, directly, as that which," but does not remain "explicitly, denominatively, obliquely, as that by which."

17. These words, unless I am mistaken, are devoid of sense. Let us remain with Relation for clarity. I ask you whether Peter's existence, insofar as it "formally" is the essence of Relation, or taken "in the being" of Relation, or "insofar as it is and in the way in which it is" Relation, or "insofar as connoting" the term, or so that Relation is taken "denominatively," that is, "as to denomination, as to the explicit, as to the direct," or "as that by which"; whether, I say, thus taken it is constituted by something distinct from existence taken simply according to its actually enduring entity. If you deny this, then whenever Peter's existence perseveres as an actually enduring entity, it must persevere with all those qualifications, so that the Relation remains with the whole objective reality of those reduplications. I suppose with the adversaries that those reduplications "as to denomination, as to the explicit," and so forth, do not consist in words or concepts alone but have their reality on the side of the object. Otherwise the argument made above from n. 13 returns with the same force.

18. But if you affirm it, then Relation "formally" as such, or taken "as to denomination," and so forth, does not consist in the entity of the foundation alone, namely Peter's existence, but is further constituted in the being of such by some other objective reality, at least "obliquely" or "as that by which." And since you wish to superadd no other reality beyond the term, the latter too will enter into the constitution of Relation "as to denomination." But it is precisely of Relation so taken that we are speaking. Here note that something can be imported "as that by which" or "obliquely" and nevertheless intrinsically constitute the thing. Thus union between body and soul truly constitutes man intrinsically, although only "as that by which"; thus Grace intrinsically constitutes the denomination "adoptive son of God," although "obliquely," for that denomination is verified only of a rational creature, and in every denomination the "direct" is said to be that of which it is verified.

19. I know that many things are so connected with some wholly extrinsic connotate that, when it fails, they necessarily fail. Thus union is essentially connected with its extremes, action with its term, creature with God or with God's concurrence, and every mode with the thing which it modifies; so much so that it is chimerical for an action, for example, to exist when the term fails, although the action is adequately distinguished from that term. But then it is false that the action fails when the term alone fails while the other entities adequately distinct from the term of the action remain in reality. For then, besides the term, the very "entity" of the action taken "materially," "quidditatively," and "as that which is direct," also fails. Through the failure of this entity the action fails "formally"; but through the

failure of the term alone the action fails "merely inferentially," insofar as the failure of the entity of the action is inferred from the failure of the term, namely by reason of essential dependence and connection.

20. For when a thing fails through the failure of its entire entity or of some part or essential predicate, it is said to fail "immediately, formally, through an intrinsic ground." But when it fails through the failure of some term or extrinsic connotate with which it is essentially connected, it is said to fail "through an extrinsic ground," or "mediately, merely inferentially, argumentatively, consequentially," because from the failure of the connotate the failure is argued of that entity in which the thing consists, or at least of some constituent or part of it. But according to the adversaries, from the failure of the term of Relation there does not follow the failure of another entity from which Relation is constituted. Therefore from the failure of the term Relation does not fail "merely inferentially." Either, then, Relation still remains, or, if it fails, it fails "formally," because it is intrinsically constituted from the term.

21. Yet if someone were to imagine that only the term of action A fails while all other entities adequately distinct from such a term remain, he would indeed imagine an impossible thing, because among the entities adequately distinct from that term is the entity of action A itself, which cannot remain without the term even taken "materially." Nevertheless, provided this impossibility is disregarded and the entity of the action is posited as remaining, action A will indeed remain, since it is nothing other than its own entity. Or at least it will be inferred that it simultaneously remains and does not remain: it remains because the whole entity with which it is adequately identified is supposed to remain; it does not remain because an action and its entity remaining without a term are repugnant. Let the adversaries consider whether they likewise wish Relation simultaneously to fail and not fail when the term fails.

22. Hence you will gather that our argument is inopportunely pressed in the case of action, union, and other things metaphysically connected with another thing adequately distinct from them. Inopportunely, I say, both because of what was said in nn. 19 and 21, and because it is never maintained that when the term fails, action remains "materially, as to entity, as to the direct," and so forth. Likewise, whenever action fails as "connoting" the term, it also fails "entitatively," or "quidditatively," and the formal "connotation" itself is inseparable from the entity of the action. All these things occur otherwise when some thing is posited as essentially depending upon a connotate extrinsic to itself, although neither the entity of that thing nor any of its constituents has a connection with such a connotate but can

rather remain in reality without it. The Connotators commonly maintain this, explicitly in the case of Relation. But to me this appears altogether contradictory, both here and in every other matter.

23. Accordingly I judge the principle stated in n. 14, namely "That upon whose failure alone, and so forth," to be inescapable, at least whenever it is applied to a case in which it is possible to verify the condition expressed by the absolute clauses, namely: "If this alone fails, and all the other entities adequately distinct from it remain," together with those contributing to the constitution of the thing being disputed. For who could believe it possible that all the constituents of thing A remain, or that nothing fail from its whole quiddity, and nevertheless thing A itself truly fail? Moreover, the Connotators produce no argument from reason by which they attack that principle. They are accustomed, however, to produce examples from various matters, especially theological ones, sufficiently difficult that it would be endless and inopportune to run through them now. Be cautious: whenever some constituted thing or denomination is proposed which truly fails through the failure of some definite connotate, do not concede that this is a merely extrinsic connotate unless you first find among the constituents of that denomination something, at least "obliquely" or "as that by which," essentially connected with such a connotate, which simultaneously and consequently fails "as to entity."

§ 3. The Third Opinion Is Preferred and Proved.

24. The third opinion, therefore, common in our School, is to be preferred. It really and adequately identifies Relation in the abstract, that is, taken in the manner of a form, with the adequate ground of founding. But Relation in the concrete, that is, taken for the whole relative denomination, it teaches to be intrinsically constituted by subject and term together with the ground of founding. Proof 1º from Aristotle, in *Categoriae*, cap. "De Qualitate," where he says: "Similar and dissimilar things are said to be such through qualities alone. For one thing seems to be similar to another by no other reason at all than that whereby it is qualified." See how the Relation of likeness is constituted "through qualities alone," in which the ground of founding stands; nor is anything further required for two things to be fully similar than that they possess a uniform quality. Likewise from Boethius, in *Commentarium super caput de Relatione*, saying that "Substance is one thing, Relation two, and therefore Relation consists not in simplicity but in plurality"; and again: "The same thing is both quality and Relation because of the term." St. Augustine agrees, *Categoriae* cap. 11, saying: "It is therefore

clear that Toward something," that is, Relation, "consists not by its own force but through conjunction with another." See how Relation is distinguished from substance, quality, and so forth, only insofar as it consists in plurality, conjunction, or the complex of foundation and term.

25. Proof 2º of the same opinion: first from the refutation of the others. For if Relation is something on the side of the object and does not consist in a relative accident or superadded mode, as the Thomists maintain, nor elsewhere in the foundation alone or ground of founding lying solely on the side of the subject, as the Connotators maintain, it remains that it consist in the complex of foundation and term, or in the ground of founding insofar as this pertains to subject and term. Secondly, *a priori*: that which, when precisely understood, makes Relation fully understood, and without which no part whatsoever of it can be understood, is the one whole quiddity of Relation. But precisely by understanding, for example, two whitenesses to the degree of four, one united to Peter and the other to Paul, always including duration if perhaps it is distinguished from the thing's existence, we understand whatever suffices for us inescapably to say that Peter is "similar" to Paul in whiteness; and if any one of these entities is not understood, this individual denomination cannot be understood, as experience makes clear. Therefore, and so forth.

CHAPTER V.
Contrary Foundations Are Resolved.

1. Objection 1: If our opinion is true, the Relation of "identity" by which Peter is like Paul in human nature will consist in the complex of both. But this is proved false: 1º, because that complex is wholly substantial, whereas Relation is an accident, since it is a Predicament distinct from Substance and must supervene contingently upon its foundation. 2º, because Relative and Absolute are opposed and consequently cannot be identified; but whatever is in that complex is absolute. 3º, because "the whole being of Relation is toward another"; which is in no way verified of such a complex.

2. I answer by granting the consequence; nor do the proposed proofs stand in the way. To 1º: Relation need not always be a physical accident and an accident in being, but can be a logical accident, or an accident in predication, insofar as it attributes a contingent denomination which supervenes upon the subject as though accidentally. Such is the denomination "similar" or "agreeing in human nature"; for it is contingently predicated of Peter because, beyond Peter's nature, it constitutively involves Paul's nature actually existing. Since it is contingent and accidental to Peter

that Paul exists, the aforesaid denomination is likewise contingent; for every denomination is rendered contingent by the contingency of any one of its constituents. Hence Peter can pass without intrinsic change of himself from not having to having that relative denomination, or conversely, solely through Paul's change. The same point is pressed in the denomination "proximately fundamentally similar," or "agreeing in nature," which denomination is likewise contingent and supervenes upon Peter, since it requires Paul's existence, and yet adds no physical accident.

3. Nor need Relation be really distinguished from Substance or from the remaining Predicaments. Hence St. Thomas, 11 *Metaphysica* lect. 9, toward the end, after teaching that Action and Passion are really identified, adds: "Predicaments are diversified according to diverse modes of predicating. Hence the same thing, insofar as it is predicated diversely of diverse things, belongs to diverse Predicaments." Therefore a distinction of reason suffices, even an imperfect one or one according to the mode of signifying, for Predicaments to be called diverse, because it suffices for diverse modes of predicating. Consider the two predications: "Peter is a man"; "Peter is similar to Paul in nature." Each predicates something physically substantial, but in a very diverse manner. The first is necessary and essential and connotes nothing distinct from Peter, and therefore belongs to the Predicament of Substance. The second is contingent and defectible while the subject remains, and is constituted through connotation of another distinct extreme; therefore it belongs to the Predicament of Relation. Nor must predicamental Relation, because it is identified with other Predicaments, be called transcendental; for it does not transcend the other Predicaments under their proper concepts, as that which is truly transcendental does, as we noted in cap. 3, but rather gives a denomination as though adventitious to the subject.

4. To proof 2º: if "absolute" means the same as "free from every respect to another," then indeed it is opposed to "relative"; but in this sense nothing is absolute, at least among created things, all of which are referred at least to God, both by a transcendental and by a predicamental respect, namely "distinction, diversity, inferiority," and so forth. Hence it must be denied that the complex of Peter and Paul is in this sense something absolute. But if "absolute" means "capable of being conceived and explained within its proper species without comparison with another," many created things are absolute, among them the complex of Peter and Paul; for it can truly be explained specifically by non-comparative terms, such as "two men, two rational animals." Yet in this sense "absolute" is not really opposed to every "relative" but only to a "relative" that is entitatively modal, such as is found

in Relations of the second genus; nor will the Thomists easily prove anything further. For nothing prevents the same thing from being capable of explanation through various concepts, some absolute and some comparative. At most there will be opposition with respect to intentional state, insofar as being known comparatively is not the same as being known absolutely.

5. To proof 3º: when it is said that the whole being of Relation is toward another, Relation must not be taken in the real sense nor implicitly, for the concept "In," which according to the Thomists belongs implicitly to the "being of Relation," is not "toward another." Relation is therefore taken insofar as it falls under a comparative concept, and then according to what is explicit; because under this concept, "Peter agrees specifically with Paul," only the manner in which Peter stands to Paul is explained. But in this way the "whole being" of the complex of Peter and Paul, which is the one object of that comparative concept, is likewise "toward another." Yet an equivocation must be diligently avoided here. When you hear that "the whole being of Relation is toward another," do not understand "toward another" distinct from the whole Relation, but "toward another" distinct from the foundation or related subject. Thus the sense is this: the whole being of the Relation by which Peter is said to be similar to Paul in essence is to refer Peter to something other than Peter, namely Paul.

6. The reason is that the word "another" must be understood only with respect to the subject which receives the denomination "related," for example the denomination "similar, equal, greater," and so forth. But Relation, insofar as it is the adequate form or quasi-form, is that "by which" the subject is denominated "similar," and so forth, but it is not that "which" receives that denomination. It is "likeness," but it is not "similar"; just as an act of the visual potency is "vision," but is neither "seeing" nor "seen," except merely "as that by which"; and similarly in innumerable other cases. Hence if you argue thus: Relation regards its term as "something extrinsic," or as "something distinct"; therefore it is not identified with the term even inadequately. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it regards it "as that which," I deny; for predicamental Relation is not that "which" regards the term, but that "by which" one thing regards another, and therefore it is defined as a "Respect" or "Relation of one thing to another." It regards it "as that by which," I subdistinguish: it regards the term as something distinct from or extrinsic to Relation adequately taken, I deny; as something distinct from or extrinsic to the foundation or subject alone, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. Hence this proposition too, "Peter, as distinct from Paul, is similar to Paul in nature," is true if it denotes Peter, as distinct

from Paul, to be the subject denominated "similar to Paul"; but it is false if it denotes Peter to have in himself whatever is involved in the denomination "similar," both "as that by which" and "as that which."

7. Thus Peter is denominated "similar to Paul" partly through his own nature and partly through Paul's nature, which consequently enters "as that by which" into the denomination "similar" belonging to Peter. Thus Peter is denominated "dissimilar" from the Thomistic relative accident through that very accident, lest we proceed to infinity. Thus the same Peter is denominated "proximately fundamentally similar" to Paul through Paul himself, on Thomistic principles. Therefore Peter's likeness to Paul is a certain quasi-form constituted from the natures of Peter and Paul, and gives Peter a denomination partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, in which denomination Peter performs the function of a partial form and a total subject. Here it must be noted that in mutual Relations, especially equiparant ones, each extreme is both term and foundation with respect to the other. For Peter is the foundation, that is, subject, of his likeness to Paul and is the term of Paul's likeness to Peter himself; and the same happens conversely to Paul. But each likeness, Peter's to Paul and Paul's to Peter, has the same constituents, with only the diversity of the denominated subject. Keep all these matters before your eyes lest you become entangled in captious formulas of argument.

8. But from this Objection 2 arises: therefore Paul is the foundation of Peter's likeness to Paul; for he is the foundation of his own likeness to Peter, and this likeness is the very likeness of Peter to Paul, since it has the same constituents. But the foundation of Peter's likeness to Paul is Peter. Therefore Paul is Peter. The objection is pressed in an act of contrition that is love of God and hatred of sin because of God, in this manner: God is the term of hatred of sin; for he is the term of contrition, which is hatred of sin. But the term of hatred of sin is sin. Therefore God is sin. It is also pressed in the proximately fundamental likeness between Peter and Paul; likewise in Peter's dissimilarity to the Thomistic mode of Relation; likewise in the likeness of two paternities or unconnected likenesses. In all these cases, as is clear from the preceding chapter, the same difficulty arises unless you flee to the Connotators or invent infinite modes.

9. I directly distinguish the first consequence: "Paul is the foundation of likeness," and so forth, of a likeness which is only Peter's likeness to Paul, I deny the supposition; of one which is also Paul's likeness to Peter, I grant the consequence. Then I distinguish the minor premise: the foundation receiving the denomination "similar to Paul" is Peter, I grant; the foundation receiving the denomination "similar to Peter" is Peter himself, I deny the

minor premise and the consequence. That likeness, since it is simultaneously Peter's to Paul and Paul's to Peter, has two foundations: one which it denominates "similar to Paul," and this foundation is Peter alone; another which it denominates "similar to Peter," and this is Paul alone. Nor can these denominations be inverted unless the proper essence of that likeness itself is inverted. This is commonly seen in various forms which contain diverse denominations for diverse subjects. Thus the same cognition denominates the intellect "knowing" and the object "known," not conversely; and the same heating, which is simultaneously action and passion, denominates wood "acted upon" and fire "acting," not the reverse.

10. Hence what is commonly objected in the Relation of "greaterness" is easily solved, where a quantity of a cubit, for example, is referred to a quantity of a palm; this Relation is constituted by both quantities, and the one that is greater constitutes the denomination "less," just as the one that is less constitutes the denomination "greater." Thus you will argue: therefore "greaterness and lessness" are the same, since they have the same constituents; therefore the quantity of a palm is referred to the quantity of a cubit by the relation of "greaterness," and consequently will be denominated "greater" than the cubit. The consequence is clear, because it is referred by the relation of "lessness," which is the same as the relation of greaterness. And by the same reason it follows that the quantity of a cubit will be "less" than that of a palm.

11. I press the point as just above: a contrite will tends toward God through an act of hatred; therefore it will denominate God "hated." You will deny the consequence because the contrite will tends toward God through an act of hatred, not hatred of God but of sin, which act is simultaneously love of God. I answer in the same way. The quantity of a palm is referred to the quantity of a cubit by a relation of "greaterness," not just any greaterness, not one which is the "greaterness" of the palm to the cubit, but one which is the "greaterness" of the cubit to the palm. This same Relation is simultaneously the "lessness" of the quantity of a palm, to which alone it gives the denomination "less," and to the cubit alone the denomination "greater." The Thomists are bound to say the same in the case of proximately fundamental "greaterness" and in that by which the heavens are said to be greater and more perfect than the mode of Relation.

12. Objection 3: our opinion in substance denies real Relations. Proof 1º: because we admit nothing in the Relation of "likeness," and so forth, which those ancients who are said to have denied Relations on the side of the object would not have admitted. For they did not deny that, for example, two white things of the same intensity could actually exist in reality. Proof

2º: because we posit nothing which by its own nature possesses an order to another. For white A is not of itself ordered to white B, nor conversely; and the complex of both cannot possess an order which its parts do not possess, nor can it regard something "other" than itself. Proof 3º: because we do not preserve in Relation the concept "In"; for in the Relation of "identity" between two substances we posit no form inhering in a subject. Proof 4º: because Relation is a being "one in itself," whereas we posit "one accidentally," or one by aggregation, such as is the complex of two white things. Proof 5º: because a true Relation must "result" from foundation and term simultaneously posited; but according to our opinion it cannot result from them, since it is not distinguished from them.

13. I answer by denying the assumption; its proofs do not compel. To 1º: we differ from those who deny real Relations because they denied that formal "likeness," and so forth, exists in reality, although two white things might actually exist, and recognized in these only a foundation for the comparative act of the intellect, in which formal "likeness" would consist. We, however, recognize on the side of the object and prior to the operation of the intellect whatever suffices for true, proper, formal, and complete "likeness, diversity, equality, greaterness," and so forth to exist, so that these names are not necessarily verified of an act of the intellect comparing objects but have a full verification in the objects themselves. And since these are names of Relations handed down to us by Aristotle, there is no reason why we should be numbered among those who deny real Relations. Although even this censure is not greatly to be feared in the Relations of the first genus, for many authors of great name very probably hold that these exist in reality only fundamentally and are completed formally by an act of the intellect.

14. To 2º: in Relations of the second genus we posit something which by its own nature is clearly ordered to another, for example action, passion, union. But in the first genus, for example in the likeness of two white things, what is ordered of itself to another is not each white thing taken simply and considered separately, except at most "inchoatively" or "aptitudinally"; rather, it is the whole denomination "similar," consisting in the complex of both white things and belonging "as that which" to either of them with respect to the other. That whole denomination is of itself ordered to another, not something "other" than itself as a whole, but something "other" than the direct subject to which it belongs, as we warned above. Moreover, "to be ordered of itself to another" is so to stand that it cannot be explicitly conceived, even intuitively or through a proper species, except by comparing one thing with another. And that complex so stands insofar as it attributes

the denomination "similar," for it cannot be conceived except by comparing one white thing with the other. Nor is it repugnant for the whole complex to possess something which its individual parts considered separately do not possess. Otherwise a complex of units would not be a number, because no unit is a number; nor would a complex of men be a commonwealth, for the same reason.

15. To 3º: very many Relations physically possess the concept "In," since they are accidents physically distinct from the related subject, according to what was said in cap. 3 concerning the ground of founding. Whenever, however, the ground of founding is not distinguished from subject and term, then, just as Relation is not an accident physically supervening and inhering but only logically and contingently according to the mode of predicating, so too it possesses the concept "In" only logically and according to the mode of signifying, insofar as it is conceived and signified by us after the manner of a form denominating and affecting the subject. To 4º: Relation must be "one in itself," not by physical unity but by logical or predicative unity, insofar as it is predicated in the manner of one predicate and not in the manner of several. Nor is any other "unity in itself" required in the Predicaments, as is seen in the Predicament "Having," when it is said, for example, "The man is clothed." But in the physical sense Relation does not always possess unity in itself, since it rather consists in the conjunction or concomitance of several things, as we saw above from Augustine and Boethius.

16. To 5º: that "resulting" is not effective but formal, namely after the manner of a formal effect really indistinct, in the sense in which from soul and body united there results the being of man, and from object and cognition there results the being-known of the object. Finally, I warn you to keep before your eyes the counterexample in the Relation by which two unconnected Relations are referred to one another, certainly without other superadded modes, lest these be infinite. For first, when, for example, two Paternities are said to be "similar," there is nothing in the complex of both that of itself is ordered to another; for one Paternity is indeed ordered to its own filiation or to its son, but not to another Paternity. Then that likeness does not physically possess the concept "In," because Paternity A, which is the foundation or subject, neither inheres in itself nor is the subject of Paternity B to which it is referred. Moreover, the likeness will not be "one in itself," because it consists in the complex of foundation and term, unless recourse is had to the Connotators. Finally, it does not appear how likeness "results" from Paternities A and B simultaneously posited, since it is not an accident superadded to both.

17. Objection 4: the likeness of two horses in specific nature is equal to the likeness of two men to each other; but the specific perfection of each pair or complex is not equal. Therefore in these cases likeness is not identified with the specific perfection of the extremes. I answer: see this argument solved in a similar case above, tract. 2, disp. 1, cap. 5, n. 20; and add the manifest counterexample of fundamental likeness. By the same counterexample and solution you will easily dissolve this other argument, not unlike it: Two things hot to the degree of four can increase in heat without increasing in likeness; for if each becomes hot to the degree of six, they will not be more similar than before. Therefore the likeness of each is not identified with the heat of each.

18. Objection 5: if, of two things hot to the degree of four, a new degree of heat comes to one and not the other, the preceding likeness perishes; but nothing of the preceding heat perishes. Therefore likeness did not consist in heat. I answer: two things hot to the degree of four possess a twofold likeness, one positive, consisting in both heats, the other negative, consisting in the absence of greater intensity. Of these the first does not perish when a new degree of heat arrives, for one hot thing still agrees with the other in possessing four degrees. But the second perishes because the absence of greater intensity ceases in one extreme. And again the counterexample of fundamental likeness returns.

19. Objection 6: the Relation of coexistence of Peter and Paul expresses something distinct from the complex of both. Therefore the same must be judged of every other Relation. The antecedent is proved: through these two concepts, "Peter exists, Paul exists," whatever is in that complex is conceived; and yet coexistence is not conceived. Therefore coexistence expresses something distinct, and so forth. The minor premise is clear because coexistence is not conceived except through a comparative concept, whereas those concepts are both absolute. Confirmation 1º: in this proposition, "Peter exists as Paul does," or in this copulative, "Peter exists and Paul exists," something on the side of the object corresponds to the particle "as" or to the conjunction "and" that is distinct from Peter and Paul; but what corresponds is coexistence. Therefore, and so forth. Confirmation 2º: there is no intentional comparison unless there is a simple formally comparative concept, however many absolute concepts there may be. Therefore neither is there a real Relation unless there is a simple formally relative entity distinct from every absolute being.

20. I answer by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major premise: whatever is in that complex is conceived in every manner in which it is conceivable, I deny; only in some manner, I grant. Then I

distinguish the minor premise: coexistence is not conceived in every manner in which it is conceivable, I grant; but that it is not conceived in any manner, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. Both the complex of Peter and Paul existing and the coexistence of each can be conceived now through absolute concepts, now through comparative ones, without any objective distinction, just as the same entity of man is capable of being conceived now through the concept "man," which is absolute, now through the concept "man's essential dependence upon God," which is comparative. And the objection is pressed in fundamental coexistence, which precisely as such no less requires a comparative concept; likewise in the likeness or equality of two unconnected Paternities, where each confirmation of the objection is likewise pressed.

21. To Confirmation 1º: the particle "as" or the conjunction "and" indicates only a special mode of tending on the side of the concept and does not require anything on the side of the object distinct from both extremes taken together, as conversely is seen in the disjunction "or," which denotes nothing except a mode of tending on the side of the concept. The second Confirmation is retorted thus: an intentional comparison must in representing embrace both extremes of the comparison. Therefore a real Relation must in being embrace foundation and term, and consequently is not an accident adequately distinct from both. Moreover, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. The disparity lies in this, that the name "comparison" is determinately imposed to signify a concept expressly comparing two or more extremes with one another; but the names "likeness, equality," and the like, which are proper to real Relations, are imposed to signify the uniform quality, quantity, and so forth of two things. This signification is fully verified without a simple purely relative entity, as we showed above.

22. Finally you will object with the Angelic and Excellent Doctors, of whom the former seems to favor the Thomists and the latter the Connotators. For first St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 28, art. 2, ad 2, plainly teaches that in created relatives Relation is distinguished from the foundation or from that thing which is related. Likewise q. 7 *De potentia* art. 9, ad 4 and 5, he distinguishes the Relation of likeness from quality, and the Relation by which created substance is referred to God from the substance itself. Likewise q. 8 *De potentia* art. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, cap. 14; and in 1, dist. 4, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3; dist. 20, q. 1, art. 1; dist. 21, q. 1, art. 2; and often elsewhere, he teaches that created Relation is an accident; that its being is other than the being of substance and than the subject in which it is; that it really supervenes upon substance; that it inheres in the subject and makes a

composition with it; and that it possesses a most feeble and imperfect being. But all these things seem capable of belonging only to the Thomistic mode of Relation. Then, that the Excellent Doctor places the whole being of Relation on the side of the foundation or subject, so that the term cannot be an intrinsic part of Relation but is a merely extrinsic connotate, is clear from many places of the cited disp. 47, *Metaphysica*, especially sect. 2, n. 22 and sect. 8, n. 10.

23. I answer: created Relation, although really indistinct either from an absolute accident or from a substantial complex, is nevertheless distinguished from either by that distinction which suffices for diversifying Predicaments, namely "according to the mode of signifying and predicating." It likewise gives the subject a contingent denomination in which something really distinct from the subject is always involved, at least obliquely, and which consequently "really supervenes" upon it in denominating. It is therefore always an accident, at least a logical one; and in that sense in which it is an accident, inherence, composition, and whatever is proper to an accident are truly attributed to it, although it may sometimes physically be something substantial. An example is the Predicament "Having," which is numbered among accidents although it predicates something substantial. In the same sense it can also be said that likeness, for example, is caused by and depends upon whiteness, insofar as logically and according to our mode of conceiving, Peter's being white must be conceived prior to his being similar to Paul in whiteness, and his being called similar depends upon and is caused by his being known as white. Re-read the doctrine given in solving the first objection.

24. I admit that St. Thomas often speaks of created Relation as though of a physical accident in order to prove that the Relations of the Divine Trinity, for example Father and Son, are not really distinguished from substance as they are in creatures. But then he is not speaking of all created Relations, but of the better known and more obvious ones, namely those founded in quantity, quality, presence, action, and passion. All these, since they are really indistinct from the proximate ground of founding itself, are physical accidents of the substantial subject from which they are really distinguished. This exposition is clear, both from what was said in the preceding chapter, § 1, concerning the mind of St. Thomas against the Thomistic mode, and because, in order to show the difference between Divine and created Relations, which was St. Thomas's intention in almost all the passages cited in n. 22, the comparison had especially to be made with created Relations of father and son and others founded upon action and passion. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas speaks indefinitely of created Relation. For he also

teaches indefinitely that Relation is founded in substance through another accident, as is clear from *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, cap. 14: "Relation not only presupposes the being of substance, but also the being of other accidents from which Relation is caused; thus one in quantity causes equality, and one in quality likeness." Yet it is certain that St. Thomas admits Relations immediately founded upon substance, as Ferrariensis notes there, and as is clear concerning the Relation of specific identity from 1 p. q. 28, art. 1, ad 2, and concerning the Relation of creation from q. 7 *De potentia* art. 9, ad 4 and 5.

25. The being of Relation is called most imperfect and feeble according to the explicit concept "Toward," because a relative denomination as such, insofar as it is superadded according to the mode of signifying to the absolute perfection of the subject, although it is in some way perfect sufficiently to be called real, nevertheless adds almost nothing of physical value to the subject. For once Peter is posited as white, he is not rendered physically better when there accrues to him the denomination "similar to Paul," which thereafter depends solely upon the existence of a term extrinsic to Peter. St. Thomas gives this reason in the cited *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, cap. 14, calling the being of Relation most imperfect: "Because," he says, "the proper notion of Relation consists in being toward another, and its proper being depends upon the being of something exterior."

26. The Excellent Doctor, when he denies that the term is an intrinsic part of Relation, understands Relation according to what is "direct"; for otherwise he plainly teaches that Relation, at least as giving its formal effect, includes the term obliquely, or as a connotate, not extrinsic but intrinsic and constitutive. This is clear from the cited disputation. For in sect. 2, n. 23 he says: "relative denomination in some way includes the term." And in the same place he uses "to include" and "to connote" for the same thing, saying: "That thing which is likeness under the notion and concept of likeness, and not under the notion of whiteness, in some way includes or connotes the term." Likewise: "We grant that the relative denomination is from some intrinsic form, while nevertheless including or connoting another form extrinsic in an extrinsic term." And sect. 8, n. 10, he teaches that Relation as such "can be said in some way to include the term in its essence." And more clearly below, n. 14, that God cannot preserve without the term the entity of the foundation "under such a notion and denomination," namely a relative one, "because according to it the entity involves the term itself; indeed, in reality it adds nothing distinct beyond the coexistence of the term." But what plainly demonstrates our Suárez's mind to be opposed to the Connotators is the passage disp. 7, *Metaphysica*, sect. 2, n. 3, after the middle,

from the words "And therefore they greatly err," and so forth, where he uses the same argument that we used in the preceding chapter, § 2.

CHAPTER VI.

The Remaining Matters Concerning Relation Are Briefly Surveyed.

1. Since Relation in the abstract is really indistinct from the ground of founding, certain noteworthy consequences follow. 1º, the "ground of founding" is not so called because it really founds a Relation distinct from itself, but because it founds according to the mode of signifying, or rather because it founds the comparative concept, which is called a "formal" Relation by intentional formality and which terminates in the very ground of founding, which is a "formal" Relation by physical formality. 2º, predicamental Relation is variously constituted according to the diversity of the ground of founding explained at the end of cap. 3. Sometimes it consists in the complex of two substances, as the specific identity of two men; sometimes in the complex of two absolute accidents, as likeness and equality; sometimes in a simple modal entity, as the Relation of union between matter and form, the Relation of producer and produced, father and son; sometimes in the complex of two modes, as local nearness or distance.

2. Yet it is always really distinguished, at least inadequately, from the foundation or subject which it denominates, so that thereby it is distinguished from transcendental Relation. For the subject which is denominated, for example, "similar in nature" by the Relation of specific identity of Peter and Paul is not the complex of both men but either man; whereas the complex performs the function of a form or quasi-form denominating, and is the integral Relation which is inadequately distinguished from each man. Hence follows, 3º, that the Relation by which union is referred to its extremes is transcendental; for it is adequately identified with the foundation or related subject, which is the union itself. Hence the same simple entity can be a transcendental Relation of itself to another and a predicamental Relation of other things to one another, insofar as it gives them correlative denominations. This occurs in union, action, and cognition, which refer themselves transcendently to the extremes, to cause and effect, to intellect and object; and at the same time, insofar as they denominate the extremes mutually "united," the cause "producing" and the effect "produced," the intellect "knowing" and the object "known," they are predicamental Relations of these things among themselves.

3. It follows, 4º, that a really indivisible entity, at least in the second genus of Relations or when Relation is a modal entity, can be the form of two

correlatives and their mutual Relation. For the same cognition is the form of knower and known, and the same action the form of producer and produced. One may object: therefore, while Peter is the father of Paul, paternity is filiation; therefore paternity cannot denominate Peter without filiation also denominating him, and consequently without denominating him "son of Paul." But there is a manifest counterexample in cognition, production, and passion. Paternity, therefore, in the stated case is filiation, not Peter's with respect to Paul but Paul's with respect to Peter. This filiation truly denominates Peter, not "son" but "father," because it confers the denomination "son" not as one to be given to Peter, but only as one to be given to Paul. One may object again: the denominations "father" and "son" are opposed and require real distinction. I distinguish: real distinction of subjects, I grant; of forms, I deny. And I press the point with the denominations "agent" and "patient," "producer" and "produced." Whether a Relation of likeness or equality could likewise exist if God placed numerically the same whiteness or numerically the same quantity in two subjects is denied by Thomists and affirmed by Scotists.

4. It follows, 5º, that the Relations of the Divine Trinity are not predicamental but mutual transcendental Relations, because each is really and adequately identified with its own foundation or subject, for example Paternity with the Father alone, Filiation with the Son alone, and so forth. If you ask whether God is predicamentaliter referred to creatures, this must be wholly denied if Relation is a physical accident or a mode really superadded. But given our principles, the question is not of great importance but almost entirely concerns the manner of speaking, as the Excellent Doctor well notes, disp. cit., sect. 15, n. 20. For if relative denomination either is merely extrinsic or at least adds nothing really to the complex of foundation and term, it certainly derogates nothing from God's immutability. It is clear that God is contingently denominated "lord, producer, creator," and so forth, which denominations he did not have from eternity but only when creatures actually exist. Those who admit Relations of God to creatures wish them to consist precisely in these denominations.

5. Yet that the Relation of God to the creature is not real but only of reason is the opinion of St. Thomas in many places, our Suárez subscribing to it in the cited section. They are moved by the fact that God in no way depends upon the creature but is outside the whole order of the creature, as St. Thomas says, 1 p. q. 13, art. 7; but a real Relation exists only between extremes of the same order, that is, as Father Suárez explains, n. 23, between extremes which either belong to the same genus, or to two genera one of which can be perfected by the other, such as created substance and quality;

or at least it requires a dependence of the foundation upon the term, such as is found in the creature with respect to God. Hence, according to the mind of the Angelic and Excellent Doctors, the denomination "producer," for example, as belonging to God, is not really relative, not so much from defect of form as from defect of capacity in the subject, which is not of itself orderable to the creature.

6. Nevertheless our authors commonly, with many other ancient and modern writers cited by Father Theophilus Raynaudus, *Theologia naturalis* dist. 7, q. 1, art. 5, and Servera, disp. 18, *Logica* n. 41, unhesitatingly recognize predicamental Relations of God to existing creatures, in the sense explained in n. 4. St. Anselm recognizes the same, whose words Father Suárez reports in the cited sect. 15, n. 16. Nor does St. Thomas seem to dissent, 3 p. q. 16, art. 6, ad 2, saying: "Being man belongs to God by reason of union, which is a certain Relation." He also proves there that for God to become man is not to be changed, because among relatives "to become anew" does not imply change. And indeed, since it is certain that several contingent denominations belong to God which require the existence of creatures and by their own nature cannot be conceived under the notion of such except by comparing God with creatures, the disagreement which remains concerning the name of Relations seems to concern only the manner of speaking. To the same belongs the question whether they should be called "predicamental Relations" or rather "after the manner of predicamental Relations," because God and whatever belongs to God are not placed in the Predicaments.

7. Two things must here be noted concerning the mind of St. Thomas. The first is that in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, cap. 13, he says generally: "Something is not found to be denominated from a Relation as though from something existing externally, but from something inhering; for someone is not denominated father except from paternity which is in him." Father Suárez agrees in the cited disputation, often teaching that a relative denomination cannot be "merely extrinsic." This seems contrary to our doctrine, according to which a man is denominated "father" from the generative action which is in the son, as every cause is denominated "producing" from the production which exists in the effect.

8. I answer: St. Thomas and Father Suárez exclude only a relative denomination from a form that is "merely," or "adequately," extrinsic; and they require that the form be in the subject "directly." But on our principles most Relations are not "merely extrinsic" to the subject, but partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, being constituted directly and principally by something intrinsic to the subject, although obliquely they include something extrinsic, namely the term. Such are those founded in quality, quantity, presence, and

others. But not a few founded upon action will indeed be extrinsic to the subject if the ground of founding consists in action, as many think, whom we have followed for the greater clarity and facility of the doctrine. They will, however, be intrinsic if in paternity, for example, the ground of founding is principally the generative potency or the substance of the father, as the Angelic and Excellent Doctors seem to think, while the action is an obliquely constitutive condition. But I think even this disagreement concerns the manner of speaking.

9. The second is that "relation of reason" in St. Thomas is not always a fictitious relation, but often is the very act of the intellect conceiving two extremes in an ordered way, or according to a comparative mode of tending, without conceiving any order or relation on the side of the object. This is explicitly true of the Relations of God to the creature, which the Holy Doctor calls "of reason alone." This is clear from q. 7 *De potentia* art. 11, where St. Thomas says that a relation of reason occurs in two ways. First, when the intellect through reflexive cognition finds Relations in things understood insofar as they are understood, for example Relations of genus and species. Read the text and compare it with what we said, tract. 1, Proem., disp. 2, cap. 5, from n. 12 and afterward from n. 34.

10. In another way, St. Thomas continues in the same place, a relation of reason occurs when "the intellect understands something in order to another, although the intellect does not invent that order, but rather it follows from a certain necessity upon the mode of understanding. And the intellect does not attribute such relations to what is in the intellect but to what is in reality. This occurs insofar as things having no order according to themselves are understood in an ordered manner, although the intellect does not understand them to possess an order; for thus it would be false." He wishes the Relations of God to the creature to be such. Note that the intellect does not fashion that order, since according to the Thomists in St. Thomas's expression "to invent" is the same as "to fashion." Likewise note that it does not understand an order in the object, nor the object as possessing an order, "for thus it would be false." Therefore that order is nothing other than the ordered or comparative mode of tending of cognition. Nor is it an obstacle that such an order "follows upon the mode of understanding"; for what kind of consequence this is we explained in the place cited in the Proemial material.

11. Several questions remain. Question 1º: whether Relation terminates formally at a relative; that is, whether paternity, for example, terminates at the son as son, or rather at the absolute entity of that man who is the son. All Thomists affirm the first concerning mutual Relation, and many also

concerning non-mutual Relation. But our authors deny it. They frequently prove it because the Relation of some things would terminate at itself. For the same action which is paternity is the form of the son as son; and the same form which renders extreme A similar or equal to extreme B also renders B itself similarly similar or equally equal. This reason does not seem effective to me. For if there is an effect indistinct from its production, as many hold concerning acts of the intellect and will, then the Relation of a cause as actually causing, which is production, will terminate at itself. Indeed, since every cause in second act is referred not only to the effect but to the action which is the Relation of the cause, this Relation already terminates at itself. Add that, as we warned in the preceding chapter, Relation need not be related "as that which" but "as that by which," and is not that which regards the term but that "by which" the foundation regards the term. Consequently the term need not necessarily be really distinguished from Relation, but from the foundation or subject; just as, although every effect must be really distinguished from the cause producing "as that which," it need not be so distinguished from the action or production of itself, which produces only "as that by which."

12. Nevertheless, in most Relations the opinion of our authors is true. For the term of paternity and of every action producing an effect distinct from itself is the absolute entity of the effect taken specifically, just as the term of cognition or vision is not the object as known or seen but the object taken specifically, as is also clear in the term of union. Likewise the term of likeness or equality is commonly conceived and expressed under an absolute notion: one white thing is said to be similar to another white thing "as white," and one man equal to another "as having such a stature." Indeed, even when predicamental Relation is adequately identified with the term, as in the examples of the preceding number, it does not terminate in a predicamental relative; for then the term is reciprocally related only transcendently through such a Relation.

13. One may object, 1º: the Father in the Trinity is referred to the Son as such. I answer: we are speaking only of predicamental Relations. Mutual transcendental Relations, such as those in the Trinity, terminate at a relative; and thus prime matter is transcendently referred to form insofar as each is of itself ordered to the other. One may object, 2º: according to St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 40, art. 2, ad 4, "When it is said that the being of a relative is toward another, by the word 'another' is understood the correlative." But the correlative is not absolute. Therefore, and so forth. I answer: the word "another" is the "correlative," not reduplicatively and formally, but specifically and materially, namely that entity which is denominated

"correlative." Thus we say that cognition terminates at the known, and vision at the object or term, without this being understood reduplicatively; otherwise cognition or vision would terminate at itself, because by cognition the object is constituted in the being of known, and by vision in the being of object or actual term.

14. Hence you will infer that Peter is not the father of Paul as son, but as man; and that filiation and paternity are not opposed Relations except with respect to their formal effects. For in the abstract they are the same simple entity of generation. Yet because this entity cannot give both denominations to the same extreme but requires two really distinct extremes, those Relations are therefore called opposed. Nor does this opposition cause one relation or denomination formally to regard the other, but only causes one extreme to be constituted as regarding the other and conversely; and one denomination cannot exist without the other because both proceed from the same form essentially requiring two denominable subjects. The same thing, due proportion observed, occurs in other mutual Relations according to our principles.

15. Question 2º: whether there is a non-mutual Relation. The most common opinion affirms it and adduces as examples the Relation of knowledge to the knowable and of the creature to God. Yet many weighty authors deny it, whom the learned Servera cites and follows, disp. 18, *Logica* n. 8. I say 1º: it is sufficiently probable that God is referred to creatures predicamentaliter or after that manner, as we saw above, n. 4 and following. I say 2º: it is more probable that God is not transcendently referred to creatures, even possible ones, although he is connected with them, because transcendental Relation appears to import some dependence upon its term. And perhaps St. Thomas speaks in this sense in many places where he denies a Relation of God to creatures. For, as many observe, St. Thomas and Aristotle, when speaking of Relation, do not always understand predicamental Relation alone but often transcendental Relation also, which many likewise hold to belong to the Predicament of Relation.

16. I say 3º: on our principles admitting extrinsic Relations, there is no reason to deny that the Knowable is reciprocally referred to knowledge, as likewise the sensible to sense, the visible to sight, and every object, as extrinsically denominated by an act, to the potency or act; for such denominations are of themselves relative. But when Aristotle and St. Thomas teach the opposite, they must be understood of an intrinsic Relation after the manner of that by which knowledge is referred to the knowable. I say 4º: there are non-mutual predicamental Relations; and thus that most common opinion is absolutely true. It is proved by the examples in n. 11. For

although the intellect as producing is referred predicamentaliter to its act, the act itself as produced is reciprocally referred to the intellect only transcendently, since it adequately identifies with itself its Relation. It must be noted that the question concerns a formally mutual Relation, that is, a correlation resulting from two connected Relations corresponding to each other on both sides, such as the Relations of father and son, producer and produced, knowledge and knowable. For if the discussion concerns unconnected and disparate Relations, there is none which cannot be mutual, at least among created things. For according to all, the knowable can be referred to knowledge by a Relation of coexistence, diversity, and so forth, as cognition also to the intellect in the example just given.

17. Question 3º: whether it is true that predicamental Relation always requires an existing term. The most common opinion affirms it, if the whole Relation physically exists, because it is either constituted by the term or at least consists in a form essentially connected with the existence of the term, as on our principles the Relation of father or producer. One may object: the truth of a cognition concerning a non-existing object, for example "Troy existed," is a predicamental Relation to the object, since it is a certain likeness of the act as image to the object. I answer: that truth is indeed a Relation; but when it concerns an object not actually existing, then neither the Relation nor the truth physically exists adequately, or as to all its constituents, but only as to what is direct. Nevertheless the whole denomination is said to exist denominatively, because according to common sense cognition is denominated "true" if the object conforms to it in the difference of time which cognition denotes.

18. Nevertheless one might apply two limitations. The first is that the term must exist in some difference of time, present, past, or future. For there are certain denominations which seem to import a predicamental relation to a past or future term, for example when Peter is denominated "posterior to Adam" or "prior to Antichrist." The second limitation is that the term must exist either physically or at least intentionally. For the denominations "knowing" and "loving" always import a Relation of intellect and will to the object, and indeed a predicamental one, since it is really distinct from the foundation or related subject; and yet they often regard an object that in no way exists except intentionally, as when a chimera is known or a merely possible good is loved. Nor does this remove the distinction taken from this point between predicamental and transcendental Relations. For a transcendental Relation, although sometimes by its specific character it requires an existing term, as when union is referred to its extremes or action to its term, nevertheless by its genus admits a merely possible term

and does not even require its intentional existence, but prescinds from it, as when the power of a cause is referred to possible effects.

19. Question 4º: what are the properties of Relation? I answer: Aristotle numbers five. The first: "to have a contrary." This does not belong to every Relation, as Aristotle himself warns, but to one founded in quality. The second: "to admit more and less." Nor does this belong to every Relation, according to the same author; for although something can be more or less dissimilar or unequal to another, it cannot in the same way be more or less father or son. The third: "to be said convertibly," that is, so that of correlatives one cannot be signified without mention of the other, for example neither master without servant nor servant without master. The fourth: "to be simultaneous by nature." The fifth: "to be simultaneous in cognition." Each property comes almost to the same thing; for, as St. Thomas says, 1 p. q. 13, art. 7, ad 6, relatives are simultaneous by nature when "one includes the other in its concept," that is, when one under the notion of such cannot be conceived without the other; and this is to be simultaneous in cognition. Yet if "simultaneous by nature" is understood properly, so that neither is the cause of the other's existence, it is not a universally true property, as Aristotle himself observes.

CHAPTER VII.
On the Postpredicaments.

1. Certain properties of the Predicaments, which Aristotle treated in the final chapters, are called Postpredicaments. Five are numbered, namely "Opposition, Priority, Simultaneity, Motion, and Having." Opposition is fourfold: "relative, contrary, privative, contradictory." Relative opposition exists between correlatives or mutually related extremes and consists in the repugnance that two mutually corresponding denominations should belong to the same subject, at least taken individually. Therefore such opposition argues a distinction of subjects. Thus it is repugnant that the same subject by virtue of the same generation be father and son. This opposition also occurs among equiparant correlatives. For white A is denominated "similar to white B," and white B "similar to white A"; but neither can possess both denominations.

2. Contrary opposition exists between two qualities excluding one another from the same subject, as between heat and cold or between whiteness and blackness. Privative opposition exists between a form and its absence in a subject capable of the form, as between sight and blindness in a man. Contradictory opposition exists between the being and non-being of a

thing absolutely. We speak here of opposition of things in being; for opposition in signifying, which is proper to enunciations, was explained in the Summulae.

3. Priority occurs in four ways, which these verses indicate:

Say prior in time, nature, order, and honor.
We say the cause is prior to the caused.

In four ways, I say; for priority of cause coincides with priority of nature. That is said to be prior "in time" which precedes another in duration, as Alexander precedes Caesar. That is said to be prior "in nature" which is the cause of another, or at least a prerequisite or condition lying on the side of the cause. Thus the Sun possesses priority of nature with respect to the light which it produces. Hence, when a cause produces an effect even in an indivisible instant of time, the cause is said to be "in a prior sign" of that instant, and the effect "in a posterior sign" of the same instant.

4. To this priority is annexed priority "in consequence of existing," or "of subsisting," which is found between extremes connected non-mutually and belongs to that whose existence is inferred from the other without reciprocally inferring the existence of the latter. Thus God is prior to creatures "in consequence of subsisting," because this consequence is valid: "A creature exists, therefore God exists," while the converse consequence is not valid. This priority also belongs to superior predicates with respect to inferiors, as the predicate "animal" with respect to the predicate "man"; and then it is also called "logical priority."

5. That is said to be prior "in order" which is placed before others in arrangement, as the exordium of a speech with respect to its epilogue. That is said to be prior "in honor" which excels others in dignity.

6. Simultaneity occurs in as many ways as priority. Motion is the transition of the same subject from one term to another, concerning which at length in Physics. Having, when it signifies having something placed around oneself, as clothes or weapons, belongs to the tenth Predicament; but insofar as it signifies having something in any manner whatsoever, as having riches, servants, friends, knowledge, magnitude, and so forth, it extends through various Predicaments.

TREATISE V.

ON CERTAIN MINOR DOUBTS CONCERNING THE BOOKS PERIHERMENIAS: PRINCIPALLY, HOWEVER, ON THE TRUTH AND FALSITY OF ENUNCIATIONS.

In the two books *Perihermenias*, that is, *De interpretatione*, Aristotle treated the sign, the noun, the verb, and speech, especially enunciative speech. We treated these expressly in the *Summulae*, as usage has established. But because we referred to this place certain minor doubts concerning the sign and definition, and because scholastic usage has also attached here certain other, more serious questions concerning the truth and falsity of enunciations, we have therefore instituted the present Treatise in order to resolve them all.

DISPUTATION I.

SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE SIGN AND DEFINITION.

CHAPTER I.

Doubts About the Sign.

1. Doubt 1: whether every sign must be corporeal or sensible? 2º whether the character of sign properly belongs to a formal sign? 3º whether anything can be a sign of itself? 4º whether anything whatsoever can be a sign of anything whatsoever, if it causes that thing to come to cognition? I had decided to treat all these questions at present. But I see that they are merely

questions about a name and depend upon the definition of sign that each person frames for himself at will. Some answer negatively to all of them; others affirmatively. For my part, I think the first question must be denied and the second affirmed; for both are sufficiently gathered from what was said in the *Summulae*, where we also noted that St. Augustine, and likewise St. Thomas in many places, are not speaking of sign in general, but only of the external, sensible human sign, which among us is called "sign" by antonomasia.

2. In the third question I likewise think the answer must be affirmative, provided there is some distinction as regards accidents or circumstances, at least of place or time, or at minimum a distinction of reason. For Christ the Lord in the sacrifice of the Mass offers Himself as a memorial sign of Himself as formerly immolated upon the altar of the Cross, as is clear from the Council of Trent, Sess. 22, cc. 1; 2. Nor is there any contradiction in the sign and the thing signified being the same, as the heretics object. For if some commander, in order to celebrate a victory formerly won by himself, were thereafter each year to stage a play in which he himself, with the same soldiers and standards, appeared upon the stage and represented by a bloodless contest the battle he had fought with bloodshed, then both the commander and each soldier would represent himself and would be a sign of himself; Catholics use this example against the heretics. In both cases, however, there is a distinction as regards circumstances, as anyone can see.

3. One may object: even without such a distinction there can be a sign of itself; for Divine cognition represents itself, as does a created cognition reflected upon itself. Likewise, the spoken word "name" signifies itself, since it is itself a name. By this example St. Augustine proves (*De magistro*, c. 4) "that there are signs which, among the other things they signify, also signify themselves"; and in the same book, c. 10, he says: "Speech, among other things, signifies itself as well." I answer: these examples can in the first place be admitted because of some distinction of reason, considered, for example, in Divine cognition insofar as it stands "as that by which" and "as that which," or insofar as it is act and object. Next, if this distinction appears excessively improper, it may be denied that reflexive cognition is properly a sign of itself, and said to be so only improperly, insofar as "to signify" is taken broadly for "to represent" in any manner whatever; for the proper character of a sign requires that the sign in some way mediate, or intervene between the faculty and the thing signified. As to St. Augustine's examples, it should further be said that neither the spoken word "name" nor speech is a sign of itself as its unique or adequate thing signified; for "name" signifies every name conjointly, just as "speech" signifies every speech. Hence it is

really but inadequately distinguished from its thing signified. St. Augustine therefore pointedly adds "among other things."

4. In the fourth question the common opinion denies it, because several absurdities would follow, for example, that a man would be called a sign of his own image. There are some, however, who admit that this and other such things are indeed abhorrent to common usage, but not to the philosophical sense, according to which whatever causes another thing to come to cognition is truly a sign.

5. Doubt 5: what is the form by which a spoken word is formally constituted in the being of a conventional sign? There are various opinions. Some say it is a real relational mode which the spoken word has toward the thing signified; others, a fictive relation of reason; others, a certain diminished being, intermediate between real being and a being of reason. All these are rejected by this one argument. That mode or entity resulting in the spoken word would have to be produced by the institutors of languages, since the signification of spoken words is attributed to them and depends solely upon their will. But that the will of the institutors of the Spanish language, for example, having passed away so many centuries ago, could now fabricate or physically produce anything while a word is being uttered by me is both incredible and impossible.

6. The true opinion, therefore, commonly held by our authors and by the Scotists, teaches that a spoken word is constituted in the being of a conventional sign by an extrinsic denomination, the form of which is the will of our forebears or of the people, insofar as it morally perseveres in the acceptance and memory of their descendants. For the spoken word "bull," for example, is constituted in the being of a sign by that through which it is rendered proximately apt to excite cognition of a bull. This excitation of cognition is signification in second act and, as it were, the effect of the sign. But that spoken word is thus rendered apt by the will of our forebears; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: both because through that will the word is assigned and ordained to cause us to come to cognition of a bull, and because, prescinding from anything else, provided we understand that the word has been destined by that will for such an office, we understand it to be a sign, and a bull immediately presents itself to our mind. This is clearly evident in other conventional signs, in which the same account holds. For what else causes the sound of a bell to signify Mass, or a branch to signify wine for sale, except human institution?

7. Objection 1: children and peasants do not know the will of their forebears, yet they know the signification of words. Add 1º that even learned men do not always think about such a will when they perceive spoken signs.

Add 2º that brute animals perceive conventional signs and sometimes even use them appropriately, as Fr. Lynce learnedly confirms by examples; yet they cannot perceive the will of the institutors, since that will is spiritual. I answer: the peasant knows the will of his forebears at least confusedly; for in his own way he knows that words signify thus because men so will and intend. For this reason, when he hears a word unknown to him, he often asks the speaker, "What do you mean?" The point is pressed: a peasant knows the value of money while ignorant of, or not thinking about, the will of the prince by which that value is constituted; he also knows himself to be joined in marriage without being able distinctly to explain the constitutive elements of marriage. Indeed, he knows the signification of words without knowing anything about relation, a being of reason, or diminished being. Let the same answer be given concerning children who already have the use of reason; of those before the use of reason I shall speak immediately.

8. The additions advance nothing. The first is answered as just stated, because even learned men do not actually think about the constitutive elements of very many things whenever they know or see those things in an ordinary way, just as they do not think about a being of reason or any other form by which you may choose to constitute spoken signs. Indeed, they often know the thing constituted with evidence while being entirely ignorant of its constitutive elements, or greatly doubting about them, as happens regarding the continuum. Whenever, therefore, a conventional sign is known, all its constitutive elements are known, and consequently the will of its institutors; for it is contradictory that a thing be known while its constitutive elements are not known. But they are known under the confused concept "sign of such a thing," not under express concepts of each individual constitutive element. The second addition tells against everyone; for whatever the form of a conventional sign consists in, it is not perceived by brute animals. Therefore brute animals perceive no conventional sign and use none. Whatever signs they give or perceive beyond nature are signs for them by habituation; and this consists in the facility acquired by a dog, for example, of renewing the species of some pleasing object upon materially hearing some name. Thus dogs are moved in the same manner by words that signify nothing, if they have been accustomed to them; and a parrot or magpie repeats not only the word "man" but the word "angel," without being able to perceive what that word signifies. The same should be understood of children before the use of reason.

9. Objection 2: the signification of words now exists, whereas the will of our forebears no longer exists. I answer: that will does not exist physically, but it exists morally, insofar as it perseveres in an effect left behind, namely

in the memory and acceptance of descendants. Thus the will of a legislator already dead, because it morally perseveres, truly obliges descendants to the commanded act. Thus also the will of a prince already deceased constitutes the value of money.

10. Objection 3: the will of the institutors has the signification of words for its object; therefore, lest it have itself for its object, it must be distinguished from signification. I answer: a threefold signification may be distinguished. One is in remote first act, consisting in the entity of the spoken word as of itself capable of being assumed as a sign. Another is in proximate first act, consisting in the proximate aptitude to excite cognition of some thing; and the present question concerns this signification, which we say is constituted by the will of our forebears, of which it is not the object but the formal effect. Another is signification in second act, consisting in the actual excitation of cognition of the object when the word is heard. This last is the object of the will of our forebears, who willed solely that, when the word was heard, such a cognition should be excited in the hearer; and by that very will they formally constituted the word in the being of a sign. That will, therefore, does not regard itself as object, because it does not will signification in first act but formally constitutes it; it wills only signification in second act, from which it is distinguished. One may object: if it wills signification in second act, it cannot fail to will the word to be a sign, which is to will signification in first act. I distinguish: it cannot fail to will this signatively or expressly: denied; exercitively: granted. But this is not absurd, because every volition exercitively wills itself, since each person wills because he wills. The whole solution may conveniently be explained by the example of the value of money or of legislative will.

11. Objection 4: a sign, formally considered, states a relation to the thing signified; but the will of our forebears is not a relation; therefore, etc. I answer by denying the minor premise, because that will is a transcendental relation of itself toward the thing signified and can denominatively render the spoken word predicamentally related to the same thing. But if you do not wish an extrinsic denomination to be a real relation and a relation "according to being," call it a relation "according to predication," or even a fundamental relation of reason; in this sense several authors should be understood when they say that a sign is constituted by a relation of reason.

12. Doubt 6: in what order does a spoken word signify the thing and the concept? We are not speaking of such words as "concept," "cognition," and the like, which certainly signify concepts alone. Nor are we speaking of the natural signification by which a spoken word, like any voluntary action, presupposes and therefore signifies a concept of itself. We are speaking,

then, of words that signify things distinct from a concept, and likewise of the concepts that the speaker has concerning those same things which he signifies by the word. The first opinion holds that the thing and the concept are signified by the spoken word equally principally. The second holds that only the concept is signified primarily and immediately, while the thing is signified secondarily and mediately. The third holds that the thing is signified primarily, principally, and directly, while the concept is signified secondarily, indirectly, and consequently. This is the common opinion of our authors together with the Excellent Doctor, 1 p., l. 2, *De Attribut. negativ.*, c. 31, nn. 6, 21. Indeed, it is the opinion of the great Augustine, as will immediately appear.

13. Proof: spoken words directly signify that which speakers intend to manifest when they speak seriously and are not hunting after the empty glory of subtlety. That this is not their own concepts but things is proved 1º because otherwise we would have to know our concepts reflexively whenever we speak, since no one directly intends to manifest what he does not first know. But, as experience itself testifies, we ordinarily speak about things without such reflection. Add that, if the word "man," for example, of itself presupposed two concepts in the speaker, one of man and another of the concept of man, whoever heard it would understand both concepts, which is likewise contrary to experience.

14. It is proved 2º: one who teaches and instructs others by speaking does not primarily and directly intend to manifest his own thoughts to his pupils, nor do they intend to be taught and to learn anything except things; therefore this is, or ought to be, the direct intention of speakers. St. Augustine expressly teaches the antecedent in *De magistro*, c. 14, saying: "Is this what teachers profess, that their thoughts should be perceived and retained, rather than the disciplines themselves which they suppose themselves to hand down by speaking?" He adds: "For who is so foolishly curious as to send his son to school in order to learn what the teacher thinks?" Therefore one who teaches or learns the mysteries of Faith directs his whole intention to the thing signified. Hence also this spoken proposition, "God is triune," is absolutely a truth of Faith and is absolutely to be believed by supernatural Faith; but it could not be such if its direct and primary signification were the concept of the speaker.

15. Confirmation from the same St. Augustine, *De Principiis dialecticae*, c. 7, where he speaks thus: "When a word is received as a sign, the mind looks at nothing other than the very thing of which the sign received is a sign; thus, when Augustine is named, he to whom I am known thinks of nothing other than myself; or something occurs to the mind of anyone who hears

this name, whether he does not know me or knows another who is called Augustine." Confirmation again: the speaker's concept is manifested to us differently by the spoken expression "I know a stone" than by the spoken word "stone." But by the first, the speaker's concept is manifested to us directly and principally, and the stone indirectly; therefore by the second the reverse is true. Add that these names, "Lion, Ram, Bull, etc.," are not and are not called names of concepts, but of things: "Adam called all living things by their own names" (Gen. 2).

16. Objection 1: we speak in order to manifest concepts and for the sake of human intercourse, which consists in the manifestation of concepts; nor were spoken signs instituted for any other end, and they would be superfluous if concepts could manifest themselves of themselves. Therefore the primary signification of spoken words regards concepts. Add the authority of Aristotle, who says that spoken words are signs of the passions that are in the soul. Likewise St. Thomas frequently teaches that a spoken word does not signify a thing except through the mediation of a concept. St. Augustine confirms this in *De doctrina Christiana*, l. II, c. 2, saying: "There is no cause for us to signify, that is, to give a sign, except to bring forth and convey into another's mind that which the person giving the sign bears in his own mind."

17. I answer: just as viceroys were instituted in provinces because the king cannot personally be present and govern everywhere, and, if he could, their institution would be superfluous, yet the primary office of viceroys is not to represent the king—otherwise they would not differ from a statue of the king—but to do what the king would do if he were present, namely to administer justice and provide counsel for the people; precisely so does it happen in the present matter. If concepts were outwardly manifest of themselves, spoken signs would not be necessary. But this indeed proves that they substitute for concepts, as a viceroy does for a king; it does not prove that the primary office of them all is to signify concepts, which belongs only to the spoken word "concept" and to others which are, as it were, statues of concepts. Rather, their office is to do the very thing which concepts do inwardly and would do outwardly if they were manifest, namely directly and immediately to signify things. Human intercourse indeed requires some spoken words directly imposed to signify concepts and movements of the soul, but it further requires many others primarily instituted to excite in another a cognition similar to that which is in us, and only secondarily a cognition of our cognition.

18. Furthermore, Aristotle's statement that spoken words are signs of concepts must be understood indirectly and secondarily; for elsewhere he

himself teaches, l. 1, *Elench.*, c. 1, that "we use spoken words, as though by gestures, in place of things," because we cannot bring the things themselves into disputation. St. Thomas may be explained as speaking of the mediation of the concept not as a more proximate thing signified, but as a measure, that is, an exemplar or rule which the spoken word imitates in signifying things outside the soul. For, as Fr. Suárez observes, cited c. 31, it is commonly said that words signify objective concepts and express formal concepts; just as an image of Caesar drawn according to the pattern of another image principally represents Caesar but expresses the other image. Hence words signify things as conceived, or as objected to concepts, with the word "as" reduplicating a prerequisite condition on the part of the speaker by way of a rule or norm of signification. In this sense, in the foregoing example, it may be said that image B represents Caesar as represented by image A, without thereby representing image A primarily. Finally, from St. Augustine's words it follows only that external signs are given so that we may cause those very objects which we bear in our mind to come to another's cognition.

19. Reply 1: the word "man" signifies a universal nature; therefore it directly signifies the concept by which the nature is rendered universal. 2º The word "man" signifies differently from the expression "rational animal"; but it does not signify a different thing; therefore it signifies a different concept. 3º Spoken words substitute for concepts, as we admit; therefore they supposit for them; therefore they directly signify them. I answer to 1º: the word "man" signifies human nature directly and universalitas indirectly or obliquely; nor does it otherwise signify a universal nature. To 2º, granting the premise, I distinguish the consequence: primarily and directly: denied; secondarily and indirectly: granted. To 3º: if supposition is nothing other than substitution, I grant the antecedent and the first consequence, but deny the second, because to substitute for another thing is not the same as directly to signify it. For when one image of a king is substituted for another, it does not directly signify the other image but the king. But if supposition is taken in the logical sense, insofar as it means the use of a term to manifest in an enunciation the matter "concerning which," the first consequence must be denied. Indeed, our opinion is thereby strongly confirmed; for spoken words directly signify that for which they are taken in an enunciation. But it is certain that they are taken, not for concepts, but for things; otherwise, for example, "Peter is a man" would be false, because the cognition "Peter" is not the cognition "man."

20. Objection 2: one who speaks otherwise than he conceives lies; therefore spoken words principally signify concepts. I answer by denying the

consequence, because for a lie it is sufficient that spoken words not conform to concepts in signifying things enunciatively. It is one thing that spoken words must conform to concepts, that is, imitate them in signifying; it is another that they must principally signify those same concepts. That obligation of conformity proves that concepts are rules or norms of spoken signs; but at the same time it establishes that, just as concepts directly and immediately signify things, so too do spoken words which imitate them. One frequently lies who outwardly says what is true contrary to his inward opinion, or who vocally enunciates the thing as it is in itself while thinking it to be otherwise. Therefore spoken words, even when they do not accord with the mind of the liar, can be rendered true provided the thing is as enunciated; therefore it is because they principally signify things. Add that, for a spoken enunciation to be rendered absolutely false, the indirect signification of the mental judgment could suffice.

21. Objection 3: writing directly and immediately signifies spoken words, and things only mediately and indirectly. For, as St. Augustine says in *De Principiis dialecticae*, c. 5: "What else do written letters show to the eyes but themselves, and beyond themselves spoken words to the mind?" Therefore the same must be said of spoken words in relation to concepts. I answer: many acknowledge a disparity, first from experience; for what immediately occurs to the imagination of one reading is the spoken words, whereas the concept of the speaker does not ordinarily occur in this way when vocal speech is heard. Second, from reason; because individual letters or characters taken separately signify nothing but various vocal sounds; therefore, when a complete written word is formed from them, it will signify solely or principally the spoken word.

22. Others, however, judge that writing too primarily and directly signifies things. First, because writers of history intend to signify to posterity, not their own words, but things that previously happened; and those who read books likewise intend to learn these things. Second, because one ignorant of the Latin language, although he reads a book written in Latin and the spoken words corresponding to those characters occur to his mind, does not thereby understand what the book signifies. Third, because otherwise no written proposition would be of Faith; indeed, none would be true. For this proposition, for example, "God is holy," if it directly signified spoken words, would yield the wholly false sense that the spoken word "God" is the spoken word "holy." Others may say that both spoken words and things are immediately signified by writing, but the thing directly and by way of an object that verifies, while the word is signified obliquely, or by way of an object merely manifested and not verifying. Thus, when you say

"creature of God," you immediately and expressly signify not only the creature but God as well; yet God is not signified directly and by way of the object that verifies, and therefore you can truly say, "a creature of God is something finite and limited." I prefer to leave this matter undecided.

CHAPTER II.
Doubts Concerning Definition.

1. Doubt 1: to which operation of the intellect does definition belong? The first opinion holds that a perfect definition is found only in judgment. Thus Fathers Hurtado, Compton, Quirós, whom Echlalez, Servera, and others follow. The second holds that it belongs to the first operation of the intellect, and consequently is found only in complex apprehension. Thus Fathers Oviedo, Alphonso, and frequently our more recent authors; the Thomists commonly hold the same. The third holds that it can belong to both the first and second operations and therefore is sometimes a judgment and sometimes an apprehension. Thus Fathers Arriaga, Lynce, Izquierdo, and others. Let our opinion be that perfect definition belongs to the first operation of the intellect in such a way that it cannot consist in judgment except insofar as judgment contains apprehension or is equivalent to apprehension.

2. Proof 1: this judgment, "Man is a rational animal," is not the definition of man except insofar as it formally or equivalently contains the apprehension "rational animal." Therefore definition so belongs to the first operation that it cannot consist in judgment adequately taken. Proof of the antecedent: first, that judgment, insofar as it contains the term "man," does not constitute the definition of man. First, because one of the rules of a good definition is that the thing defined must not enter into the definition; but the term "man" is the formal thing defined. Second, because a definition by its concept is an explanation of the thing defined and is clearer than the thing defined; but that term certainly is not an explanation of itself nor clearer than itself.

3. Next, that judgment, insofar as it contains the copula, is neither a definition nor part of one. First, because the copula is the application and union of the definition to the thing defined, as of a form to a subject; but union presupposes the form which it applies to the subject and is distinguished from it at least virtually or by reason. Second, because it is as true that in that judgment the definition is predicated of the thing defined as that in "A rational animal is a man" the thing defined is predicated of the definition, and that in "Man is an animal" the genus is predicated of the

species. But in these the copula does not constitute, but presupposes, the thing defined or the genus which it predicates. Therefore the same holds here.

4. Hence proof 2: it is an unshaken law of definition that it must be convertible or reciprocal with the thing defined, so that the whole definition is truly and aptly predicated of the thing defined—namely the objective definition as regards being, the formal definition as regards signifying—and conversely. But this law collapses if definition consists in judgment adequately taken; for one could then only falsely or ineptly say, "Man is a rational animal," or conversely. Therefore, etc. Indeed, otherwise it will never be true that the entire definition is predicated of the thing defined or subjected to it, but only a part of the definition. Proof 3 from the authority of Aristotle, who frequently teaches that a definition affirms or denies nothing and therefore is not called true or false, but good or bad. See, for example, *Perihermenias*, l. I, c. 4; *Posteriora analytica*, l. I, c. 8; l. II, c. 3. See also St. Thomas in those places and in others where he most plainly teaches our opinion, for example, *Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q. 16, a. 2; q. 17, a. 3; *De veritate*, q. 1, aa. 3, 12. Hence when the Philosopher says that in demonstration a definition is usually one of the premises, or even the conclusion, he is not speaking of definition according to itself, but insofar as it is applied to the thing defined for purposes of syllogizing.

5. From these things you will readily gather that the complex apprehension "rational animal," before it is inserted into a judgment, is fully and perfectly a definition. This is further proved. First, because the definition of definition applies to it, namely "an expression explaining the essence of a thing"; for it explains, or distinctly manifests, animal and rational, in which the essence of man consists. Second, because it is an expression consisting of proximate genus and ultimate difference, which all dialecticians judge sufficient for a perfect definition. Hence whatever is added to it in a judgment lies outside the character of perfect definition. But observe that, if the judgment "Man is a rational animal" is really indivisible, it will as a whole be a definition in the real sense, because it does not have parts of which one rather than another is the definition. No one denies this or brings it into question. But then the sense of our doctrine will be that judgment as such does not belong to the formal concept of definition, just as according to our adversaries it does not belong to the formal concept of the thing defined, although that same judgment is adequately identified with the thing defined. Therefore there must be distinguished in it by reason a part which is the definition, namely the tendency of the judgment precisely insofar as it is equivalent to definitive apprehension. This suffices to prevent

definition from being said absolutely to consist in judgment, just as, according to all, it suffices to prevent the thing defined from being said to consist in judgment.

6. Objection 1: a perfect definition is a perfect mode of knowing; but through apprehension separated from judgment nothing is known, as is clear in the apprehension "an even number of stars," through which we know nothing about whether the number of stars is even or odd. Confirmation: a mode of knowing is an expression; therefore a perfect mode of knowing is a perfect expression. But no apprehension is a perfect expression; therefore no apprehension is a perfect mode of knowing and consequently none can be a definition. I answer: if "mode of knowing" is taken strictly for an act generating knowledge properly so called, not even judgment is a mode of knowing, because demonstration alone generates knowledge. Hence the same difficulty presses our adversaries. But if a mode of knowing is the same as an expression manifesting what is unknown, as it is ordinarily defined in the *Summulae*, or, what comes to the same thing, a dialectical expression artfully declaring what is confusedly signified by the simple name of the thing, then certainly the apprehension "rational animal" is a perfect mode of knowing, since it artfully declares the essence of man which is confusedly signified by the name "man."

7. The apprehension "an even number of stars" is not a mode of knowing: first, because the definition of a mode of knowing as commonly explained does not apply to it; second, because it belongs to those apprehensions to which the objects supply no foundation and which are called non-suasive because they do not incline to assent. A definitive apprehension, however, must be among suasive apprehensions which incline to assent, as I shall presently say. To the confirmation: here is an evident counterexample: a worm is an animal; therefore a perfect worm is a perfect animal. But none of these little animals is called a perfect animal, as is established in the *Animastica*; therefore none can be called a perfect worm. Something, therefore, can belong to an imperfect genus and yet be called perfect in its species because it possesses all the perfection that can belong to such a species.

8. Objection 2: the definition of definition applies to the judgment "Man is a rational animal," for it is an expression explaining the essence of a thing. I distinguish: insofar as that judgment contains the apprehension "rational animal," or insofar as it is equivalent to it: granted; insofar as it contains the expression "man": denied. For in this respect it is not the definition but the thing defined; it does not explain but is explained. Reply: by the force of the apprehension "rational animal" alone, we do not yet know what man is until

we compare that object with man, and this comparison is made through judgment. Likewise, we do not know of what thing it is an explanation until the identity of that object with man appears. Add that definition states a relation to the thing defined, which must therefore be in the mind at the same time. I answer: in the first place, for all these points it is enough that the apprehension "man" exist in the mind at the same time, together with a reflexive apprehension comparing the definition with the thing defined and apprehending the identity or agreement of the two.

9. Next, although we do not yet know what man is by comparative cognition, we nevertheless know it by absolute cognition of that quiddity which belongs to man; for to know the quiddity of man is truly to know what man is. Thus through the apprehension "man" the nature common to Peter and Paul is known, but it is known absolutely, not comparatively, until reflexive comparison supervenes. Nor must a definition signatively state of what thing it is an explanation; it need only be such, and propose the essence of the thing so vividly, that the intellect, if it penetrates the terms, cannot deny that essence of the thing to which it belongs nor apply it to another. Thus a proper portrait of a man, although it does not bear the inscription "man," does not thereby cease to be his perfect image; indeed it would be imperfect if it needed such an inscription. A transcendental relation to the thing defined suffices, just as according to our adversaries a transcendental relation of the thing defined to the definition suffices. One may object: the aforesaid apprehension does not explain man through genus and difference, for it does not mention man. I answer: a definition need explain a thing through genus and difference in no other way than by explaining those primary predicates which are the very thing. One may object again: through a definition an answer is given to one who asks, "What is man?" But the answer is given by an enunciation. I answer: the definition is not the whole answer, but only that part which the questioner desires to know, namely the predicate.

10. Objection 3: in these judgments, "A lion is a rational animal," "Man is not a rational animal," there is no definition of man, although the apprehension "rational animal" is present. Confirmation: one who has the aforesaid apprehension can still be indifferent to affirming or denying that man is a rational animal; for it can happen that, led by some apparent reason, he denies it or at least doubts it. But one who is so disposed does not properly know what man is, as seems evident; therefore, etc.

11. I answer to the objection: in those judgments there is a definition of man. For the first is false precisely because it applies to the lion a definition that belongs to another, namely to man; therefore it contains that definition.

The second is not true precisely because it denies the definition of its own thing defined; therefore it expresses that definition. Certainly St. Thomas, in the places cited above at no. 4, plainly supposes that through judgment a definition can be applied to a thing of which it is not the definition. To the confirmation, granting the major premise, I distinguish the minor premise: he does not properly know what man is by comparative cognition of man with his quiddity: granted; by absolute cognition of the quiddity of man, which is purely definitive cognition: denied, as are the minor premise and consequence. Although discursive or judicative knowledge necessarily excludes doubt, error, or indifference of the intellect regarding the same object, purely definitive knowledge does not, since it neither requires comparison with the thing defined, as we saw in no. 9, nor is knowledge in the strict sense, as is clear from no. 6.

12. This argument can be answered in another, and perhaps truer, way, namely: not every apprehension of essential predicates suffices for a definition. Rather, an apprehension is required that is so clear, perspicuous, and complete that, if judgment is then made, it necessitates the intellect not to apply such a quiddity to an alien subject and not to deny it of its proper subject; just as a portrait of a man, if perfect, necessitates the intellect neither to deny that it is of a man nor to judge that it is of a lion. Apprehensions of this sort are called "suasive" because they propose the object so vividly that they strongly incline toward judgment and, though they do not necessitate judgment as to exercise, they necessitate it as to specification by radically excluding the contrary judgment. Hence, although they are not formal judgments because formally they affirm or deny nothing, they are nevertheless virtual or radical judgments insofar as they move toward judging and are equivalent to judgment in their power of rendering the intellect certain. Such is the apprehension of first principles; such also is that which results from seeing a present object, or whenever we perceive an object with an exceedingly strong motive for judging. In a certain way the cognitions of brute animals are also such: although they are not and cannot be judgments, they nevertheless render the internal sense certain concerning the pleasantness of the object.

13. A definitive apprehension, therefore, must be of this character, as is clear from the very office of a mode of knowing, or "manifestation of what is unknown"; for it will not render the object properly known and manifest unless it proposes it with such clarity that doubt or error concerning it cannot coexist. This is what others commonly mean when they say that the intellect does not properly define unless it penetrates the terms, and that once the terms have been penetrated it cannot apply the definition to an

alien subject or doubt to which thing it belongs. Certainly, according to Aristotle, definition is the middle term in demonstration; but nothing can be a middle term in demonstration unless it is evidently apprehended. One may object: the apprehension "rational animal," although not suasive, nevertheless consists of genus and difference and is an expression explaining the essence of man, since it distinctly proposes his essential predicates. But we desire nothing else for a perfect definition.

14. I press the point with this conjectural judgment: "Perhaps man is a rational animal." This is neither the definition of man nor a mode of knowing, since through it one does not properly know what man is and doubt is not excluded; yet nothing appears to be lacking for it to be a perfect definition according to our adversaries. If you say that evidence or clarity is lacking, which belongs to the concept of a mode of knowing, consider the same answer to have been given by us. Therefore, although a non-suasive apprehension can in some way consist of genus and difference and be some explanation of the essence of a thing, it never fulfills these offices perfectly, that is, with the clarity belonging to the concept of a mode of knowing and therefore to the essence of definition, whose proximate genus is mode of knowing; just as whatever belongs to the essence of animal belongs to the essence of man.

15. Hence, as to the objection and confirmation at no. 10, it must be denied that the intellect can join those judgments with an apprehension that is perfectly definitive, or that such an apprehension leaves room for indifference, doubt, or error. Therefore, whenever the intellect forms those judgments, it will indeed have the apprehension "rational animal," but it will not penetrate the terms; nor will that apprehension be suasive or properly and perfectly definitive. It will instead be an incomplete apprehension, or at least one not conceived from the proper merits of the object.

16. Objection 4: if definition can consist in apprehension, it can also consist in material vision, especially if the vision is clear. I deny the consequence, because material vision is not a mode of knowing but a sensation; nor does it form genus and difference or distinctly explain the essences of things. Finally, observe that division also does not necessarily require judgment but can be preserved in apprehension, for example: "One part of man is body, another is rational soul." Nothing, however, prevents it from often consisting in judgment, for example: "One part of man is body, etc." For in division the arguments we gave above concerning definition do not apply.

17. Doubt 2: whether definition is a mode of knowing distinct from division? We resolved this doubt affirmatively in the *Summulae* with regard

to accidental, integral, and essential potential division. As regards actual essential division, some answer negatively; for each of these divisions, "One part of man is body, another rational soul," "One part of man is animal, another rational," is no less an expression explaining the essence of man, both physical and metaphysical, than the customary definitions of man. Therefore the definition of definition, and being an essence, apply to both.

18. Others, on the contrary, acknowledge a distinction, at least on the part of the mode of tending; for definition tends in a compositive manner, namely by joining parts into one essence, whereas division tends in a resolutive manner, namely by distributing or resolving a whole into its parts. This diversity suffices for different species of mode of knowing, just as a diversity in the mode of tending suffices for different species of complex enunciation, as is clear in copulative and disjunctive enunciations concerning the same extremes. This second opinion appears more probable, especially because division ought to express the divided whole by its proper name, at least obliquely, whereas definition ought rather to abstain from mentioning the thing defined. To the foundation of the first opinion it may be said that division does not properly explain the essence of a thing, because under the name "essence" the parts are not taken distributively but conjointly.

DISPUTATION II.
ON THE TRUTH AND FALSITY OF ENUNCIATIONS.

CHAPTER I.
In What Does the Truth of Enunciations Consist? And Does Every True Enunciation Essentially Require It?

1. We are not speaking of transcendental truth, which is a property of being as such and belongs even to a false enunciation, as it does to every real being. It is said to consist in the intrinsic knowability of things or, as others prefer, in the intrinsic necessity of things to conform to the Divine Ideas. We are speaking, therefore, of the truth of enunciations insofar as they correspond to their objects. This is called "formal truth" and throughout the schools is commonly defined as "conformity of the act with the object." This definition is taken from the Philosopher's dictum: "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is said to be true or false." For an enunciation to be formally true, therefore, is for it intentionally to conform to the object, when it stands in representing as the object stands in being. Conversely, for it to be formally false is for it to lack that conformity or to become disconformed to the object in the character of an intentional image. Hence formal falsity is defined as "disconformity of the act with the object." Thus this act, "Peter runs," is true when Peter is running and false when he is not running.

§ 1. The True Opinion Concerning the Constitutive Principle of Truth Is Chosen and Proved.

2. Various opinions are current concerning the constitutive principle of Truth. The principal are four. The first holds that Truth is a relation of the act to the object, distinct from both, which some wish to be a relation of reason and others a real relation. But against this is 1º that God's knowledge is true from eternity without there being from eternity a being of reason, and without any real relational mode ever being able to exist in God. 2º Even in us, before any relation of reason is fabricated, a heretical proposition is entirely false and a Catholic proposition entirely true. 3º The real relation consisting in a superadded mode remains rejected from the preceding Treatise. 4º Once these relations are excluded, merely by understanding that Peter is really running and that the act affirms this, one fully understands that the act is true.

3. The second opinion teaches that Truth is adequately identified with the act. This can be understood in two ways: either in the sense in which the Connotators identify a relation with its foundation alone, so that nevertheless the act can fail to be true merely from the failure of the object as a purely extrinsic connotate; or in the sense of Fr. Hurtado, to be reported below. But the former sense is displeasing in light of what was said in the preceding Treatise concerning relation; the latter will be rejected below. The third opinion constitutes the Truth of an act contingently true through the act and object, but the Truth of a necessarily true act through the act alone. We shall later show, however, that the same account holds in both. The fourth generally states that Truth stands in the complex of act and object, so that by this name "Truth" the act is imported directly and the object obliquely, and consequently the denomination "true" is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic to the act: intrinsic insofar as it involves the act itself, extrinsic insofar as it imports the object. This is the common opinion in our school together with the Excellent Doctor, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 8, sect. 2, and appears to me more probable than the others, although Fr. Hurtado with several others most sharply opposes it.

4. Proof: the conformity of the act with the object is constituted from the act and object; therefore so too is Truth, which is defined through that conformity. Proof of the antecedent: for the act to be conformable to the object is for it to represent the object as it is, or for it to stand in representing as the object stands in being. But this constitutively includes

the act and object. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise, 1º by parity with physical likeness or agreement, by which, for example, Peter and Paul are conformable in the being of man. For this physical conformity includes both extremes for no other reason than that Peter's being thus conformed to Paul consists precisely in Peter's standing in the being of man as Paul stands. Therefore, likewise, for an act to stand in representing as the object stands in being necessarily includes both the representation of the act and the very being of the object. The consequence seems evident. The antecedent is proved by Hurtado where he treats Relation and can be proved against others by the arguments adduced in the preceding Treatise. Add the parity of an artificial image, whose conformity with its prototype is constituted from the image and prototype, as Hurtado admits. The same, therefore, must be said of an intentional image.

5. 2º By reason: those are the constitutive elements of any thing which, once posited, cause the thing to be understood as constituted, and any one of which, if mentally excluded or prescinded from, causes the thing immediately to be understood as failing. This appears to be an entirely firm principle for discovering the constitutive elements of things and is established by constant induction. But once this act, "Peter runs," is posited and understood, merely by further understanding that Peter really runs, you understand that the act represents the object as it is and is entirely true; and conversely, if you mentally exclude or prescind from either object or act, you understand that this conformity immediately fails or does not remain complete. Therefore, etc. The minor premise appears undeniable: for who can conceive that by that act Peter's running is represented as it is while prescinding either from the representation or from the fact that Peter really runs?

6. One may object from Fr. Hurtado: when the object is excluded, Truth fails, not from the defect of the object alone but from the defect of the essential requirement, identified with the act, that the object be as enunciated. Thus an action cannot exist without its term, nor the power of a cause without the possibility of the effect; yet an action is not thereby constituted by its term, etc. But against this, 1º because in many acts no such requirement exists, as will appear below. Against this, 2º because even if one prescinds from such a requirement, or does not know that it belongs to the act, or by possibility or impossibility conceives it to persevere, one will still understand the Truth of this act, "Peter runs," to fail merely because one sees that Peter is not running. Nor will one need any other reason or motive for this, nor await the failure of some other entity in reality in order unhesitatingly to believe that the act is not true, because by that very fact

one plainly sees that Peter's running is not represented as it is. Truth therefore fails from failure of the object not merely inferentially, or through an extrinsic ground, as in the example of action or the power of a cause, but through an intrinsic ground, or "immediately," as we said in our proof. Hence such a requirement, even in acts in which it exists, lies outside the concept of formal Truth; for although you prescind entirely from such a requirement, you will still conceive the act as true precisely because it represents the object as it is, whether it requires this or not. It is certainly one thing to conform to an object, and another to require conformity, as will appear from the examples in no. 8.

7. Hence you will gather that the object also constitutes the formal Truth of acts which are necessarily true. This necessity sometimes arises solely from the nature of the object, which is of itself necessary, as if someone from merely human testimony says, "God is triune"; sometimes from the intrinsic perfection of the act alone, as if someone by a natural intuitive act or by an act of supernatural Faith affirms an object in itself contingent; sometimes from both sources, as in the Vision of the Blessed concerning the existence of God, or in a supernatural act concerning any necessary object, and in necessary Divine knowledge. When this necessity arises from the perfection of the act, whether the object is necessary in itself or not, it is called and is radical Truth—or rather, not so much Truth as a requirement of Truth—otherwise called Certainty. But even then it does not belong to the concept of formal Truth, because no one explains formal Truth through a requirement of conformity or a connection of the act with the object, but through actual conformity, which is, as it were, the terminus of that requirement and is really but inadequately distinguished from it, since it is constituted through the object.

8. Thus, although an existing creature necessarily requires coexistence with God and cannot fail to be unlike and unequal to God in perfection, nevertheless the actual coexistence, unlikeness, or inequality itself is not adequately identified with the creature but is also constituted through God. Likewise, the denomination "hot" is no less inadequately distinguished from a subject intrinsically requiring it than from a subject not requiring it, as is clear in fire and hot water. Hence you will similarly gather that the object constitutes the formal truth of Divine knowledge insofar as terminated at creatures, as the Excellent Doctor expressly teaches in *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 17.

9. What we have said concerning Truth should be understood proportionately of Falsity: namely, that it is a part extrinsic to the act and is inadequately distinguished from it. There is, however, this difference: Truth

is constituted through the object insofar as the object is as it is enunciated, whereas Falsity is constituted through the object insofar as it is not as enunciated. This is to be constituted through the privation of the object, whatever that privation consists in, which is treated in Metaphysics, or through something on the part of the object incompatible with conformity between act and object. Examples are the Falsity of these acts: "Antichrist exists," "Man is a lion." It should be noted, however, that what we have thus far said concerns affirmative Enunciations, because all dispute about these in the present question. If we speak of negative enunciations, Truth appears to be constituted through privation of the object, but Falsity through the object, as will be clear to one who considers the matter. It should further be noted that this and the following question concern only acts distinct from their object; for if an act is identified with the object, as Divine knowledge insofar as God contemplates Himself, no one doubts that formal Truth is adequately identified with the act.

§ 2. Not Every Enunciation That Is True Essentially or Intrinsically Requires Truth.

10. This conclusion does not depend upon the preceding one; for although someone grants to every Enunciation a requirement of Truth, nevertheless, since this requirement is only quasi-radical Truth, he could still constitute formal Truth through something else distinct from the act. Nothing prevents one thing from being essentially connected with another thing either adequately or inadequately distinct from it. Thus action is connected with its term, and cognition with its formal effect or the denomination "known," which is constituted from cognition and object. Repeat what was said in nn. 7 and 8. Conversely, although someone asserts that Truth is contingent upon the act, he could constitute it through the act alone, as the Connotators do. Moreover, we do not deny that Divine knowledge and created Enunciations which are supernatural, or natural and intuitive, or otherwise evident, possess radical Truth; or, what comes to the same thing, intrinsically require formal Truth, either essentially or, if a natural act is in question, at least naturally. The question remains only concerning natural abstractive and non-evident acts. In this matter Fr. Hurtado, *De anima*, disp. 9, from § 36, whom few follow, opposes us, holding that formal Truth is adequately identified with every true act, so that it is not contingent upon the act but is rooted in its essence as a metaphysical property.

11. Nevertheless, the stated conclusion is held by almost everyone and is proved thus: this act, "Peter runs in the marketplace," which I suppose to be true but elicited from a fallible motive—for example, from the authority of a single witness or from the fact that Peter usually runs in the marketplace at this hour each day—could have been elicited numerically the same even if Peter were not running; but then it would be false. Therefore it is of itself indifferent to being true or false, and consequently does not essentially require Truth. Proof of the major premise: if Peter were not running, all the principles and causes now influencing that act could still exist, namely the same intellect, the same species, the same motive. Peter's running does not influence such an act in any genus of cause, since it is supposed absent and distant. None of these things is necessarily connected with the existence of Peter's running, and from these same principles, according to our adversaries, another false act of similar tendency would flow if Peter were not running. But when the same principles remain entirely unchanged, there is no reason why the same act could not be elicited; for, as the proverb says, "The same thing, remaining the same, is always naturally apt to do the same." Therefore, etc.

12. The objection is pressed: that act is in no respect connected with the existence of Peter's running. First, not by reason of any causal influx, as seems evident and is not denied by our adversaries. Next, not by reason of representation, even enunciative representation; for the false judgment "Peter runs in the marketplace" enunciatively represents the same existence of the running and is not connected with it. Finally, not by reason of any principle of itself repugnant to falsity, such as the habit of supernatural Faith; for no principle of that act is of itself repugnant to falsity—not the intellect, not the species, not the motive. What, then, causes that act to depend so greatly upon the existence of the object? One may object that it depends upon it as upon an extrinsic condition without which the principles of the act cannot influence, just as an act of Faith concerning a future object depends upon the futurition of the object as upon an extrinsic condition.

13. But against this, 1º because it appears sufficiently harsh that a natural opinative act should be no less intrinsically certain than an act of supernatural Faith. Yet Fr. Hurtado both supposes this, since he places an excess of certainty only on the part of the principles, and it evidently follows from his opinion, since each act is essentially unable to exist unless the object is as enunciated. And indeed, if the principles of a supernatural act possess greater certainty in themselves, why do they not communicate it to the act? Against this, 2º because in the habit of Faith there is a foundation for repugnance to the falsity of the act, namely its supernaturality, which makes

God the special Author of every act of Faith; and therefore that habit cannot influence toward any false act. But no principle of the act in our case is supernatural; indeed, there is none which of itself could not influence toward a false act. Against this, 3º because the futurition of the object is a condition necessary for an act of Faith precisely because without it the motive of Faith, which is Divine revelation or the testimony of God, cannot exist. But without the existence of Peter's running, the motive for judging that we assigned in no. 11 can undoubtedly exist in our case.

14. One may object again that a true act is connected with the existence of the running as with its formal object, for no act can exist without an object. But against this: the false judgment "Peter runs in the marketplace," conceived from the same fallible motive, has the same formal object. First, because it signatively represents and affirms the same thing as the true act. Second, because it is rendered false by the absence of the existing running, and no act is rendered false except through the absence of its own object. Third, because, if it has a different formal object, how does it say absolutely nothing about that object? Yet that false act certainly is not connected with the existence of the running by reason of its formal object. How an act can fail to exist without an object will be explained in the following chapter.

15. Other, not ineffective proofs of the same conclusion are commonly adduced. 1º From examples: first, that of an external image, which of itself can now be conformable, now disconformable to its prototype solely through a change in the prototype; second, that of a spoken enunciation, which according to our adversaries, even in the being of a sign, does not possess a requirement of Truth, although, with the same signification or institution of our forebears remaining, it cannot fail to signify what it once signifies. 2º From reason: a true and a false act having this tendency, "Peter runs," and conceived from the same fallible testimony, are of the same species. First, because there is no source from which they could derive a specific diversity, since they agree in principles, object, and mode of tending. Second, because species are not to be multiplied without necessity, as is a standard principle in philosophy; but here there is no necessity, since the diversity of the denominations "true" and "false" can be preserved solely through change in the object in its physical being, as may be seen in an external image and also in the physical denominations "similar" and "dissimilar," "equal" and "unequal." But if the contrary opinion is true, those acts are not of the same species, since they differ in an essential predicate.

16. 3º From absurdity: it follows from the contrary opinion that an Angel or demon could by his own light know evidently the secrets of hearts and future contingents that depend upon free choice, if, for example, he judged

probably, or even rashly or from the slightest basis, that Peter will sin tomorrow or now has an internal sinful consent. For if it happens that such a judgment is true, it will be essentially connected with the object as being, or going to be, as enunciated. Therefore, since the Angel or demon comprehensively knows that judgment of his own, he will evidently know in it, as in a middle term, that the object really is or will be thus. It likewise follows that supernatural beings, and even the mystery of the Trinity itself, can be evidently known in a natural medium, if the act by which someone believes from merely human authority that God is triune is comprehensively known, or if someone comprehends those acts by which heretics believe several mysteries of Faith. The same absurdity follows—as may be noted in passing—if truth consists in a Thomistic relational mode, for according to its authors this mode is essentially connected with its term. One may object from Hurtado that concurrence is not owed to an Angel for the certain cognition of futures or the secrets of hearts and consequently not for penetrating an object connected with them. Against this: according to all, concurrence is owed to an Angel for knowing the secrets of his own heart, that is, his own natural acts actually existing. But this, if your opinion is true, absurdly entails that concurrence is likewise owed to him for knowing futures and the secrets of another's heart.

17. From what has been said you will gather that acts concerning necessary matter, if they are natural, opinative, or non-evident, are contingently true so far as they themselves are concerned, although because of the immutability of the object they cannot be false. For example, when someone from the mere authority of a teacher judges that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, that judgment is necessarily true by reason of the object, not by reason of itself, or not intrinsically; and consequently it would remain numerically the same if, by possibility or impossibility, the object were otherwise. The reason is, first, because nothing compels us to posit an intrinsic requirement in the act, since the necessity of Truth is preserved by the merits of the object alone. Second, because that act rests on a motive of itself fallible and otherwise has no intrinsic principle repugnant to Falsity. Third, because otherwise it would follow that something natural is immediately and essentially connected with the Divine Trinity, namely an act of human faith concerning which we spoke in the preceding number, and consequently that the Trinity could be evidently known in that act as in a middle term.

18. But understand that these acts are not connected with their objects under the special title of Enunciation or Truth, whatever may be the case with another general title under which, according to several authors, every

being is connected with every other. If this is true, it will indeed make those acts connected with their objects, but no more and in no other manner than with other things that are not objects, or than a lion with an eagle; nor, according to its defenders, is this connection such that every being becomes a suitable middle term for distinctly knowing all others through created comprehensive cognition.

CHAPTER II.
Arguments Against the Doctrine of the Preceding Chapter Are Refuted.

1. The arguments now to be resolved can be directed against both conclusions of the preceding chapter, for they tend to prove that formal Truth is adequately intrinsic to the act and consequently essential to every act, unless we have recourse to a relational mode or to connotates unseen by us. Objection 1: if Truth consists in act and object, it will denominate both "formally true," just as, because the likeness of two whitenesses consists in both, it denominates both "similar." I answer by denying the consequence, because the denomination "formally true" determinately requires a representing act as its subject; for Truth is defined as "conformity of the act with the object," not "conformity of the object with the act." The object, therefore, is not capable of the denomination "formally true" from the form, or quasi-form, of Truth, although from it the object is in some way denominated similar or conformable to the act; for to be true is not to be conformable in any manner whatever, but to be conformable by way of an intentional image. The likeness of two whitenesses denominates each extreme because by force of its definition it is not determined more to one than to the other, and because each is capable of the denomination. The opposite occurs in relations of disparity, against which the objection can be pressed; for although the inequality of two quantities is constituted from both, it does not thereby denominate both "greater" or both "less."

2. Objection 2: the object is called the measure of the Truth of the act; but the measure is distinguished from the measured. I press the point: an external image in the being of a true or conformable image is measured by the object; therefore the object does not constitute that conformity. Likewise, substantial form is called the measure of the perfection of the physical composite, and the specific difference is called the measure of the perfection of the species; therefore neither is intrinsically constitutive of the measured thing. I answer: one measure is extrinsic, as a yardstick with respect to cloth, or even the specifying object with respect to the

representation alone of an act; and this is adequately distinguished from what it measures. Another is intrinsic and constitutive of the measured thing, from which it must be distinguished only inadequately, as in the examples just adduced and also in our case, in which the object, although extrinsic to the act taken specifically, is intrinsic to Truth, or to the act as true.

3. Objection 3: if Truth is constituted through the object, several absurdities follow. 1º The Truth of Divine Knowledge concerning sin will be morally evil, since it is constituted from a morally evil object; for, as they say, "evil arises from any defect." 2º The Truth of my cognition enunciating the Knowledge of God will be simply infinite, indeed entirely equal to the Truth of Divine Knowledge concerning my cognition, since each Truth has entirely the same constitutive elements. 3º The Truth of this act, "A goat-stag is a chimera," will be an impossible and chimerical Truth, for that is chimerical one constitutive element of which is a chimera. 4º Something could exist at present while its constitutive elements do not exist, for the Truth of this act, "Troy existed," exists at present although its object does not now exist. I answer: all these difficulties are evidently paralleled in the denomination "known," which certainly is constituted from object and act.

4. For it likewise follows, 1º that Divine Knowledge concerning sin of itself gives rise to a formal effect that is morally evil, and that for sin "to be known by God" is something evil. 2º That God's Knowledge is "known by me" just as perfectly as my cognition is "known by God," since each denomination has entirely the same constitutive elements. 3º That the denomination "known," falling upon a goat-stag, is an impossible and chimerical denomination. 4º That the denomination "known" now exists without the subject from which it is intrinsically constituted, namely that which arises from this cognition, "Troy existed," or from others concerning a future, past, or purely possible object. Whatever, therefore, our adversaries say here, let them consider it said to themselves in our matter.

5. I answer, therefore, to 1º: that Truth of Divine knowledge is morally evil not as regards what is direct, nor absolutely or formally, but as regards what is oblique, and this merely materially. The reason is that Truth receives absolutely or formally only those denominations of which the act is capable, since the act is signified directly not only by the name "true act" but also by the name "Truth." But the act of Divine knowledge is not capable of the denomination "morally evil," just as no other cognition enunciating a sin is, when it in no way influences toward that sin; for, on the supposition that another sins, it is not evil to know the sin as it is. Add that sin does not communicate the denomination "evil" to every constituted whole of which it

is a part, at least when the constituted whole imports, either directly or formally, another co-part which is neither cause nor effect of the sin. This is clear, first, in Justification, which is constituted through sin as through the term from which; second, in the Sacrament of Penance, which according to Cardinal de Lugo and others is obliquely constituted through past sins; third, in the relation of God's Coexistence with, or Opposition to, sin, which is constituted through the term.

6. These examples will clarify the sense of the saying, "evil arises from any defect." It must be understood of the defect of some circumstance or part among those which the constituted whole ought to possess but does not; thus a human action is called evil if even one of its due circumstances is lacking. But we deny that anything due is lacking to the Truth of which we are speaking. Reply: God loves the Truth of His knowledge concerning sin. I distinguish: radical Truth: granted; formal Truth: I further distinguish: He loves it according to what is direct: granted; according to what is oblique: denied. For God to be said absolutely to love some constituted whole, it suffices that love presuppose all the constitutive elements and terminate at the principal ones. For in no other sense does God absolutely love our Justification, the Sacrament of Penance, and His Opposition to sin. Thus God also loves a just man with the love of friendship, although with that love He does not and cannot love prime matter.

7. To 2°, I deny the consequence absolutely and in the formal sense, or in the order of the proper denominations of each Truth. For although materially, that is, insofar as they constitute a pair or complex, there is no inequality, since a pair composed of creature and God is no more imperfect than a pair composed of God and creature, nevertheless these constitutive elements are imported differently by the name "Truth of created cognition" and by the name "Truth of Divine Knowledge." By the first name created cognition is imported as what is direct, that is, as the unique subject of denominations; by the second name Divine cognition alone is so imported. Hence it follows that the first Truth is neither equal to the second nor infinite: first, because its direct subject is incapable of such denominations; second, because the infinity of the object, although included in Truth adequately taken, remains extrinsic to the act and consequently, although it gives the act a partly extrinsic denomination, such as "true," it cannot give it the denomination "simply infinite," which by its nature requires intrinsic communication. For this reason the coexistence of a creature with God is not infinite, nor equal to the coexistence of God with the creature, although each imports the same constitutive elements.

8. To 3º: the consequence is absolutely false, because to say that the Truth of that act is impossible absolutely signifies that that act cannot be conformed to the object; but it is undoubtedly conformed to it. Nor is it an obstacle that it is constituted from a chimerical object, because it enunciates that object as chimerical; and Truth in its own order is called possible when it is constituted from an object such as it is enunciated by the act. But, lest we become entangled in terms, I distinguish thus: the Truth of that act will be impossible and chimerical according to what is direct: denied; according to what is oblique: I further distinguish: according to what is oblique it will be chimerical as a being: granted; as a verifying object, that is, in the order of denominating the act "conformable to the object": denied, because in this sense no chimera is chimerical or impossible. Or somewhat differently: according to what is oblique it will be chimerical in the order of real existence: granted; in the order of intentional existence proportioned to it: denied, for in this way no object is chimerical. But the proposition "That is a chimera one constitutive element of which is a chimera" should be distinguished thus: if it is a constituted whole of the real order: granted; if of the intentional order: I further distinguish: if even one constitutive element is a chimera both as a being and as a verifying object, or both in the order of intentional existence and in that of real existence: granted; otherwise: denied.

9. To 4º: the Truth of propositions concerning a past, future, or purely possible object does not exist wholly physically when the act exists; it is said to exist wholly only in a moral manner, insofar as the object enunciated, just as it was, will be, or can be, corresponds to those propositions in the same way as an object enunciated as it now is corresponds to propositions concerning a present object. For this reason the past object, etc., as regards its office of verifying, is esteemed by prudent persons as though present, which is for it now to exist morally. Certainly several constituted wholes, either successive or after the manner of successive things, are said absolutely to exist through the existence of one part and do not require the simultaneous existence of all; indeed, they often exclude it. Such is the denomination "known," discussed at no. 4; likewise the denomination "prior" or "later in time." Thus a man is called "old," or a house "ancient," through past years. Thus also this day or this hour is called absolutely "present," although only an indivisible part of the day or hour can be physically present.

10. Objection 4: Truth is a perfection of the intellect; therefore it is not constituted through the object, for nothing is rendered better or worse by an extrinsic form. Proof of the antecedent, 1º because Truth stands to the

intellect as goodness to the will; but goodness is a perfection of the will or consists wholly in its acts. 2º Because Truth is an Attribute of God, who Himself is called "Truth." 3º Because error, or falsity of acts of the intellect, is an imperfection of the mind; for this reason it is repugnant to the Divine mind, and for this reason the habit of erring, or of judging falsely, is a great imperfection of the human mind; and for this reason also it is not lawful to lie or deceive others. 4º Because the intellect innately desires Truth and innately recoils from falsity; but an innate appetite seeks or avoids only intrinsic good or evil.

11. The objection is first answered by a parallel case: the Truth of external speech is not intrinsic to the words or the speaker; yet this Truth too is called a perfection of the speaker, just as an external lie is called and is no slight imperfection. For this reason an external lie is repugnant to God when He outwardly speaks to men; and for this reason it is not lawful for us to deceive anyone by a vocal lie. Likewise for this reason a facility or habit of speaking barbarously, perjuring, or blaspheming, even without internal advertence, is judged a great imperfection. If you say that vocal Truth or lying is a perfection or imperfection not formally but, first, inferentially, insofar as it is thereby inferred that the speaker is truthful or lying in mind, and second, causally, insofar as several goods or evils thereby arise in the hearers, we may say precisely the same.

12. Therefore radical Truth, which inheres in acts intrinsically true—such as scientific acts and others discussed in the preceding chapter, no. 7—is a physical perfection both of the act itself, with which it is wholly identified, and of the intellective faculty in which it physically inheres. Hence also formal truth which presupposes radical truth is a physical perfection of the mind in comparison with Falsity, not according to its whole self, but only according to what is direct, namely according to the representation of the act, which in acts radically true is always physically better than in others. But purely formal Truth, separated from radical Truth, such as exists in contingently true acts, is not a physical perfection in comparison with Falsity, whether taken adequately or as regards what is direct. For this opinative act, "Peter runs," does not physically and formally perfect the intellect more when true than when false.

13. Yet although this purely formal Truth in comparison with falsity is not a physical perfection of the mind formally, that is, immediately and by reason of itself, it is nevertheless so inferentially and causally: inferentially, insofar as it ordinarily presupposes acuteness and diligence of the intellect or prudence in judging even contingent things; causally, insofar as many advantages for human life are derived from the conformity of judgment with

things and many evils are avoided, since the will and other faculties depend upon the guidance of judgment. For these reasons formal Truth may be called a "moral perfection," because it is morally estimable or prudently desirable, and because in the estimation of prudent persons the intellect stands better with Truth than with Falsity, on the basis of those goods which are presupposed and follow. The same reasoning, with due proportion, must be applied to Falsity or formal error in determining whether it is or is not called an imperfection of the mind. Hence, to the objection, speaking of a perfection which physically and formally perfects, I distinguish the antecedent: radical Truth, or formal Truth founded upon it as regards what is direct, is a perfection of the intellect: granted; formal Truth adequately taken, or even purely formal Truth taken as regards what is direct and comparatively with Falsity: antecedent and consequence denied.

14. To 1º of the proof: I admit that the goodness of acts of the will—whatever may be the case as to whether from another standpoint it can be partly extrinsic—is not constituted through the object. But the disparity lies in this: goodness does not consist in the likeness or conformity of volition with the object, for volition is not a representation or intentional image of the object. Rather, it consists in the act's tending toward a good object by pursuit and toward an evil object by aversion. But the tendency of pursuit or aversion is adequately identified with the act of the will, just as judicative tendency is identified with the act of the intellect. It is therefore no wonder that it is a perfection of the faculty. To 2º: Truth is an Attribute of God insofar as it is taken for Veracity in speaking, which is the supreme necessity of not lying or deceiving, and insofar as it means the same as Infallibility, which is infinite radical Truth essentially excluding every Falsity and error from the Divine mind. Truth is also attributed to God in Sacred Scripture in other senses. But precisely formal Truth concerning created objects, although according to what is direct it is a perfection of God and God Himself, nevertheless adequately taken insofar as it involves what is direct and what is oblique, is neither an Attribute nor a name of God. For who would say, "God is conformity of an act with an object"?

15. To 3º: error or radical Falsity—that is, the fallibility of a faculty, or its capacity or inclination to err—is a physical imperfection of the mind; formal Falsity is so only inferentially and causally, or also morally, insofar as the mind with Falsity stands worse than with Truth in the estimation of prudent persons. This suffices for Falsity to be altogether repugnant in the Divine mind, especially because it would imply a defect of infinite radical Truth, that is, of complete Infallibility, which is an Attribute of God. It likewise suffices for lying and deceiving others to be unlawful, especially because of

human intercourse, which principally consists in goods of the moral order. Finally, it suffices for the habit of erring to be an imperfection and vice of the intellect, for it is a certain radical Falsity of the faculty.

16. But note several things here. 1º Habits called "intellectual virtues" (see Treatise I, disp. I, c. 8) properly perfect the intellect, not precisely because of the formal Truth of their acts, but because of their power and requirement of producing certain judgments and consequently judgments radically true. 2º No habit is called a "vice of the intellect," nor properly a "habit of erring," unless of itself it inclines toward acts always or for the most part false because of the perversity of the motive. Such is the habit of assenting to conclusions insofar as sophistically deduced, or of judging wrongly in matters of Religion or other necessary matters, for example, of thinking that there are several Gods or that the Sun is smaller than the earth, or even of judging rashly about contingent things from a very slight motive. These habits are intrinsically vicious. First, because they produce acts radically false, as those acts may be called which rest upon an irrational motive and are thereby rendered intrinsically connected with Falsity, or at least so fallible that, if Truth sometimes happens, as occasionally in a rash judgment, it is altogether accidentally and apart from, or contrary to, the character of the motive. Second, because even if the acts were not in themselves radically false, a habit inclining one to judge from an irrational motive would be intrinsically vicious, just as a habit of outwardly lying is intrinsically vicious although its effect is not an intrinsic vice. 3º Finally, the habit of judging probably about things, especially contingent things—that is, from a grave and reasonable but not certain motive—which is called an "opinative habit," is indeed a certain physical perfection of the intellect, but is neither a perfection after the manner of an "intellectual virtue" nor an imperfection after the manner of a "vice," although it can be morally denominated now perfect, now imperfect, from the Truth or Falsity that contingently belongs to its acts.

17. To 4º: the intellect does indeed innately desire radical Truth such as inheres in scientific acts, and in this sense it innately desires to know. But whether it also innately desires formal Truth as the immediate terminus of appetite is uncertain. It can be said that it desires formal Truth by an elicited appetite arising from natural inclination, so that the natural inclination which is innate appetite terminates at the elicited appetite, and this latter at formal Truth. Moreover, even if the appetite intended in the objection is admitted, it proves only that Truth is an extrinsic good of man, morally estimable. The innate appetite of other things is borne only toward an intrinsic good; but the innate appetite of the rational creature is also borne

toward extrinsic goods and goods merely morally estimable. Thus man is said innately to desire honor, glory, fame, intercourse, society, friendship; all of which are extrinsic goods by which man is not rendered better or worse except inferentially, causally, or morally. The same reasoning must be used concerning innate hatred or avoidance of Falsity.

18. Objection 5: at least an intrinsically true act, for example an act of supernatural Faith, adequately identifies formal Truth with itself. Proof: an act of Faith is formally constituted true through that by which it is repugnant to formal Falsity; but it is repugnant to this through its essence. Therefore through its essence it is formally constituted true. I press the point: fire is formally constituted hot through that by which it is repugnant to cold; but it is repugnant to cold through its substance. Therefore through its substance it is formally constituted hot, and not through superadded heat. Next, I distinguish the major premise: through that by which it is immediately and formally repugnant: granted; through that by which it is repugnant only mediately and radically: denied. Then I distinguish the minor premise: it is repugnant to Falsity through its essence immediately and formally: denied; only mediately and radically, insofar as it essentially requires formal Truth immediately opposed to Falsity: granted; hence the minor premise is granted in this sense and the consequence denied. But it is replied from Hurtado: one who clearly knew an act of Faith would know in it the revealed mystery; therefore such an act is through itself conformable to the object. I answer: for this it suffices that such an act be intrinsically connected with the mystery; this connection is only radical truth. And I press the point: one who comprehends the Sun knows in it or from it that God exists; therefore the Sun through itself coexists with God.

19. Objection 6, especially for the opinion of Fr. Hurtado: this act, "A stone exists," through itself represents the object as it is; for it is not helped by the object to represent it as it is, otherwise the object would partially represent itself. Therefore such an act through itself, and not through the object, is formally constituted true. I press the point against Fr. Hurtado in the relation of greaterness: it would likewise follow that a giant through himself is greater than a pygmy and is not helped by the pygmy to be greater; otherwise the pygmy would be partially greater than himself. Therefore I deny the antecedent, when understood with exclusion of the object. For this whole expression, "to represent the object as it is," does not import bare representation but additionally the correspondence of the object according to its physical being; otherwise there will be nothing to verify the addition "as it is." Nor does it follow that the object partially represents itself, because it does not help the act to represent simply, but to represent

conformably to the object, namely by constituting the conformity of the representation, not "as that which" but "as that by which."

20. Final objection for the same opinion: this enunciation, "Peter runs," cannot change its object or exist without an object; but its object is Peter really running, or the running as actually belonging to Peter. Therefore it cannot exist without Peter really running, and consequently cannot exist without being true. I press the point with the spoken proposition, which likewise cannot change its object while the same institution remains. Likewise with this false judgment, "Peter really runs," which has Peter really running as its object and yet can exist without Peter really running. That a proposition falsely saying that Peter runs has this object was sufficiently proved in the preceding chapter, no. 14, nor does Fr. Hurtado deny it, cited disp., §§ 54-57.

21. One may perhaps object: a false proposition has as its object a fictive running of Peter, or a being of reason, first because it represents the running otherwise than it is in itself, and second because Peter's running, when it does not exist, has only objective being in the intellect, which is the characteristic of a being of reason. But against this is the fact that the proposition is false precisely because true and real running by Peter is lacking. Therefore this is its object; for no proposition is rendered false except through defect of its proper object. Consequently, for an object to be called fictive and a being of reason, it is not sufficient that it be represented otherwise than it is in itself as regards existence; it must also be represented otherwise than it is in itself as regards essence, so that an essence incapable of existing, or chimerical, is conceived. Nor is it true that Peter's running, when it does not exist, has purely objective being in the intellect; for this is verified only of an intrinsically repugnant object which neither is nor can be in itself. But what is not repugnant additionally possesses being in the state of possibility, or in the power and potency of its cause; as does the object of this act, "Another world is possible," which consequently is not a being of reason.

22. Therefore, to the objection I distinguish the major premise: it cannot change its object signatively, that is, by a change falling upon the signification or representation of the act: granted; for a proposition once signifying that Peter runs can never signify that Peter sits. It cannot change its object exercitively, that is, by a change falling upon the physical existence of the object: denied; for it is not connected with the object's being in reality as enunciated. Then, granting the minor premise, I deny the consequence: although Peter does not really run, the proposition can signify that he really runs. In that case it does not remain without an object signatively taken, nor

without an object in the being of an object, because it does not remain without the representation which it had and by which the object is constituted in the being of an object. It nevertheless remains without the object taken exercitively, specificatively, and as a being, that is, according to physically exercised existence, which is adequately distinguished from the act. For in this sense every false proposition remains without an object and is therefore false.

23. Reply 1: that proposition does not have Peter's running signatively taken as its object, otherwise it would have itself for its object, but Peter's running taken exercitively, specificatively, and as a being. Therefore, when Peter exercitively does not run, the proposition entirely lacks its object. Reply 2: a true proposition is verified through its own object, and a false one is falsified through its own object. Therefore, if the one can exist without its verifier and the other without its falsifier, each can exist without an object.

24. I answer to 1º by distinguishing the antecedent: it has Peter's running, exercitively taken, etc., as its object by representing it as though it were thus in reality: granted; by requiring or implying that it be thus: denied. And I distinguish the consequence: it entirely lacks an object that is as represented: granted; it lacks an object that exists otherwise in reality: denied. When it is said that no proposition exists without an object, the meaning is not that the object must be something existing in reality, otherwise propositions about past, future, or possible objects would not have an object; indeed, neither would cognition concerning a being of reason have an object if the object had to be something possible. The meaning, therefore, is that every proposition or cognition must be a representation of some thing, whether existing, possible, or chimerical. In this sense the proposition of which we are speaking can never lack an object. To 2º: I grant the antecedent when properly understood, namely if the verifier is the object insofar as it is as enunciated, while the falsifier is the object insofar as it is not as enunciated. Hence in the consequent I grant that each proposition can exist without its object insofar as verifying or falsifying; I deny, however, that it can thus exist without an object so as not to be a representation of any object, according to what has just been said.

CHAPTER III.

Whether a Proposition Once True Can Become False.

1. The stated question is raised concerning a proposition of contingent matter that is mental, natural, and non-evident. For there to be room for dispute, all here suppose, 1º that a proposition of this sort is not essentially

but contingently true, according to what was said in c. 1, § 2. Nor is to be contingently true the same as to be mutably true; for although in its first production it could have failed to be true, the question remains whether it can cast off Truth once possessed. It is supposed 2º that the same proposition can be conserved in the intellect through several instants of time; let these instants be called A, B, C, D, etc. On these suppositions, it is doubted whether a proposition true, for example, at A can become false while remaining the same at B. Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Alphonsus, Lynce, Compton, and others hold the negative opinion and subtly defend it, with not a few authors outside our school agreeing, whom Servera cites and follows. The affirmative opinion, however, is far more celebrated and true. The Thomists and Scotists commonly hold it, and among our authors, together with the Excellent Doctor, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 8, sect. 2, Fathers of Coimbra, Amicus, Rubio, Quirós, Mauri, Juan Bautista de Benedictis, and very many others.

2. Proof 1 from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas. For the former says in c. *De subst.*: "The same expression appears to be true and false; for example, if the expression that someone is sitting is true, when he rises the same expression will be false." St. Thomas cites and approves this place in *Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3, where, rejecting a certain opinion by an absurd consequence, he says: "It would follow that a proposition once true would always be true, which is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that this expression, 'Socrates sits,' is true while he sits and the same is false when he rises." Nor may this be interpreted of spoken speech, as some do. For the Philosopher is there speaking of speech which remains: "Speech," he says, "and opinion themselves remain unmoved, but when the thing is moved, contraries come to belong to them." Spoken speech, however, is flowing and successive. St. Thomas, moreover, in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 6, expressly proves that a true mental proposition can be changed into a false one. He says: "Truth is the adequation of thing and intellect. And because if something is taken away from one of two equals and nothing from the other... inequality must arise, which stands to falsity as equality does to truth; hence, if the intellect remains true while the thing changes and the intellect does not... falsity arises, and thus there will be a change from truth to falsity."

3. Proof 2 by reason: the proposition "Peter runs," true at instant A, if it is conserved at B when Peter is no longer running, becomes false. Therefore it can pass from true to false. Proof of the antecedent: whenever that proposition exists it enunciates that Peter is running in the present; but at instant B it is false that Peter is running in the present. Therefore, etc. The

adversaries say that by that proposition Peter's running is enunciated as present, not indeed as present at instant B, but as present only at instant A, at which the proposition was first produced and at which Peter's running is supposed to have existed. But our proof returns: that proposition does not enunciate Peter's running in the past, but absolutely in the present; it does not say that Peter ran, but that he runs. But to enunciate at instant B the running as present only at instant A is not absolutely to enunciate the running as present, but as past, since instant A is not present at B but already past; and consequently it is not to say that Peter runs but that he ran. Therefore the said proposition does not enunciate a running present only at instant A, but present at whatever instant the proposition itself exists, whether A or B. The point is pressed: at B it is false to say, "Instant A is present." Therefore it is likewise false to say at B, "Peter runs at present," if the running is present only at A.

4. For these reasons Fr. Arriaga, *Logica*, disp. 14, sect. 2, subsect. 1, whom the adversaries commonly appear to imitate, boldly warns that "to concern the present, past, or future" are not intrinsic differences of the mental propositions of our intellect, but extrinsic denominations arising from the variation of instants and capable of varying without variation in the entity or representation of the cognition. He adds the example of Divine knowledge concerning existing creatures, which remains unchanged whether creatures actually exist, have existed, or will exist. Hence it follows that the proposition "Peter runs," produced at A, is then about the present; but when conserved at B it is no longer about the present but about the past, and this without any intrinsic variation in itself. Yet this doctrine, which to many appears discordant and contrary to common sense, is rejected, 1º by the authority of Sts. Augustine and Thomas.

5. For the great Augustine in *De civitate Dei*, l. XI, c. 21, expressly proves the difference between God's knowledge and human cognition from the variation of times. He says: "For God does not in our manner foresee what is future, behold what is present, or look back upon what is past; rather, He does so in another manner, widely and profoundly different from the custom of our thoughts." And after other things: "For His knowledge is not, like ours, changed by the variety of the three times, namely present, past, and future." Our cognition, therefore, is not in this respect similar to God's knowledge, as Arriaga wishes, but by an intrinsic mode of tending consignifies one of those three differences of time in preference to the others; otherwise it would not be changed by the variation of times. St. Thomas most expressly teaches this same intrinsic diversity in mode of tending and signifying in many places, for example *Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q.

16, a. 8, ad 4; *Quodlibet* IV, a. 17, c.; *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 5, c.; a. 6, ad 6. Especially to be read is that a. 5 of q. 1, *De veritate*, where the Holy Doctor accurately teaches that Truth is diversified in our intellect in two ways: "In one way," he says, "because of the diversity of things known; in another from a diverse mode of understanding. The running of Socrates is one thing, but the soul understands the running of Socrates differently as present, past, and future, and according to this forms diverse conceptions," etc. He immediately explains there why the same reasoning does not hold in Divine cognition.

6. The doctrine is rejected 2º because the intellect manifestly experiences that it tends in a different manner when it judges, "Peter is," from when it judges, "Peter was," or "Peter will be." Otherwise we would never know for what time we judge something to exist, because we do not discern the individual suchnesses of instants, and otherwise the judgment, as you maintain, prescinds from the differences of present, past, and future time. Consequently, one who sees Peter sitting would not know whether this judgment, "Peter runs," is true or not, because he does not discern for what instant it affirms Peter's running; and if it affirms it for an instant already past or future, perhaps it is true. It is rejected 3º because judgments about the present and past are explained by different spoken words, and from diversity of spoken words we infer diversity of concepts. The point is pressed: one who sees Peter not running, if he vocally says, "Peter runs," undoubtedly lies; but to lie is "to go against one's mind." Therefore that spoken proposition is contrary to the mental judgment then existing. But why is it contrary unless a judgment opposed to "Peter runs" corresponds to it, namely "Peter does not run"? Therefore a judgment intrinsically different from that which is explained by the words "Peter runs," or by the words "Peter will run," corresponds to it. For what is explained in these latter ways is not opposed to the judgment then existing, and therefore those words can then be uttered without lying.

7. It is rejected 4º: these judgments, "A universal flood existed at some time," "A universal flood will exist at some time," either differ intrinsically by their mode of tending or they do not. If the first, we have what we intended, namely that our judgments do not intrinsically prescind from the threefold variety of times; for the diversity in mode of tending cannot arise from elsewhere, since those judgments agree completely in object. If the second, it follows absurdly that both are now true; for of judgments which differ neither in object nor in mode of tending, one cannot be true in preference to the other. The point is pressed: do those tendencies, "existed," "will exist," contract time to the past rather than the future, and conversely, or do they not? If they contract it, they differ in mode of signifying. If they

do not, they allow the phrase "at some time" to range over all possible times, and thus the first judgment will be verified no more than the second. The same argument can be made concerning these: "Antichrist will exist at some possible instant," "Antichrist exists," or even, "Antichrist existed, at some possible instant."

8. The true opinion is proved 2º, and at the same time the doctrine of our opponents is further rejected. The proposition "Peter runs," first, does not affirm Peter's running for all time collectively, as is evident. Next, neither does it affirm it for all time disjunctively, by a disjunction between past, present, and future, as is likewise evident: first, because its contradictory, "Peter does not run," does not deny the running for all time collectively; second, because it would yield this sense, "Peter either runs, or ran, or will run," and thus no contingent proposition would be true or false for us, since we are ignorant of the present and future; moreover, it would follow that these propositions are now true: "The Devil is holy," "Peter the Apostle sins mortally," and others equally discordant and erroneous. Finally, neither does it affirm Peter's running for a determinate instant, for example A. It remains, therefore, that it affirms the running for present time indefinitely taken, according to what will be said in the following chapter. This final antecedent is proved 1º because this concept, "present time," does not signify time as contracted to instant A; for it forms a universal and is successively verifiable of any instant. But that proposition no less confusedly and indefinitely designates present time, as is clear. Therefore it does not contract it to instant A.

9. 2º Because otherwise that judgment, "Peter runs," could in the same intellect be joined with this evident judgment, "Peter does not run," if, for example, it is conserved at instant B when the intellect, seeing Peter sitting, now judges that he does not run. The consequence is clear because these judgments do not conflict if they speak of different instants. Hence the intellect at instant B would judge absolutely that Peter runs and does not run—absolutely, I say, because the restriction to instant A which you place in the affirmative judgment is so implicit and hidden that it is neither discerned nor known by the intellect. Someone could also, while looking upon the Sun shining with full brilliance, preserve this judgment elicited before dawn: "The Sun has not yet risen." These and similar consequences appear sufficiently discordant and incredible.

10. Finally, our opinion is proved by turning against the adversaries the example with which they commonly arm themselves. This proposition, "Peter exists at instant A," although it expressly designates instant A and is true at A, becomes false if conserved at B. Therefore determination of the

instant, whether implicit or explicit, does nothing to aid the contrary opinion. Proof of the antecedent: that proposition not only affirms Peter's existence at A, but simultaneously signifies that instant A is absolutely present. But instant A is not and cannot be absolutely present at B, where it is already absolutely past. Therefore such a proposition existing at B signifies something false. Proof of the major premise: this proposition, "Peter will exist at instant A," signifies that instant A is absolutely future, and this one, "Peter existed at instant A," that such an instant is absolutely past. But the same account holds of the aforesaid proposition in relation to present time. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established because otherwise it could now truly be said, "Antichrist existed near the end of the world," "Adam will exist at the beginning of the world." There is no source from which these propositions could now be rendered false except that the former denotes the end of the world as past and the latter the beginning of the world as future.

11. One may object: for its Truth, a proposition about the present does not require that the time for which it affirms the object remain present for as long as the proposition is conserved, but only that it be present when the proposition is first produced. Therefore, if it is once true because the object exists at the time then present, it always remains true, although it is later conserved when that time has already become past. Thus several propositions of Sacred Scripture which speak about the future or present are still true, although their object is now no longer future or present; for example that of Isaiah, "Behold, a Virgin shall conceive and bear a son," and that of Christ the Lord, "This is your hour, and the power of darkness." Likewise, if a proposition about the present is once false, either because the object does not exist at the designated instant or because that instant is not present to the proposition as first produced, then although that instant later becomes present to the proposition as conserved, the proposition always remains false. The same holds proportionately in propositions about the past and future. Hence those propositions of the preceding number concerning the existence of Adam and Antichrist are now rendered false because, with respect to this time in which they are first produced, neither is the beginning of the world future nor the end of the world past.

12. But this solution first incurs the fault usually objected against us, namely that the proposition reflects upon itself. For this proposition, "Peter runs," will yield the sense: "Peter runs at the time which is present to me as first produced." Next, from this doctrine our opinion is effectively advanced thus: does the proposition "Peter exists at A" essentially require that it first be produced at instant A itself, or is it indifferent to being produced before or after? The first cannot be said according to the supposition made in no. 1,

admitted by all in the present question, namely that the same proposition can be conserved through several instants. For if it can be conserved at B or C, why can it not also first be produced there? Certainly an instant as physically existing is wholly extrinsic to a mental proposition and supplies no influx upon it. Moreover, the proposition is not modally tied to that instant in existing, although it is tied to it in signifying; otherwise it could not be conserved without that instant, just as union cannot be conserved without its extremes or action without its term.

13. But if the second is said, as in fact it is said by many authors of the contrary opinion, then the proposition "Peter exists at A," if first produced at B, signifies that instant A is present at B; and if first produced at C, it will signify that instant A is present at C; and so of the rest. Likewise, a proposition which does not designate an instant, such as "Peter exists," will affirm Peter's existence at the time at which it itself is produced, whether this is A, B, or C. Therefore it is of itself indifferent to signifying that the object is present now to one instant, now to another, because, as you say, it must signify that the object is present with respect to the instant at which it is first produced, and otherwise it is of itself indifferent to being first produced at different instants. But if this is so, the principal, or sole, foundation of the contrary opinion manifestly collapses, namely that a mental proposition cannot fail always to signify what it once signifies, lest otherwise it successively change its signification and object. For by the same right it is true that the same proposition cannot change its signification divisively, that is, by signifying something different, or in a different manner, if it is produced at one time rather than another. Therefore, if the adversaries admit this change, they completely disarm themselves.

14. Confirmation: this proposition, "Instant A exists," which I suppose to have been elicited at instant A itself, either can of itself first be produced at another instant or cannot. If you say the second, against this is the fact that such a proposition is not necessary but contingent; for the existence of instant A is no less contingent than the existence of Peter, and the distinction between a necessary, contingent, and impossible proposition is taken from the matter "concerning which," as is known from the *Summulae*. But if it essentially required first to be produced at A, it would be necessary and its contradictory impossible; for while it is produced it is necessarily true. It is contradictory that at A itself it not be truly said, "Instant A exists." Afterwards, however, although conserved forever, according to the adversaries it can no longer cast off Truth. Hence it follows that concerning the existence of instant A no proposition about the present can be formed at

any time which is not necessarily true or necessarily false, whether affirmative or negative, as will be clear to one who considers it.

15. But if the first is said, then that proposition can pass from true to false. Proof of the consequence: when conserved at B, it signifies that instant A exists at B; but this signification is manifestly false. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: when conserved at B, that proposition signifies the same thing and in the same manner as it would signify if it were first produced at B. But in that case it would signify that instant A is existing and present at B, if the solution of no. 11 is true. Therefore, etc. The rest is established, and the major premise is undeniable, because signification and mode of signifying are essential to a mental proposition and consequently entirely invariable at whatever time it is conserved or produced, unless the essence of the act varies. By the same reasoning that proposition could pass from false to true, if it were first produced before instant A and subsequently conserved at A.

16. Nor do the examples of Sacred Scripture objected in no. 11 press the point. For those are written propositions which, like spoken propositions, regard mental judgments as the measure and rule of their signification and therefore signify nothing different, nor for a different time, from the judgments for which they substitute. But because the propositions of Sacred Scripture, by the intention of men and of God, are substituted not for judgments existing now but for judgments that formerly existed in the minds of the Prophets, they carry their signification back to that former time and derive their Truth from it. The case is different with mental judgments, to which a mode of signifying together with time is essential and which cannot at will be referred to different times. Hence the supernatural judgments of the Prophets, unless they differ from ours in mode of tending, could not be divinely conserved until a time at which the object had ceased to be future; just as acts of Faith by which the Apostles formerly believed Christ to be present in mortal flesh could not now be conserved. For such acts, being intrinsically and essentially true, cannot exist when the object is no longer as enunciated.

17. Nevertheless, we do not deny that there can be acts of a created mind having a mode of tending absolute from the differences of times, after the manner of Divine knowledge, such as the intuitions by which the Blessed see future things in the Word, and acts of essentially infused knowledge, especially in the soul of Christ the Lord. But the present question is not about these, but about natural and contingently true acts, which we have proved by authority and reason to vary intrinsically according to the variation of times.

CHAPTER IV.
The Foundation of the Contrary Opinion Is Overthrown.

1. Those who hold the contrary opinion rely upon this single foundation, which they develop in various ways. For the proposition, "Peter is running," to be true, its object must exist throughout the whole time imported by the copula, or verb, in the manner in which it is imported; that is, Peter must be running throughout the whole time for which the proposition affirms that he is running. But for it to be false, Peter must not be running in at least some part of that time. Yet if Peter is once supposed to be running throughout that whole time, he can no longer fail to be running in any part of that time, as is evident. Therefore, if the proposition in question is once true, it can never afterward be false. This is explained and pressed: does that proposition signify that Peter is running at every instant, or at one determinate instant, for example A, or at some instant disjunctively? Whichever of these modes it signifies, it cannot pass from true to false; for such a transition would require that Peter, while running at every instant, not run at some instant; or, while running at A, not run at that same instant; or, while running at some instant, run at none. This is contradictory and full of contradiction.

2. To solve the objection, the manner in which a proposition concerning the present consignifies time must be explained. The proposition, "Peter is running," does indeed determine present time in distinction from future and past time, but it signifies that time indefinitely with respect to particular instants, namely, by prescinding from their individual determinations, so that of itself it permits the character of present time actually to be contracted either by instant A, or by B, and so forth. Hence, with respect to instants, it may equivalently be called disjunctive; for its truth requires only that Peter be running at that instant which is actually present, whichever it may be. Hence it equivalently yields this sense: "Some instant is present, whether A, or B, or another, and at that instant Peter is running." From this it follows, 1º, that such a proposition cannot be expounded thus: "Peter is running at some instant which was, is, or will be"; for this would be to tend disjunctively toward present, past, and future time. But the proposition essentially signifies present time, which it distinguishes from past and future.

3. It follows, 2º, that this signification of present time can be verified successively by various instants, according as each is actually present while

the proposition exists. For in contingent predication an indefinite signification of a common nature participable by various individuals can be verified now by one, now by another, as is clear in the proposition, "A man is running," which is verifiable now by Peter, now by Paul, now by any other man; or, as they say, it now "supposits" for one and now for another. Here note that the verb "to supposit" is now understood according to the explanation of supposition given by the Thomists in the Summulae, namely, "the acceptance of a term for that of which it is verified." Here the discussion concerns the verification, not of the whole enunciation, but of the term, which they say is verified when it is accepted for a thing existing in the time imported by the copula. Hence, since in our case this term, "present time," can be verified successively by various instants, it follows that the verb "is running," insofar as it imports present time, successively supposits for various instants.

4. It follows, 3º, that the proposition in question, although true at A, can be false at B, at which Peter is no longer running. For at B it no longer supposits for A, as before, but only for B, since it supposits for that instant of which it is verified that it is present time while the proposition itself is speaking. And since at B, A is no longer present but past, it ceases to supposit for A and supposits for B, which is actually present. If Peter is not running at B, it is falsely enunciated that he is running at the present time.

5. Now to the objection: I answer by distinguishing the major premise. The object must exist throughout the whole time in whatever manner imported by the copula: I deny this. Throughout the whole time for which the signification of present time supposits while the proposition is speaking: I grant the major premise. Then I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: Peter can no longer fail to run in any part of that time for which the proposition supposits while it is true: I grant this; at another time for which the proposition, or the signification of present time, may successively supposit: I deny the minor premise and the consequence. To the confirmation: that proposition expressly and formally signifies in none of those modes that Peter is running, but only indefinitely designates present time, prescinding from whether it is A or B. Nevertheless, I grant that virtually, or equivalently, it signifies in the last of those modes, provided that the disjunction is not between present, past, and future, but between the individual determinations of the instants, while at the same time it absolutely requires that some one of them be present.

6. It is therefore equivalent to this tendency: "Peter is running at some instant." By the expression "at some instant," this tendency disjunctively attains the individual determinations of all instants; but by the verb "is

running," properly taken, it absolutely signifies that one of them is present, and is determined never to supposit for any instant which may be past or future. Hence the proposition in question, when Peter is running at A, is true at A, because then this whole statement is verified: "He is running at some instant," since instant A is some instant and is then present. But the same proposition is false at B, when Peter is no longer running, because Peter is then running at no instant which is present; for only B is present, and at B he is not running. Therefore the verb "is running" is then falsified. Hence it is clear how, without contradiction, it is maintained both that Peter is running at some instant and that he is running at no instant: the former is maintained at A, the latter at B.

7. Yet this whole solution is greatly displeasing to the adversaries, because according to it the proposition would change its signification and object, since at one time it signifies that Peter is running with respect to instant A, and afterward no longer signifies with respect to A but with respect to B, and so of the rest. But this is to vary the proposition essentially, just as according to us it would be varied if it now signified with respect to present time and afterward with respect to future or past time. First, however, this difficulty presses the adversaries equally, as we showed in the preceding chapter, from n. 13 to 16. Nor can the doctrine delivered there in n. 11 be rejected by them unless the argument in n. 10 remains unsolved. Secondly, according to many patrons of our opinion, it is not absurd for the proposition to change its material object, provided that this object is not attained explicitly and on the part of the act, but only implicitly, or on the part of the object. Many examples are adduced concerning this. Thus the proposition, "A man is running," now signifies Peter, now another, since it can be verified by anyone. Likewise, "All who are in the school are writing," so signifies those who are actually in the school that, without any change in itself, it would signify others, even more or fewer, if they were there.

8. Thus also an act of will detesting everything prohibited, elicited before a law prohibiting gambling, does not then detest gambling; yet if it is preserved after the law, it now detests gambling. Finally, to omit other examples, an act of contrition by which someone, from the general motive of offense against God, whom he supremely loves, grieves over all the sins committed by him, although at the time he remembers them only in common: such an act, I say, is grief over the sins which that man actually committed in such a way that, without any intrinsic variation in itself, it would be grief over other and different sins, more or fewer, if they had been committed by the same man. Yet to change its object is no less repugnant to acts of the will than to acts of the intellect. Therefore, since the proposition,

"Peter is running," when it exists at A, signifies the individual determination of the instant only implicitly, it can, if preserved at B, signify the determination B in place of the determination A, because present time, which the proposition signifies explicitly, is then contracted by B. Likewise, in the examples just given, the act of will attains only those material objects in which the character of "prohibited object" or "committed sin" is actually found; otherwise it would not attain those same objects but others. And indeed the contrary opinion entails a more difficult change. For if the proposition, "Peter is running," is of itself indifferent to signify now an object which was, now one which is, now one which will be, it can therefore change a signification concerning the present into a signification concerning the past or future, although the signification of present time is explicit and designated.

9. Lastly, if this change of the material object, attained only implicitly or confusedly, seems difficult, as it truly seems to me, it can easily be denied with our more recent authors that the proposition changes its object in the state of an intrinsically signified object, whether explicitly or implicitly. For at whatever instant it is found, it always signifies that some instant is present and that Peter is running at it. Hence it always expresses present time in distinction from future and past, and always attains, on the part of the object, the individual determinations of all possible instants insofar as they are of themselves capable of participating in the character of present time. These determinations, I say, it attains equivalently and disjunctively, merely denoting that one of them actually coexists with the proposition itself, or is actually present time. Yet with this it is consistent that the proposition, insofar as it signifies present time, changes its verifier, or object in the state of a verifier, because the signification of present time imbibed in the verb "is running" is now verified by instant A, now by B, now by another. Thus the proposition, "A man is running," without changing its signification of the individuals of human nature, can change its verifier, since it is indifferent to being verified either by Peter or by another.

10. Hence, strictly speaking, this expression is false: "The proposition, while it exists at A, signifies that Peter is running with respect to A, and afterward no longer signifies with respect to A but with respect to B." For the proposition always signifies the same thing and in the same manner. Nevertheless, that expression can be admitted if "signifies" is taken less properly, so as to mean the same as "supposits" or "is verified with respect to the signification of present time." This can be explained by the preceding example of the proposition, "A man is running." If one asks why the signification of the proposition does not vary when its verifier varies, the

reason is that a disjunctive signification, whether formally or equivalently, such as an indefinite signification is, at least within contingent predication, is indifferent to being verified by any member of the disjunction without itself determining which member it is. Hence the determination of the verifying member arises from the existence of the object and is extrinsic to the proposition, which of itself is content with any member whatsoever. Consequently, it remains unchanged when the physical existence of the members so changes that one succeeds another in the office of verifying. But this whole doctrine will become clearer from solving the replies of the adversaries.

11. First reply: for a disjunctive proposition not to be falsified, it is enough that one extreme, or member of the disjunction, exist, although the others do not. For this reason the proposition, "Some man is running," remains true even if no man besides Peter is running. But according to us the proposition, "Peter is running," equivalently signifies the instants A, B, and so forth disjunctively. Therefore, for it not to be falsified, it is enough that the running exist at instant A, even if it does not exist at the others. I answer, 1º: I grant the whole argument. From this it follows only that the proposition cannot be falsified while the running exists at instant A. Nevertheless, it can be falsified at B, because then, just as instant A does not exist but did exist, so too the running at instant A does not exist but did exist; see the statements in the preceding chapter, n. 10. And since at that time the running exists at no other instant, because no other instant besides B is present, and at B there is no running, it follows that the running now exists in no member of the disjunction. Thus, to turn the example back upon the objection, if the proposition "Some man is running" is preserved or uttered at B, when no man is running, it is certainly falsified, although Peter ran at A; because it does not say that some man ran, but that some man is running.

12. I answer, 2º, for the sake of clarity, by distinguishing the major premise: it is enough that one member exist, and so forth, in the same manner in which it is affirmed to exist: I grant this; in another manner: I deny the major premise. Then I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: it disjunctively signifies the instants, and so forth, while simultaneously affirming that some instant is actually present: I grant this; while prescinding from present, past, or future: I deny the minor premise. Finally, I answer by distinguishing the consequence: it is enough that the running exist at instant A as present: I grant this; that it exist at that instant as past, as in fact happens at instant B: I deny the consequence. Here again the objection returns, together with the retortion just given. One may press: that

proposition does not determine a time; therefore it is verified by the existence of the running at any time whatsoever. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it does not determine time with respect to the difference of present from future and past: I deny this; with respect to the individual determination of the instant: I grant the antecedent. Then I answer by distinguishing the consequence: provided that any such instant is present: I grant this; if it is past or future: I deny the consequence. Thus the proposition, "Some man is running," although it does not determine Peter's running in preference to another's, nevertheless determines the present running of some man, and therefore is not verified by future or past running.

13. Second reply: of the instants A, B, C, one is past, another present, another future while the proposition is preserved at B. Therefore, if the proposition equivalently signifies those instants disjunctively, it cannot fail disjunctively to signify present, past, and future. I grant the antecedent and answer by distinguishing the consequence: it cannot fail disjunctively to signify past and future reduplicatively as such: I deny this; taken specifically, so that the signification prescinds from the state of being past or future and attains the instants only insofar as they of themselves can be actually present: I grant the consequence. One may press: what is past can no longer be present. I answer by distinguishing: reduplicatively as past: I grant this; specifically and of itself: I deny it. Or otherwise: it can no longer be present, nor could it be, considering the requirement of the proposition: I deny this; it can no longer be present, yet could have been, considering the requirement of the proposition: I grant this. Since the proposition is of itself indifferent to existing at any possible instant, it cannot indefinitely signify time present to itself without equivalently signifying all possible instants disjunctively, because there is no instant with which the proposition, considered of itself and in the state of possibility, cannot coexist. Hence it is accidental with respect to the proposition that, when it is produced or preserved, it finds instant A already past and consequently incapable of existing again. For since the proposition could have been produced earlier, when that instant was still capable of being present, it now prescinds from that incapacity.

14. Third reply: while the proposition exists at A, it signifies as much as it can and is capable of signifying. Therefore, either it is capable of signifying Peter's running with respect to instant B, or it is not. If the former is said, then already at A it signified the running with respect to B, and therefore it was already false at A if the running does not exist at B. If the latter, then while it is preserved at B it does not signify Peter's running with respect to B, and consequently is not falsified by the absence of running at B. Granting

the antecedent, I answer the appended question: the proposition is capable of signifying running with respect to A, with respect to B, and with respect to any other instant, and indeed actually signifies thus while it exists at A, if one wishes to speak that way. Its signification, however, is then verifiable only by the instant which coexists with the proposition, because the signification is equivalently disjunctive and, moreover, does not attain the instants except under the character of "present time," which it affirms to be contracted by one of them. Hence, while the signification exists at A, it is not yet verifiable by B, because B is not yet present; nevertheless, it will become verifiable by B if the proposition is preserved at B. Consequently, if Peter is then not running, the affirmation of running will be false. Thus the proposition, "All who are in the school are writing," disjunctively signifies all men capable of being in the school, unless one wishes it to change its signification when it is verified now by these men and now by those, at least divisively; and it affirms writing of them all. Yet that signification is verifiable only by those who actually exist in the school, because it attains them all under the character of "existing in the school," which it supposes to be contracted by some individuals.

15. Fourth reply: does the proposition signify the time present to itself when it first exists, or the time present to itself for as long as it endures? In whichever of these ways it does so, if it is once true, it cannot lose its truth. I answer: from its intrinsic mode of representing, the proposition determines present time neither to the first instant of its production nor to the whole time of its duration. Rather, it indefinitely expresses the time coexisting with itself as existing, or the time in which it itself exists, prescinding from whether that time is A or B, and even from whether the proposition exists by preservation or by first production. Since the proposition is indifferent to coexisting with various times, both successively and divisively, there remains room for a change from true to false, or conversely. Nor should one infer as absurd that the proposition, "Peter is running," reflects upon itself, since it signifies time as coexisting with itself. For a certain indirect reflection of this kind is quite commonly admitted, both in acts of the will, even first acts, because no one wills except because he wills to will; and in acts of the intellect, because powers make themselves known. Nor can the tendency of propositions concerning future and past time, if they differ intrinsically, as seems evident, be explained without some reflection upon themselves. For the proposition, "Peter will run," must be expounded thus: "He will run in a time that will come after me"; and the proposition, "Peter ran," thus: "He ran in a time which preceded me."

16. Fifth reply: according to us, that proposition determinately signifies present time; therefore, existing at A, it determinately signifies instant A, because no other time is then present. Confirmation: present time at A is essentially instant A itself and is not really distinguished from it; therefore, a proposition signifying present time at A signifies no instant except A. A further confirmation: the character of "present time" cannot be signified as common to many, because it is never possible for more than one instant to be actually present, since the others are past or future. Therefore present time is always signified as contracted to one individual instant. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it determinately signifies present time by a determination distinguishing present from past and future: I grant this; by a determination distinguishing the individual determination of one instant from the others: I deny the antecedent and the consequence. Nor does it matter that at A no time other than A itself is present; for this makes the proposition, insofar as it imports time, determinately verified by A, but does not make it determinately signify A. Thus the proposition, "An existing man is running," determines man in distinction from lion and the other species of animals, but does not determine Paul in distinction from John and the rest. And if no existing man other than Paul existed, it would be determinately verified by Paul, but would not therefore determinately signify him.

17. The first confirmation is answered by this same example. For supposing that Paul alone now exists, an existing man is now essentially Paul himself and is not really distinguished from him. Yet the act, "An existing man is running," does not signify Paul alone but indefinitely all men, while supposing that some man exists. Therefore, just as it is accidental with respect to this proposition that an existing man is not distinguished from Paul, so it is accidental in our case. I therefore grant the antecedent, because present time is time actually existing, and existence is not really distinguished from essence, although existence as actually exercised is not said to be an essential predicate. But I deny the consequence, because just as the proposition does not signify only that time which is then present, but quasi-disjunctively all times which can or could coexist with the signification, or be present, so it does not signify A alone, although at that time it supposits for A alone. Here note that contradictory intentional predicates do not belong to present time and instant A; for each is distinguished from the differences of past and future, and each is not distinguished from the individual determinations of the other instants.

18. The other confirmation is similarly answered by the concept "existing man," which signifies a nature common to many even if only one man exists. If it is said that at least several men can exist simultaneously,

which is enough for a common nature to be abstracted, I shall reply in turn that several instants can also exist successively, which likewise suffices for abstracting the common nature of "existing instant," or "present instant." For individuals that exist successively participate in the character of "existing" no less properly than those which exist simultaneously. Certainly this apprehension, "present time," is no less indefinite and confused than "past time" or "future time." But these latter signify a nature common to many; therefore the former does also. Add that the proposition, "The existing Pope is the head of the Church," does not signify only that individual Pope who now exists, but indefinitely all Popes, since it could be verified by any one of them if it were preserved or produced in his time. Yet this objective concept, "existing Pope," is truly participable only successively, since two Popes cannot exist simultaneously. The same is seen in the proposition, "A man exists in place A," if we suppose place A to be capable of containing only one man, and therefore of admitting several only successively.

19. Finally, it is replied: at least the proposition "Peter is running at instant A," if once true, cannot become false, since it does not signify present time indefinitely but determines the individual determination of the instant. Once this is admitted, however, the proofs for our opinion are weakened. I deny the assumption, which is granted too incautiously by some defenders of our opinion. Indeed, our opinion is validly confirmed by the example of that proposition, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Nor does it matter that by the addition "at instant A" the proposition designates the individual determination of the instant, because at the same time, by the verb "is running," formally or equivalently distinct from that addition, it signifies that instant A is absolutely present; and this signification is false at B. Therefore the verb "is running" there signifies present time with the same amplitude which it has in a proposition not designating an instant, and consequently is indifferent to supposit for any instant coexisting with it. If one objects perhaps from the simplicity of the judgment, I refer to what was said above, Tract. 2, disp. 2, cap. 7 and 8, where at n. 25 a not dissimilar difficulty is solved. Now add the clear example and objection from propositions concerning the past and future, which, although they designate instant A, simultaneously signify that it is past or future; see the preceding chapter, n. 10.

20. Finally observe: a proposition concerning the present can change both from true to false and from false to true. Likewise some propositions concerning the future or a limited past can do so. Thus, "Peter will run tomorrow," can be false today and true tomorrow, namely if the running

does not exist tomorrow but on the immediately following day; conversely, it can be true today and false tomorrow. The same applies to the proposition, "Peter ran yesterday." One must speak otherwise if future or past time is not limited. For then an affirmative proposition concerning the future can change from true to false, but not conversely. For example, "Peter will run," is true today if Peter's running will be tomorrow. Yet if the same proposition is preserved tomorrow, when the running is already present and afterward will no longer be future, it becomes false. But if it is once false, this is because Peter's running will exist at no future time; once this is given, it can never afterward become true. The reason is not the same in a proposition concerning the present: what is once not present can at some time be present, whereas what is once not future can never afterward be future. Conversely, an affirmative proposition concerning the past can change from false to true, but not conversely. Thus the proposition, "Peter ran," false today, will become true tomorrow if Peter runs today. But if it is true today, it cannot afterward be falsified, because if Peter is supposed to have run, he can no longer not have run; for, as they say, "there is no potency with respect to the past." The case is not the same in a proposition concerning the present; although what once was can no longer not have been, nevertheless in the course of time what once is can cease to be. The opposite judgment must be made concerning negative propositions.

CHAPTER V.

Other Questions Concerning Truth and Falsity Are Decided.

1. First question: whether formal truth or falsity belongs only to judgment, or also to apprehension? I answer, 1º: truth and falsity simply or properly so called belong formally to judgment alone. For no one is properly said to attain the truth concerning the existence, essence, or accidents of some object until he forms within himself a judgment conforming to the object; nor is anyone properly said to be deceived or mistaken until he forms a judgment differing from the object. For one who has not yet determined within himself what he thinks of the proposed matter is neither deceived nor in possession of the truth. But to form a judgment is the same as to judge. Hence this truth may be called "truth of judgment," and it is proper to the intellect alone. I said "formally," because radically or inchoatively it also belongs to apprehensions, at least complex ones, such as "a roaring lion" and "a rational lion," of which the former in a certain way invites a true judgment concerning a lion, and the latter a false one.

2. I answer, 2º: truth broadly taken, insofar as it is precisely the conformity of a representation with its object apart from judgment, is also found in apprehension, both complex and simple, as is evident. For example, the concept "man" represents what truly exists in its object and is consequently a representation conforming to it. Yet this truth, which may be called "truth of pure representation," is less proper, both because of what was said in the first answer and because the name "truth" properly signifies something proper to the intellect; whereas this truth is common to sense, for example sight, and even to paintings and statues. I answer, 3º: falsity, even broadly taken, can be found in complex apprehension, for example "a four-footed man"; but not in a purely simple apprehension. For although, while wishing to apprehend a man, one elicits the concept "lion," this representation is not therefore unlike its object, since it does not regard man but lion. By these distinctions the apparently opposed texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas, as well as the various opinions of authors on this matter, may easily be reconciled.

3. Second question: whether truth and falsity admit of more and less; or, what amounts to the same, whether one proposition can be truer or falser than another. As regards truth, first it must be affirmed if the discussion concerns radical truth, that is, the necessity of conforming a representation to its object, or the certainty or evidence of cognition. Thus an act of supernatural faith is truer than a natural act, that is, more certain; intuitive cognition is truer than abstractive cognition, that is, more evident; and divine knowledge is supremely certain, that is, supremely certain, supremely evident, and conformed to its objects with the greatest necessity. It must likewise be affirmed if truth is taken materially and in the state of being; for where the entity of an act is more perfect, truth, which directly imports the act, cannot fail to be more perfect, or greater entitatively.

4. But if the discussion concerns formal truth insofar as it precisely denotes the conformity of judgment as such with the object, truth does not admit of more and less, but, as they say, "consists in an indivisible." So the authors commonly teach. The reason is, first, that truth, as is everywhere asserted with St. Thomas, q. 1, De veritate, a. 5, and often elsewhere, is a certain equality of the act with the object according to that being which is enunciated. But equality does not admit of more and less; hence two palms are no less equal than two cubits. Secondly, the truth of an act cannot stand unless the object has in itself the whole of what the act enunciates; for if anything of this is lacking, truth is lacking, as is clear in the act, "Man is a rational four-footed animal." But for the object to have in itself the whole of

what is enunciated, so that nothing of it is lacking, consists in an indivisible and admits no latitude.

5. One must reason otherwise concerning falsity, not only radical but also formal, for one falsity can be greater than another. The reason is, first, that falsity is taken from distance or departure from the true; but one proposition can be more distant from the true than another, and from a thousand examples it is known that distance and departure admit of more and less. Hence, if there are one hundred men in the marketplace, the proposition saying that there are only ten is falser than one saying that there are only ninety. Secondly, falsity is the inequality of the act with the object according to the being which is enunciated, as is commonly said with St. Thomas in the cited place. But inequality admits of latitude; hence half a palm is more unequal to a cubit than a palm is.

6. First objection: truth is greater insofar as it is more repugnant to falsity; but necessary truth is more repugnant to falsity than contingent truth. I answer: in necessarily true acts there is indeed a greater radical repugnance to falsity. But formal truth does not consist in this, but in the formal and immediate exclusion of falsity, which is actual conformity with the object. This formal exclusion is equal everywhere, for it is just as impossible for falsity to be given in the composite sense of contingent conformity as in the composite sense of necessary conformity.

7. Second objection: truth is the likeness of an act to its object; but likeness admits of more and less; therefore truth does also. Hence the act, "Man is a rational animal," will be truer than the act, "Man is an animal," because it is more like its object, since it expresses more of the object's perfections. I answer: because of this argument I spoke in n. 4 of the truth of judgment as such, which is the "truth of judgment" explained in n. 1. For I think that the "truth of pure representation," discussed in n. 2, admits of more and less. For every image conforms its representation to its object more insofar as it expresses what is in the object more vividly and distinctly, or insofar as it reveals more predicates or features of the object, as is clear in intellectual apprehension, sight, painting, and sculpture.

8. Therefore in a mental proposition there may be considered, first, the "truth of representation," in which judgment agrees with the preceding apprehensions; and according to this one proposition can be truer than another, as the example in the objection proves, just as in this sense the apprehension "rational animal" is a truer image of man than the apprehension "animal." Secondly, there is the "truth of judgment," which is proper to judgment as such and by which a proposition differs from every purely apprehensive concept. According to this, no proposition is truer than

another, because man just as truly has in himself the whole of what the act "Man is an animal" enunciates as the whole of what the act "Man is a rational animal" enunciates. From this aspect, from which precisely the "truth of judgment" is taken, one act is not more like its object than another, although it is more like it from the aspect of clarity and more vivid expression, from which the "truth of representation" is taken. I therefore grant whatever the objection intends if it speaks of the "truth of representation," which does not import judgment, or prescinds from it. But speaking of the "truth of judgment," I answer by distinguishing the major premise: it is likeness of any sort whatsoever: I deny this; it is likeness in having the whole of something: I grant the major premise. Then I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: likeness admits of more and less often: I grant this; always: I deny the minor premise and the consequence. For likeness consisting in having the whole of something is a certain equality and therefore admits no latitude; for example, the likeness of two white things in possessing the whole four degrees of whiteness.

9. Third objection, against the resolution in n. 5: falsity consists in the privation of truth; but all false acts agree equally in that privation; therefore none can be falser than another. Certainly, just as there is no latitude in the object's having the whole of what is enunciated, so neither is there latitude in its not having the whole of what is enunciated. I press the point: distance consists in the defect of proximity; but Madrid and Rome agree equally in this defect with respect to Salamanca; therefore they will be equally distant from Salamanca. Likewise it could be inferred that there is no latitude among unequal things, because they agree in the privation of equality; and that all sick persons are equally sick, because they all agree in the privation of health. Therefore falsity according to common usage is not taken for the mere privation of truth, but additionally imports a positive departure from the true. Nor is it usually defined as "non-conformity," but as "the difformity of the act with the object." But departure and difformity admit of more and less, just as does not having the whole of what is enunciated, when taken as having it otherwise or having something less.

10. Third question: whether a singular proposition concerning the future is determinately true or determinately false. No one doubts concerning a necessary future, for example, when it is said: "The sun will rise tomorrow; Peter, who is now living, will die; if Peter runs, he will be moved." The difficulty concerns a contingent, or free, future, namely one which will exist without a prior necessity of existing, even when all prerequisites on the part of the cause are posited; whether it is an absolute future, as when it is said, "Peter will sin," or a conditioned future, as when it is said, "If Peter were

tempted, he would sin." Aristotle, 1 Periherm. c. 8, judged that singular propositions concerning a contingent future are neither determinately true nor determinately false, being led by the motive that otherwise the freedom and contingency of the future thing would be destroyed. For if it is truly said today, "Peter will sin tomorrow," Peter will already be unable not to sin tomorrow, because no one can bring it about that what is once supposed true for a determinate time should not be true with respect to that same time. For the same reason it follows that if that proposition is supposed determinately false, Peter will already be unable to sin tomorrow.

11. But some call the contrary opinion most true and most received, others Catholic, and others undeniable according to the principles of faith. And indeed it is absolutely a Catholic opinion if it speaks of divine knowledge of future things, or even of created supernatural cognition, as when by the light of faith we assert the future sin of Antichrist or the general Judgment at the end of the world; for no Catholic doubts that these cognitions are now determinately true and their opposites determinately false. But concerning other natural cognitions, although the most common opinion holds the same, certain authors think otherwise, though perhaps the disagreement is merely verbal.

12. The question cannot be discussed worthily unless many theological matters are mixed in, concerning which there is a long dispute between the Thomists and our authors in Tract. De Scientia Dei; for example, whether a future thing is formally constituted in the state of a future thing by the divine decree; whether such a decree, as actually present, is the formal verifier of a proposition concerning the future; and whether it is predetermining. Therefore, to abstain from questions belonging to another discipline, we shall now briefly give a few considerations sufficient to refute the Aristotelian opinion. The common opinion is therefore proved, 1º, because the natural proposition, "Antichrist will sin," affirms the same thing as the knowledge of God or an act of faith concerning the future sin of Antichrist. But God's knowledge is determinately true concerning every future object, as was known even to the Gentiles, both from the providence of God and from the infinite perspicacity of the divine mind, whence among pagans arose the custom of consulting oracles concerning future things. Therefore our proposition also is determinately true. For it is contradictory that of two cognitions affirming the same thing, one should be determinately true and the other not.

13. 2º, Peter's sin today either determinately is or determinately is not; for it cannot remain suspended today between being and non-being, as is evident. Let us therefore suppose that today it is. I infer: therefore yesterday

it was true to say, "Peter will sin tomorrow." The consequence is proved: the proposition, "Peter sins," is truly said today, and if Peter sins today it will truly be said tomorrow, "Peter sinned yesterday," because Peter's sin is given in the time imported by the copula. But this reason equally applies to the proposition uttered yesterday, as everyone sees. Therefore, and so forth. 3º, just as this principle is self-evident, "Everything either is or is not," and likewise this one, "Everything either was or was not," so also this one, "Everything either will be or will not be." But because of the first two it is evident that of two contradictories concerning the present or past, one is determinately true and the other determinately false. Therefore because of the third it must be evident that of contradictories concerning the future, for example, "Peter will sin; Peter will not sin," one is determinately true and the other false. These same arguments apply to conditioned future things, as will be clear to anyone who applies them.

14. First objection: Aristotle's foundation proposed in n. 10. I answer: that motive presses more plausibly against divine foreknowledge, since it is altogether certain and infallible. If the Philosopher, destitute of the light of faith, wished to deny this, he erred disgracefully, although there are some who interpret his mind otherwise. Peter's freedom to sin therefore remains unharmed. For truth, both divine and human, although temporally preceding Peter's sin, is nevertheless posterior to the sin by a posteriority of "accommodation," as they call it, insofar as Peter will not sin because God or a man truly knew it, but rather the cognition was true because Peter was freely going to sin.

15. On the supposition of such truth, Peter can no longer not sin, but has a certain necessity of sinning. Yet not every impotence or necessity is opposed to freedom, but only that which the will does not freely bring about and cannot avoid, and which is called "antecedent necessity." But that which the will freely brings upon itself or can avoid, and which is called "consequent necessity," does not impair freedom. Thus, on the supposition that one now freely consents to a temptation, it is necessary that one sin now; and on the supposition that I see someone now laughing, it is necessary that he now laugh, nor can he now fail to laugh. Yet because he himself freely brings this impotence and necessity upon himself, since even at that instant he could have prevented those suppositions, he sins freely and laughs freely. Of this kind is the necessity of sinning implied by true cognition of Peter's future sin. For Peter, afterward existing at his own time, by freely committing the sin freely brings upon himself that necessity, since that truth would never have existed unless Peter were now freely to sin. Hence Peter can prevent that necessity, because if he does not sin, as he can, God from

eternity did not foreknow the sin but foreknew the non-sin, and the natural created proposition was already false from the beginning. Priority of time is material when the connection of the preceding thing is accommodated to the free determination of the will just as though it were present.

16. Second objection: a free future thing is not actually determined to be, either in itself, since it does not yet exist, or in its cause, which either does not yet exist or is not determined but indifferent. Therefore there is now nothing from which a proposition concerning a free future can have determinate truth. The consequence is clear, because a proposition derives truth from the object's determinately being, according to the saying, "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is said to be true or false." I answer: omitting the determination of the future thing in the First Cause, concerning which theologians will dispute, I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it is not actually determined in itself, nor will it be determined afterward: I deny this; it is not determined now, but will be afterward: I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. A proposition concerning a free future, for example "Peter will sin," does not affirm that the sin is actually determined, but that it will be in future time. Therefore, if it actually will be, although it is not now, the proposition is already conformed to its object. For just as a proposition concerning the present is conformed to its object if it enunciates the object as it is, and a proposition concerning the past if it enunciates the object as it was, so a proposition concerning the future is conformed if it enunciates the object as it will be. Hence the saying, "From the fact that a thing is, and so forth," must be understood with extension to the time imported by the copula, whether present, past, or future. The difficulty drawn from the fact that formal truth is constituted from the object, and consequently cannot exist before the object exists, remains solved in chapter 2; and it is not relevant now, since it equally applies to a proposition concerning the past, which neither Aristotle nor anyone else denies to be determinately true. Whoever wishes other arguments solved may consult the Conimbricenses, in c. 8 De Interpretatione, q. un., throughout.

TREATISE VI.
ON ARISTOTLE'S ANALYTICS.

Aristotle wrote four books which he called Analytics, that is, Resolutory books, for the Greek word "analysis" is translated into Latin as "resolution," because in them, by distinctly examining the matter and form of the syllogism, as well as its principles, parts, and properties, he mentally resolves the syllogism. The first and second books explain syllogistic form in common and are called the books of the Prior Analytics, or "on prior resolution." The third and fourth explain demonstration, or the demonstrative syllogism, and its conditions taken from matter, and are called the books of the Posterior Analytics, or "on posterior resolution." Concerning the syllogism, beyond what was said in the Summulae, few things remain, which must now be treated briefly together with the doctrine of demonstration.

DISPUTATION I.
ON THE SYLLOGISM IN COMMON.

CHAPTER I.
Certain Doubts Concerning the Syllogism and Its Premises Considered in Relation to the Conclusion.

1. First doubt: in what does the essence of the syllogism consist? Some say that it consists in the premises alone, because according to the

Philosopher the demonstrative syllogism causes knowledge, that is, causes evident cognition, namely the conclusion; but it is the premises alone that cause the conclusion. On the contrary, others place the whole essence of the syllogism in the conclusion, because a syllogism is cognition of one truth through another and after another, which belongs only to the conclusion. But the common opinion places the essence of the syllogism in the premises and conclusion taken together. First, because Aristotle's definition of the syllogism, which all approve in the Summulae, namely, "Discourse in which, certain things being posited, something other than those things posited follows of necessity because these are so," is verified neither of the premises alone nor of the conclusion alone. For the expression "in which" plainly denotes that both what is inferred and those things from which it is inferred are contained within the syllogism. Secondly, because with the same premises remaining, a different syllogism is produced solely by a diversity of conclusion, as is clear in the direct and indirect moods of the first figure. Likewise, a different syllogism results if the same conclusion is inferred from different premises.

2. When a demonstrative syllogism is said to produce knowledge, the discussion concerns habitual knowledge; or, if actual knowledge, a part is taken by synecdoche for the whole, the premises being taken for the syllogism. Or, if preferred, demonstration causes knowledge in the genus of formal cause, insofar as it is the form denominating the intellect as knowing. And if the syllogism is sometimes said to be cognition of one truth through another, the premises are not therefore excluded from its constitution, just as whiteness is not excluded from the constitution of a white thing when "white" is said to be a subject denominated by whiteness; unless one wishes here also to take a part figuratively for the whole. Hence the contrary foundations remain solved.

3. Second doubt: whether a syllogism can exist in an act really indivisible which represents the whole object of the premises and conclusion. I answer: if perhaps such an act can exist in the human intellect, it will not properly and formally be a syllogism, because "syllogism" means the same as "reasoning" or "discourse of the mind." But discourse and reasoning necessarily import really distinct cognitions, one of which arises from another or from others. For this reason neither God nor the angels discourse, because although they know effects in causes, they do not know them from causes in such a way as to proceed from causes previously known to a cognition of effects. See St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 7, and q. 58, a. 3. At most, therefore, such an act could be called a syllogism virtually or eminently.

4. Third doubt: in what manner do the formal premises cause the conclusion? It is certain that some causality intervenes, for a syllogism is not discourse through an accidental succession of cognitions, as when, after knowing Peter, we turn to knowing Paul, but is "discourse according to causality," as St. Thomas says in the cited q. 14, a. 7. But the doubt is what kind of causality this is. Many, especially Thomists, think that the premises concur effectively toward the conclusion, so that they physically produce it and co-elicit it together with the intellect. Others, especially among our authors, hold that they concur as it were directively, insofar as by showing the identity of the extremes with the middle they incline and determine the intellect to affirm the identity of the extremes with one another. This kind of concurrence by illuminating, inviting, and inclining is called moral causality, such as the rules of an art have with respect to artifacts, and, according to the common opinion, cognition of the lovable object with respect to love.

5. This opinion is proved, 1º, by the same parity with cognition purely directively concurring toward love. 2º, by parity with suasive apprehension, or evidence, which although it determines one to judge, does not efficiently cause the judgment. 3º, because the intention of the end, although connected with the choice of means, does not physically cause it, but morally, by inclining the will; therefore likewise, and so forth. 4º, because the approximation of fire to wood does not efficiently cause heat in the wood; but the premises are an intentional approximation of the motive for inferring the conclusion. 5º, because one vital act cannot physically produce another act of the same power; otherwise vision would produce vision and hearing would produce hearing. Finally, because the effective power of causes is not to be multiplied without necessity, and there is none in the present case. The complete decision of this question depends upon matters to be disputed in psychology. Meanwhile the proofs adduced are not weak.

6. For the contrary opinion, 1º, St. Thomas is objected, 1 Poster., lect. 3, saying: "Principles stand to conclusions in demonstrations as active causes in natural things stand to their effects; hence in 2 Physics the propositions of a syllogism are placed in the genus of efficient cause." 2º, because without physical causality it will not properly be verified that a syllogism is "discourse according to causality." 3º, because the premises complete the proximate power of the intellect for eliciting the conclusion; but what completes and actualizes the power of an active cause for acting actively influences. 4º, because the premises assimilate the conclusion to themselves in evidence or probability; but only a physical cause assimilates the effect to itself. Likewise the conclusion according to the formality of "inference" must be contained in the premises, because it is contained in the intellect

according to the formality of "intellection," and in the species according to the formality of "image." 5º, because the premises perform the office of a species with respect to the conclusion.

7. I answer to 1º: in that passage St. Thomas takes "as" not univocally but analogically, signifying the proportion that exists between physical and moral influx, which also is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. To 2º: moral, or directive, causality, although less proper than effective causality, is certainly sufficient for one thing to be called absolutely the cause or effect of another. Thus a house is properly called the effect of art. Thus one who by command or counsel determines another to steal is absolutely called the cause of the theft. To 3º: the premises do not complete or actualize the power of the intellect toward the conclusion except after the manner of a moral co-principle, or even after the manner of application or approximation. This is confirmed by the rules of art with respect to the proximate power of playing the lyre, as also by the cognition prerequired for loving and by the approximation of fire to wood. To 4º: since the intellect is intrinsically capable of knowing evidently, probably, and discursively or inferentially, it sufficiently contains, in conjunction with the corresponding species, all these predicates or formalities of the conclusion, without recourse to the premises except after the manner of an application or co-principle morally precontaining the conclusion. To 5º: this is falsely asserted, for the species itself of the object of the premises, which is really indistinct from the object of the conclusion, can influence the conclusion, at least if it is determined by the premises as by an application or condition without which it cannot occur.

8. But whichever side one holds, one may infer from this, against certain authors, that the premises must exist simultaneously in time, or in the same instant, with the conclusion when they cause it. That a physical cause must actually exist while it causes will be shown in its own place. That the same is true of a directive or moral cause, at least while it causes immediately by itself and not precisely through some effect left behind, is shown by examples of cognition for loving, application for burning, and others. But the premises direct, incline, and determine toward the conclusion, not precisely through some other effect, but immediately and by reason of themselves, as all admit. Add that otherwise some false conclusion could be legitimately inferred from evident premises. Let there be only one lion in the world, existing at instant A but perishing at B. Let Peter see it existing at A and elicit these premises: "If a lion exists, something capable of roaring exists; but a lion exists." Then, if at instant B a conclusion can legitimately be inferred from premises no longer existing at B but existing at the preceding

instant, Peter could rightly conclude at B: "Therefore something capable of roaring exists," which is then false; and yet both premises were evident when elicited.

9. It is nevertheless consistent with this that the major premise regularly precedes the conclusion in time; and this often happens also with both premises, namely when the intellect has not yet sufficiently penetrated the terms of both to be determined to elicit the conclusion. Nor does it matter that the premises are necessary causes, for a necessary cause does not cause without temporal delay unless in the first instant it is proximately ready. We therefore intend only that both premises, although existing earlier in time, must at least be preserved or repeated in the instant in which the conclusion is elicited, just as cognition of an object must be preserved while love is elicited, although it often exists earlier in time. One will object: according to St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 7, syllogistic discourse requires succession of time, so that principles and conclusions are not known simultaneously.

10. I answer from what was just said. When the intellect, about to acquire knowledge, begins to investigate principles in order to proceed from them to conclusions, there is a succession of time, not as regards preservation of the premises while the conclusion is elicited, but as regards their first production, especially that of the major premise, which is principally accustomed to be called the "principle," and which is connected neither with the minor nor by itself with the conclusion. This arises from the weakness of the human mind, which regularly discovers truths only gradually. This alone St. Thomas intended. Yet he teaches otherwise when, knowledge having already been acquired, a syllogism is formed from habit. Hence the Holy Doctor, I, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2, says: "It must be said that two operations can be simultaneous in one power when one is referred to the other, as is clear when the will simultaneously wills both the end and the things that are for the end; and the intellect simultaneously understands principles and conclusions through the principles when it has already acquired knowledge."

CHAPTER II.

Whether the Premises Necessitate the Intellect to the Conclusion.

1. For the present purpose there is a twofold necessity. One is "as regards specification," or "as regards species," or "of contrariety." Although this necessity does not compel the placing of an act of a determinate species, it nevertheless compels one not to place an opposite act. The other is "as regards exercise," or "of contradiction"; this necessity compels an act of a

determinate species actually to be placed and exercised. The opinion common to almost all teaches that premises, both probable and evident, necessitate the conclusion as regards species, so that while the intellect assents to the premises it cannot dissent from the conclusion, or, what amounts to the same, cannot elicit a judgment contrary or contradictory to the conclusion. This is commonly proved because the intellect cannot dissent from these self-evident principles: "Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as one another; to be said of every, and to be said of none." But it would dissent from them if, after assenting through the premises to the identity of the extremes with the middle, it denied the identity of those same extremes with one another by contradicting the conclusion; or if, while judging that animal is truly said of every man and that Peter is a man, it judged that animal is not truly said of Peter. Hence what is impossible would also follow, namely that the intellect at the same instant judges contradictories, namely that every man is an animal and that some man, such as it judges Peter to be, is not an animal.

2. These arguments apply equally to probable premises, as will be clear upon consideration. The intellect can indeed absolutely dissent from a probable conclusion, but not on the supposition that it assents to the premises, for this would be directly to judge simultaneously two contradictories, at least virtually; and this is repugnant even in probable matter. Thus, although the will can absolutely reject a means necessary to an end, it cannot do so on the supposition that it efficaciously intends the end. One will say: with probable premises the intellect can have a grave motive for dissenting from the conclusion; therefore it can dissent. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: for dissenting in the divided sense of the premises: let it pass; for dissenting in the composite sense: I deny the antecedent, and I distinguish the consequence in the same way. Although the intellect actually assenting to these probable premises, "Every man existing in the marketplace is walking; Peter exists in the marketplace," can simultaneously apprehend a grave motive for judging absolutely that Peter is not walking, indeed although reflexively it judge that motive to be grave, it cannot nevertheless in that instant directly judge, "Peter is not walking," because neither that nor any other motive can incline toward such a judgment as one to be placed in circumstances in which it is actually judged that Peter is one of the men who are walking.

3. There is greater disagreement among authors concerning necessity as regards exercise. But the affirmative opinion, at least as regards evident premises, is common among Thomists and Scotists, and most of our authors hold it, such as Fonseca, the Conimbricenses, Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo,

Compton, Mauri, and John Baptist de Benedictis; and the same is taught clearly enough by St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 2. It is commonly proved because the intellect necessarily, and independently of a command or free application of the will, assents to an object proposed to it as altogether evident. But when the premises are posited, the object of the conclusion is proposed to the intellect as wholly evident. Therefore the intellect cannot then suspend assent to the conclusion and consequently is necessitated as regards exercise. The consequence is legitimate, and the minor premise is not denied by the adversaries, nor does it seem deniable, because to an intellect which evidently judges, for example, that every man is an animal and that Peter is a man, nothing appears more evident than that Peter consequently is an animal.

4. The major premise is proved, 1º, by experience, because the intellect often breaks forth necessarily into several assents and cannot be restrained by the will; as when someone, attending to himself, judges that he exists, or when, seeing the sun risen, he assents to the existence of daylight, or when first principles and self-evident truths are proposed to him, for example, "The whole is greater than its part"; "Two and three make five." But if evidence once necessarily carries assent away, there is no reason why it should not always do so, since it always removes every doubt and suspicion of falsity and does not allow an assent once given to be revoked; otherwise it would not be genuine evidence. 2º, by parity, because the visual power, although it can be prevented by the will from seeing insofar as it can be compelled to close the eyes or turn them elsewhere, cannot nevertheless, with the eyes open, be prevented from seeing a present object clearly illuminated. No reason for this can be given except the evidence of the object. Therefore likewise the intellect, although it can be prevented by the will from assenting to an object evident in itself insofar as it can be distracted elsewhere, cannot be prevented from assenting when the object is proposed to it as evident; for this is to be presented to the open eyes of the mind in clear light. Confirmation: the will, once an efficacious intention of the end is posited, is necessitated as regards exercise to the choice of a means proposed as simply necessary to the end. Therefore likewise, and so forth.

5. Most of the cited authors seem to extend the same necessity to probable premises, because although their object is not evident, the connection of that object with the object of the conclusion is evident. Therefore, whoever judges the first imposes upon himself a necessity of judging the second. For if someone plainly perceives that A cannot be true unless B also is true, how can he assent to object A and suspend assent

concerning B? Thus, one who opines that Titius is a Calvinist, if he knows from elsewhere that every Calvinist is a heretic, must opine that Titius is a heretic. For by those premises, "Every Calvinist is a heretic; Titius is a Calvinist," although the minor is merely probable, and therefore infers a merely probable conclusion, which follows the weaker part, the connection of the judged object with Titius's being a heretic is rendered evident. For the same reason, no one believes one who reports a friend's mortal wound without believing that the friend will soon die; no one opines that another has lost his eyes without opining that he is blind. The same is clear when the premises are rash judgments. Therefore, if someone from a slight foundation judges that another was a guest at Titius's table, and that all Titius's guests were drunk, the other will immediately and rightly complain of the injury done to him by the rash judgment. But why, unless because he regards it as certain that no one can assent to those premises without judging that he was drunk? There is also the parity of the will, which, although it is not bound efficaciously to intend the end, nevertheless, if it does so intend, cannot fail to choose the means necessarily connected with the end.

6. For these things to be true, a twofold limitation or condition is frequently added by the cited authors. The first is that, together with the premises, a more vivid apprehension of another disparate object not occur, drawing and occupying the effort and attention of the intellect to such a degree that it does not permit attention to the conclusion, because the powers are no longer sufficient to produce a new act at the same time. If such an apprehension is present, the premises will necessitate as regards specification, but not as regards exercise. The second is that the terms of the premises be well penetrated and their sense fully perceived; otherwise there will not even be necessity as regards specification. One will say: therefore the premises do not absolutely necessitate to the conclusion, since they can exist in circumstances in which the conclusion can either be denied or suspended. I grant the consequence if "absolutely" comprehends all circumstances.

7. For this reason, when the premises have been posited, we not rarely remain hesitant and deliberate about the conclusion to be inferred until we reflect again and again upon the sense of the premises. For the same reason, sometimes in disputation, even after correctly disposed premises have been granted, the consequence is denied by men who are not unlearned, because the intellect is either greatly distracted by the tumult of other apprehensions or does not sufficiently penetrate at first sight the terms of the premises, although it perceives enough to assent to them in some manner. Therefore the necessity hitherto asserted principally regards the command of the will.

The authors mean that an intellect which well penetrates the premises and is not occupied by other apprehensions cannot be prevented by the will from eliciting the conclusion, much less be determined to an act contrary to the conclusion.

8. I add a third limitation, namely that the aforesaid necessity be attributed to premises having a common middle disposed in the first figure according to the four perfect moods; likewise to premises having a singular middle according to the first and second figures; and also to the premises of a hypothetical syllogism according to the form explained in the Summulae, especially of the conditional and disjunctive syllogism. I think it more true that the others do not necessitate as regards exercise, at least an intellect not excessively acute; and I greatly doubt whether they necessitate as regards specification. This threefold limitation does not conflict with the proofs given above. The first does not, because when it is said that the evident presentation of an object carries assent away, it must be understood when the intellect has the physical powers sufficient for producing the assent.

9. The second does not conflict either, because while such attention or penetration is lacking, the connection of the object of the premises with the object of the conclusion is not rendered evident, because neither the terms nor their form and disposition possess sufficient clarity to excite an evident apprehension of such a connection or to supply for it. But when that connection is not evidently perceived, the intellect can implicitly and virtually contradict those principles cited in n. 1, at least when those principles are not contained in the premises explicitly and formally, but only implicitly and virtually, as most often happens. For it often occurs that someone incautiously assents to an object which afterward is demonstrated false through some self-evident principle. The intellect can then also judge two virtual contradictories. Thus a Calvinist or Jansenist judges that he does not have freedom from necessity while he wrongly desires, and simultaneously judges that he sins; these are virtually contradictory. Thus also in disputation we commonly reproach an adversary, whether orally or in writing, for inconsistency and contradiction when he simultaneously grants two propositions of this kind.

10. Hence the third limitation is also preserved, for syllogistic form in the second and third figures is not so perfect or perspicuous as to render evident the connection of the object of the premises with the object of the conclusion. First, because it is regulated by the principles cited in n. 1 only mediately and remotely, as all warn in the Summulae. Secondly, because for this reason the reduction of imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones was

invented. This would be entirely useless if premises disposed according to an imperfect figure necessitated to the conclusion, so that no one assenting to the premises could suspend or deny it.

11. One will say: every syllogism of every figure concludes necessarily and by force of form, which Aristotle's definition expresses by the words "it follows of necessity." I answer: the sense of this doctrine is that, given the truth of the premises of any figure, the conclusion cannot fail to be true if it is correctly deduced, and this indeed by force of form, or the disposition of the terms, whatever may be the matter "concerning which." Yet it is consistent with this that the conclusion is not in fact deduced, or is not correctly deduced, or that in its place an opposite act is elicited from another motive, because that connection of truths is not rendered evident by the premises. With these limitations, therefore, I think what has been said from n. 1 concerning the necessity of the conclusion is true, notwithstanding the objections now to be solved.

12. First objection: the intellect is a power subject to the will, like the locomotor power, which can be turned anywhere at will. I answer: the locomotor power has nothing by which it is determined except the will; but the intellect can be determined by species, apprehensions, and premises. Hence it is more to be compared with the visual power, according to n. 4. Moreover, the intellect is simply subject to the will in conjectural matters and, speaking in itself, in probable matters. But in things proposed evidently it is subject to the will first remotely or mediately, insofar as it can antecedently either be applied by the will to seeking evident species and apprehensions or be distracted elsewhere so as not to encounter them. Secondly, it is not rarely subject even immediately in a qualified sense with respect to assent to the premises, insofar as it can often be determined by the will, not to deny or suspend every assent from an object evidently apprehended, but to elicit one assent rather than another, namely when the evident apprehension does not altogether determine the mode and tendency of the assent.

13. For example, someone can evidently apprehend the identity of man and animal without thereby being altogether determined to predicate animal of man rather than man of animal, nor to elicit a universal proposition rather than an indefinite one. This apprehension necessitates the will to command some assent, but leaves to it a choice among various tendencies and modes of predicating. Hence the will can command that determinate assent which is opportune for the end, for example of constructing a syllogism according to the rules of logic. From this one may gather that this opinion is compatible with logic directing toward demonstration, according to what

was said Tract. 1, disp. 1, cap. 10, n. 16. For logic directs immediately to the premises with respect to the disposition of terms. But it directs immediately to the conclusion simply, or with respect to the substance of assent, in the second and third figures, and also in the first when the conclusion is indirect, or when the terms are only imperfectly penetrated, because then production of the conclusion is generally not necessary. Yet toward a direct conclusion of the first figure, when the premises are well penetrated, logic directs only mediately, insofar as it directs toward the right disposition of the premises.

14. But why, one asks, does logic not direct immediately here also? For with these premises posited, for example, "Every animal is living; every man is an animal," the intellect is indifferent to eliciting either the direct conclusion in Barbara or the indirect one in Paralipt. I deny such indifference concerning the direct conclusion, for the intellect always and necessarily elicits it, although it does not always reflexively notice that it is eliciting it. The reason is that the premises cause the object of the conclusion to be apprehended or proposed in such a manner as altogether to determine even the mode and tendency of the act. Therefore the intellect is indifferent only to placing or omitting the indirect conclusion, which can exist simultaneously with the direct one without inconvenience.

15. Second objection: no finite goodness necessarily carries away the love of the will; therefore no finite object necessarily carries away the assent of the intellect. Confirmation: the premises do not formally and explicitly propose the object of the conclusion, but only implicitly or virtually, insofar as they propose something necessarily connected with that object. But one who assents to one object is not compelled, at least as regards exercise, formally to assent to the others with which it is connected. Otherwise no one could judge, "Peter is white," without having this explicit assent, "Peter is a being," or this one, "God exists." Add that assent to one object virtually contains dissent from its contradictory, and yet does not necessitate the exercise of that dissent. For one who judges, "There is light," is not compelled immediately to infer, "Therefore there is no darkness." Add further that the will often wills some object without formally willing the others with which it is identified or connected. I answer to the objection: I deny the consequence, which certainly does not hold from a free power to a necessary one. For the latter, unlike the former, cannot suspend operation when all requisites for operating are posited, and in our case experience and reason prove that they are actually posited.

16. To the confirmation: our opinion does not rest upon the mere connection of objects, but upon the connection as evidently proposed. If

this is given, one must either assent to both objects or to neither. But the combination of the extremes with the middle in the first figure is such that it necessarily excites a most vivid apprehension of the infallible connection of the object of the premises with the object of the conclusion. Indeed, even if it does not excite such an apprehension, the disposition of the premises itself can supply for it, because in the line of virtual manifestation it attains the highest clarity and approaches very closely to formal manifestation, as seems evident from experience and is admitted by the adversaries. Hence the cited examples do not harm our position, because from this act alone, "Peter is white," no explicit apprehension is necessarily excited that it follows from this that Peter is a being or that God exists. But if this act were joined with, "Whatever is white is a being," or "If Peter is white, God exists"; or if together with "There is light," there were also, "When there is light, there is no darkness," then, I say, the aforesaid evident apprehension would necessarily be excited or supplied, and assent concerning the consequent object could not be restrained. What is added concerning the will is perhaps not true when the connection is evidently perceived as unavoidable; hence no one wills to cut another's throat without willing him to die. But even granting it, there is no parity, because of the difference between a free and a necessary power.

17. Third objection: there is in the intellect a habit of first principles, and there is also another habit of knowledge concerning conclusions. But both habits will be idle if the intellect assents necessarily both to evident principles and to conclusions arising from them; for a necessary cause does not acquire a habit, as is clear in sight, fire, and the sun. I press the point: when a command of the will is posited, the intellect acts as a necessary cause. Does it then acquire a habit or not? Furthermore, I answer: perhaps intellectual habits are not distinguished from experiential species, as many think in psychology; and thus there is already a clear reason why they belong to the intellect rather than to other necessary causes. Those who admit them as distinct from species place them in the intellect because they think the facility of understanding which we experience as gradually acquired cannot otherwise be explained except through habit. But in sight, fire, and the sun neither the same reason nor the same experience applies. In this way habit will serve, not that the intellect operate more quickly, but that it operate with less effort and fatigue, and in this sense more easily. But note that perhaps the habit of knowledge is not directed to conclusions alone, but simultaneously also to principles insofar as they are disposed in the form of premises, although principles taken in themselves and separately generate a distinct habit.

18. Fourth objection, against the necessity of a probable conclusion: when probable premises are posited, the conclusion is merely probable, for it cannot draw from the premises certainty or evidence which they themselves do not have. But the intellect is not necessitated as regards exercise to merely probable assent. Therefore, and so forth. First confirmation: in the consequent as such there is no greater probability than in the premises, as is certain. But it would be greater if the alleged necessity were given, for the probability of the premises in themselves does not necessitate assent; whereas according to us probability derived into the consequent does necessitate. Moreover probability, since it is the power drawing and persuading the intellect to assent, is greater insofar as it persuades and draws more strongly. Second confirmation: while the premises stand, either the intellect can fear the opposite of the consequent or cannot. The latter removes from the act the character of opinion, which consists in being compossible with fear of the opposite. The former leaves indifference to the intellect; moreover, it destroys the foundation of our opinion drawn from evidence of the connection, because if assent is induced by force of such evidence, it excludes every fear. Third confirmation: if it were possible for the intellect to assent simultaneously to the same probable truth by two numerically distinct acts, it could place one and suspend the other. Therefore, all the more can it suspend assent to the conclusion when the premises are posited; for here there is a connection of objects, whereas there there is formal identity, which has greater force. Here there is a new probable truth, and consequently a new danger of error; not so there.

19. These arguments move Fr. John Baptist de Benedictis, tom. 1, Philosoph., l. 4, c. 5, to deny necessity of exercise to a probable conclusion, although he grants necessity of specification. But first, from this very point the objection with its confirmations can be pressed against him, for it proves that the intellect can positively dissent from the conclusion just as it can or could dissent from the premises, at least if at the same time it apprehends some motive for the opposite side, as often happens. Secondly, just as probable assent to the premises, although it can absolutely be suspended at any instant, nevertheless on the supposition that it exists at instant A can no longer be suspended at that instant but necessarily exists, according to the saying, "Everything that is, on the supposition that it is, necessarily is," so assent to the conclusion can indeed be absolutely suspended when no supposition is made, but not on the supposition of assent to the premises. Through that assent the object of the conclusion is supposed virtually prejudged together with an evident apprehension of the objective connection, which the cited author does not deny. For such prejudgment

pours into assent to the conclusion that necessity of being which it itself has in the instant in which it is supposed to exist. The adversary is bound to philosophize in the same way concerning necessity as regards specification.

20. Hence, to the objection, granting the major premise, I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: the intellect is not necessitated, and so forth, absolutely and with no supposition made: I grant this; with some supposition made: I deny the minor premise, and under the same distinction the consequence. This distinction would have to be adopted if "as regards specification" were substituted for the addition "as regards exercise." To the first confirmation: I deny that probability derived into the consequent is greater than in the premises, for it is one and the same probability, since it is founded upon the same motive. Nor is it true that it necessitates the intellect more strongly. For just as the premises necessitate, not absolutely and in themselves, but on the supposition that the intellect assents to them, so too the probability of the consequent necessitates only on this same supposition, not absolutely and in itself. Nor is this power of drawing and persuading distinct from that which belongs to the premises, since it is poured from them into the consequent. Indeed, with respect to the effect of necessitating on a supposition, it shines forth more in the premises than in the consequent, because it is more necessary for the premises to be, on the supposition that they are, than for the conclusion to be on the supposition of the premises. For the latter can be frustrated by divine power, but the former cannot. Add the same objection in the necessity of specification. For since probability is a power dissuading and drawing back the intellect from dissent, and since the intellect can absolutely dissent from the premises, but not from the consequent on the supposition of the premises, a greater probability in the consequent would likewise follow.

21. To the second confirmation: I embrace the first part of the dilemma, provided it is understood of a fear indistinct from, or inseparable from, that which accompanies the premises. But just as the fear accompanying the premises does not leave the intellect indifferent to suspending their assent in the instant in which it exists, on the supposition that it exists, but only to suspending it prior to such a supposition or to revoking it in following instants, so likewise fear concerning the opposite of the consequent proceeds step by step in the same way and leaves the intellect no indifference to suspend or revoke assent to the consequent except by a revocation or suspension which indivisibly removes assent to the premises. Evidence of the connection does not exclude fear from assent to the consequent, for it is evidence of itself conditioned, which becomes absolute and necessitating by the supposition of fearful assent. This is explained thus:

it is evident to me that if Peter walks, he is moved; but this evidence does not necessitate me to absolute assent to the consequent, "Peter is moved," until I assent to this enunciation, "Peter walks." Hence, if this assent is merely probable and fearful, it also renders fearful the assent to the consequent, notwithstanding the evidence of the connection between walking and being moved.

22. To the third: the antecedent can first be denied without scruple. For simultaneous positing of two numerically distinct acts is repugnant by the nature of the thing precisely because, if it were possible, it would also be necessary whenever one of them was posited. They would be such thoroughly twin brothers that whatever determined one to existence would equally determine both to existence. And since, moreover, the positing of both would be superfluous, because each would reveal nothing other, nor otherwise, nor better than the other, and nothing superfluous can be necessary, it follows that such simultaneous positing is naturally impossible. Secondly, let the antecedent pass; I deny the consequence, because for multiplying assents, connection has greater force than formal identity, since the former, unlike the latter, in a certain way multiplies objective truths, which are not fully satisfied by the first assent. Nor is there in a probable conclusion a properly new danger of error; rather, the same danger which exists in the premises is extended to a new truth, for one cannot err in the conclusion without error in the premises.

CHAPTER III.
A Twofold Question Concerning the Conclusion of a Syllogism.

1. First question: whether for eliciting a conclusion from correctly disposed premises there must necessarily be prerequired cognition of the goodness of the consequence or inference. There is a twofold inference. One is "objective," consisting in the connection of objects by force of which the object of the premises cannot be true unless the object of the conclusion is true. The other is "formal," consisting in the right disposition of formal terms according to the rules of logic, insofar as it is apt to convince in any matter. The first of these can be separated from the second, as in this enthymeme: "Peter is a man; therefore he is an animal."

2. I assert, 1º: cognition of the goodness of the formal inference with reflection upon the rules of logic is not necessary. This was sufficiently proved in Tract. 1, disp. 1, cap. 7, where we showed that experiential cognition without art suffices. Indeed, as we noted there in n. 22, not even

such reflexive cognition is required in itself, although it is sometimes required accidentally because the terms and sense of the premises are not sufficiently and ultimately penetrated. For the premises through themselves in exercise render the intellect secure concerning the right form of discourse, sufficiently to prevent it from concluding rashly or by blind impulse.

3. I assert, 2º: a judgment concerning the goodness of the objective inference distinct from the premises is not prerequired. Thus the common opinion against certain authors who think the contrary. It is proved, 1º, because otherwise three premises would be necessary for a syllogism. For from these, "Every man is an animal; Peter is a man," the conclusion could not be inferred until this other judgment were added: "The object of these acts is connected with Peter's being an animal"; and only then could it be concluded: "Therefore Peter is an animal." Hence it would follow that a syllogism in itself requires more than three terms, that syllogistic art was incompletely handed down by Aristotle, and that it is explained only in mutilated form by all who discuss it in the dialectical institutions.

4. 2º, because for someone to judge without hesitation the identity of such extremes with one another, it suffices that he judge their identity with a third. Likewise, for judging that animal is truly said of such a subject, it suffices to judge that such a subject is one of those of which animal is truly said. Otherwise no one could assent even in common to these principles, "To be said of every"; "Things which are the same as one third thing," and so forth, unless he first judged the connection between identity with a third and identity with one another, or between being said of every and being said of each. Consequently those principles would not be self-evident. Therefore, in order that it be judged in the conclusion that Peter is an animal, the customary premises suffice, by which the identity of Peter and animal with a third is judged and Peter is asserted to be one of those of which animal is truly said.

5. It is objected: the conclusion is inferred because of the object of the premises, not considered in any manner whatsoever, but as connected with the object of the conclusion. Therefore such a connection must be formally and explicitly precognized; for it does not move one to conclude except insofar as precognized. But it is not known in this way through the premises alone, since these attain that connection only virtually and implicitly. Otherwise, if they knew it explicitly, they would consequently express the object of the conclusion at least obliquely. Therefore another judgment concerning such a connection is prerequired. First confirmation: when the premises are posited, it often happens that one person concludes

immediately while another hesitates. This can arise from nothing else than a judgment concerning the goodness of the inference which one adds and another does not. Second confirmation: for the intention of the end to determine in second act toward the choice of means, the utility or necessity of the means must be expressly judged. Therefore likewise, for the premises ultimately to determine to the conclusion, the necessary inference of the conclusion must be expressly judged.

6. The objection at most proves that an explicit apprehension of that connection is necessary. But it does not even prove this. For such a connection need not always be known formally and explicitly. It suffices that it be proposed through a cognition which, within the line of virtual and implicit representation, is supremely vivid and proximate to explicit representation, and which consequently supplies for the explicit and is altogether equivalent to it in determining the intellect to assent to the consequent object. Of this kind, with respect to that connection, is the representation of the premises in the perfect moods of the first figure, as we noted in chapter 2, n. 16. For it expresses its object in such a manner as almost to place before the eyes the object of the conclusion, or the connection with it, not only apprehensively but judgmatically.

7. That in the other figures, and generally whenever the premises do not necessitate to the conclusion, an explicit apprehension, and if one wishes a judgment, concerning the objective or formal inference is required, can be allowed. For this will be accidental with respect to the perfect syllogism, of which we now speak and of which authors speak when they dispute absolutely concerning the syllogism. This is no different from the case in which one disputes absolutely what human nature or the human intellect can do; the discussion is not then about infirm nature or a rude intellect, but one possessing the whole perfection of which the human condition is capable.

8. The first confirmation proves only the necessity of apprehension. Indeed, it does not prove even this absolutely, but only when the premises have an imperfect form or accidentally are not well penetrated. The second confirmation unjustifiably equates the will with the intellect, that is, a blind power with a seeing power, especially since in our case a judgment equivalent to an explicit one concerning the objective necessity of the conclusion precedes, whereas nothing similar precedes in the case of choosing the means.

9. Second question, and a disputed one: whether the conclusion formally attains the object of the premises; that is, whether the conclusion not only affirms the identity of the extremes with one another, but also proposes to

itself as the motive for affirming the identity of the extremes with the middle, which is the object of the premises. Or, if the syllogism is regulated by "to be said of every," whether the mental conclusion, "Therefore Peter is an animal," not only assents to the identity of Peter with animal, but also intrinsically represents as the reason for assenting that Peter is one of the men of whom animal is truly said, as was judged in these premises: "Every man is an animal; Peter is a man."

10. Omitting two intermediate opinions, one of which affirms this concerning some conclusions and denies it concerning others, while the other affirms it concerning virtual and exercised representation but denies it concerning formal and designated representation, there remain two diametrically opposed opinions. The first absolutely denies it and is defended by Fathers Hurtado, Compton, Alphonso, Izquierdo, John Baptist de Benedictis, to whom add the Scotists cited by Mastrius, as also Spinula, Aversa, and others. The second absolutely affirms it, and is expressly held by St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8, a. 3, c., whom the Thomists follow, and several of our authors, such as Rubio, Amico, Arriaga, Oviedo, Mauri, Quirós, and others. This question requires examination neither superficial nor brief; perhaps there will be a place for it in psychology. For now it is enough to have proposed it, lest the volume on logic grow beyond measure.

DISPUTATION II.
ON THE DEMONSTRATIVE SYLLOGISM.

CHAPTER I.
What Demonstration Is, and How Many Kinds There Are.
On Things Precognized and Principles.

1. Demonstration, which is also called an apodictic or demonstrative syllogism, according to Aristotle, 1 Poster., c. 2, is "a syllogism causing knowledge," namely both in the genus of efficient cause, insofar as it causes habitual knowledge, and in the genus of formal cause, insofar as "because we possess it, we know," since it itself is actual knowledge, as the same Philosopher explains. But because "to know is nothing other than to possess a demonstration," according to Aristotle there and 2 Poster., c. 3, lest perhaps a vicious circle seem to be committed in defining, demonstration is usually defined more clearly according to Aristotle's meaning thus: "A syllogism in which an evident conclusion is deduced from certain and evident premises," or even more briefly, "an evident syllogism."

2. This definition supposes that without evidence there is no demonstration and therefore no discursive knowledge properly taken. Hence a sufficiently common opinion denies that sacred theology is properly a science, although in certainty it surpasses human sciences and in a broad sense is called a science, because it proceeds from principles which are indeed most certain but not evident, since they are known through supernatural faith. Nevertheless, many require for the concept of

demonstration and science only certainty, provided that this can be found without evidence, as it is found in sacred theology. The dispute is about a name. The first opinion is most true in purely human sciences, of which we now speak.

3. But one may ask: what is evidence, and what is certainty? I answer: evidence is a clarity by which a thing is so perspicuously presented to the intellect as though it were seen with the eyes in midday light. Hence the name is derived from seeing, although evidence does not always depend upon sight or another sensation. One is "evidence of the object," consisting in such force and proportion of the motive as necessarily to carry away assent, or at least to allow it to be delayed by no fear, doubt, or obscurity, nor an assent once given to be revoked. Another is "evidence of cognition," consisting in the intrinsic perspicuity of an act so revealing the truth of the object as to dispel every obscurity upon which hesitation of the intellect or fear of falsity might rest.

4. Certainty is firmness of truth or persuasion. One certainty is "of the object," another "of the subject," another "of cognition." Certainty of the object is its necessity of being so as it is judged to be, at least insofar as it stands under such a motive. Certainty of the subject is the firm and tenacious adherence of the intellect to its judgment as true. This does not always arise from the merits of the judgment or object, but not rarely from obstinacy or passion, as when heretics tenaciously adhere to their errors. Certainty of cognition is its intrinsic infallibility or repugnance to falsity. This certainty, which depends upon the motive, is called metaphysical when it is essentially repugnant to falsity; physical when it is repugnant to falsity only naturally; moral when falsity can occur only with great difficulty and is not to be feared by any prudent person. Every evident judgment is certain either metaphysically or physically. Yet not every certain judgment is also evident, as is clear in an act of supernatural faith, which, although supremely certain, is not evident but obscure. Therefore demonstration requires evidence of judgment and the certainty of cognition imbibed in it, either metaphysical or at least physical.

Division of Demonstration.

5. One demonstration is *a priori*, namely one which assumes as middle term a physical or metaphysical cause in order to prove an effect or property. Another is *a posteriori*, or "from a sign," namely one which assumes an effect as middle term in order to prove the cause; and also that which argues "from a concomitant," that is, from a middle term connected with the object to be

inferred but which is neither its cause nor its effect, as if one proves risibility through the capacity for weeping, or argues thus: "Whatever endures in time exists in a place; but the heavens endure in time; therefore they exist in a place." With this division, according to many, coincides that famous and ancient division by which demonstration is divided into "why" and "that." A demonstration "that" is given when it is evidently shown that a thing is; a demonstration "why," when it is evidently shown because of what cause the thing is.

6. Nevertheless, the common usage of the ancients calls "demonstration why" only one which through a proximate cause proves the effect, for example risibility through the capacity for wonder, or an eclipse of the moon through the interposition of the earth. All the rest it calls "demonstrations that," whether they proceed from effect, from a concomitant, or from a remote cause. Among demonstrations "why," that is called "most powerful," or "most perfect," which demonstrates a first property through the essence of the subject, for example the capacity for wonder through rational animality.

7. Demonstration is otherwise divided into "ostensive" and "leading to the impossible." Ostensive demonstration is that which simply shows the thing from true premises explicitly threatening no absurdity, as if one demonstrates that man has the capacity for wonder because he is discursive and everything discursive has the capacity for wonder. Demonstration leading to the impossible, which is also called "from an absurdity," "from the impossible," or "from an inconvenience," is that which from one true premise and another granted by the adversary deduces an impossible or manifestly false conclusion, so that the adversary is compelled to revoke the proposition previously granted and admit its contradictory; or even that which, without such a circuit, threatens in the premises an absurdity that would follow unless the conclusion were true, for example: "If man were not discursive, he would not be a rational animal; but he is a rational animal; therefore he is discursive." Finally, demonstration by reason of form can have as many figures and moods as we gave in the Summulae.

On Things Precognized and Precognitions.

8. Aristotle requires for demonstration three "things precognized" and two "precognitions." The things precognized must be the "subject, property, and principles"; and these three are to be precognized in two modes, which modes are called precognitions. One mode is had when concerning an object one knows "that it is," or "whether it is." The other is when one knows

"what it is." Cognition of "whether it is" can bear either upon being of the thing, namely by knowing that the thing is existing or at least possible, or upon the state of truth, or of a complex enunciable, namely by knowing that some proposition is true. Cognition of "what it is" is also subdivided into cognition of "what the name means" and cognition of "what the thing is." The former is the ultimate concept of the name; the latter is the definition of the thing itself.

9. Therefore the "subject" is that concerning which we wish to demonstrate something and which consequently we make the subject in the conclusion. "Property" in the present acceptation is that predicate which is taken as to be demonstrated of the subject. "Principles" are those truths through which it is proved that the property belongs to the subject. These three, subject, property, and principles, must first be precognized as regards "what the name means"; for unless one penetrates the terms, or ultimately conceives the names, how will one demonstrate? Secondly, the subject and property must be precognized "that they are" in the state of the thing, unless perhaps there is a dispute concerning the possibility of the subject, or even concerning a chimerical being. Yet the property need not necessarily be precognized "that it is" in the subject, since this very point is to be demonstrated. Nevertheless, nothing prevents it from in fact being precognized from another source as belonging to that subject. Thus, after seeing an eclipse of the moon, someone can demonstrate it from the interposition of the earth. Therefore the property need only necessarily be precognized as some thing possible in itself.

10. Furthermore, the principles must be precognized "that they are" in the state of truth, at least through a suasive or evident apprehension. Finally, those three need not be precognized as regards "what the thing is," except when the quiddity itself or definition is assumed as middle term, or is undertaken to be demonstrated *a posteriori*. It is indeed customary at the threshold of each complete science to premise a definition of the subject of attribution or adequation; but this is done for the sake of method, not because it is required for every particular demonstration. One will say: whoever does not know what a thing is cannot reason concerning it. I answer by distinguishing: if he does not know it as regards "what the name means," that is, if he does not have the ultimate concept of the name: I grant this; if he does not know it as regards "what the thing is," that is, if he does not have a definitive concept: I deny this. For although one does not know how exactly to define the heavens or the sun, one can reason about many things concerning them, at least through demonstration "that."

On Principles and Self-Evident Propositions, and Also on a Circle That Is Not Worthless.

11. But one will ask what the principles are from which a demonstration must proceed and which must be precognized by one demonstrating. I answer: principles here are propositions lacking a middle term. In a broad sense, any propositions can be called principles which are here and now evidently known without a middle term or without discourse, although in themselves they are knowable through a middle term. And thus every demonstration even *a posteriori*, or one which argues from an effect known through evident experience of the senses, proceeds from principles, that is, from propositions evidently known without a middle term. Properly, however, only propositions indemonstrable *a priori* are called principles, namely those which in themselves have no cause through which they can be proved. Hence they are called "first" propositions, that is, propositions not depending upon another prior one, and "immediate," that is, lacking an *a priori* middle term.

12. Principles so understood are of different kinds. Some are called in Greek "axioms," in Latin "dignities," otherwise "proloquies," "maxims," or "sayings," namely those which are known by the light of nature and common to all sciences, and which consequently anyone undertaking to learn any science must regard as true. Such are these: "Everything either is or is not"; "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be"; "The same thing cannot truly be simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same thing"; "The whole is greater than its part." Others are called "positions," namely those which, although indemonstrable *a priori* and evident once their terms are penetrated, are nevertheless not common nor known to everyone without a teacher, but proper to some science; hence it is not necessary that one precognize them before beginning to learn, since they are usually proposed and explained to him at the threshold. Of this kind in logic is, "From the true nothing follows except the true," and in mathematics, "If equals are subtracted from equals, equals remain."

13. Essential definitions of things pertain here. They are numbered among the positions or first principles of each science because in the sciences, for methodical reasoning, they are usually premised, and for the most part are either prudently supposed or are proved only through induction from experience, or even from an absurdity. This mode of proof can belong to all principles, even axioms, if perhaps they appear less evident.

Now what we said, that for demonstrating principles must be precognized in the state of truth, is to be understood thus: axioms, even when they do not formally enter the demonstration, must be precognized by the demonstrator at least habitually, that is, so that the demonstrator not only does not dissent from them but is disposed to assent whenever they occur to the mind. Positions, however, need not be precognized before every demonstration, but only when a demonstration is to be constructed from them, or from premises demonstrated through them.

14. With principles explained in this way, we come to self-evident propositions. A proposition is called "self-evident" when anyone approves it as true from its own terms, or when it requires no other reason or middle term in order to be approved by anyone using reason, besides the ultimate concept of its own terms, namely the subject and predicate of which it consists. If it is known in this way according to common and obvious notions imbibed by all from childhood, then it is most properly called self-evident. Such are the general principles called axioms, for example, "The whole is greater than its part"; likewise identical propositions and others which display manifest truth, for example, "Peter either is white or is not white."

15. But if a proposition is known from its own terms whose ultimate concept is not commonly possessed by everyone but pertains to some faculty, then it will be self-evident, less properly indeed, but nevertheless properly. For although the extremes are more recondite, nevertheless, if the whole reason for the truth of the enunciable consists in the extremes themselves, penetration of the terms suffices for the truth of the proposition to become manifest without need of another middle term; and this is the characteristic of a self-evident proposition. In this sense every immediate proposition, or one which lacks an *a priori* middle term through which it may be proved, is said to be self-evident, for example, "Quality is an accident"; "Quantity is not quality"; and generally those principles which are called positions.

16. An immediate proposition is further said to be self-evident either "in itself alone" or "in itself and to us." This division, which is taught by Thomists and rejected by Scotists, has an appropriate sense if it speaks of the objective proposition, or of the object as enunciable. Thus a proposition will be immediate and self-evident "in itself alone" when the middle term through which it is proved is not other than the extremes themselves by real otherness, or at least by an otherness founding a perfect distinction of reason; nevertheless, because we know imperfectly, it is assumed by us as a middle term and as though a third thing. For example, when the first

property is predicated of a subject, as the capacity for wonder of man, the proposition becomes knowable and demonstrable through the definition of the subject, namely "rational animal," which is assumed by us as middle term and as the *a priori* reason why man has the capacity for wonder, and consequently stands "to us" as though it were something other than the extremes. But since that definition is not something other than man "in itself," the objective connection of the extremes is not made known through something other "in itself." Therefore it is self-evident "in itself" and immediate in itself, or lacking a middle term, although not "to us."

17. But when no *a priori* reason mediates either on the part of the object or from our mode of conceiving, then the proposition is immediate and self-evident "in itself and to us," as happens in first principles and whenever the predicate belongs to the immediate nature of the subject, or whenever the definition or a part of the definition is predicated of what is defined. It must be noted here that in a broad sense contingent truths which we immediately perceive through evident experience are also called "self-evident." Thus it is self-evident to each man that he exists. But a proposition is not properly called self-evident unless the same proposition is manifest of itself to all. Contingent and singular truths concerning a created object, however, either are not manifest except individually to individual persons, or are not manifest except to those who see or otherwise experience them. Here it is also customary to note that for the concept of an immediate or self-evident proposition it suffices that it lack an *a priori* middle term in some genus of cause, even though it does not lack one in another genus. Hence a proposition can be immediate in the genus of intrinsic cause while simultaneously demonstrable through an extrinsic cause.

18. Finally, it must be noted that it is not contrary to the nature of every immediate and self-evident proposition that it be capable of demonstration *a posteriori*. On this occasion it must be explained to what extent a circle is permissible in demonstration. We use a circle when, with their offices exchanged, we take the object that was the consequent as antecedent, and from it infer as consequent what had previously been antecedent. If this is done without any other cognition of the truth newly assumed as antecedent than that which had been acquired by the preceding discourse, there will be a vicious circle, customarily called a "formal circle," or "uniform circle," otherwise "begging the principle." But if the consequent previously inferred is afterward known more deeply, or is even proved from another source, it will then be permissible through it to prove the former antecedent by reasoning backward. This is called a "material circle" and "demonstrative regress," and is certainly subject to no defect. Thus we commonly prove

causes through effects, and afterward through the causes more attentively considered and better known we prove those same effects *a priori*. In this way, therefore, an immediate proposition can be demonstrated *a posteriori*, although it performs the office of a first principle of *a priori* demonstration.

CHAPTER II.

What the Premises of Demonstration Ought to Be Like, Especially from the Matter about Which It Is Concerned.

1. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* I, c. 2, prescribes certain conditions for the premises of demonstration, from which there results, as it were, this definition of demonstration: "A syllogism consisting of true, first and immediate premises, prior and better known, and causes of the conclusion." These six conditions are conveniently reduced to three: namely, that demonstration consist 1º of "true" premises, in which, that is, the predicate really belongs to the subject; and not merely true in any way whatsoever, but certain and evident, as Aristotle everywhere supposes; 2º of "immediate" premises, that is, lacking a middle, or indemonstrable *a priori*, which we explained in the preceding chapter; and this is the same as consisting of "first" premises; 3º of "causes of the conclusion," under which are included those expressions "from prior" and "better-known" things, for a cause is "prior" by nature to the effect, and is also "better known" by nature, insofar as those things are said to be better known by nature upon which the exact cognition of other things must be founded when we wish to know them accurately and radically.

2. But concerning the second condition you may ask whether every demonstration must consist of "first" premises. I answer: every demonstration of the reason why concerning a necessary object must consist of "first" premises, either formally or at least virtually, namely by consisting of mediate premises that are already supposed to have been demonstrated through first principles. For it is customary in the sciences, and taught by Aristotle in *Topica*, c. 1, that conclusions demonstrated through first principles, and thereby participating in their power of certainty and evidence, should thereafter be taken as premises for demonstrating new conclusions. In this sense, therefore, a demonstration must proceed from first principles, or, what comes to the same thing, from immediate propositions known in themselves, not only in themselves but also with respect to us.

3. Concerning the third condition you may ask whether the premises must be better known than the conclusion, not only in the sense explained

in no. 1, but in such a way that they are clearer, that is, more evident, and also truer, that is, more certain. Aristotle seems to affirm this from the celebrated maxim, "That because of which each thing is such is itself more so"; for since the conclusion is known in the manner stated because of the premises, the latter must be better known. Philosophers commonly agree, especially the older ones. Yet for the truth of that maxim, in which "because of" denotes an essential cause, they require three things: 1º that the predicate in which the comparison is made belong to both extremes; and therefore it does not follow that, if man was created for the sake of God, God is more created; 2º that such a predicate be capable of more and less; hence, although you are a man because of your father, your father is not therefore more a man; 3º that one be the cause of the other in that very predicate, and indeed an adequate cause in its own genus. With these conditions, which they think are found in the present case, they regard that maxim as unshaken, and therefore hold that the premises are always more certain and more evident than the conclusion.

4. But Fathers Hurtado, Oviedo, Lynch, Quirós, and very many others, especially the more recent authors, judge the opposite, and indeed on account of arguments of no small weight, which may be seen in their works. Nor do they admit the aforesaid maxim generally, except with respect to a final cause; in that genus, if medicine is loved, for example, for the sake of health, health is loved more. As far as I am concerned, the matter is uncertain and probable on either side as regards an excess of evidence, which can readily admit of more and less. But as regards an excess of certainty, which is now taken for the infallibility of the act or the necessity of the object, the negative position is more probable. For certainty, insofar as it is common to the premises and conclusion of the same demonstrative syllogism, often does not admit of more and less. Either the certainty is metaphysical, and then in both it is altogether impossible that falsity should underlie them; or the certainty is physical, as in this demonstration: "Whenever the earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon, an eclipse of the Moon occurs; but at such a time the earth is thus interposed; therefore at such a time an eclipse of the Moon occurs." In this case too, falsity is equally impossible in both without an altogether equal miracle, as will be clear to one who considers the matter. At most there may be admitted an excess of certainty that is, as it were, extensive in both premises taken together.

5. I return to the conditions expressed in no. 1, and I note two things. 1º For a demonstration to be "from causes," not only is a physical cause sufficient, such as the rising of the Sun with respect to the day, but also a

metaphysical cause or root, such as rationality with respect to the capacity for wonder, and the capacity for wonder with respect to risibility. Indeed, a predicate suffices which, with respect to us, is the proximate reason for the connection or agreement of the extremes, although it is not their cause in themselves, as when it is demonstrated that man is a living thing because he is an animal. Moreover, a cause useful for demonstration, according to the variety of the matter, can be fivefold, namely efficient, exemplar, final, material, and formal; concerning these we treat at length in Physics.

6. 2º Those conditions are strictly required by a demonstration of the reason why. But in a broader sense it can be said that every demonstration, even one *a posteriori*, or of the fact, must consist first of evidently "true" premises; then of "immediate" or indemonstrable premises, at least virtually, that is, by lack of need, insofar as evident premises, from whatever source they become such, do not here and now need a new middle in order to contain evidence and be able to transmit it to the conclusion, as we already indicated in the preceding chapter, no. 11; finally, of "causes of the conclusion," which are causes at least in knowing, even if not always in being, so that although the object of the premises is neither the cause nor the root of the object of the conclusion, nevertheless, by reason of the necessary connection, it is an efficacious motive and reason why we assent to the object of the conclusion.

7. Besides what has thus far been said, Aristotle prescribes that the premises of demonstration consist of a predicate "of every instance, essentially, and insofar as it is itself." A predicate is "of every instance" when nothing can be taken under the subject to which the predicate does not belong at every time. Such a predicate is either "Prior-Analytic," or so by reason of form, namely when it is expressly applied to everything contained under the subject while prescinding from the truth of the thing, as is often done in the *Analytica Priora*, where universal propositions are customarily formed as examples of syllogistic form without attending to truth or the condition of the matter, for example, "Every A is C," or "Every man is white." The other is "Posterior-Analytic," or so by reason of matter, concerning which the *Analytica Posteriora* treats, namely when by the nature of the object the predicate really belongs to every instance and always, even though the subject is not expressly distributed, for example, "Man is an animal." This is required in at least one premise of a categorical demonstration.

8. But three things must be noted. 1º "Of every instance" is understood not only positively, namely when the subject is a common term containing several inferiors under itself, but also negatively, namely when the subject is

singular, because then too nothing can be taken under the subject to which the predicate does not belong. Hence the proposition "God is immutable" consists of a predicate "of every instance" and is suitable for demonstration. 2º For a predicate "of every instance," agreement at every time determined for itself by the nature of the subject or predicate is sufficient. Hence the proposition "Winter is cold," or "Summer is hot," consists of a predicate "of every instance," although the subject determines fixed times; likewise, "The Moon undergoes an eclipse," although the predicate determines the time at which the earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon. 3º A negative demonstration likewise requires a predicate "of no instance," which is similarly found when nothing can be taken under the subject from which the predicate is not removed at every time.

9. An essential predicate is found in two modes. A predicate essential in the first mode is one that is placed in the definition of the subject, not as an addition or term of connection, but as the whole quiddity, or part of the quiddity, or as something formally contained in some essential part. Such, with respect to man, are rational, animal, living thing, and the remaining superior predicates. A predicate essential in the second mode is one in whose definition the subject is placed, having a necessary connection with it. Such, with respect to man, is risible, since it is defined as "a man capable of laughing." Or, more clearly and generally, it may be said to be that which, although outside the essence of the subject, nevertheless terminates a necessary connection with it.

10. Aristotle adds here two other modes of essentiality, namely "existing, or being, through itself," which mode properly belongs to substance insofar as it is called "a being in itself," to distinguish it from an accident, which is "a being in another"; likewise "causing in virtue of itself," according to which an effect belongs to its proper cause precisely as such, as building belongs to an architect and playing the lyre to a lyre-player. Hence, for a lyre-player to build, or for an architect to play the lyre, is not essential but accidental. Yet this perseity does not make an essential predicate, as that expression is now taken, unless the necessary connection of the subject with the predicate is added. Therefore, at present only the twofold perseity "in predication," just explained, is to be considered.

11. Finally, the predicate "insofar as it is itself," which Aristotle calls a "universal predicate," namely in another sense than that in which we took "universal" in Treatises II and III, is a predicate of every instance and essential, which belongs convertibly or reciprocally to the subject, as rational, capable of wonder, and risible with respect to man. It is said to be "insofar as it is itself," because such a predicate cannot belong to any subject

that is not that very thing or contained under it. From what has been said you will infer that a "universal" predicate, as now understood, is related to an essential predicate as species to genus; and similarly an essential predicate to a predicate "of every instance," if the latter is taken as prescinding from the Prior-Analytic and Posterior-Analytic modes.

12. Aristotle set forth a predicate endowed with these conditions so that demonstration might consist of "necessary" premises. Hence you may ask whether it belongs to the concept of every demonstration that it concern necessary matter. I answer that it does not, as I shall show in the last chapter, where we treat of the object of science. Nor do all the conditions that Aristotle prescribed in the *Analytica Posteriora* pertain to the concept of demonstration as such; rather, several pertain only to demonstration of the reason why, and others only to the most perfect demonstration, as the interpreters commonly note. They likewise know that Aristotle almost always speaks of demonstration concluding universally. As an example of the limitation of Aristotelian doctrine, all note here that a predicate "insofar as it is itself" is required when a proper property is to be demonstrated of a subject from its proper root, whereas for other demonstrations a predicate "of every instance and essential" is sufficient. Whoever wishes to see the Philosopher's entire doctrine explained more fully and learnedly should read the Coimbra Fathers on the *Analytica Posteriora*.

CHAPTER III.

What Opinion and a Topical Syllogism Are, and How the Latter Differs from a Demonstrative Syllogism.

1. Since syllogism in general is divided into demonstrative, topical, and sophistical, and enough has been said about the sophistical syllogism in the Summulae, the topical syllogism must now be explained so that the demonstrative syllogism, as opposed to it, may become better known. But because this cannot be done unless it is known what opinion is, this must first be explained. "Opinion," says St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4), "signifies an act of the intellect which is borne toward one side of a contradiction with fear of the other." It is commonly taken for the same as a "probable" judgment, that is, a concept arising from a motive or foundation which is indeed verisimilar and draws one toward assent, but is not evident or infallible, or at least is not applied through an infallible light, and therefore leaves room for fear of falsity. Hence every opinative, or purely probable, judgment is said to involve fear.

2. Two kinds of fear of falsity are distinguished. One is "radical" or "permissive," which is identified with the probable judgment itself; because the judgment is not intrinsically connected with truth, it does not altogether pacify the intellect, but rather grounds or permits the simultaneous existence of a fear that falsity may perhaps be hidden. The other is "formal," which in the intellect is an act judging or vividly apprehending the danger of falsity, either from reasons favoring the contrary side or even from the known fallibility of the motive because of which assent is given; and from this there results in the will a fear of the false, which is properly called fear. This formal fear does not always accompany a probable judgment, at least if neither the fallibility of the persuasive motive is adverted to nor any motive for the opposite side presents itself. Indeed, it does not always accompany a wholly erroneous or rash judgment, since subjective certainty can be joined to such a judgment, as we noted above.

3. Opinion differs from a scientific act insofar as it is inevident and obscure, and moreover uncertain of itself; not because it always concerns a contingent material object, but because an opinative act, considered in itself, is not incompatible with falsity, since the motive is not sufficient, or is not sufficiently applied, to communicate certainty to the cognition. Hence Aristotle's statement that opinion concerns contingent things, or things that can be otherwise, must be understood "by virtue of opinion," insofar as opinion of itself does not prevent the object from being otherwise. For the rest, it is evident that very many opinions concern necessary or impossible things, for example, when the connection of omnipotence with possibles, or the distinction of essence from existence in creatures, is disputed. Hence also, when Aristotle says that "the probable is what happens for the most part," or "what is accustomed to happen almost always," either he defines only the topical and sophistical probable, or he does not define the probable at all, but merely asserts that what happens for the most part or almost always is probable, for example, that a mother loves her son. He does not, however, deny that there are other probable things which either happen always or never. Thus, one who says, "What is open to the eyes is evident," does not thereby deny another mode of evidence.

4. You may ask how opinion differs from faith. I answer: faith in general is a judgment concerning an object held on the testimony and authority of one saying that the matter is so. When it rests upon the testimony or revelation of God and proceeds from a supernatural principle, it is called divine faith, and differs from opinion in being most certain and infallible; it agrees with opinion only insofar as it is inevident and obscure. But when it rests upon the authority of a man, it is called human faith, and is uncertain

and fallible, always physically and for the most part morally, because "Every man is a liar." For this reason it is customarily included, even by Aristotle, under the name of opinion, and can serve for a topical syllogism. Properly, however, it differs from opinion, because opinion has a motive drawn from the thing itself, or at least somehow pertaining to the thing itself, namely something that appears to be a cause, sign, or effect of the thing, or an argument from similarity, parity, an unacceptable consequence, and so forth; whereas such faith is moved precisely because a man says so. Yet both agree in being inevident and fallible.

5. Opinion also differs from suspicion and rash judgment, because suspicion rests upon a slight judgment, as does rash judgment, which moreover has against it some grave reason or strong presumption in favor of the opposite side. Opinion, however, although in a broad sense it may include even these acts, properly requires a motive of some weight, assent to which is not altogether foolish, even in comparison with a motive for the opposite side, if one is present. For this is what it is to be a probable motive, and I am not speaking of theologically probable opinion, which perhaps requires more: namely, to merit the approval of the intellect, or at least not to be altogether unworthy of approval. This probability will be greater or less according to the weight and persuasive force of the reasons for assent, both absolutely and in comparison with opposing reasons when these are present; and it can decrease to such a degree that it is called probability or opinion only with the qualification "slight" or "slightly probable." Nevertheless, it is always necessary that it have nothing certain against it; otherwise it will not be opinion but an erroneous judgment, for, as they say, "Against what is certain there is no probable opinion."

6. Opinion thus explained is either "immediate" or "mediate." Immediate opinion is that by which we assent to an object from its own terms, which, without requiring a middle, of themselves invite and move toward assent, although not with the exclusion of fear. Such is this proposition: "A mother loves her son." For that there are immediate probable propositions, or propositions probably known through themselves, which are first probable principles, although some deny it, is established by the common judgment of the learned, as was recently shown with much and select learning by the equally most learned and acute Fr. Vincent Mascarelli in his distinguished work *De Libertate Actus Divinae Fidei*, sect. 6, 7, and 8.

7. Mediate opinion is that which is had through discourse from two probable premises, or from at least one probable premise, as if "Bertha loves Titus" were inferred from these: "A mother loves her son; but Bertha is the mother of Titus." Frequently, indeed, a probable conclusion is deduced from

a certain and necessary antecedent; but then another uncertain premise is understood. For example, when one argues thus, "Prime matter has its own essence; therefore it also has its own existence," this merely probable premise is understood: "Whatever has its own essence also has its own existence," or this other one: "Essence is not distinguished from existence." Finally, opinion is divided into "actual" and "habitual"; this division needs no special explanation.

8. From what has been said it is easily gathered what a "topical" syllogism is, which is also called "opinative, probable, dialectical." For it is "a syllogism producing opinion," or "a syllogism in which a probable conclusion is deduced from probable premises, or from one probable premise and another certain one." The reason why one uncertain premise suffices is that it suffices for the identity of each extreme with the middle not to be certain; consequently, from that motive the identity of the extremes with one another cannot become certain. Hence, when both premises are merely probable, the conclusion is more uncertain and less probable than either premise, because it is liable to falsity under more titles. For example, in this discourse, "A mother loves her son; but Bertha is the mother of Titus; therefore Bertha loves Titus," the conclusion is rendered fallible under a twofold title, both because perhaps some mothers do not love their sons, and because Bertha perhaps is not the mother of Titus.

9. But when both premises are probable, care must be taken that they are jointly probable, or rather jointly verifiable, so that the truth of one, if it happens to obtain, does not necessarily destroy the truth of the other; otherwise the conclusion will be spurious, indeed evidently false or chimerical. For example, if you argue thus: "Physical predetermination is given whenever the will acts freely; but physical predetermination destroys liberty; therefore something that destroys liberty is given whenever the will acts freely," you indeed take premises of which one is defended as probable in the Thomistic school and the other in the Jesuit school, but nevertheless the consequent is plainly contradictory.

10. A topical syllogism thus explained differs from a demonstrative syllogism not by reason of form, which must observe the same rules in both, nor by reason of the matter "about which," because the same material object can be scientifically known by one person and opined by another, either because of different motives or because of the same motive proposed in different ways; rather, it differs by reason of the matter "from which," that is, by reason of the formal propositions from which each is constituted, all of which in the demonstrative syllogism are certain and evident, whereas in the topical syllogism the conclusion and at least one premise are inevident and

uncertain. But if there is a syllogism from morally certain premises, although many seem to reduce it to the topical syllogism, it is better called a demonstration, not philosophical, but historical or moral.

CHAPTER IV AND LAST.
On the Science Obtained Through Demonstration.

1. To complete the doctrine of demonstration, it remains for us to discuss briefly here the science which demonstration produces or implies. The name "science" is taken 1º most broadly for any true cognition whatsoever, since this suffices for a thing not to be said to be absolutely unknown; 2º more strictly for any evident cognition, whether discursive or not. In this way it also belongs to the cognition of first principles, which is called "understanding" or "intelligence"; it likewise belongs to experiential cognition, by which we immediately and evidently perceive contingent and singular objects. According to this meaning, science differs from opinion and faith.

2. It is taken still more strictly, 3º for discursive cognition obtained through an evident, or demonstrative, syllogism. This meaning, which is most frequent among philosophers, includes demonstration *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Hence actual science is the same as "demonstration," or "the conclusion of a demonstration"; habitual science is "a habit acquired through demonstration." Concerning the object of science thus understood, it is asked whether it must be "universal, necessary, perpetual, ingenerable, incorruptible, and a being in itself." These attributes are commonly assigned to it by philosophers with Aristotle, who therefore deny that science concerns singular, contingent, corruptible, and accidental beings, or non-beings.

3. I answer 1º: those attributes, rightly explained, belong to the object of total sciences which are methodically taught and are called disciplines, at least as regards their principal acts. For first of all, their subject, or the aspect "under which," is something universal, for example, being as such, movable body as such, or mode of knowing as such. Nor does any science through its primary acts treat of a singular precisely as singular, but of some genus or species, to such an extent that, when the Sun or Moon is treated, no account is taken of the individual difference; rather, those predicates are demonstrated which would belong indifferently to another Moon or Sun of the same species, if there were one. Except, however, acts concerning God precisely as such, of which there are some in Physics and more in Metaphysics, insofar as the latter is called natural theology.

4. Next, that object is "necessary and perpetual" with respect to the connection of the subject with the predicate insofar as affirmable by such acts. For these acts take a predicate that either pertains to the essence of the subject or is necessarily inferred from it; and, moreover, they do not affirm it of the subject as actually existing, but as prescinding from the state of existence, with this implicit condition: "if it exists," or "whenever it exists." In this sense, for example, that man is capable of wonder is something necessary and eternal, not in existing but in being true, because it is truly affirmable at every time and from eternity. Furthermore, the object is "ingenerable and incorruptible," either because generation and corruption are not exercised concerning universals but singulars; or because prescission is made from the state of existence, to which it belongs to be generated and corrupted; or because no generation or corruption can alter that object with respect to its function of rendering scientific acts true. This remains true even when corruptibility itself is asserted of its proper subject.

5. Finally, that object is a "being," or "one in itself," both logically through univocation or analogy, and also physically; because no science formally treats of an accidental being, at least insofar as by this name is signified a chance being or something one by aggregation, such as a heap of stones (cf. Conimbric. in c. 10, l. I, *Posteriorum*, q. 1, a. 1, ad finem), unless perhaps when Metaphysics treats of accidental unity in order to distinguish from it unity in itself, and that, of course, through less principal or secondary acts.

6. I answer 2º: without those attributes there can be an object of demonstration, and therefore of science, or of a scientific act, which either pertains to no discipline because its matter is easy and obvious, or pertains to some discipline less principally or secondarily. Examples are these demonstrations: "Whatever thinks exists; but I think; therefore I exist. Whatever runs is moved; but this lion runs; therefore this lion is moved. This bundle of wood is one accidentally; but this bundle of wood actually exists; therefore something one accidentally actually exists."

7. You will say that these are not demonstrative syllogisms. On the contrary: they are evident syllogisms; consequently they are neither false, nor sophistical, nor topical; therefore they are demonstrative, for no other species of syllogism remains. You will reply that they are experiential syllogisms. But although they can be called such insofar as they immediately take one or both premises from experience, that they constitute a species of syllogism distinct from every demonstration and topical syllogism seems unheard of. They certainly satisfy the definition of demonstration given in chapter I, no. 1. Experience is indeed said to concern singulars, but singulars

known without discourse; when, however, evident discourse proceeds from them, there is then a scientific progression. Otherwise, the cognition we acquire of the existence and attributes of God from these creatures which we behold could be neither demonstration nor science, which is contrary to the common judgment favored by the Apostle, Rom., c. 1.

8. You will say again: nothing is more common among philosophers than that science concerns necessary things and thereby differs from opinion, which concerns contingent things. I press the point 1º: therefore, just as opinion can nevertheless concern necessary things, and commonly does, as we saw in the preceding chapter, so science can concern contingent things. I press the point 2º: it is likewise common among philosophers that science must concern a positive being and one in itself; yet it is certain that Metaphysics, through less principal acts, treats demonstratively of privations, beings of reason, and accidental beings. Accordingly, philosophers are speaking of methodical sciences with respect to their principal acts, or of science of the reason why concluding universally. Add that, just as opinion is said to concern contingents, not absolutely in themselves but by virtue of its motive, or probable cognition, which of itself is fallible and only contingently true, so science concerns necessary things, not absolutely in themselves, but on the supposition of an evident motive and of the existence of the scientific act, which is always certain and intrinsically connected with the object, without which it cannot exist.

9. Moreover, discursive or demonstrative science is divided in as many ways as demonstration. Hence one science is *a priori*, another *a posteriori*; one is of the fact, another of the reason why. This last alone is called science simply by many, and to it properly belongs the celebrated definition of science taken from Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* I, c. 2, namely: "Cognition of a thing through its cause, together with the cognition that it is its cause, and that the thing cannot be otherwise." This definition can be explained in the following way. First, the phrase "through its cause" indicates discursive cognition, which is proper to man; for an angel does not know effects through a cause, but in the cause, by simple intuition. It also indicates a proximate cause; for a remote cause is not properly and strictly the cause of a mediate effect. What sort of cause is required we stated in chapter II, no. 5.

10. Next, the words "and that it is its cause" denote that cognition of what is the cause and of what is the effect is not sufficient unless one is known as the cause of the other. Hence, one who saw an eclipse of the Moon and at the same time perceived the earth to be interposed between the Sun and the Moon, if he did not know that the eclipse proceeds from the interposition of the earth, would not know why the Moon is eclipsed. Yet an

express judgment concerning causality, distinct from the premises and preceding the conclusion, is not required; otherwise a demonstration of the reason why would require three premises. Rather, it suffices that the power of causing be known in exercise in the premises through the very penetration of the middle; unless one prefers to say that the formal conclusion attains the object of the premises "as that by which," and proposes it to itself as the cause of the material object.

11. Finally, the phrase "and that it cannot be otherwise" is customarily referred to the necessity and immutability of the object explained in no. 4. But it can more suitably be understood of the certainty and evidence of the act, which, for as long as it exists, does not permit the object to be otherwise than it is enunciated; and in this it differs from an act of opinion, according to no. 8. For the rest, that there can be science of the reason why concerning an object contingent in itself is demonstrated, among other things, by this example: "Whatever is colored is visible; but this paper is colored; therefore it is visible." It must be noted here that science of the reason why, when it proceeds through the highest causes, is called "wisdom," a name which among the human sciences is attributed to Metaphysics alone; but when it proceeds through lower causes, it is properly called "science." Concerning the divisions of science into actual and habitual, total and partial, practical and speculative, and also concerning the distinction of total sciences according to various abstractions from matter, we spoke in Treatise I, Proemial Matters, as much as is sufficient for the logician.

The Subalternation of Sciences Is Explained.

12. There remains the division of total science into "subalternating" and "subalternated," which must now be briefly explained. The subordination or dependence often found among sciences is called subalternation. A science which depends upon or is subordinated to another is called subalternated; that which subordinates another to itself is called subalternating. For one faculty to be subalternated to another in a broad sense, or in a certain respect, it suffices 1º if by reason of its end it serves another: thus the art of bridle-making is subalternated to horsemanship, and horsemanship to the military art; likewise every human science to Sacred Theology; 2º if the subject of one is contained under the subject of another, from which standpoint every natural science is subalternated to Metaphysics; 3º if it borrows certain principles from another, as Surgery receives from Geometry the principle, "A circular wound heals more slowly."

13. But for subalternation simply speaking, three conditions must concur together. 1º The subject or matter of one science must be contained under the common subject of another. 2º It must add some accidental difference; otherwise the sciences will not be simply distinct, but one will be a part of the other. 3º All, or at least most, of the principles of one science must be conclusions demonstrated or demonstrable *a priori* by the other. For these reasons Medicine, which considers the human body as curable, is simply subalternated to Physics, because the human body is a species of movable body as such, which is the subject of Physics; curability is superadded, which is an accidental difference; and finally all or most of the principles of Medicine are conclusions demonstrated or demonstrable by Physics. For example, a physician deduces the conclusion "A disease arising from cold is cured by hot remedies" from these principles: "Contraries are cured by contraries; but heat and cold are contraries." It belongs to the physicist to prove each of these. Hence it is customary to say, "Where the physicist ends, the physician begins."

14. For the same reasons, Music, which considers number as related to sounds, is subalternated to Arithmetic; and Perspective, which considers line as visual, is subalternated to Geometry. See other examples in Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* I, c. 10. When an accidental difference can be scientifically known separately from such a subject, the subalternated science is then said to be intermediate between two others: one from which it receives the subject, and another from which it borrows the difference. Thus Music stands between Arithmetic and Physics, since from the latter it receives sounds and from the former number. Nevertheless, it is not properly subalternated to both, but only to that from which it receives the principles together with the subject.

15. A subalternated faculty existing in one who at the same time possesses the subalternating science, for example Music in an arithmetician, is without doubt a science, and indeed *a priori*, or of the reason why, since it elicits evident conclusions from principles or premises evidently known by the same intellect through first principles. It is doubtful, however, whether, when it is possessed by one ignorant of the subalternating science, for example Music by one who is not an arithmetician, it is a science. Some affirm, others deny. The question concerns science taken formally for cognition; for if it is taken objectively, or for a demonstrable object, it will certainly be a science although the act is not scientifically known. I say 1º: the subalternated science apart from the subalternating science can be science of the fact, or *a posteriori*; for a musician or physician can evidently

prove from experience and effects the principles which he uses. All seem to agree on this.

16. I say 2º: a subalternated science without the subalternating science cannot be science *a priori*, or of the reason why; and if it does not otherwise possess evidence *a posteriori*, it is in no way science. The first part is proved because no one has science of the reason why unless he knows how to resolve conclusions into first principles. But the subalternated practitioner, who uses mediate propositions in place of principles, cannot make that resolution without the subalternating science, as is manifest. The second part is proved, and at the same time the first is confirmed, because science properly so called cannot stand without evidence, or at least without metaphysical or physical certainty. But a subalternated faculty, when the subalternating science is absent and evident experience is likewise absent, knows its principles only through human faith, by which the teaching master is believed. Yet human faith can imply neither evidence nor certainty greater than moral.

But now I put an end to this thorny and difficult work, composed with labor and study, if with less than happy success, certainly not perfunctorily; and neither the labor nor the work will be worthy of regret to me if, under a favorable star, it redounds to the glory and honor of God, the Best and Greatest, of the Immaculate Virgin Mother of God, of Ignatius the fire-bearing First Father, and of all the inhabitants of heaven.

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